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ABSTRACT
This study presents a comparative analysis of the media’s role in politics in 
Thailand and Japan. Previous studies of the media’s role in politics are categorized into 
four groups: the pluralist model, which views the media’s role as that of a ‘watchdog’; the 
Marxist model, which argues that the media act as a ‘guard dog’ that guards the owners’ 
interests; the hegemonic model, which claims that the media act as an ‘agenda-setter’; the 
cultural relativist model, which considers that cultural factors can limit the media’s role to 
that of a ‘servant of the state’. In this study, the media are viewed as active political actors, 
which interact dynamically with the state and the public. The media do not pursue a single 
consistent role. Rather, the media’s role is viewed as fluid and changeable depending on 
their political relations and power relations between the state, the media, and the public at 
the time.
This study proposes a ‘political information contest’ model, which views the 
interactions between the state, the media, and the public as contests for control of political 
information. These interactions involve the exercise of power relations. The bulk of the 
analysis of these interactions is made in Chapters Two to Seven. Chapters Two and Three 
assess the use of coercive and reward means of power relations between the state and the 
media in the areas of press censorship and television regulations. The analyses suggest that 
both the Thai and Japanese states have always tried to regulate the flow of political 
information and suppress alternative political discourse, and that the media’s role changed 
when the state undertook coercive or reward strategies. Chapter Four examines the ways in 
which the Thai and Japanese journalists’ use expert and legitimate strategies in gaining 
access to, interpreting, and disseminating political information. The analysis finds that
some of the journalists’ professional and ethical qualities act as impediments preventing the 
media from pursuing active roles.
Chapters Five and Six examine the extent to which the media change their role. This 
is done through qualitative content analyses of local press and television news coverage. 
The findings reveal that the media’s role can change depending on the power relations 
between the state, the media, and the public that are operating, and that the media in 
Thailand and Japan act differently in similar circumstances partly due to differences in 
political culture. Chapter Seven discusses the interaction between the public and the state. 
The discussion points to the improvement in direct public access to official information, as 
well as the existence of various problems associated with the implementation of the 
information disclosure law and the accessibility of the Internet. This study concludes that 
contests over control of political information are more likely to occur in Thailand, where 
there is a higher degree of political pluralism, than in Japan, where one political party 
dominates. It also suggests that political information contests are essential elements of 
democratic societies as they enhance public understandings and their participation in 
politics, although the forms and degrees of the contests vary in each society depending on 
the political culture in which they operate.
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A NOTE ON NAMES
Japanese names in the text are surnames. For bibliographical references, their 
surnames appear first with no comma between their surnames and given names. On the 
contrary, the Thais referred in the text are given names, as it is more familiar to the 
Thais to be addressed by their given names. The bibliographical references of Thai 
sources also appear in the same order in accordance with the cataloging system of the 
Thai-language sources.
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CHAPTER ONE
1
INTRODUCTION
In the era ofpostmodernism, the media disengaged from  
politics and became the so-called "the Fourth Estate". It 
established itself at least in principle, as independent o f  
all institutions, including the state, political parties, and 
interest groups.
James W. Carey1
During the May Crisis in 1992, the majority of the Thai press vehemently attacked the 
military-led National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC) that had toppled the elected 
Chatichai government a year earlier. The press allied itself with groups demonstrating 
against the military dictatorship and demanding a restoration of the civilian government. 
The press provided detailed coverage of the demonstrations, much of which was filtered 
out by the state-owned broadcasting media. The public turned to the press and cable 
television for information about the events, and also sought first-hand experience by 
joining in the demonstrations and forming their own communication networks.2 As a 
result, the NPKC accused the press of instigating public unrest, and threatened to close 
down the offending publications. Despite such threats, the press continued to play a 
watchdog role by reporting military attacks on the demonstrators. For these reasons the 
role of the Thai press has become regarded by some scholars as an oppositional force 
within Thai politics.3
Consider a second event, on May 31 1993, when Prime Minister Miyazawa 
Kiichi agreed to an interview with Tahara Soichiro, the host of Sunday Project, a 
popular political talkshow broadcast live on Asahi TV. Unlike other political talkshow 
hosts, Tahara is famous for his blunt speech, and aggressive style of interviewing - a
James W. Carey, "The Mass Media and Democracy", Journal of International Affairs. Summer 
1993, 47(1), p. 7.
Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, "The Development of a Participatory Democracy: Raison D'Etre for 
Media Reform in Thailand", Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science. 1994, 22, pp. 101-14. 
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, "Thailand's Media: Whose Watchdog?", in K. Hewison (ed.), 
Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 
217-32.
manner which is considered 'non-Japanese'. He told Miyazawa before the interview that 
the question of governmental reform would be a part of the discussion despite the Prime 
Minister's wishes to the contrary. During the interview, Miyazawa promised that he 
would embark upon reforms to address the deep-seated problem of corruption. When it 
later became clear that Miyazawa was failing to deliver on his promise, Asahi TV 
repeatedly screened a clip of his pledge to reform, a move which possibly contributed to 
the LDP loss in the general election of July 1993, ending 38 years LDP rule.4
2
These two events clearly indicate that the role of the mass media in liberal 
democratic societies today is no longer that of a neutral observer and broker of 
information, by impartially and objectively disseminating political opinions to the 
public.5 As James Carey suggests, mass media in the era of postmodernism has become 
independent from all political institutions and related interest groups. Moreover, the 
mass media today are not simply a political spectator, but also an independent political 
actor. They:
help set the political agenda, they can accelerate and magnify political 
success and failure, they can serve as independent advocates for victims 
of oppression, they can mobilize third parties into conflicts, and they are 
central agents in the construction of social frames about politics.6
The idea that the media are active agents in the political process is not new in 
countries such as the United States and Britain, in which the free press has a long
See Kristin Kyoko Altman, "Television and Political Turmoil: Japan's Summer of 1993", S.
J. Pharr and E.S. Krauss (eds.), Media and Politics in Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i 
Press, 1996), pp. 165-86; McCargo, however, pointed out that there is not substantial evidence 
that the show influenced the actual outcome, because the LDP lost little of its core support. See 
Duncan McCargo, "The Political Role of the Japanese Media", The Pacific Review. 1996, 9(2), 
pp. 251-64.
As Wheeler writes, "The mass media provide powerful channels of information between the 
political elite and the electorate. Traditionally, the press and the broadcasting act as proactive 
devices for encouraging the citizen to participate in the democratic process. The mass media, by 
disseminating the full range of political opinions, enable the public to make political choices 
and enter the national life. Therefore, they are understood as important mechanisms in ensuring 
the principles of modem democratic societies". See Mark Wheeler, Politics and the Mass Media 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p.l.
This study rejects the notion that the media's role is merely a mirror of political life. In fact, the 
media have become a political actor. Gadi Wolfsfeld, Media and Political Conflicts: News from 
the Middle East (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 3. See also Judith 
Lichtenburg (ed.l Democracy and the Mass Media (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990).
history. However, in Asian countries like Thailand and Japan where the media have 
been heavily controlled and regulated, debates about the growing political role of the 
mass media have come to the fore in recent years. In Thailand, press reports such as 
those which featured corruption allegations surrounding a land reform project on the 
Southern resort island of Phuket and contributed to the fall of the Chuan Leekpai's 
administration in 1995 signify the growing importance of the media in inducing political 
change.7 In Japan, a late 1980s survey of eleven broad groups closely involved in the 
political process found that nearly all considered the mass media to be the most 
influential group in Japanese society.8 The press coverage of the Recruit Scandal that 
brought down Prime Minister Takeshita and his administration in 1989 has drawn a 
similar degree of attention.9
3
Since such proactive media operations have been rare in Japan and Thailand, the 
analysis of media activities and institutions, as well as the relations between political 
and media institutions, remains relatively undeveloped. The present work seeks to 
address these issues by comparing the role of the media in Japanese and Thai politics. 
Firstly, it will provide an analytical framework that can be used to understand the 
political role of the media in both countries and the media's relationships with other 
political institutions. Secondly, the underlying factors in changes to the media's role in 
each country will be identified. A common analytical lens will be employed to engage in
This scandal was disclosed by a leading local paper, Thai Rath. It concerned a number of 
influential ministers who oversaw a land reform project in Phuket during the 1995 Chuan's 
administration. The press found that these ministers secured parcels of the land with business 
potential for family members and business friends. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, 
Thailand's Boom and Bust (Chiengmai: Silkworm Books, 1998), pp. 255-56.
The eleven respondent groups consisted of business organizations; bureaucrats; LDP members; 
farm organizations; mass media; intellectuals; labour unions; opposition parties; citizens' 
movement groups; feminist groups; and the Buraku Liberation League (BLL). All groups with 
the notable exception of the mass media, ranked the mass media at the top of hierarchy of 
influence even above the ruling triumvirate of business groups, bureaucracy, and the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) which were commonly assured to be the most important actors on 
Japan's political stage. See Kabashima Ikuo and Jefferey Broadbent, "Referent Pluralism: Mass 
Media and Politics in Japan", Journal of Japanese Studies. Summer 1989, 12(2), pp. 329-61. 
The scandal involved senior LDP members, high-ranking bureaucrats, and members of the mass 
media who accepted stocks from the Recruit Cosmos Company - the property subsidiary of 
information services firm Recruit Co., Ltd. See Maggie Farley, "Japanese Press and Politics of 
Scandal" in S. J. Pharr and E.S. Krauss (eds.), Media and Politics in Japan (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1996), p. 148; See also Chapter 1: "Rikuruuto Hodo no Meian" 
(The Black and White of the Reports on the Recruit Scandal), in Katsura Keiichi,
Gendai no Shimbun ("Newspapers at Present! 2nd ed.(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997).
cross-national and cross-cultural comparison. Finally, an alternative perspective that 
may prove to be of value in the analysis of the media's role in other democratic societies 
will be elaborated.
4
1.1 Definitions
Before proceeding with this discussion, it is necessary to define a number of important 
terms. First, the term ‘political information’ will refer to all political messages presented 
to the public, and required by the public to exercise their political judgements and form 
opinions. In modem societies, political information is largely mediated through various 
means of communication and mass media. As a result, public opinion is shaped by the 
type of political information and ideas disseminated. Democracy only functions 
effectively when the public has the right to access accurate political information that its 
government makes available. 10 When such political information conveyed to the public 
is sufficiently broad based, the public is well placed to form its own judgements about 
what policies are consistent with its basic values and interests. Conversely, democracy 
does not function when political information provided to the public is inaccurate, 
incomplete, or distorted, and the public is misled into favoring policies potentially 
harmful to itself or the nation. 11
Secondly, the term ‘political communication’ denotes all aspects of 
communication between institutions encompassing the state, the media, and the public. 
The state consists of all government agencies and their representatives, the media 
defined here as the press and television broadcasting, and the public consisting of the 
immediate audience and all the recipients of political information. However, this unit of 
analysis is not unified or conclusive, as each is a result of an interplay of various
See International Commission for the Studies of Communication Problems, Many Voices. One 
World: Towards a New More Just and More Efficient World Information and Comrrmniration 
Order (Paris: UNESCO, 1980), p. 253; Also Judith Lichtenburg fed.l. Democracy and the 
Mass Media (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); John Keane, The Media and 
Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Benjamin Page, Who Deliberates?: Mass Media 
and Modem Democracy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996); and Uchida 
Mitsuru, "Chiiki medeia to Demokurasii" (Local Media and Democracy), Masu komunikeshon 
kenkvu (Journal of Mass Communication Studies), 49, July 1996, pp. 3-13.
Benjamin Page, op. cit., p. 2.11
political and social actors at a particular point of time. 12 Each actor should therefore be 
seen as a process, not a structure. Based on this view, this study adopts a systematic 
outlook to address important aspects of communication between the actors of different 
groupings, in order to avoid the overemphasis of a single element. The ‘political 
communication system’ will therefore refer to a four part system consisting of: all 
aspects communication between the state, the media, and the public; political aspects of 
media institutions such as those of the press and television broadcasting; audience 
orientations to political communication; and political information accessed, interpreted, 
and disseminated in the political communication process.
Notably, the definition of ‘political communication’ employed in this thesis goes 
beyond the more limited concept articulated by Duncan Watts, who sees the term as 
encompassing "all those means by which information is conveyed from those who rule, 
or aspire to do so, to those over whom they have influence, the governed" .13 Indeed, 
this definition of ‘political communication’ is typical of those working within the 
Marxist tradition, as the flow of political information is seen to be structured, 
controlled, and located within the dominant framework of class interests. Other popular 
definitions of ‘political communication’ are based on studies that mainly focus on voter- 
persuasion paradigms. These studies typically define the term as a process whereby 
political organizations use, react to, and are used by the news media to achieve certain 
political results, or a process whereby the news media influence their audience to think 
about and make judgments on politically significant issues. According to Blunder and 
Gurevitch, such a preoccupation with the audience has "resulted in an imbalance of 
activity favoring studies of the audience at the expense of other elements in the 
communication process" .14
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Surin Maisrikrod, for example, suggests that the Thai state consists o f three main actors: the 
military/bureaucracy, the monarch, and the government. These three main actors are in alliance 
with one another from time to time, but at the other times they are in opposition. See Surin 
Maisrikrod, "Emerging Patterns of Political Leadership in Thailand", Contemporary Southeast 
Asia. June 1993, 15(1), pp. 80-97.
Duncan Watts, Political Communication Today (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1997), p. 1.
Jay G. Blunder and Micael Gurevitch, The Crisis o f Public Communication (London: 
Routledge, 1995), p. 11.
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Thirdly, the term ‘political culture’ is defined here as "the particular pattern of 
orientation in political action in which each political system is embedded" . 15 This 
pattern of attitudes and orientations also leads to specific forms of political 
organizations and activities. Although it is known that cultural factors may contribute to 
the formulation of such orientations, no theory has yet been clearly elucidated about 
how ethnicity, religion, or other cultural manifestations relate to specific attitudes and 
behavior toward government. However, as most scholars agree, culture is a set of shared 
psychological values and practices; thus, political culture, as a subset of culture, 
consists of "patterns of psychologically based political orientations" toward the state 
that flow from cultural norms and values, and the boundaries of these shared values and 
practices represent significant variance.16 Therefore, ‘political culture’ in a political 
communication system encapsulates the values, norms, beliefs, means, and traditions 
that are shared by actors involved in a political communication system.
1.2 Why A Comparative Study?
James Carey has suggested that the definition of the relationship between the mass 
media and politics varies across nations, and therefore the political role of media in each 
society must be examined on a country-by-country basis.17 However, British political 
communication scholars such as Blunder and Guerevitch suggest that comparative 
research of different political communication systems offers a number of methodological 
advantages.18 Firstly, a comparative study is an antidote to naive universalism, that is 
an antidote to the presumption that the research findings of the political role of media in 
one society are applicable everywhere. Secondly, comparative studies provide a view of 
both the similarities and differences between systems, thus attention is drawn to the
15 Daniel J.Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States. 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1984), p. 109.
16 David L. Swanson and Dan Nimmo (eds.), "The Field of Political Communication: Beyond 
the Voter Persuasion Paradigm", New Directions in Political Commiiniratinn: A Resource 
Book (California: Sage, 1990), p. 35.
17 James Carey, "The Mass Media and Democracy", Journal of International Affairs. June 1993 
(47), p. 7.
18 See Chapter Six: "Comparative Research : The Extending Frontier" in Michael Gurevitch, and 
Jay G. Blunder (eds.), The Crisis of Public Communication flLondnn- Routledge, 1995), p.
83.
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shared characteristics of the interaction between the media and political systems as well 
as culturally specific features in different societies. Lastly, and most importantly, a 
comparative analysis helps determine the degree to which Western-based theories of 
political communications systems are applicable to non-Westem societies. At the same 
time, such an analysis may contribute to the formulation of theories based on 
experiences and issues in non-Westem societies. 19
However, the most compelling reason to engage in comparative research is the 
extent of the globalization of media — a situation that has been brought about by the 
rapid development of new media technologies. The global diffusion of political 
information is a result of how these new media technologies cross the boundaries of 
national communication systems. Indeed, this process is just part what Arjun 
Appadurai has described as broader "global cultural flows which include ethnoscapes, 
technoscapes, financesapes, mediascapes and ideoscapes" .20 Two of these terms — 
mediascapes and ideoscapes — relate directly to the process of global diffusion of 
political information. Appadurai refers to mediascapes as the "distribution of electronic 
capabilities to produce and disseminate information ... throughout the world (in which 
the world of commodities and the world of news and politics are profoundly mixed) " .21 
As a result of this, we are living in an 'imagined world' in which the lines between 
realistic and fictional landscapes become blurred. The CNN  coverage of the Gulf War, 
for example, has been regarded as an ‘imagined war’, because little combat footage or 
that of the victims of the war were broadcast. Indeed, global audiences saw little more 
than repeated footage of SCUD missile attacks, or footage from the Battle of Khafji.22 
Yet these media practices resulted in unprecedented rates of TV news viewership and 
newspapers readership across the globe. At the same time, the term 'ideoscapes' refers 
to political ideas, terms, or images that each national government has adopted to suit its
19 Ibid., pp. 83-96.
20 Aijun Appadurai, "Disjuucture and Difference in the Global Culture Economy", Theory. Culture 
and Society. 1990, (7), pp. 295-310.
21 Ibid., pp. 298-99.
William A. Dorman, "Press Theory and Journalistic Practice: The Case of the Gulf War", in S. 
Iyengar and R. Reeves (eds.), Do the Media Govern?: Political Voters and Reporters in America 
(Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1997), pp. 118 - 125.
own political culture. Through this term, we can see a growing trend whereby the 
United States, in particular, exports professional media ideologies and practices to other 
countries.23 The extent to which these ideologies and practices are adapted to suit the 
political communication systems and political cultures in each country are questions 
that can best be analyzed and understood in comparative terms.
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1.3 Why Japan and Thailand?
There are several reasons for selecting Japan and Thailand as case studies in the analysis
of the role of mass media in politics. From a historical perspective, Japan and Thailand
have similar cultural environments. In his comparative work on "Value Systems and
Economic Development in Japan and Thailand", Ayal writes:
A Japan-Thailand comparison has numerous advantages. There 
was a striking chronological similarity between the histories of 
the exposure of the two countries to the West and in the nature of 
the contacts with the West. Both countries possess traditions of 
selective cultural borrowing over a long historical past, and both 
are within what might be loosely called the same general oriental 
cultural area (as opposed to the Westem-Christian area). The 
similarities extend to factors often mentioned as important 
for the economic development of Japan : both countries maintained 
their political independence; both were characterized by a homogenous 
culture, awareness of national identity, a high degree of authority enjoyed 
by the central government, and an early realization by the rulers that 
it is imperative for national survival to leam Western methods.24
Indeed, Japan and Thailand do share a number of historical similarities. First, 
they both opened up to the West in the 1850s. Second, the Meiji period and the reign of 
King Chulalongkom, which both began in 1868, were considered times of major reform 
and modernization in each country. Third, the reasoning behind modernization ~  
resistance to the encroachment of colonial power -- was also strikingly similar, even 
though the results were economically and politically different.25 Last, as a result of
See, for example, Nick Stevenson, The Transformation of the Media: Globalization. Morality 
and the Politics (London: Longman, 1999).
Eliezer B. Ayal, "Value Systems and Economic Development in Japan and Thailand", Journal 
of Social Issues. 1963, 19, p. 36, cited in Douglas H. Pressman, “Thai Modernity: A Study in 
the Sociology of Culture”, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Brown University, 1990, p. 86.
In his work on Thai modernization, Jacobs argued that the reason that Japan was able to 
modernize and develop while Thailand did not was that Japan was a society in which 
individual, innovative potential led the country to development. Thailand, on the other hand, 
was a society which sought to preserve the traditional system. This point is also agreed to by 
Murakami who argued that Japan was ready to adapt and integrate to the requirements of 
industrialization since the Meiji periods, which was more advanced than other East and
modernization, they were the only two countries in Asia to actually maintain their 
political sovereignty in the face of European colonialism. Though Thailand was seized 
by Japan during the Pacific War and Japan was occupied by the United States after the 
Second World War, this was for less than a decade -- a period too short to leave any 
really substantial colonial legacy. In comparison to other previously-colonized Asian 
countries like Singapore and Malaysia upon which culture and values are often imposed 
by the government in order to bridge vastly different ethnic groups, Japan and Thailand 
have their authentic culture embedded in every aspect of society.
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These relative cultural homogeneities, in addition to unique national language 
systems, give rise to a number of socio-cultural factors that link the two countries. In 
Thailand, values such as gratitude, obedience, and respect for authority and seniority are 
viewed as culturally important, and these values are largely passed along from 
generation to generation by means of teaching and socialization.26 Studies of Japanese 
society suggest that Confucian values passed down through the generations have 
influenced the Japanese to become highly group-oriented, disciplined, and to have a 
strong sense of responsibility toward their duties and obligations (giri and ninjo)21 A 
pioneer comparative study of Thai and Japanese societies was undertaken by Embree in 
1950.28 However, he marked a major difference between the two societies, labelling 
Japanese society as ‘tightly structured’ due to the presence of order and regularity 
within it, and Thai society as ‘loosely structured’, due to its supposed absence of order
Southeast Asian countries. Surangsri's comments were also in consensus with these arguments. 
She contrasted the role of the intellectual groups in Thailand and Japan, the Young Siam and the 
Merokusha that during the modernization period. She argued that the less pronounced role than 
their Japanese counterparts of the Young Siam intellectuals was another reason that 
resulted in gradual development in Thailand. See Norman G. Jacobs, Modernization Without 
Development: Thailand as an Asian Case Study fNew York: Praeger, 1971); Surangsri 
Tonsiengsom, "Western Knowledge and Intellectual Groups in Japan and Thailand in the 
Nineteenth Century", Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington, 1990; and 
Murakami Yasusuke, "Modernization in Terms of Integration: The Case of Japan", in S.N. 
Eisenstadt (ed.), Patterns of Modernity Volume II: Bevond the West (New York: New York 
University Press, 1987), pp. 65-88.
Chancha Suvannathat, "The Inculcation o f Values in Thai Children", International Social 
Science Journal. 1979, 31(3), pp. 477-85.
Hayashi Chikio conducted a research on the national character among the "new 
breed"(shinjinrui) Japanese, and pointed out that attitudes regarding giri and ninijo still 
maintain their significance in the minds of the young Japanese. See Hayashi Chikio, "The 
National Character in Transition", Japan Echo. 1988, 15(Special Issue), p. 8.
John F. Embree, "Thailand - A Loosely Structured Social System", American Antropologist. 
1950, (52), pp. 181-93.
and regularity.29 However, Embree's theory was later debunked by critics who pointed 
to the lack of empirical data, and a high degree of order and regularity is in fact 
discernible in Thai society.30 In a similar vein, there is also a controversy concerning the 
characteristics that make up Japanese society and its people. Scholars who study the 
concept of 'Japaneseness' (Nihonjinron) question the validity of claims based on what 
were formerly known as peculiar characteristics of the Japanese, such as conformity, 
consensus, and group orientation. Sugimoto and Mouer have discarded such claims, and 
emphasized the prevailing tensions and conflicts among different classes in the Japanese 
society.31 Due to these disparate interpretations of social factors in Thailand and Japan, 
it seems more prudent to assume that social factors in both countries are neither totally 
similar, nor dichotomous, but there are overlapping categories that are perhaps yet to be 
classified.
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There are two features of political systems in contemporary Thailand and Japan 
that owe much to national characteristics but are still quite similar: the preponderance of 
factions, or groups within the major political parties, and the prominent role of money 
in politics.32 In Japan, one feature of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) - which ruled 
for 38 years (1955-1993), and has been leading a coalition government since 1996 - is 
that the party comprises factional alliances (habatsu), based on personal loyalty rather 
than ideological affinities. When a new cabinet is formed, factional leaders acquire 
ministerial posts by turn. In Thailand, a political party comprises a number of groups 
(kloom). Each group is centered around a certain powerful individual who is able to able 
to exert influence (often of a financial nature) over a large number of local constituents 
and hua khanaen (voting chiefs).33 These voting chiefs operate in a similar manner to
Ibid.
See an editorial volume on the subject in H.D. Evers (ed.), Loosely Structured Social Systems: 
Thailand in Comparative Perspective (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1969).
Ross Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto, Images of Japanese Society: A Study in Social 
Construction of Reality (London: KPI, 1986).
Likhit Dhiravegen, "The One-and-a-half Party System and a Halfway Democracy: A 
Comparative Perspective", in Yoshihara Kunio (ed.), Thai Perceptions o f Jananese 
Modernization (Kuala Lumpur: Falcon Press, 1989), pp. 68-90.
James Ockey, "Capital Accumulation by Other Means: Provincial Crime, Corruption, and the 
Bureaucratic Polity", Paper presented at the 5th International Conference on Thai Studies, 
(London, SOAS, 1993).
networks of local supporting groups in Japan, or the so-called köenkai, connecting 
factional politicians with local bureaucrats and businessmen, and canvassing votes at 
election time.34 However, the dissolution of factions and shifts in alliances within and 
between political parties are more common in Thailand than in Japan. As Likhit argues, 
alliances within kloom are based loosely on patron-client relationships, and so are less 
stable than habatsu in Japan, which are based on oyabun-kobun relationships that 
emphasize the loyalty of workers (kobun) to their lord (oyabun) . 35
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Money, on the other hand, seems to play an equally important role in the 
politics of both countries. While the term ‘money politics’ describes a feature 
considered inherent in Japanese politics, ‘business politics’ (thurakit kan-muang) 
characterizes the enormous influence of business on politics in Thailand. Yet both terms 
share a similar meaning — they denote a reciprocal relationship between businessmen 
and politicians, and this relationship is particularly strengthened via the local networks 
of political support groups, such as hua khanan in Thailand, and köenkai in Japan. For 
instance, businessmen want politicians to push for legislation and policies favorable to 
their interests. Politicians, in turn, receive financial contributions from business to 
support their costly re-election campaigns.36
A further analogy can be drawn from postwar interpretations of Japanese and 
Thai politics, especially in the context of the distribution of political power. A number 
of political scientists regard Japan and Thailand as 'bureaucratic polities', in which 
public administration and policy decision-making is dominated by bureaucrats. For 
many years there were two popular theoretical models of the post-war Japanese 
political system. One saw the bureaucracy as the single dominant power in policy-
Köenkai is a mass membership organization with the function of organizing large members of 
the general electorate on behalf of a particular candidate. Gerald Curtis, for instance, saw it as 
the most important campaign strategy of the LDP during the postwar period. See, Gerald L. 
Curtis, Election Campaigning; Japanese Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); 
Also for a discussion on the role of köenkai in giving a rise to Former Prime Minister Tanaka 
Kakuei see Jacob M. Schlesinger, Shadow Shoguns: The Rise and Fall o f Japan's Postwar 
Political Machine (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997).
Likhit, op. cit., p.78.
Ibid., p. 84.
making, largely as a result of postwar development in which bureaucrats had the leading 
role in rebuilding the economy and society.37 The other model viewed the bureaucracy 
as one of the three main pillars of an exclusive 'ruling triad' coalition of the bureaucracy, 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and big businesses.38 However, it has been argued 
that these models were no longer plausible by the 1980s due to an emergence of pluralist 
elements in Japanese politics and policymaking. As a result of these changes, a new 
model called ‘patterned pluralism’ was formulated, emphasizing the importance of 
various autonomous interest groups which have multiple points of access to 
policymaking process.39 Yet, it is also recognized that these interest groups have lately 
aligned themselves with bureaucrats in order to gain access to the policy-making 
process, since the latter retain a powerful influence in this process.40
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In Thailand, the center of political power, according to Fred Riggs' 1966 
interpretation, was located within the "bureaucratic polity", which comprises the armed 
forces, the police, and the civil administration, rather than political parties operating 
under parliamentary rules.41 Until the end of the 1980s, Thailand was ruled by the 
military strongmen around 86.5 per cent of the time, while the rest of the time it was led 
by civilian governments whose survival rate averaged around 9 m onths42 Riggs'
For example, see Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford : Stanford 
University Press, 1982); John C. Campbell, "Democracy and Bureaucracy in Japan", in Ishida 
Takeshi and E. Krauss, Democracy in Japan (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), 
pp. 113-137.
For details on this model see Muramatsu Michio and Ellis S. Krauss, "Bureaucrats and 
Politicians in Policymaking: The Case of Japan", American Political Science Review. 1984,
78, pp. 126-48.
Muramatsu Michio and Ellis Krauss, "The Conservative Party Line and the Development of 
Patterned Pluralism", in K. Yamamura and Y. Yasuba (eds.), The Political Economy of Japan 
Vol. I (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 516-54; and Muramatsu Michio, 
"Patterned Pluralism Under Challenged: The Policies of the 1980s", in G.D.Allinson and Sone 
Yasunori (eds.), Political Dynamics in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1993), pp. 50-71.
See Ellis S. Krauss, "Japan: Divided Bureaucracy, Unified Regime", in John Pierre (ed.), 
Bureaucracy in Modem State: An Introduction to Comparative Public Administration (Hants, 
England: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 118-139; Chapter 7: The Structure and Process of Central 
Government: Is Japan a Bureaucratic Polity? in J.A.A Stockwin, Governing Japan:
Divided Politics in Major Economy. 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).
The main thesis of Riggs' argument was that there was no guiding force outside the bureaucracy 
capable of establishing the parameters of bureaucratic action. Thus, the bureaucracy was free to 
act as it chose. Fred Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu : 
East-West Center Press, 1966), p. 197.
Rangsan Thanpompan, “Process of Economic Policy Formulation in Thailand: A Historical 
Political-Economic Analysis (1932-1987)”, Paper presented at the TDRI Year-End Conference, 
December 1988, p. 71 (in Thai), cited in Suntaree Komin, Psychology of the Thai People:
depiction of Thailand as a 'bureaucratic polity' centering on the political struggle within 
the bureaucracy was, however, challenged by Girling, who argued that the political 
changes in the direction of a more pluralistic system in the late 1970s meant that 
political parties became more prominent, with the business sector developing greater 
influence.43 Kevin Hewison also pointed to some serious flaws of Riggs' analysis, which 
was based on modernization theory. He identified such weaknesses as a failure to 
account adequately for historical changes and conflicts, and unwarranted assumptions of 
class homogeneity.44 Anek Laothamatas has even suggested that since the early 1980s 
the 'bureaucratic polity' is dead and has been replaced by so-called ‘liberal corporatism’, 
which refers to a political system dominated by capitalists and the middle class.45 The 
leading Thai political scientist, Chai-Anan Samudavanija, reinterpreted the political 
developments of the 1980s and 1990s and suggested that there has been a trend towards 
increasing political participation from different social groups, and that political parties 
have emerged at the center of power supported by bureaucrats and business groups.46 
Yet as Pasuk and Baker argue, bureaucratic power still dominates the Thai political 
system.47 This may be due, in part, to the fact that there are frequent cabinet reshuffles 
- on average these take place every eleven months. Such a state of affairs reflects the 
shifting alliances of the kloom and the consequent inability of political parties to 
develop the skills needed for long term policy-making.
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Values and Behavioral Patterns. 2nd ed. (Bangkok: National Institute o f Development 
Administration, 1991), p. 123.
John L.S. Girling, The Bureaucratic Polity in Modernizing Societies (Singapore: Institute of  
Southeast Asian Studies, 1981).
Kevin Hewison, Power and Politics in Thailand: Essays in Political Economy (Wollongong, 
Australia: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1989), p. 14.
Anek Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy of Thailand, from 
Bureaucratic Polity to Liberal Comoratism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).
Chai-Anan Samudavanija (2nd), Anakhot kanmuanv thai (The Future o f Thai Politics 
(Bangkok: Institute of Public Policy Studies, 1996), p. 54. See also Kevin Hewison, "Of 
Regimes, State and Pluralities: Thai Politics Enters the 1990s", in K. Hewison, G. Rodan, 
and R. Robison (eds.), Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism. Democracy, and 
Capitalism (NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1993), pp. 159-190.
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, "Power in Transition: Thailand in the 1990s", in K. 
Hewison (ed.), Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation (Xondon: 
Routledge, 1997), p. 39. Further readings on Thai bureaucracy see, for example, Chai-Anan 
Samudavanija, "Old Soldiers Never Die, They Are Just Bypassed: The Military, Bureaucracy 
and Globalization", in K. Hewison (ed.), Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and 
Participation (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 42-58.
Another important similarity between Thailand and Japan is that both countries 
retain their traditional monarchical systems. The tennösei (Imperial system) in Japan 
and the Sathaban Mahakasat (institution of the monarchy) in Thailand float sublime 
and receive only minor challenges from the surrounding society, as they are protected 
by legal sanction, superstition, terror, and powerful influence. A serious crime would be 
committed should the Thai or Japanese media direct at their monarch even a fraction of 
what the British media regard as normal coverage of its royal family. In Thailand, for 
example, ‘self-censorship’ is regularly adopted by domestic reporters in relation to the 
monarchy (as is also the case with Buddhism, the official state religion). Journalists who 
write negative reports on these subjects can face long jail term, and publishers can be 
threatened with orders of closure. In Japan, by contrast, reports in Japanese media on 
the Imperial family are somewhat more relaxed. For example, in 1993 there was a media 
campaign engineered by traditionalists using weekly magazines to attack Empress 
Michiko, a commoner. She was portrayed as a "domineering and insensitive harridan, 
willing to trample over time-honoured traditions and the memory of her husband's 
father, Hirohitö" 48 Although similar direct attacks against, or negative reservations 
about, the royal family never appear in any of the Thai mass media, they exist and are 
spread by underground pamphlets, fascimiles, and rumour. As a famous social critic, 
Sulak Sivaraksa, who has been twice charged for the crime of lese majeste observes:
Although we [the Thai press] don't behave like the British press, we gossip 
even much more. And nowadays, o f course, we don't only gossip. We send fax 
which are very revealing about the audacity, sometimes very negative elements 
of the royal family, and that we cannot stop.49
Finally, and most importantly, Thailand and Japan are the two Asian countries 
whose modem histories most closely parallel those of Western democracies. As 
mentioned earlier, both countries embarked on modernization, industrialization and 
democratization under the control of local elite rather than as colonies. Therefore, if 
media theory written about Western political democracies works anywhere outside the
Richard McGregor, Japan Swines (NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996), p. 279.
Sulak Sivaraksa is interviewed in the BBC production o f 'The Royal Court o f Thailand Pt. 2'. 
This program was aired by the ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) on February 12,
2000 at 6 pm.
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West, then it should work in these two countries. The comparative study of Thailand 
and Japan will certainly help define the limits of Western media theory.
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However, it is important to note the discrepancy in the democratic status of 
political systems in these two countries. Although Thailand and Japan have established 
democratic political systems, their actual democratic status differs. Japan was the first 
industrialized democracy in the non-Westem world. It had its first parliamentary 
election in 189050, during the Meiji period, whereas Thailand only held its first election 
in 1933 after the political revolution of 193251. Even so, Thailand is often seen as "a 
semi-democracy"52 where bureaucratic and nonbureaucratic forces share political power, 
and continually engage in a struggle to maximize their position.53
Given Japan's longer history of effective democracy and rapid economic 
development, its media are far more technologically advanced, diverse, and educative 
than the Thai media. However, genuine investigative newspaper and television reporting 
on sensitive matters is rare. The major dailies, for example, often follow each other's 
themes closely. The reader is therefore likely to be bombarded with the same message. 
As a result, Japan is not yet regarded as a mature democratic society as Britain and the 
United States which possess strong, reliable, and watchful media. This is due to the 
‘soft-authoritarian’ nature of Japanese media (to borrow a term used to describe the
See Robert A. Scalapino, "Elections and Political Modernization in Prewar Japan", in R.E. 
Ward (ed), Political Development in Modem Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1968), pp. 254-83.
Thailand has also had 17 coup d'etats and sixteen constitutions since 1932. Discussion on the 
failure in the development of democracy in Thailand is taken up by Anek Laothamatas in Mop 
mu thu: Chon chan klang kab kanphatthanakanprachathippatai (The Mobile Phone Mob:
The Middle Class and Democratic Development! (Bangkok: Matichon, 1993).
An example of a semi-democratic political system is one which a strong executive branch is 
preferred to the legislative branch; the prime minister does not have to be an elected member of 
the parliament; the upper house is composed mostly of military and civillian bureaucrats with 
more or less equal powers to the lower house; and the total number of senators is almost equal 
to the number of elected representatives. See Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "Thailand: A Stable 
Semi-democracy", in L. Diamond et al. (eds), Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing 
Experiences with Democracy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 271-312.
Since the revolution in 1932, there has been a constant power struggle between army factions 
and civillian leaders. There was also a stmggle between the government of the day and various 
mass movements organized by trade unions, student, and the left-wing groups. For a 
discussion on the power struggle between the military establishment and the civillians in the 
Thai political history see Ji Ungpakom, "The Struggle Against the Military for Thai 
Democracy", Working Paper No. 55 (Perth: Murdoch University, Asian Research Center, 
1996).
Japanese political system by Chalmers Johnson), in which a symbiotic relationship 
exists between journalists, media organizations, and politicians. Hence, the media 
sometimes serve the holders of political power for their own personal or commercial 
interests.
As for Thailand, the media, which were previously seen as a ‘servant of the 
state’54, are changing their political roles. The country has had a long history of 
newspaper closures sanctioned by the repressive Press Act of 1941, which allowed the 
state to dismiss any editor or shut down any publication that has printed material 
deemed to be improper, or a threat to the peace that affects public morality. The press 
has frequently been used as a tool for exerting political and business influence, and at 
times this has led to dramatic situations. For example, in 1992 Sondhi Limthongkul, the 
publisher of the Asian Times and the local newspaper, Phujadkarn rai wan, was the 
target of an assassination plot when he refused requests from the military government to 
stop publishing critical stories.55 Thai broadcasting also retains tough censorship 
standards despite a considerable degree of liberalization in the last few years. In M ay 
1993, an FM radio station owned by the Nation Group was taken off the air for 
broadcasting remarks by Sulak Siviraksa, an outspoken Buddhist critic, who had 
criticized the army.56 More recently, a media-watch center was established, in which a 
high level committee closely monitored news reports that are critical of the ministries 
and the government. This initiative was based on the government’s view that talk-back 
radio programs permitted listeners to ring up and disseminate false information that 
scared away foreign investors and hurt the economy. Although this media-watch center 
was abolished in 1997, then Interior Minister, Mr. Sanoh Thienthong, made a claim
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According to Likhit and Thinapan (1989), the Thai media system has been generally supportive 
of social stability and political conservatism. The Thai press is also seen to reinforce political 
culture rather than the emergence of new political values and behaviors. See Likit Dhiravegen 
and Thinapan Nakata, "Social Cultural Aspects of Thai Polity", in S. Prasith-Rathsint (ed), 
Thai National Development: Social and Economic Background (Bangkok: Thai University 
Research Association, 1989), pp. 166-96.
Sondhi Limthongkul, Speech made at a Hong Kong Conference on "Asia Values and the Role 
of the Media in the Society", December 1-3, 1994, organized by the Freedom Forum Asian 
Center in Hong Kong and the Foreign Correspondents' Club o f Hong Kong.
Arunee lab, "Wad-wong Su" (The Realm of Media), Jodmai Khao (The Newsletter). The 
Reporters' Association of Thailand. May 17, 1993.
which summed up a common official view among Thai political representatives: 
“Democracy does not mean anybody can do whatever he or she wishes without any 
control”.57
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1.4 Theoretical Approaches
Previous studies of the mass media and their political role in liberal democratic societies 
have focused on the interrelationship between the state, the media, and society. These 
studies, for the most part, were informed by one of four main theoretical approaches: 
the pluralist model; the Marxist model; the hegemonic model; and the cultural relativist 
model. The strength and weakness of each approach will now be ascertained.
1.4.1 The Pluralist Model: Media as a ‘Watchdog’
The pluralist model is based on the assumption that the role of the press and the 
broadcasting media in liberal democratic countries is to participate in the 'free 
marketplace of ideas'. In the 1950s, this American perspective was projected globally 
by Siebert58, who developed four theories of the press, which collectively remain the 
dominant paradigm for explaining mass media systems. The four theories emphasize 
distinctions between 'authoritarian', 'libertarian', 'communist', and 'social responsibility' 
press systems. Authoritarian governments limit freedom of the press to those values 
that observe the primacy of the government administration. In such systems, censorship 
or regulation allows the government to directly supervise the gathering and 
dissemination of news. In extreme cases, authoritarian practices allow for total 
government domination of the press so that it can serve primarily as a medium for 
official statements or propaganda, as with former communist states such as the USSR 
and East Germany. In contrast, liberal democratic systems place the individual above 
the government. The system nurtures a press free of government control, and this free 
market of ideas allows fair exchange in a public forum. At the same time, the libertarian
M. Baker, “Thai Economic Crisis Brings Media Crackdown”, Asia Online. June 11, 1997 
(http://www. theage.com.au/special/asiaonline/media.html).
Fredrick S. Siebert, Four theories of the Press: The Authoritarian. Libertarian. Social 
Responsibility and Soviet Communist Concents o f What the Press should he 2nd ed. (Urbana: 
University o f Illinois Press, 1963).
58
may invoke the values of social responsibility, which modifies the laissez faire posture 
of the libertarian press.
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The pluralist view favors the libertarian system, which allows the press to be
commercially owned and operated in a free, democratic political culture. The role of the
press is regarded as that of a 'public watchdog'. In this watchdog role, the mass media
disseminate vital information to the citizenry, they facilitate the formation of public
opinion by providing an important forum of debate, and they enable the people to
influence the conduct of government by articulating their views. Other essential
elements of the media's watchdog role include a substantial autonomy and the ability to
represent the public rather than that of vested economic and political interests. In doing
so, the media may reveal abuses of power by these dominant groups and help to sustain
or develop democratic society. Underlying this theory is the view that the media are
central to the construction of what is termed the ‘public sphere’, which is defined as the
space between state and society in which private individuals can conduct their rational
discussion. This discussion, in turn, will influence the government through elections and
the mobilization of public opinion.59 However, the concept of the 'public sphere',
developed in the West during the eighteenth century, has been challenged by Habermas:
The liberal model o f the public sphere...cannot be applied to
the actual conditions of an industrially advanced mass-democracy
organized in the form of the social welfare state. In part the liberal model
had always included ideological components, but it is also in part true
that the social pre-conditions, to which the ideological elements
could at one time at least be linked, had been fundamentally transformed.60
In The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere61, Habermas distinguished his
concept of the ‘bourgeois public sphere’ from the classical liberal concept of the ‘public
sphere’. He argued that the emergence of capitalism in the late 19th century gave rise to
James Curran, "Rethinking the Media as a Public Sphere", in P. Dahlgran and C. Sparks, 
Communication and Citizenship: Journalism and the Public Snhere in the New Media Age 
(London: Routledge, 1991), p. 29.
Jürgen Habermas, "The Public Sphere", in A. Matterlart and S. Siegelaub, Communication and 
Class Struggle Vol.l (New York: International General, 1979), p. 200, cited in Nicholas 
Gamham, "The Media and the Public Sphere", in P. Golding et al. (eds), Communicating 
Politics: Mass Communications and the Political Process (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986) 
pp. 41-42.
Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society (London: Polity Press, 1989).
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a new political class, the bourgeoisie, whose members succeeded in constructing the
public sphere by creating a network of institutions within a society. These institutions
included newspapers, publishing enterprises, libraries, universities and debating
societies, which enabled the bourgeoisie thereby to transform its own class-specific
political agenda into broader public opinion. Habermas further pointed out that the
transformation of the public sphere was brought about by a combination of advertising
pressures, monopolization and concentration of media ownership which accompanied
capitalist development. He argued that public opinion would then no longer derive from
a process of rational discourse, but be the result of manipulative social engineering:
Ever since the marketing of the editorial section became interdependent 
with that of the advertising section, the press became an institution of certain 
participants in the public sphere in their capacity as private individuals; 
that is, it became the gate thtrough which privileged private interests invaded 
the public sphere.62
Following the thrust of Habermas's argument, the weaknesses of the liberal 
theory of the free press becomes apparent. The liberal theory simply assumes that the 
free market will provide appropriate institutions and processes of political 
communication to support a democratic polity. It ignores the way in which market 
forces can produce results in forms of oligopoly control of information. The content is 
highly politicized in support of bourgeois positions, but offered as if  neutral. The 
arguments put forward within the next model address this proposition. They contend 
that genuine public opinion does not exist in today's media environment, as the mass 
media are the agents of those who hold the economic, political, and social power in the 
system.
1.4.2 The Marxist Model: Media as a ‘Guard Dog’
In his analysis of capitalism, Marx argued that the mass media emerged from capitalist 
relations of production, and that the bourgeoisie's control over the proletariat was 
defined by its ability to determine the ideological landscape; one way of doing this is 
through the manipulation of media content.63 In Marx's theory, the press is a central
62 Ibid., p. 185.
63 See Chapter 11 The Communitarian Press: The Role of Karl Marx in J. Herbert Altschull, 
Agents o f Power: The Media and Public Policy. 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1995), pp.
element of the ‘superstructure’ that the ruling class created as their literary, political and 
idtsoogical mechanism for maintaining power. Many political analysts of the media have 
apjpled a Marxist approach to their works. Chomsky and Herman, for example, argue 
tha t the media may give the impression of promoting public debate by confining 
po)litcal discourse to legitimate areas of controversy, and by grounding their 
assunptions in ways that do not challenge the structure of social power. Hence, they 
are; pimarily engaged in manufacturing social consent. In their opinion, the role of the 
me;dii is to "inculcate and defend the economic, social and political agenda of privileged 
groups that dominate the society and the state" .64 The media are seen as instruments for 
the; preservation of existing institutions and social order. While the media can criticize 
indiivduals, the fundamental nature of the political, economic, or social systems goes 
unqujstioned.
For example, the news coverage of the Watergate scandal focused mainly on the 
activities of President Nixon. Nixon was portrayed in the press as a villain who allowed 
criminals to break into the Democratic Party headquarters for reasons that remain 
obsicure. The issues which still interest American journalists today are largely limited to 
"what the president knew and when he knew it? " .65 Even during the investigation, 
questioning did not delve into the underlying causes behind the scandal. Chomsky and 
Herman argue that the Democratic Party was untouched by the media because it 
represented "powerful domestic interests, solidly based in the business community" .66 
They contend that the media viewed the party as a privileged group, which had been an 
important part of the American political system and should be protected. They also 
comment on the difference between the watchdog role of the media in traditional liberal 
thought and that of the media in contemporary society, arguing that nowadays media 
watchdogs only bark when the privileged members of the system are threatened .67
195- 208.
64 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman (2nd.), Manufacturing Consent: The Political
Economy of the Mass Media (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 298.
65 Ellen Hume, "The Weight of Watergate", Media Studies Journal. Spring 1997, 11(2);
http://www.mediastudies.org/deflne/hume.html.
66 Chomsky and Herman, op. cit., p. 299.
Communication scholars, such as Donahue et al., agree that the media no longer carry 
out a watchdog function. Instead, they act more as ‘guard dog’ .68 This metaphor 
suggests that the "media perform as a sentry not for the community as a whole, but for 
those particular groups who have the power and influence to create and control their 
own security systems" .69
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Another approach based on the Marxist model has been developed by 
Altschull.70 In his book, Agents o f Power: The Media and Public Policy, he dismisses 
Siebert's categorization of the press into four distinct systems formulated during the 
Cold War, arguing that such a schema is no longer relevant. He asserts that Siebert's 
analysis simply adopted an "us-versus-them" approach which reflected the tension and 
hostility manifest at the time. Altschull writes, "the fall of the Soviet empire has 
demonstrated the fragility of ideological analyses of press history. If the 'theory' of one- 
half of the theoretical contest, that of Soviet communism, can be shown to be illusory, 
what can be said of the validity of the other half of the theoretical equation? " .71 Instead, 
he applies the Marxist approach to view the news media as agents of those who exercise 
political and economic power, and to consider media ownership as a key element in 
manipulating media content. In his book, the holders of political and economic power 
are also seen to be able to naturalize and universalize their interests because of their 
control over media production. This points to the dominance of media moguls in some 
countries, such as Rupert Murdoch in the UK, the US, and Australia, and Kerry Packer 
in Australia. Yet it seems that the overemphasis on the superstructure of ownership in 
this model neglects factors that are also highly influential in manipulating media content. 
These factors include journalists, their organizations, and their newsmaking processes,
George A. Donahue, Phillip J. Tichenor, and Clarice N. Olien, "A Guard Dog Perspective on 
the Role o f Media", Journal of Communication. Spring 1995, 45 (2), pp. 115-32. Another 
interpretation of media as 'guard dog' has been developed by Ellis S. Krauss, who suggests that 
media as 'guard dog' provide public with information and guidance necessary to make political 
judgments and decisions. However, this latter interpretation o f media's role is considered closer 
to that o f an 'agenda-setter' as discussed later in this chapter. See also Ellis S. Krauss, "Japan: 
News and Politics in Media-Saturated Democracy" in R. Gunther and A. Mughan (eds.), 
Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), p. 273.
Ibid., p. 122.
J.Herbert Altschull, op. cit.
Ibid., p. 140.
which are addressed in the following model.
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1.4.3 The Hegemonic Model and the Media as an ‘Agenda-Setter’
This model is primarily based on the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci's theory of 
hegemony, which argues that a "certain way of thought and life is dominant, in which 
one concept of reality is diffused throughout the public society in all its institutions and 
private manifestations" .72 The concept of hegemony holds that the elite classes rule by 
consent rather than force, and that the media have a central role in developing public 
acceptance of the status quo.73 This model stresses how ideology creates its own forms 
of expression and signification, and serves as a mechanism which shapes the 
consciousness of a compliant public. From this perspective, the media are regarded as 
active agents not as passive participants as in the pluralist model. The media are active 
because they define the interests of the ruling elite through highlighting important issues 
upon which the public can formulate opinions. The hegemonic model is similar to the 
more traditional Marxist model insofar that it emphasizes the domination of the political 
and economic elite. However, it also focuses on the news creators and views them as 
being the extensions of the power holder groups. Hegemonic theory thus focuses more 
on the production of media content rather than the structure of media ownership, 
arguing that the economic imperatives of the owner and affiliated power holders are 
mediated by organizational norms which provide journalists with linguistic rules, and 
vocabularies for encoding and decoding events and activities. But how do journalists use 
these codes strategically to promote dominant ideological interests?
In answering this, it is important to mention contemporary theory concerned 
with the question of media effects. According to this theory, the media perform an 
‘agenda-setting’ role. This ‘agenda-setting’ role is based on the premise that the news 
media are necessarily selective in their reporting of politics and public issues. In the 
course of news gathering, reporters, editors and producers routinely make 'gate-keeping'
Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1971), cited in
David L. Altheide, Media Power (London: Sage, 1985), p. 57.
73 Mark Wheeler, Politics and the Mass Media, p. 25.
judgments about which issues to cover and which to ignore, as well as 'manufacturing 
news', that is, to decide on the placement and prominence to be given to these issues. 
Cohen and Young suggest that journalists interpret events heir preconceived
models of the social universe:
In a real sense the court correspondent going through the 
daily list, the crime reporter phoning up the police desk, 
the London editor of TV news deciding whether to run an 
item on the Birmingham robbery, the editor selecting the 
news story on abortion statistics as suitable for an editorial 
: all are involved in making news.74
In the news selection process some public issues will be pursued more frequently and 
receive more prominent coverage than others, and some will be altogether ignored. The 
media output will signal to the audiences who read and watch the news that some policy 
issues are more important than others. As a result, over time the news media tend to 
shape the public's own agenda, which, in turn, preserves and strengthens the dominant 
ideology of the society.75 The key role of the media in this model, as suggested by 
McCombs and Shaw, is not that it tells people what to think, but what to think about.16 
The results from McCombs' and Shaw's study of the 1968 American presidential 
election led many researchers to believe that the mass media could decide which issues 
are important, and that they could influence the public agenda, and thereby transform 
into a policy agenda.77 Their study was emulated by many others, most of which 
yielded similar results.78 For example, Iyengar and Kinder concluded from their analysis 
of the television coverage of the U.S. presidential performance that public judgments as 
well as recognition of issues resulted from mass media agenda-setting.79 They employed 
the concept of "media priming" in an attempt to explain how television news actually 
shapes the way in which individual viewers think about politics. Through a series of
Stanley Cohen, and Jock Young (eds.), The Manufacture of News: Social Problems. Deviance 
and the Mass Media (London: Constable, 1973), p. 18.
Ian Ward, Politics of the Media (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1995), p. 49.
Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1963), p. 120, cited in Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, "The Agenda Setting 
Function of the Mass Media". Publics Opinion Quarterly. Summer 1972, (36), pp. 176-87. 
Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, op. cit.
Everett M. Rogers and James W. Dearing, "Agenda-Setting Research: Where Has It Been, 
Where Is It Going?", in D.A. Gräber (ed.), Media Power in Politics. 3rd ed. (Washington D.C.: 
C.Q. Press, 1994), pp. 77-95.
Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, News that Matters: Agenda-setting and Priming in a 
Television Age. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
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coitrolled experiments which they manipulated the content of news bulletins, they 
coicluded that media prime an audience to be receptive towards certain issues and not 
ho others. Thus, priming sets standards by which people evaluate politics.80
Another competing conception of the media's power in setting the public agenda 
hias been formulated by a German sociologist, Noelle-Neumann.81 Using German poll 
diati, she claims that the mass media are not pluralistic, but rather tend to confine their 
interpretation of political infonnation to moral and political stance consonant with the 
vie vs of newsmakers. She bases her thesis on the premise that while individuals have 
opiiions on public issues, they are not always willing to express them publicly. Instead, 
the/ observe the political environment and determine which opinions are widely 
accepted by their reference group, and which are not. Over time they tend to express 
doninant views and reject alternative positions. However, they still have the ability to 
chaige their opinions. In this case, the mass media become their prime source of 
infcrmation by providing exposure to the newly established public opinion. Noelle- 
Netmann's refers to this concept as "spiral of silence", in which those whose views are 
not well supported by the media lose confidence and develop a more reserved attitude 
when expressing their views in public. This reluctance to speak also reduces their 
confidence in their own views, as well as encouraging them to embrace popular opinion. 
Although Noelle-Neumann's concept of the ‘spiral of silence’ was originally quite 
influential, it has been criticized on the grounds that it views audiences as essentially 
passive observers, and critically fails to consider the individual's relationship with other 
members of his or her reference group.82 Moreover, attempts to use this concept 
outside of the German context have not always provided the same results, with many 
researchers suggesting that cultural factors elsewhere influence public behavior 
differently. As claimed in the following model, the failure to consider domestic factors 
such as political culture and local languages in studies of media content is a critical
80 Ibid., p. 63.
81 Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann, The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion. Our Social Skin (Chicago: 
University Press, 1984).
82 Slavko Splichal, "Public Opinion: A Critique of the Spiral o f Silence", in J. Servaes and R. Lie 
(eds.), Media & Politics in Transition: Cultural Identity in the Age of Globalization 
(Amersfoot, Netherlands: Acco Leuven, 1997), pp. 111-126.
weakness of the hegemonic model.
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1.4.4 The Cultural Relativist Model: Media as a ‘Servant of the State’
Recent studies of political communication systems and the political role of the media in 
various countries shy away from the media-audience paradigm. Instead, such studies 
emphasize the role of political culture in creating a significant impact on how the local 
political communication system operates, and how the media perform their roles in the 
political arena. For example, Swanson andNimmo refer to the work of Wildavsky, who 
argues that a cultural theory considers that culture acting as a "social filter" will enable 
people to construct ‘political preferences’ .83 They suggest that this perspective is 
crucial in understanding how cultural factors influence state-media-audience relations 
within the political system .84
This perspective is also shared by Blunder and Gurevitch, who claim that "all
political systems generate principles derived from the tenets of their political cultures,
for regulating the political role of the mass media" .85 Elements of political culture, such
as the degree to which freedom of expression is cherished as a basic political value, or
conversely, the degree to which restrictions on it are regarded as necessary and
permissible for the sake of other political goals, are seen as regulating mechanisms that
indicate the media's degree of autonomy and the extent to which and by what means this
autonomy is constrained. A recent publication on the relationship between the mass
media, politics, and society in the Southeast Asian countries carefully adopts this
approach, arguing that indigenous elements of consensual and communal traditions have
shaped the political functions of the local mass media. These functions are:
(to) support nation-building, political stability, national development, 
and social justice; promoting regional cohesion; moulding national 
identity; promoting social harmony; explaining public issues; 
informing and educating; and exercising self-restraint in sensitive,
Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing the Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory 
of Preference Formation". American Political Science Review. (81), pp. 3-21, cited in David L. 
Swanson and Dan Nimmo (eds.), "The Field of Political Communication: Beyond the Voter 
Persuasaion Paradigm", New Directions in Political Communication: A Resource Book 
(California: Sage, 1990), p. 39.
Ibid., pp. 39-40.
Jay G. Blunder and Micael Gurevitch, The Crisis o f Public Communication, p. 19.
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racial, ethnic and religious matters.86
Several Southeast Asian statesmen, including Lee Kuan Yew and Soeharto, both of 
whom contributed to this Southeast Asian press volume, went further in saying that the 
press should be an extension of the government. They advocated a government-media 
framework of relationships called ‘developmental journalism’. Within such a framework, 
the media work co-operatively with the government to educate the people, promote 
government policies, and strengthen harmonious relations among the citizenry. In 
Singapore, for example, there is a close relationship between the press and the 
government87, to ensure that journalists broadly share the values and perceptions of the 
authorities, and thereby better "shape public opinion to help build up a national 
consensus on important issues" .88
This cultural approach to the analysis of the political role of media is seen to
provide a useful understanding of the relationship between the state and media in the
countries which have so-called "authoritarian governments". For instance, an Australian
media scholar, David Birch, points to the importance of understanding the political
culture in his study of the Singaporean media:
This is a legitimating strategy for keeping the PAP in power: 
it requires a compliant media to stage the myths, generated by 
government, in order to manipulate and control social 
consciousness. All societies and cultures do this to some 
extent. What makes Singapore different from most is that it 
admits what it is doing, and legitimates it within the postcolonial 
discourse of nation building. Understand this discourse and 
the media in Singapore begins to make sense.89
The application of a cultural approach, however, has its critics who argue that it 
abuses the notion of liberty and freedom of the press. They see it as a myth to 
legitimate excessive government control over the media. The media are considered a
Achal Mehra (ed.), Press Systems in ASEAN States (Singapore: Asian Mass Communication 
Research and Information Center, 1989), p. 10.
For further discussion see David Birch, Singapore Media: Communication Strategies and 
Practices (Malaysia: Longman, 1993).
Lee, Kuan Yew, "Singapore and the Foreign Press", in A. Mehra(ed), Press Systems in ASF, AN 
States (Singapore: Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Center, 1989), p.
118.
David Birch, Singapore Media: Communication Strategies and Practices, p. 74.
government propaganda tool used to preserve the status quo. In this model, the media
are a ‘servant of the state’, forging a consensus of social and political values to generate
support for a particular regime. The articulation of the concept of ‘Asian Values’ by
several Southeast Asian governments, is seen as a process of myth creation whereby
which legitimizes particular political orders, and ensures that domestic media remain
subservient to state. This is reflected in comments made by Suthichai Yoon, editor-in-
chief of Thailand's The Nation:
We're quite suspicious [that] the words, ‘Asian Values’, are being used 
by authoritarian governments as a cover for security-related issues they'd 
like to impose. Before the end of the Cold War, it was the communist 
threat that was used by the government when we were told not to 
publish a certain story. Now it's Asian values that are being used as a 
new excuse for governments to tell journalists not to publish certain story 
because it could threaten our values.90
Journalists in some Asian countries argue that ‘Asian values’ such as group orientation 
and high levels of personal discipline impinge on their normative journalistic practices. 
A Bangladesh editor mentions that “Asian values, like all values, are political and 
historical. They run through the media like shadows that constantly move with us, 
follow us, precede us, yet never disappear” .91 However, a recurrent weakness in this 
discussion has been that there is no clear definition of the term ‘Asian values’ among 
journalists. Schidlovsky, the Director of Freedom Fomm Asian Center, for example, 
argues that a single set of ‘Asian values’ is impossible to define, particularly among 
journalists, within such a culturally diverse region.92
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Indeed, some have argued that the concept of ‘Asian values’, which assumes 
regional similarities without substantial justification of local cultural distinctiveness, is 
merely an excuse for authoritarian practices and control of the media.93 Those who have 
adopted this model have therefore suggested that local cultural factors must be assessed
Comments made at a conference on "Asian Values and the Role of Media in the Society", 
organized by the Freedom Forum Center and Foreign Correspondents' Club of Hong Kong, 
December 1-3, 1994.
Enayetullah Khan, "Roundtable". Media Asia. 1996, (23), p. 32.
John Schidlovsky, "Is there an Asian Model for Journalism: The Asia Press Forum", Paper 
presented at the Asia-Pacific Media Conference, Sydney, Institutional Federation of Journalists, 
February 6-8, 1995.
Alan Knight, "Fact or Friction?: The Collision of Journalism Values in Asia", in D. 
Kingsbury, E. Loo, and P. Payne (eds.), Foreign Devils and Other Journalists (Victoria: 
Monash Asia Institute, 2000), pp. 1-16.
at the domestic level first, and then cross-national comparative studies of these factors 
should be made to accurately assess the impact of national values and their effect on the 
media's roles in politics.94
1.5 Towards A New Model
The foregoing discussion outlined four different approaches for analyzing the political 
role of the media in democratic societies. Critics of each model argue that the political 
role of the media in a liberal democracy is contested and debatable. Unsurprisingly, 
previous studies on the political role of the media in a soft-authoritarian society such as 
Japan and a semi-democratic society such as Thailand have applied different theoretical 
models, leading to different results. In Thailand, for example, Siriwan Sermcheep has 
used Sieberf s pluralist view to argue that there are certain characteristics of the Thai 
press that are clearly authoritarian in nature, and that the role of Thai journalists differs 
considerably from that of a public watchdog.95 Ramaimas Bowra, on the other hand, has 
analyzed the Thai media system within the hegemonic model framework and saw the 
Thai press as a policy advocator that can set the agenda for political reform.96
In contrast, Ubonrat Siriyuvasak has pointed out that the Thai press assumed a 
‘watchdog role’ in reporting the protests and subsequent killings in Bangkok during 
May 1992, and acting as a counterweight to the despotic military government led by 
General Suchinda.97 A similar argument was made by Thitinan Pongsudhirak, who 
claimed that the press acted as an oppositional force against Suchinda's abusive 
government, and denoted that it had discarded its earlier role as a servant of the state. 
Yet at the same time he argued that sections of the Thai press increasingly acted as
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Tanno (eds.), Politics. Communication, and Culture (Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage, 1997), pp 
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Siriwan Sermcheep, "Characteristics of the Press in an Authoritarian System: A Case Study of 
Thailand", Unpublished Master’s Thesis, California State University, 1992.
Ramaimas Bowra, "Media and Political Communication in Thailand: The Role in Policy 
Advocacy", Policy Advocacy and the Media in Thailand (Bangkok: Institute o f Public Policies 
Studies, 1997), pp. 66-85.
Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, "The Development of a Participatory Democracy: Raison D'Etre for 
Media Reform in Thailand", Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science. 1994, 22, pp. 101-14.
guard dogs for certain business groups.98 Some political scientists argue that the role of 
the Thai press is ambiguous. They suggest that while the press has portrayed itself as a 
check on government conduct and exposed its wrongdoings, it does not appear to have 
genuine autonomy. In his evaluation of the Thai democratic spirit after the May 1992 
crackdown, Callahan notes that although the national newspapers did an outstanding job 
in covering the events of May 1992, commercial and political survival factors were 
crucial in shaping the ‘truth’ of the news.99 In a similar vein, McCargo's recent study of 
the media's role in policy advocacy affirms that the Western 'watchdog' label is not 
appropriate in the Thai context. He argues that although the Thai media, the press in 
particular, is often a political actor in its own right, it is somehow linked to or owned by 
prominent political figures, and dedicated to the promotion of particular interests.100
Disparate interpretations of the media's political role are also common in Japan. 
Watanabe Takesato, for example, identifies four characteristics of the Japanese press, 
which he regards as major impediments to the promotion of liberal democracy. They 
are: the favoring of big businesses; confonning to the system of reporters' (kisha) clubs, 
which provides journalists with privileged access to politicians; support for political 
conservatism by not providing critical analyses of major issues or scandals; and 
maintaining the status quo.101 In combination, these characteristics create and maintain a 
close and intense relationship between journalists and politicians, which often works 
against the public interest. According to revisionist scholars such as Karel van Wolferen, 
the former President of the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan, these factors make
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During the May 1992 crackdown, people went out to join the demonstration on the 
Rajdamnoen Road because the "truth" received from radio and television (the "truth" (khwam- 
ching) was the term that was often emphasized by the broadcasting media at that time) was 
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the Japanese media a 'servant of the state'.102
30
Similarly, in a comparative study of the regulatory constraints on television 
bnadcasting in Hong Kong, South Korea, and Japan, Ki-Sung Kwak suggests that 
conmon cultural factors impinge on each country's broadcasting legislation. Confucian 
vahes, in particular, are employed by these countries to form the groundwork for 
regelating television broadcasting. In his view, the lack of strict legal constraints in Japan 
poiits to the country's Confucian legacy, which emphasizes the use of ethical norms to 
harmonize society rather than legal principles. He also views the system of reporters' 
clibs in Japan as fostering mutual beneficial relationship between the government and 
broidcasters, and concludes that the Japanese media serve as propaganda organs for the 
autiorities.103 However, in a recent volume entitled Media and Politics in Japan, Farley 
see> the role of the Japanese press as closer to that of a guard dog which acts on behalf 
of tie political elite, and only reluctantly exposes major scandals which seem too close 
to disrupt the center of political power.104 Pharr, on the contrary, argues that the 
Japmese media are tricksters who can transform the state over time. This argument, 
Pharr claims, is supported by recent critical programs such as TV Asahi and Sunday 
Project which broadcast the interview with former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa 
mentioned earlier, which contributed to the LDP downfall in 1993.105
Disagreement over the political role of the Thai and Japanese media in the 
various studies noted above is generated by their assumption that the media pursue a 
single consistent role in relation to the state and the public. However, it can be argued 
that the political role of the media is fluid  and changeable, depending on relationships
Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power : People and Politics in a Stateless Nation 
(London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 93.
Ki-Sung Kwak, "Structural and Cutlural Aspects of the Regulation o f Television Broadcasting 
in East Asia: A Comparative Study", Gazette. 1997, 59(6), pp. 429-443; Ki-sung Kwak, "The 
Context of the Regulation of Television Broadcasting in East Asia", Gazette. 1999, 61(3-4), pp. 
255-273.
Maggie Farley, "Japan's Press and the Politics of Scandal", in S. J. Pharr and E. S. Krauss 
(eds.), Media and Politics in Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), pp. 133-64. 
Susan Pharr, "Media as Trickster in Japan: A Comparative Perspective", in S. J. Pharr and E.
S. Krauss (eds.), Media and Politics in Japan (Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press, 1996), pp. 
19-43. See also Duncan McCargo, "The Political Role o f the Japanese Media", The Pacific 
Review. 1996, 9(2), pp. 251-64.
formed with other political actors:
When one asks functional questions, one is in a sense seeking 
the operative elements of the system with full realization that 
these elements and their relationships differ among systems and 
also change with the passing of time in the same system.106
Previous research on the Thai and Japanese media treat different elements in the system
-  the state, the media and the public, in particular -- as given and uncontestable, rather
than as objects of study. Although their analyses have generated questions about the
interdependent nature of relations between the government, the media, and the public,
most have overlooked the issue of political interactions among these important actors.
Recent comparative studies in politics suggest that explicit attention should be 
paid to the importance of interactions between institutions within a given political 
context. 107 Likewise, it can be argued that to understand the role of media in politics of 
the democratic society, it is important to understand the social and political relations 
and interactions between relevant elements in the system within which the media must 
operate. In this case, the most relevant elements are the state, the media, and the public. 
Two concepts useful in assisting our comprehension of the state-media-society 
relationships and the role of the media within the political system are those of power 
relations and power-dependency. 108 These concepts are useful because they focus 
attention on three important aspects of the interrelationship: key centers of influence, 
resources, and institutional linkages.
1.5.1 Concepts of Power Relations and Power Dependency
Most studies in which a concept of power is used as the principal theoretical 
explanation for the relationship between media and politics draw on the hegemonic 
model. This literature sees the media as powerful forces that influence what people
31
Richard R. Fagen, Politics and Communication (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1966), p. 21. 
Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo (eds.), "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Politics", Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics (Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge Press, 1992), pp. 1-32.
See Richard M. Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations", in M.Olsen and M. Marger (eds.), 
Power in Modem Societies (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 48-58.
know and believe. 109 However, the notion that power is inherent in relevant actors is 
also implicit in other models. The Marxist model, for example, is concerned with how 
power resides in certain interest groups, known as power holders. The cultural relativist 
model, on the other hand, implies that power is manifested in the government's control 
and manipulation of political infonnation.
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However, the conventional idea that power is concentrated or centered in the
subject has been rejected by Michel Foucault, who saw power as rather more complex,
diffused through many nonpolitical organizations and groups.110 Foucault insisted on
the omnipresence of power, that it is inherent in the process of social interaction :
Power must be analyzed as something which circulates, 
or rather as something which only functions in the form 
of a chain. It is never localized here and there, never in 
anybody's hands, never appreciated as a commodity or 
a piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised 
through a net-like organization...Individuals circulating 
between its threads...are always also in the position of  
simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power.111
From a Foucauldian perspective, power is not simply inherent within the state, 
the media, or the public. Rather, it springs from the interaction among these three actors 
-  interaction which involves political information. The state, more particularly, should 
be seen as “being in the making”, and thus understood as a process in which different 
actors interact by establishing their interests in the process of state formation. 112 
Recently, some media scholars have applied the concept of power relations to 
interactions between the state, the media, and the public in a formation of a political 
communication system. Reese, for example, applies the concept of power relations in 
analyzing the interdependency between the media and their sources. He suggests that 
the media rely on official and governmental sources for political information, but these
See many writings in this view in Doris A. Gräber (ed.) (3rd.), Media Power in Politics 
(Washington D.C: A Division of Congress Quarterly, 1994).
Michel Foucault, "Power and Strategies", in C.Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77 bv Michel Foucault (Hertfordshire, England: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1980), pp. 140-3.
Ibid., p. 98.
Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, “Class, Democracy and Modernity”, Theory and Society. 
1983, (XII), pp. 211-44.
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sources largely depend on the media in their capacity to deliver large audiences to make 
the matters, in some cases preferably themselves, known. Reese suggests that treating 
power as a series of changing relationships helps avoid the tendency to regard the media 
or their sources as inherently powerful. 113 Defleur and Ball-Rokeach have also 
developed a media system dependency theory, which utilizes a broad concept of power 
relations and dependency to explain the degree of audience dependence on the media. 114 
They suggest that the degree to which the media can alter an audience's beliefs, values, 
and behavior depends on the degree to which the audience relies on the media for 
information. Therefore, power resides in the other's dependency on information. Indeed, 
this perspective on the sharing of information and the interdependency among actors 
falls into Max Weber's line of thought about power and domination. As Weber claims, 
the exercise of power involves the mobilization of resources such as wealth, skills, and 
knowledge, which are unequally distributed among classes, to produce effects. 
Domination is caused by inequalities in the distribution of resources that make possible 
the exercise of power. 115 Therefore, the exercise of power by the government, the media, 
or the public within a political communication system is determined by their unequal 
levels of interdependence on the mobilization of, and interaction with, information 
resources. This mobilization and interaction with information can be referred to as 'the 
ability to control political information'.
1.5.2 Political Information Contest Model
In Media and Political Conflict, Gadi Wolfsfeld identifies the following key oppositional 
forces involved in the political communication system: the authorities, the challengers, 
and the news media. He conceptualizes relations between these actors as strategic games 
and suggests the best way to understand the role of the news media in political conflicts 
is "to view the competition over the news media as part of a larger and more significant 
contest among political antagonists for political control". He develops a "political
113 Stephen D. Reese, "Setting the Media's Agenda: A Power Balance Perspective", in J. Anderson 
(ed.), Communication Yearbook. XIV, 1991, pp. 309-40.
114 Melvin L. Defleur and Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach (5th.), Theories of Mass Communication (New 
York: Longman, 1989).
115 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology in H. Gerth and Wright Mills (eds.)
(trans.) (London: Routledge, 1970).
contest model" to explain how and why power relations among the news media, the 
authorities, and their political antagonists -  such as terrorist groups -  can be exercised 
to gain political control. 116 This model is useful because it focuses on the 
interrelationship between influence, available resources, and institutional linkages of key 
actors involved. Building on Wolfsfeld's model, a political information contest model 
asserts that power relations are manifest in the outcomes of active conflict and contest 
between the state, the media, and the public. The locus of power relations at any given 
time can be established by reference to the visible results of the contest over political 
information. This innovative model differs from Wolfsfeld's model in two respects: first, 
it includes the public as a unit of analysis; and second, it highlights the way in which 
power relations shape political interactions, particularly when these interactions involve 
a contest in which each actor aims at gaining greater control of political information. In 
the political information contest model, the ability to control political information varies 
from one actor to another.
The state's ability to control political information depends on the following 
variables:
• The ability to control the political environment;
• The ability to deploy information and regulate access to that information;
• The ability to control the flow of that information; and
• The ability to mobilize elite support.
The media's ability to control political information depends on the following 
variables:
• The ability to gain access to such information;
• The ability to accurately construct issues/meanings from that information;
• The ability to disseminate such information to the public; and
• The ability to mobilize supports for or oppositions to particular issues.
The public's ability to control political information depends on the following
34
116 Gadi W olfsfeld  Media and Political Conflict, op. cit., p. 3.
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variables:
• The degree of access to such information directly;
• The ability to interpret political information and form judgments regarding particular 
political issues; and
• The ability to influence political outcomes.
This model also incorporates a typology of the power relations that emerge in 
contests between actors as they try to control political information. According to 
French and Raven, there are five categories of power relations: coercive, reward, expert, 
legitimate, and referent. 117 These types of power relations are exercised by the state, the 
media, and the public while gaining control over political information within the political 
communication system. Accordingly, there are four major premises underpinning the 
Political Information Contest model. Firstly, in order to gain greater control over 
political information, the state is likely to use a coercive approach towards the media, or 
at least one based on rewards or incentives. The former strategy includes the use of law 
and regulations whereas the latter involves providing access to media ownership. Due to 
the asymmetry of relations between the state, the media, and the public, the state is 
relatively free to use its authority — embodied in such things as media regulations — to 
increase its ability to control the flow of political information and mobilize elite 
support. The introduction of strict laws and regulation, however, inevitably leads to a 
change in the media's role from being a ‘watchdog’ to being a ‘servant of the state’. As 
Curran observes, "Once the media become subject to public regulation, it will lose its 
bite as a watchdog and may even be transformed into a snarling Rottweiller in the 
service of the state" . 118 In a similar vein, control over ownership can be exercised both 
directly and indirectly to influence media output. Accordingly, the ownership of
These terms - coercive, reward, expert, legitimate, and referent - were originally identified by 
John French and Bertram Raven as five common resources o f power, which A must possess to 
get B to undertake or not undertake any action. Although the terms used here have relatively 
similar meanings, they are intended to explain types of power relations, not power resources. 
Accordingly, definitions and meanings of these terms in this thesis are different from those in 
John R.P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, "The Bases of Social Power", in D. Cartwright (ed.), 
Studies in Social Power (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959), pp. 150-67.
James Curran, "Mass Media and Democracy: A Reappraisal", in J. Curran and M. Guerevitch 
(eds.), Mass Media and Society (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 84.
material resources and the power to determine the content and format of the mass 
media, as Ubonrat notes, "should therefore be seen in terms of a complex and dialectical 
set of relationships and not as uni-directional" . 119
Secondly, the media tend to resist the state's attempts to control by having 
'expert', or employing 'legitimate' power relations with the state. On the one hand, the 
media can maximize their professional expertise in disseminating accurate political 
information and closely watching for abuses of power by the state. On the other hand, 
they can give legitimacy via the process of co-ordination in which journalistic practices 
such as access to political information, the construction of meanings and the 
dissemination of information rely on access granted by state officials. When many 
journalists are keen to access particular information, the relevant officials in charge may, 
for example, exploit the situation by using personal relationships with journalists for 
their own benefits. Moreover, the question of media practices also relates to media 
organizations and resources as well as professional ethics. Indeed, the media are not a 
unified entity. The media actually consists of a multitude of different organizations and 
organs. The better-financed media are in a stronger position to gain high level access to 
political information. They also have the ability to train their journalists or hire gifted 
journalists capable of providing thoughtful political analysis and disseminating it to the 
public. Yet there are also some journalists within such media organizations who lack 
ethical values and are thus prone to being influenced by the elite or interest groups to 
distort the political information that they have obtained.
Furthermore, the media may initiate 'legitimate' power relations with the state 
by reinforcing conservative elements within political culture. Indeed, political culture is 
thereby forged in the process of the media's construction of meaning and dissemination 
of political information. As Gronbeck suggests, "mass media allow the whole populace 
to share in the unifying rites that reinforce the political culture and legitimate the
36
119 Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, "Cultural Mediation and the Limits to "Ideological Domination": The 
Mass Media and Ideological Representation in Thailand", Soioum. February, 1991, 6(1), p. 48.
badership" . 120 The type of culture embedded in the political communication system and
reinforced by the media is likely to play a critical role in shaping public attitudes
t)wards politics, particularly in forming public opinion. According to Lippman,
public opinion is primarily moralized and codified version of the facts.
I am arguing that the pattem of stereotypes at the center of our codes largely 
determines what group of facts we shall see, and in what light we shall see them.121
Thirdly, there are what may be considered as 'referent' power relations between 
tie public and the media. The media construct and disseminate meanings, to which the 
public refer in making their own political decisions. The public may adopt either 
positive or negative referential power relations with the mainstream media, depending 
cn the political information available, and perceived accuracy of the information that the 
media disseminate. If the political information is easily accessed by the public perhaps 
via the use of the Freedom of Information Act or Internet technology, the public may 
nit rely on the traditional mass media as their main reference for information. 
Otherwise, the traditional media will remain an important channel for political 
information. Furthermore, better-educated members of the public tend to have a greater 
ability to interpret political information and form judgments than the less educated 
public. Media literacy is crucial because political information received by the public has 
been mediated in many ways by process and activities such as legal maneuvers, 
ownership issues, journalistic practices, and political culture.122
Finally, it should be emphasized that the media's role in politics varies depending 
on what types of power relations are operating at a given time. Although the power 
relations in specific instances are inherently unique, certain recurring patterns of power 
relations between the state, the media, and the public that determine the media's role in
37
Bruce E. Gronbeck, "Popular Culture, Media, and Political Communication", in D. Swanson 
and D. Nimmo (eds), "The Field of Political Communication: Beyond the Voter Persuasion 
Paradigm", New Directions in Political Communication: A Resource Book (California: Sage, 
1990), p. 207.
Walter Lippman, Public Opinion. (New York: Macmillan, 1922), p. 49.
Ibid., pp. 82-3.
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politics can be identified. The Political Information Contest Model, as demonstrated in 
the following table, recognizes that the media's role is fluid and can shift from that of a 
‘watchdog’, as in the pluralist model, to the role of a ‘guard dog’, or an ‘agenda setter’, 
or a ‘servant of the state’. Power relations among the central actors which involve 
conflicts or contests over the control of political information creates the possibility in 
shifts in the media's role, and largely determines what function the media will play in 
politics.
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The dynamic process implicit in the Political Information Contest model largely 
depends on changes in the power relations between the three actors. For instance, the 
media can take on an agenda-setting function when they are able to gain maximum access 
to sources of political infonnation, including those found outside the power structure, 
such as in the business community, the academy and the like. In such cases, intense 
media coverage based on a mass of detailed political information can attract the public. 
As a result, members of the public are likely to develop a kind of ‘positive referent’ 
power relation with the media; that is the public will in all likelihood increasingly 
depend on the media for political information, and focus more closely on what the media 
have to say. They are likely to start to link their own social and economic welfare to the 
media agenda, which in turn forms the basis of a public agenda. At times this public 
agenda can be transformed into a policy agenda by various means: for example, through 
the organization of public demonstrations. In such a situation, the state will be 
compelled to take sides, that is, to form a coalition with either the media or the public. If 
the state sides with the public, then it may alter its policy priorities in order to assuage 
public opinion. Conversely, if the state forms a coalition with the media, it may urge, 
force, or indirectly manipulate the media to play down issues, causing public disquiet.
However, if  the state in any given democratic society does not permit freedom 
of access to information, and if the media are denied access to information, then the 
media will essentially become little more than a 'servant of the state'. In acquiescing to 
state authority, the media may provide inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading 
information to the public. If the public recognizes such misinformation, then it will 
develop a type of ‘negative referent’ power relation with regard to the media, and accord 
their pronouncements little or no significance. As a consequence, the public may become 
uninterested in and eventually withdraw from politics, or seek alternative sources of 
information, such as the international media, the Internet, or social networks. On the 
other hand, the media are highly motivated by financial considerations, or an interest in 
obtaining newsworthy information from political elite such as high ranking officials, 
politicians, the media may act as a guard dog protecting elite groups' interests, for
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example, by seeking to manufacture public consent on certain issues beneficial to the 
elite. The media may also make use of members of the elite as their information channel. 
While the media may, to some degree, have a network of informants within sections of 
political elite, these political elite also utilize the media as their own private sources of 
information. Members of the public also seek to establish their ov/n information 
networks that secure accurate and adequate political information substantial to heighten 
broader public opinion.
1.6 Objectives
The principal objective of this thesis is to conduct a comparative analysis designed to 
explore new perspectives drawn on the political information contest model, which will 
assist in the understanding of the interrelationship between the state, the media, and the 
public, and the extent to which the media's political role varies over time and according 
to circumstance. As most previous studies have been confined to the analysis of the role 
of the media in a single country, a comparative approach focusing on Thailand and 
Japan will develop a broader analytical view and a more comprehensive understanding 
of the political communication systems in both countries.
Four central questions underpin this study:
• What is the nature of power relations between the state, the mass media, and the 
public in both countries, particularly when they are competing for control over 
political information?
• What are the factors (the dependent variables) that escalate or impede the change in 
power relations, that is the contest over control of political information among the 
three actors in both countries? Are these similar or different?
• In what ways have the media changed their role in politics, and is the political 
information contest model useful in explaining such transformations?
• What are the independent variables that have spurred significant changes in the 
media role in one country but not in the other?
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To answer these questions, it will be necessary to formulate subsidiary 
questions as follows:
• What are the features of the Japanese and Thai media systems in terms of 
ownership structures and media regulations, and why have they evolved in such a 
manner?
• To what extent have the ownership patterns and media regulations been significant 
to the dissemination of political information in both countries?
• To what extent have political newsgathering and other journalistic practices been 
crucial to the Japanese and Thai media’s dissemination of political information?
• What roles have the mass media played in the political history of each country?
• To what extent does the Japanese and Thai media's coverage convey the values of 
the local political culture?
• Have the Japanese and Thai mass media been considered as driving forces promoting 
reform and the transformation of politics, or have they simply been bastions of 
conservatism serving existing interests?
1.7 Chapters and Methodologies
This comparative analysis of political information contests and the media's role in the 
Thai and Japanese politics is divided into seven chapters. Chapter Two and Three 
encapsulate the articulating relationship between political and media institutions, and 
the impact of the political system on the media system in both countries. Chapter Two 
applies the political information contest model to the analysis of press censorship laws 
and regulations in Thailand and Japan. Chapter Three then discusses the political 
information contests within the systems of distinctive ownership structures and related 
regulations of television broadcasting in both countries. The analyses in these two 
chapters are based on literature reviews, interviews with the key actors and agencies 
involved, such as journalists, editors, owners and broadcasters, and media intellectuals, 
as well as analyses of Japanese and Thai governments' media policies, censorship laws, 
and systems of media regulation. Relevant interviews were mostly conducted in 1998 
and 1999 during fieldwork in Thailand and Japan.
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Chapter Four concerns the media's ability to gain access to, interpret, and 
disseminate political information. This account focuses on political information contests 
in the process of political newsgathering and journalistic practices. It explicates both 
historical and recent developments in journalistic circles, including comments by 
journalists gathered at Matichon newspaper in Bangkok, and Asahi Shimbun in Tokyo. 
Chapters Five and Six look at political information contests and consequent shifts and 
changes in the political roles of the press and television broadcasting by providing 
content analyses of press coverage and television news programs concerned with 
political issues. In Chapter Five, characteristics of news representation in the domestic 
press in Thailand and Japan are discussed, and four case studies are presented. These 
include a content analysis of major press coverage on Thai political reform in 1997 in a 
comparison with a content analysis of 1993 and 1994 press coverage of political reform 
in Japan, and an analysis of headlines of four Thai major newspapers during the last 
month of the Chavalit cabinet in 1997 in comparison with a similar analysis of headlines 
of Japanese press during the last month of the Hashimoto administration in 1998. 
Chapter Six compares and contrasts selected prime time TV news programs of both 
countries. In particular, the chapter examines the extent to which political news content 
related to significant political events. Domestic comparisons of popular TV news 
programs and discussion of several case studies will demonstrate how the Thai and 
Japanese television media have changed their roles. The question of how a political 
culture is transmitted nationally through semiotic signs including text, image, symbol, 
myth, and events is also addressed. Finally, Chapter Seven discusses the Thai and the 
Japanese public’s struggle in gaining direct access to political information. Then, it re­
examines the Political Information Contest model and its usefulness in explaining the 
transformation of political role of the media in both countries, and summarizes the 
relationships between the state, the media, and the public in Thailand and Japan.
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CHAPTER TWO
POLITICAL INFORMATION CONTESTS AND PRESS CENSORSHIP
Although it's risky to publish the news with the revealed 
information that is confidential and may affect the 
government, and even though the government could 
order closure o f the publication, we still dare to publish 
such reports.
Kietchai Phongphanich1
"Freedom o f the Press" in Japan suffers from a range 
o f external and internal constraints that inhibit the ability 
o f newspapers to either actively search or print as much 
politically sensitive information as they potentially could.
Professor Sugiyama Mitsunobu2
2.1 Censorship, Press and the State
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze political information contests and power
relations between the press and the state. It outlines the historical interplay of different
types of power relations between the state and the press, which predates other kinds of
media. From the beginning, press censorship was a coercive instrument through which
the state contested to gain control over political information. In doing so, the state
designs stringent regulations, or alternatively gives rewards and incentives to the press
in order to induce self-censorship. According to Sue Jansen, censorship is
all socially structured proscriptions or prescriptions which inhibit 
or prohibit dissemination of ideas, information, images, or other 
messages through a society's channels of communication whether 
those obstructions are secured by political, economic, religious, or 
other systems of authority".3
Censorship can also be described as the knot that ties knowledge and political control. 
Censorship has been a means that the state has employed to spread its ideas of
Kietchai Phonphanich is an executive editor and publisher of Khao Sod Daily. Interview on 
April 23, 1998.
Professor Sugiyama Mitsunobu teaches media studies at the Institute o f Socio-Information and 
Communication Studies, The University of Tokyo. Interview on October 26, 1998.
Sue Jansen, Censorship: The Knot that Binds Power and Knowledge fNew York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), p. 14.
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nationalism (knowledge) for the purpose of accelerating the 'nation-building' process ,4 
and enhancing its position as a 'strong state ' . 5 It has also been an instrument for 
increasing the state capabilities to overcome resistance (control), and suppress 
alternative political discourse (knowledge). The state establishes the awareness of the 
conditions for political knowledge by imposing and maintaining the control of political 
information.
The state’s ability to control the political environment is the most important 
factor determining the level of political information contestation. However, the state’s 
ability to maintain control of political information also varies depending upon its ability 
to regulate access to information, its ability to control the information flow, and its 
ability to mobilize media support. This ability can be achieved by the state’s 
employment of legal and extralegal controls. Legal controls are a coercive type of power 
relations, which are exercised to regulate access to information and control the flow of 
information. They consist of: placing limits on the freedom of printing, including holds 
on the authority to grant and revoke publishing licenses, and the pre-censoring of media 
content; placing limits on freedom of expression, such as the imposition of strict post­
censorship laws with heavy fines and jail terms; and by placing limits on freedom of 
distribution, such as the prohibition or restraint of publication sales, or their outright 
confiscation. Extralegal controls, to the contrary, are not based on any legal provision 
and are subtle means to mobilize media support. They are reward type power relations, 
which combine together the impositions of reward and punishment, such as the 
forewarning of editors or owners to impose self-censorship, or the influencing of 
advertisers not to endorse certain publications. More drastically, extralegal means of
As Benedict Anderson suggests, the national press is an important bastion o f an 'imagined 
community'. A  public community could be united with other communities because members of 
both communities imagined they read or receive the same kind of information. If the state could 
control the political discourse in the press, then it could spread its concept o f nationalism to 
these communities via the press. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Community;
Reflections on the Level o f Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991). 
The notion o f a 'strong state' is associated with state social control, which denotes "the 
successful subordination of people's own inclinations o f social behavior or behavior sought by 
other social organizations in favor o f the behavior prescribed by state rules. See Joel S. Migdal, 
Strong Societies and Weak States: State-society relations and State Capabilities in the Third 
World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 22-23.
maintaining control over political information include death threats, kidnapping, 
personal attacks, and even murder.
The historical development of both legal and extralegal controls in Japan and 
Thailand is outlined in this chapter. This account concentrates on how certain 
censorship laws and regulations affect the political role of the press, and the extent to 
which coercive and reward approaches have been used in competing for control over 
political information. The comparison is expected to highlight why press censorship 
evolved historically and became an institutionalized feature which characterizes the role 
o f the press and its engagement in a process whereby political information is 
disseminated in both countries.
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2.2 The Press and Absolutism
Censorship laws in both Thailand and Japan were first introduced by the states to 
suppress criticisms and attacks against royal administrations. Due to initial lack of 
sitriigent regulations, the press' role could be recognized as that of a watchdog. The 
press often criticized government wrongdoings, and presented the public with diverse 
opiiions that partly led to political changes in both countries — the change from the 
absolute monarchy to a constitutional democratic rule in Thailand, and the promulgation 
o f  ihe Meiji Constitution in Japan.
Censorship in Siam6 was introduced to protect the court and the royal family 
firon criticism. Thai censorship provisions can be traced back to a libel law of 1864,
For history of the Press in Thailand see Supapan Boonsaat, Prawat nungsuphitn nai prathet 
Thai (History of the Press in Thailand! (Bangkok: Banakit, 1974); Sukanya Tiravanit, 
Prawatkan nungsuphim thai phai nai rabob somburanavasitthirat (History of the Thai Press 
Under the Absolute Monarchy! (Bangkok: Thai Wathanaphanich, 1977); Sukanya 
Tiravanit, "Kan nungsuphim nai prathet thai" (Newspapers in Thailand), in Wiwatthanakan 
seumolchon Thai (Evolution of theThai Mass Medial Paper Presented at the seminar on the 
occasion of the Year of the World's Communication at the Faculty o f Communication Arts, 
Chulalongkom University (Bangkok: Buddha Bhucha Publishing, 1983); Boonrak 
Boonyaketamala, "Thailand" in J.A. Lent (ed.), Newspapers in Asia: Contemporary Trends and 
Problems (Hong Kong: Heineman Educational Books, 1982), pp. 334-363; John D. Mitchell, 
"Thailand", in J.A. Lent (ed.), The Asian's Newspaper Reluctant Revolution (Iowa: Iowa State 
University Press, 1971), pp. 210-233 ; Also Thitinan Pongsudhirak, "Thailand's Media:
Whose Watchdog?", in K. Hewison (ed.), Political Change in Thailand’ Democracy and 
Participation (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 217-32.
which was enacted during the reign of King Mongkut (1851-1868). This law imposed 
jail sentences and heavy fines for publications judged to have defamed the royal family, 
to have treated the law with contempt, or to have incited the populace to revolt.7 Yet 
the Siamese government at that time had more difficulty in dealing with foreign editors 
and their publications, as it could not order any foreign publications to close because of 
the protection under "extraterritorial rights".8 These extraterritorial rights were granted 
to foreign nationals who undertook commercial activities in Siam;9 hence any legal 
proceedings against foreign-owned enterprises and their workers had to be undertaken in 
the consular courts.10 King Mongkut, however, took a number of steps, such as limiting 
the scope of activity among the Siamese literati, and attempting to exert influence over 
foreign publishers.11
Whilst King Mongkut had problems in curbing freedom of expression in the 
foreign press, his successor, King Chulalongkom (1868-1910), devised an alternative 
strategy for controlling press discourse. This strategy was twofold. Firstly, King 
Chulalongkom established a Royal Printing Office, and encouraged his immediate family
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The law imposed three-year jail terms and 1,500 baht fines on conviction. John D. Mitchell, 
"Thailand", in J.A. Lent (ed.), The Asian's Newspaper Reluctant Revolution (Iowa: Iowa State 
University Press, 1971), p. 215.
There were a number of foreign journalists working for small but growing number of foreign- 
registered newspapers. Added to the first Thai language newspaper, Bangkok Recorder, were 
Siam Times, and Bangkok Press , both of which were launched in 1864 and folded in the same 
year, as well as Siam Weekly Monitor and Bangkok Summary which came out in 1867 and 
1868 respectively. Prakart Wacharapom, Tham-niab khon tham nungsuphim (The Cabinet of 
the Newspapermen! (Bangkok: Dok Ya, 1990), pp. 46-7.
Nakarin also asserts that the privilege of'extraterritorial rights' motivated a large number of Thai 
public intellectuals to take on the journalism profession with the foreign-owned press in the 
following reigns of King Chulalongkom (1868-1910) and King Vajiravudh (1910-1925). See 
Nakarin Mektrairat, Kan-patiwat Siam por-sor song si ied ha (Siamese Revolution of 19321 
(Bangkok: Mulaniti khrongkan tamra sangkhomsat mam kan fai sing phim 60 pi 
prachathippatai, 1992).
Matthew Copeland, “Contested Nationalism and the 1932 Overthrow of the Absolute Monarchy 
in Siam”, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, The Australian National University, 1993, pp. 15-16. 
King Mongkut himself wrote letters of complaint to foreign publishers in Bangkok on a 
number of occasions to express his displeasure over editorial commentary; Reynolds (1973) 
also mentioned that Bradley was watchful in selecting articles to publish in Bangkok Recorder . 
The paper had to avoid Christian proselytization and printing articles on physics, chemistry, 
philology, and medicine as well as news of Europe, America, China, and Singapore. See a 
translation of King Rama IV's letter to Dr. Bradley in 1865 in Ibid., p. 15 and also Craig J. 
Reynolds, "The Case of K.S.R. Kulap: A Challenge to Royal Historical Writing in the Late 
Nineteenth Century Thailand", Journal of the Siam Society 61(2), pp. 63-90.
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members to launch their own newspapers to cover issues like state and royal affairs.12 
Secondly, newspapers with existing royal connections received substantial but unofficial 
subsidies, assistance with printing technology, and news releases directly from the 
court. Private newspapers, such as Phitn Thai, Bangkok Times, and Krimgthep Daily 
Mail received official subsidies of around 8,000 baht13 a year.14 Not surprisingly, 
newspapers in this period were used as political tools, and as a means of disseminating 
the official, and seemingly authoritative directives.15 Some became political mouthpieces 
for financially influential groups outside the court,16 but generally the press was 
considered a 'servant of the state', as it was "either so minor or so clearly under royal 
direction that there was no need for the throne to take notice in terms of legalistic 
controls".17 However, subjection to the throne was still rigidly enforced by extremely 
coercive methods. For instance, a famous journalist named Tienwan who held radical 
views advocated the abrogation of slaves and recognition of women's rights, was jailed 
for seventeen years on a charge of lese majeste.n  Likewise, K.S.R Kulap, a famous 
historian and journalist, was punished with hard labor for wordplay suggesting that the 
king was incompetent.19
After King Vajiravudh succeeded to the throne in 1910, the number of daily 
newspapers increased sharply.20 One major reason was because the personal
The court during the reign of King Chulalongkom published the Royal Gazette, Darunowadh, 
Court-Khao Ratchakan, Wachirayan, Wachirayan Wiset, Thammajaksu, and so on. Articles 
published in these papers contained biographies, poetry, epic literature, proverbs, history, and 
foreign affairs. Ibid., pp. 67-8. See also Supapan, op. cit.
A major newspaper, Sararasd, which was published in the Sixth reign reported news about the 
exchange rates on June 1, 1923. According to the newspaper, 100 baht was approximately equal 
to 8 U.S. dollars.
Nakarin, op.cit., p. 98.
John D. Mitchell, "Thailand", in J. A. Lent (ed.), The Asian's Newspaper Reluctant Revolution 
(Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1971), pp. 215-16.
One important group included influential figures among a group of Chinese merchants and 
entrepreneurs. Further, there were four newspapers run by Chinese entrepreneurs at the end of the 
Fifth reign. Midnum Yidpor, ChinumYidpor were published in Chinese, while Sino-Siam 
Warasap were published in Thai and Chinese languages. In addition, a Japanese-owned 
newspaper, Yamato, was published in a Thai language. See Nakarin, op. cit.
Mitchell, op. cit., p. 215.
Sor. Songsaksee, Yod Khon Wannakam (Supreme Writers! (Bangkok: Dok Ya, 1978) pp 37- 
56.
Craig Reynolds, "The Case of K.S.R. Kulap: A Challenge to Royal Historical Writing in Late 
Nineteenth Century Thailand", Journal of Siam Society. July 1973, 61(2), p. 77.
Sukanya Tiravanit, "Kan nungsuphim naiprathet thai" (Newspapers in Thailand), in 
Wiwatthanakan seumolchon thai (Thai Mass Media's EvolutionV Paper Presented at the 
Seminar on the Occasion of the Year of the World's Communication at the Faculty of
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involvement in journalistic activities of King Vajiravudh himself, who had been 
contributing articles to the press since he was a Crown Prince.21 Ironically, the first 
formal censorship came in response to a press attack on King Vajiravudh's 
administration and his luxurious personal life. The government promulgated the Press 
Act of 1919, prohibiting all criticism of the bureaucracy and restricting all military 
news.22 Despite this law, the press was able to avoid the censorship by launching 
indirect attacks.23 Nevertheless, press controls increased in accordance with the growth 
in the number of newspapers, particularly during the reigns of King Vajiravudh and King 
Prajadhipok (1925-1935). Two publication laws were promulgated in 1922 and 1927. 
The first law stipulated that those who wished to own a printing press needed to seek 
permission from the court. The direct attack, however, came under the second law 
which forbade any foreigners who had not been residing in Siam, as well as public 
servants and military personnel, from engaging in publishing activity.24 It also allowed 
the withdrawal of publication licenses from any publishers if an article threatened 
national interests.25 Furthermore, these laws solidified divisions between the royal- 
subsidized press, the foreign owned press, and the locally owned press. Heavy 
penalties directly targeted the increasing aggressiveness of local newspapers.26 On the 
other hand, strident foreign newspapers that had heavily attacked the throne were 
bought out by King Vajiravudh.27
Despite the introduction of the second Publication Law in the Seventh Reign, the
21
22
23
24
25
26 
27
Communication Arts, Chulalongkom University (Bangkok: Buddha Bhucha Publishing, 1983), 
p. 7.
In the late 1912, Prince Vajiravudh began writing for the press under the pen name "Asvabahu". 
By the opening of the Sixth reign, he owned as well as subsidized a number of publications 
such as Chinosayamwarasap and Phim Thai. His famous articles were such as "cion tid lor", 
"jew haeng burapa tith", "muang thai jong  tuen therd', and an English article "A Siam 
Miscellany". His famous pen names included "Asavaphaahu", "Ramchitti", and "Phun Lham". 
Pira Chirasophone, "Thailand", in A. Mehra (ed), Press Systems in ASEAN States 
(Singapore: Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Center, 1989), p. 92.
For example, Copeland's comprehensive study of'Contested Nationalism' in the Sixth reign 
demonstrates the extensive use of comic strips and satiric verse in which animal symbolism was 
used to ridicule the King, and his administration. In many occasions, pictures o f 'hia ' or 
monitor lizard were often used to compare to the administrators, as the term 'hia ' could mean 
'low-life bastard' when applied to human being. See Matthew Copeland, op. cit.
Supapan, op. cit., pp. 100-1.
Mitchell, op. cit., p. 215.
Nakarin, op. cit., pp. 107-8.
Sulak Sivaraksa, Siam in Crisis. 2nd ed. (Bangkok: Rung Sang, 1990), p. 146.
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number of daily newspapers rose sharply. The press became a 'public space' for rational
discussion among the urban literati by the Seventh reign. This urban literati included not
only the European-educated political elite, but also the urban literate commoners.28
These groups of urban literati played an important role in disseminating critical views
against the absolute monarchy, and promoting constitutionalism through the press. The
press set a constitutional agenda that paved the way for a revolutionary movement and
an eventual transition towards democratic mle. The press had relative freedom of
expression to the extent that offensive articles such as one titled "The Royal is a
Hindrance for Development" (Chao pen look turn thuang kwam charoen ) were
published without subsequent legal action.29 David Wyatt observed this period and
called it 'the age of the popular press':
This was, indeed, the first period in the Siamese history in which there may be 
said to have been something readily identifiable as public opinion. It was the age 
of the popular press, of daily newspapers, and weekly magazines... In the absence 
of any other regular mode of taking the popular pulse, the government and the 
educated elite seem to have regarded newspapers as the voice of public opinion.
By the mid-1920s, there was no mistaking the fact that criticism of the 
government was increasing and that elite opinion was being both expressed 
and shaped in the popular press.30
Ironically, such a public sphere disappeared soon after the 1932 revolution, in which the 
absolute monarchy was replaced with a constitutional mle. Political information 
contests between the state elite who wanted to protect their bureaucratic interests and 
the press were subsequently heightened. Various coercive measures were introduced to 
control press discourse, despite the introduction of the first Thai constitution which 
guaranteed freedom of expression.31
See Nakarin, op. cit, and Copeland, op. cit.
This article was published in "Rassadom" Newspaper in 1928. Another example is an article 
titled "Nungsuphim kab rassadorn" (Newspapers and the Private Citizens) published in Sri 
krung only three months before the revolution in June 1932 with content that could be 
considered outrageous. One sentence, for instance, reads: "The New People's Government is 
going to stay, therefore, every Siamese had better make the best of it, whether he likes it or 
not". Sri krung. March 25, 1932, p. 3.
David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History. 2nd ed. (Bangkok: O.S. Printing house, 1984), 
p. 235.
The first constitution was promulgated on 10 December 1932. Article 14 guaranteed "full liberty 
of person, abode, property speech, writing, advertising, education, public meeting, association, 
or vocation"; however, the restriction on such liberties may be imposed by virtue of laws 
enacted for the purpose of "maintaining security of the state or safeguarding the liberties, 
dignity, or reputation of other persons or maintaining public order or good morals or preventing 
deterioration of the mind or health of the public". See Boonlert Suphadilok, “ Sitthi kan seusan 
nai prathet thai" (The right to communicate in Thailand! (Bangkok: Thammasat University, 
1984), pp. 14-15.
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A parallel to this history of press censorship occurred in Japan during the Meji 
era (1868-1911).32 The first Japanese censorship law came with the advent of Western- 
style political discussion or mainstream newspapers (seiron shimbun or öshimbun).33 
Among the pioneers of these high-brow political newspapers were Köko Shimbun34, 
launched by an ex-samurai intellectual, Fukuchi Genichirö, and Chügai Shimbun, 
published by another ex-samurai, Yanagawa Shunsan. Most of newspapers in the early 
Meiji period were published by former Tokugawa retainers, especially the samurai 
intellectuals, who had been stripped of their feudal social status and hereditary rice 
stipends, and hence took a stance against the autocratic Meiji government.35
For a good account of the press censorship in Japan prior to 1945, see Richard H. Mitchell, 
Censorship in Imperial Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). For detailed 
discussion of the Japanese press prior to and during the Meiji period see James Huffman,
Creating a Public: People and the Press in Meiji Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1997), and his earlier work on a famous journalist in the Meiji period in James Huffman,
Politics of the Meiii Press: The Life of Fukuchi Genichirö (Honolulu: The University Press of 
Hawaii, 1980). For detailed studies of the press in the early Meiji era, see Peter Fidgor, 
"Newspaper and Their Regulation in Early Meiji Japan", Paper on Japan Vol.6 (Cambridge-.
East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1972), and Chapter 2: The Law on 
Liberty in Modem History in Lawrence Ward Beer, Freedom of Expression in Japan : A Study 
in Comparative Law. Politics and Society (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1984). For Japanese 
sources, see Nishida Taketoshi, Nihon Jaanarizumu-shi Kenkvu (Studies of History of Japan's 
Journalism! (Tokyo: Misuzushobo, 1989); For a short summary of the press in Meiji period, 
see Uchigawa Yoshimi and Arai Naoyuki (eds)(2nd), Nihon no iaanarizumu: Taishü no kokoro 
o tsukandaka (Japanese Journalism: has it captured the spirit of the masses? (Tokyo:
Yuhikaku, 1997), and for a history of the rise of presently prestigious newspapers such as Asahi, 
and Mainichi read Daba Hiroshi, "Oshimbunsha: Sono iinmvaku kinmvaku no kenkvu"" fBig 
Newspapers: Research on the human and money connections! (Tokyo: Hamano Shuppan,
1996) .
Prior to the Meiji period, censorship in Japan targeted books and woodblock prints concerned 
with Christianity, foreign affairs, the Tokugawa family and their allies. Censorship was self- 
policed through book guilds and mutual survilliance groups. The earliest form of Japanese 
newspapers, so-called Yomiuri (reading and selling), or kawaraban (slate impression), a single 
sheet paper, limited themselves printing news related to non-sensitive matters like disasters, 
earthquakes, supernatural occurrences, and domestic stories like love suicides. James Huffman, 
Creating a Public: People and the Press in Meiji Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1997) , pp. 13-14, 21-22.
Kökö Shimbun was launched on May 24, 1868. The creator, Fukuchi Genichirö, who had 
previously been in Europe, used his European experience in producing a newspaper for everyone, 
including 'women and children'. The newspaper was accordingly filled with a variety of 
columns, such as news, gossips about officials and samurais, correspondence, and translations 
from foreign newspapers. The paper was also well-known for its depth in political 
commentaries. See James Huffman, Politics of the Meiii Press : The Life of Fukuchi Genichirö. 
op. cit, pp. 47-50.
It was evident that they launched pro-Shogunate papers in order to offer competing views against 
the government's own publication called Dajökan nisshi (Council of State Journal), which had 
been a main instrument in disseminating official information about the new Meiji government 
and its policies. Fidgor, op. cit, p. 3.
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The first formal censorship law came as a means to suppress these anti- 
government newspapers which became increasingly popular with their reports of the 
civil war.36 The Decree of 1868 stipulated that publishers must seek government 
licenses, and that commencing a publication without permission was prohibited.37 
Despite the introduction of this law, the anti-govemment papers became increasingly 
strident. The government could only use tough extralegal controls to obviate the paper 
and its editor. For instance, Fukuchi Genichiro, was attacked in his house by gun 
troops, and was arrested soon after on charges of assistance to resisters after he had 
strongly criticized the Meiji Government in his editorial pieces. He was later released, 
but his printing blocks were seized and his publication of Koko Shimbun was 
prohibited.38
The Meiji statesmen determined to further curb the obstreperous press by 
designing two censorship decrees. The first came about seven days after Fukuchi's 
release, and provided punishment for publisher, editor and vendor who did not have 
licenses, and confiscation of printing blocks and binding equipment. As a result, all Edo 
newspapers were closed down on that day, as their publishers had to seek publishing 
licenses before resuming printing. Yet a few newspapers, most of which were those 
protected by extraterritoriality, were reissued afterwards.39 The second law, the 
Newspaper Publication Ordinance (Shimbunshi inkö jö re i), for the first time dealt with 
the newspaper content by specifying matters that could and could not be published.40
Battle reports from the Boshin War between the Meiji army and Tokugawa loyalists became the 
core of the newspapers' reports. Huffman, Creating a Public: People and the Press in Meiji 
Japan, p. 39.
Fidgor, op. cit., p. 4.
Huffman, Politics of the Meiii Press, op. cit., pp. 55-9.
There were only three non-governmental newspapers remaining in Japan after August 1868. 
These were Moshiogusa in Yokohama and Bankoku Shimbun, both of which had foreign 
editors, and thus were protected by the extraterritoriality, and a pro-government newspaper in 
Osaka was also exempted, the Nagai Shimbun. See Huffman, Creating a Public: People and the 
Press in Meiji Japan, p. 45.
For instance, contents which were related to "unusual natural events, prices, commerce, politics, 
military affairs, fires, marriages, births and deaths, art, recreation, food, clothing, official 
announcements, translation of Western books, and foreign news" were allowed to be published 
as long as they did not jeopardize social values The law forbade the mentioning o f matters that 
sound "indiscriminate criticism of the government and laws, criticism of individuals, preaching 
religious doctrines and false explanation o f military affairs", and that the publishers were required 
to submit two copies of each issue for inspection and to publish the paper titles as well as 
publishers' and editors' names in each issue. Fidgor, op.cit., p. 6.
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Scholars on the subject of the Meiji Press, such as Fidgor and Huffman, have forcefully 
argued that this law was actually 'progressive', as it did not stipulate pre-censorship 
(only self-policing guidelines), and thus was cmcial in stimulating the rise of an 
independent press, which helped create an era of popular press in the early Meiji 
period.41
Four years after the Publication Law of 1869 had been promulgated, the 
government's adoption of a 'civilization and enlightenment' (bunmei kaika) policy 
began.42 The government believed that through newspapers it could seek to shape 
public opinion in support of its policies, and abruptly changed its relationship with the 
press, from one of total suppression to one of mutual sponsoring 43 Newspapers were 
now assisted both financially and editorially by the central government and local 
administrations.44 Editors were financially motivated to self-censor, and publish 
suitably moderate political views. The government's orchestration of this reward 
subsidy and payroll strategy proved so effective that it was able to persuade the 
previously hypercritical Fukuchi to become an editor of Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, a 
semi-official paper. Likewise, other editors were uneasy with competitive pressures, 
were even induced to turn their publications into fully official papers, or goyö
Peter Fidgor, "Newspaper and Their Regulation in the Early Meiji Japan"; James Huffman, 
Creating a Public: People and the Press in Meiii Japan, p. 60; Mitchell, Censorship in 
Imperial Japan, p. 34. Evidently, there was a remarkable growth of number of newspapers 
published in this period. For instance, there were 84 newspapers published between 1871 and 
1873, and by 1877 there were as many as 225 newspapers published in Japan.
A policy that was aimed to transform Japan from a traditional to a modem nation, one in which 
the state and the people held a common desire to maximize all their resources in order to build a 
rich country, strong military (fukoku kyöhei). Peter Fidgor, op. cit., p. 7.
As stated with the authoritative words, "Kaika no sendo, bunmei no shökei wa shimbunshi 
ni shiku mono nashi " (There is nothing equivalent to the newspaper in leading to 
enlightenment,and hastening the civilization), Uchigawa and Arai, Nihon no jaanarizumu : 
Taishü no kokoro o tsukandaka (Japanese Journalism: has it captured the mass spirits?)
(Tokyo: Yühikaku, 1997), p. 8.; See also Chapter 3: Serving the Government 1868-1874 in 
James Huffman, Creating a Public: People and the Press in Meiji Japan, op. cit.
Firstly, the Finance Ministry purchased three copies of every issue of Shimbun Zasshi, Tokyo 
Nichichi Shimbun, Yokohma Mainichi Shimbun, and Nisshin Shinjishi and distributed them 
to seventy-two prefectures and three major cities (Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka). Secondly, the 
central government assisted in the development of metal type printing to replace wooden blocks. 
Thirdly, local governments established a kind of newspaper reading groups, called Shimbun 
Kaiwakai (Newspaper Conversation Association), in order to promote newspaper reading 
among the general public, including women and children. And lastly, reporters of certain 
newspapers were allowed to attend court hearings, and publish the reports. See Uchigawa and 
Arai, op. cit., p. 6; Fidgor, op. cit, pp. 8-9.
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shimbun.45
Indeed, the government assistance package encouraged an overall growth of the 
number of Japanese newspapers. As newspapers flourished, they became increasingly 
competitive and politicized, especially following the rise of the People's Rights 
Movement (jiyü minken undo) in 1874, which called for the election of a national 
assembly and the promulgation of the constitution. The split in the mainstream politics 
led to lively political debate in the press. The press published diverse views of liberal 
rights and politics, and strongly criticized government policies. The relationship 
between the government and the newspapers became increasingly strained. Following its 
failure in attempting to buy out opposition newspapers, the government withdrew most 
of its newspaper assistance and issued a new Press Ordinance in 187546, which 
prohibited newspapers from having foreign publishers and editors47, and contained a list 
of penalties. To further restrict the strident newspapers, the Meiji statesmen also 
revised the Dajökan Decree No.98, which allowed for the suspension of a newspaper 
that violated public order.48 The new regulations including the Press Ordinance of 1883, 
which added the new system of security bonds in return for permission to publish,49
For instance, John Black, an editor of Nisshin Shinjishi had to accept assistance from the 
government because of his financial problems, and thus he had to run his newspaper as an 
official organ for the Ministry of Finance (Okurashö) and the Left Chamber (Sa-In ) in return. 
See Huffman, Creating a Public: People and the Press in Meiji Japan, op. cit, p. 53.
This law required newspaper publication to apply to the Home Ministry (Naimushö), to give a 
license permission, instead of the formerly empowered Education Administration Office (Gakkö 
Gyöseikan). It also punished the newspapers with content that criticized the law or the Imperial 
family, or defamed an individual of a crime, or reported the court procedure, or published 
unauthorized memorials or petitions presented to the government, or incited criminal behaviors 
or instigate riots. Fidgor, op. cit., p. 15.
John Black, mentioned earlier as the Irish owner and the editor of Nisshin Shinjishi had to 
cease his publication three months after the promulgation of the new press law. His following 
attempt to launch another newspaper under the old name, Bankoku Shimbun, lasted barely a 
week, as the authority sought the British Consulate to take action against the paper. A scholar 
on the subject saw the ban on Bankoku Shimbun as a government crusade to end 
extraterritoriality in Japan. Yet extraterritoriality in Japan was not finally abolished until after 
1899. See J.E. Hoare, "The 'Bankoku Shimbun' Affair: Foreigners, the Japanese Press and 
Extraterritoriality in Early Meiji Japan", Modem Asian Studies. 1975, 9(3), pp. 289-302.
The application of these two laws was so pervasive that in 1876 alone there were as many as 
five newspapers banned, and eighty-six journalists jailed. Uchigawa and Arai, Nihon no 
iaanarizumu (Japanese Journalism!, op. cit., p. 11.
All newspapers except those dealing exclusively with science, art, statistics, government 
directives, or price reports, were required to deposit a large sum of money with the government 
to guarantee their compliance with legal requirements. The deposit was set at 1,000 yen for 
newspapers in Tokyo, 700 yen for newspapers in major cities, and 350 yen for newspapers 
elsewhere. Mitchell. Censorship in Imperial Japan, op. cit., p. 78.
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represented a recognition by the government that the press had an important function to 
serve, not as a government watchdog, but as a tool of the state.
Yet the press’s unified campaign for people's rights was successful in setting an 
agenda for subsequent political changes despite the existence of harsh press laws. As 
Huffman explains:
The press played a central role in making the jiyu minken era possible, 
spreading information about the movement's key activities, providing a 
rationale for its central positions, and agitating directly for wider support.
The most obvious, or at least the most traditional, press role was 
informational.50
However, despite of such progressive political changes, freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, and association were, however, strictly limited under Article 29 of the Meiji 
Constitution. The article read: "Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of law, enjoy 
the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings, and associations".51 Yet 
these 'limits of law' included constitutional clauses on military service, the secrecy of 
court and Diet proceedings, administrative prerogatives, emergency executive powers, 
and parliamentary laws which might eradicate press autonomy.52 In particular, new legal 
and extralegal controls were designed to curb the opposition press. For instance, the 
1909 Press Ordinance doubled the amount of the security money, and allowed the 
authorities to ban particular issues of a journal from sale and distribution, and to 
confiscate all copies when the journal was deemed to disturb public peace and morals.53 
Several extralegal control mechanisms in the forms of 'warnings’, 'suggestions', and 
'advice' were also employed to elicit compliance and encourage self-censorship among 
publishers and journalists.
‘Warnings’ seemed to have been the favorite government device, and often
James L. Huffman, Creating a Public: People and the Press in Meiji Japan, op. cit., p. 101.
Ito Hirobumi, Commentaries on the Constiution on the Empire of Japan (Tokyo: Chüö 
Daigaku, 1906), cited in Gregory Kasza, The State and the Mass Media in Japan 1918-1945. 
(Berkeley University of California Press, 1988), p. 10.
Richard Mitchell compared the number of suspension orders issued by the Home Ministry 
before and after the promulgation of the Constitution and found out that there were more issued 
after the promulgation of the Constitution than previously, within a shorter time span. Mitchell, 
op. cit., p. 123.
Gregory Kasza, op. cit., p. 16.53
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yielded results, as most publishers who received a warning dared not disobey.54 
'Suggestions' and 'advice' were delivered through four levels of government interaction 
with the press. Firstly, the system of government deliberation councils (,Shingikai) 
brought bureaucrats and journalists together. Secondly, the establishment of the 
International Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association (Kokusai Shimbun Kyökai) 
was established to "promote 'exchanges' between the government and the executives of 
the newspaper companies".55 Thirdly, the Shunjü-kai, or Spring and Autumn 
Association was established to hold regular meeting in Spring and Autumn between the 
owners and editors of prominent newspapers, powerful government bureaucrats, and 
the Chiefs of the Police Bureau and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police. Finally, the 'press 
club' system, or 'kisha kurabu' (literally, reporters' club), was established to channel 
information to journalists from important ministries and agencies.56
The first reporters' club was originally an on-site newspaper reporters’ waiting 
room (shimbun kisha tamarijo, shimbun kisha hikaejö), established at the beginning of 
the 1880s. Later, this 'waiting room' gradually developed into "a place where official 
news for public dissemination was brought to reporters". By 1910, the use of the words 
"kurabu" and "kishakai" became widespread along with the rapidly increased number of 
clubs attached to ministries and agencies. The club also changed from an ordinary 
waiting room to a place where announcements were made, and news was gathered. A t 
kisha kurabu, relationships between the official sources and reporters were easily 
established and accumulated over years of newsgathering and personal entertainment.57
Wildes noted that "A favorite device is to send a policeman, or other attache, in plain clothes 
to the editors to warn against publishing items whose general knowledge is not convenient to 
officials. These men do not proffer their credentials, nor give their orders in written form, but 
often, in the case of foreign publications, command a Japanese employee to tell the editor that 
certain news must not be printed". Harry Emerson Wildes, Social Currents in Japan: With 
Special Reference to the Press (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927), p. 114. 
Yamamoto Taketoshi, "The Press Clubs of Japan", Journal of Japanese Studies. 1989, 15(2), p. 
383.
Mizuno Takeya, "Kisha kurabu kanren-shi " (History Related to the Reporters' Club), Nihon 
Shimbun Kvökai Kenkvüio Nenpö 1995. 13, p. 58.
It was claimed that Ökuma Shigenobu, the leader of a leading political party at that time, the 
Kaishintö, could form the press supports to the government schemes to sell properties in 
Hokkaido. Ökuma was well known for his accessibility to the press. His office at the party 
headquarters was claimed to be a place that journalists could freely come and go. He successfully 
persuaded a number of journalists to become politicians and his party members. The following 
Katsura Cabiet not only employed these tactics, but also used 'money, liquor, and women' to
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Through a calculated combination of enticements, entertainment, and the privilege 
provided by public offices to which the club-journalists were attached, the Meiji 
government claimed to have succeeded in transforming the club journalists into 
’’transcription machines".58
By the end of the Meiji period, individual clubs established rules that closely 
interlocked the press and the state. These rules promoted a shift to a pro-government 
stance among Japanese newspapers, and self-restraint among the journalists. As a result, 
the political newspapers (öshimbun) lost ground to the more popular newspapers 
(koshimbun) not only because they abandoned their critical stance against the 
government, but also because informative reporting became increasingly necessary due 
to the monopolization of news promoted by the Japanese administrative techniques and 
the system of kisha kurabu.
However, it can be argued that the market in these periods of absolutism in 
Japan and Thailand appeared to be a countervailing force against the states’ coercive and 
reward instruments. The increased competitiveness in the newspaper market fostered 
the media's ability to access, interpret, and disseminate political information, and to 
reduce the state's ability to control the flow of political information. In particular, the 
highly competitive marketplace in Siam during the Sixth Reign forced the press to 
compete for urban Siamese readers by publishing critical news and diverse editorial 
views. In this process, the press assumed an agenda-setting role moulding popular 
support for a constitutional democratic rule. Likewise, during the rise of the People's 
Rights Movements (jiyü minken undo) in Japan during the 1880s, the competition in the 
newspaper market pressured the press to offer varied political views and standpoints 
despite recurrent attacks from the government. The press campaign in promoting the 
People's Rights Movements was successful in setting an agenda for subsequent political 
changes. The Meiji Constitution that recognized freedom of speech was promulgated in
lure the press. See William de Lange, A History of Japanese Journalism: Japan's Press Club as
the Last Obstacle to a Mature Press (Richmond, UK: Japan Library, 1998), pp. 128-9.
58 Yamamoto Taketoshi, op. cit., pp. 371-88.
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1889, and this led to the establishment of a parliamentary system and the formation of 
political parties.
2.3 Censorship, Military Concerns and the State
In contrast to the civil revolutions in Europe or America, which were carried out by the 
commoners or the public from below, the Meiji Restoration in 1868 Japan and the 
Siamese Revolution in 1932 were carried out by the elite who, more or less, tended to 
continue absolutist methods of control. These elite imposed stringent laws to suppress 
attacks from those who were dissatisfied with the change. Although Constitutions were 
promulgated in both countries afterwards, the provisions protecting freedom of 
expression in both Constitutions were limited. Subsequent censorship imposed by the 
successive military regimes in Thailand (1938-1988) and military-led governments in 
Japan (1926-1945) clearly reflected the views of these military states that the press 
should serve not as a watchdog but as a servant of the state.
The overthrow of the absolute monarchy in Siam during June 1932 was 
organized by a group within the elite called the People's Party. This group consisted of 
middle-level military officers and overseas-graduated civil servants, who were motivated 
as much by the desire to protect and further their own interests as by a belief in 
constitutionalism.59 To suppress the oppositional newspapers, the People's Party 
enacted the Statutory Law of 1933.60 This law established a Bureau of Censorship to 
check all articles and news pieces against an official list of news sources.61 Publication
For further discussion, see Prudhisan Jumbala, Nation-building and Democratization in 
Thailand: A Political History (Bangkok: Chulalongkom Social Research Institute, 1992), pp. 
22-23.
The Press Act of 1933 included Section 18(1) and (3) which forbade the press to publish articles 
detrimental to public order and good morals, or which were aimed against foreign powers that 
had treaty relations with Thailand. Section 26 added that in time of war or when there was 
danger of internal disorder, the government would require all newspapers to submit publishable 
materials to the official censor for examination. Section 39 stated that the Press Office was 
empowered to publish in the Government Gazette an order prohibiting the importation o f any 
newspapers specified by name in that order. Appropriate fines and punishments were also listed. 
This act was aimed at curbing the pro-monarchy, anti-govemment papers such as Krungthep 
Daily Mail, Thai Mai, and Shaay Kamakorn. It also enhanced a demarcation between the pro- 
government press, anti-govemment press, and neutral press in that era.
Supapan, op. cit., p. 103. See also Thammakiet Kanari, "60 p i prachatippatai thai kab 
nungsuphim" (60 Democratic Years and the Newspapers in Thailand), Wan nak-khao 5 
minakhom 2536 (Reporters’ Dav March 5. 19931. The Reporters' Association of Thailand,
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of news from unapproved sources, and editors with less than twelve years of education 
were prohibited.62 Consequently, twenty-one newspapers were closed in less than one 
year for minor misconduct.63 For example, Lak Muang was closed because of its 
publication of a letter to the editor written by a Thai living in Beijing. This reader wrote 
to congratulate the newly established democracy, and attack the disadvantages of the 
monarchical system.64
When a leading military figure within the People's Party, Field Marshal 
Phibulsongkram, became Prime Minister,65 the newspapers and broadcasting media 
were employed as propaganda tools to spreading and propagate his nationalist 
ideologies and policies, including a new set of social and moral values.66 Newspapers 
that did not conform to the regime's orders were subject to severe penalty and closure.67 
The new Press Act of 1941, imposed by the Phibul's regime, gave absolute authority to 
the police and provincial governors in censoring news reports, revoking publishing 
licenses, prohibiting sale and distribution, as well as closing down publications that were 
deemed to jeopardize law and order and public morality during trie Second World War or
62
63
64
65
66
67
March 5, 1993, pp. 76-86. Thammakiet argued that the People's Party suppressed the 
newspapers for two main reasons: to prevent the royalists from regaining their power, and to 
prevent any chance of foreign intervention.
Supapan, op. cit., p. 103.
From May 1993 to April 1994, there were overall twenty-one newspapers that received orders of 
closure. Ibid., pp. 104-12.
Lak Muang was closed for three days on the ground that it was agitating the order and the peace 
of the country. See Thammakiet Kanari, "60 p i prachatippatai thai kab nungsuphim" (60 
Democratic Years and the Newspapers in Thailand), Wan nak-kkao 5 tninakhom 2536 
^Reporters' Dav March 5. 19931 (Bangkok: The Reporters' Association of Thailand, 1993), p. 
81.
At the end of 1938, there were several newspapers, such as Siam Review, Thai Kasem Ruam 
Khao, Issara, and Siam Rath, which appeared to favor the rise of of military. They supported 
for the so-called duty and righteousness of the military in protecting and preserving the national 
constitution. This paved the way to an emergence of a military leader, Field Marshal 
Phibulsongkram, who seized the premiership and the position of the Chief Commander of the 
Army. See Ibid.
For example, the Phibul's government regulated for newspapers to print the official slogan - 
"The nation is safe if we believe our leader", on the front page every issue. See detailed 
discussion in Pompirom Iamtham, Bot-bat thang kan-muang khong nungsuphim thai (2475- 
2488) (The Political Role of the Thai Press (1932-19451 (Bangkok: Thai Wattanapanich,
1977), p. 63.
In particular, the Phibul's government devised Article 34 of the new Publication Act of 1941, 
which dealt with newspapers that issued critical comments that might endanger the 
international relations.
the concomitant states of emergency.68 While the Director-General of the Police 
Department had authority to censor the press, the Minister of Interior could judge 
whether a particular article was offensive to public order and morals, and he had 
complete power to decide whether to suspend or confiscate an offending paper.69 Based 
on his unilateral power to shut down the paper, there was absolutely no way that the 
press could legally fight the Minister's censorship power.
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Furthermore, in 1942 a provision was added to the Press Act of 1941. A 
minimum capital investment of 50,000 baht was deemed necessary to establish a 
publishing business, supposedly to ensure the raising of printing standards. Yet this 
provision was interpreted by newspapermen as an effective means of control, because 
many newspapers were closed down, and a number amalgamated as a result.70 The 
degree of punishment stipulated in this Press Act of 1941 was also reinforced by 
Section 5 of the Anti-communist or "Un-Thai" Activities Act of 1952, which made a 
number of press offenses subject to criminal rather than civil action and considerably 
stiffened penalties.71 Indeed journalists at that time were kept in line by increases in 
both formal censorship and 'extralegal' control. For instance, Police General Phao 
Sriyanon who assumed positions of the Deputy Minister of Interior was well-known 
for using his 'extralegal' control in dealing with the press.72 This extralegal control 
included intimidation, or serious and unexplained "accidents" occurring to editors 
unwilling to conform.73 Since the press was not allowed to report impartially, or to
These provisions also led to orders of closure even when the country was neither under any 
threat of was, nor in a state of emergency. See Pisith Shavalatawat, Kodmai seusan 
molchon (Mass Media Laws"). 6th ed. (Bangkok: Dok Ya, 1995); Also Manich Sooksomchitre, 
Khoomu kodmai thi na ru samrab nak-khao (Legal Manual for Reporter). 3rd ed. (Bangkok: TP 
Print, 1995).
Pira, op. cit, p. 97; Mitchell, op. cit., p. 217.
After the revised Publication Act o f 1941 was announced, the number of newspapers fell by half 
from 25 to 12. See Sukanya Tiravanit, Prawatkan nungsuphim thai phai nai rabob 
somburanavasitthirat (History of the Thai Press Under the Absolute Monarchy! (Bangkok:
Thai Wathanaphanich, 1977).
Paul Blackburn, “Communications and National Development in Thailand, Burma, and 
Malaysia: A Comparative Systemic Analysis”, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, The American 
University, 1971, pp. 93-4.
Mitchell, op. cit., p. 218.
Sommai has listed a number of interesting cases in which editors and journalists were 
assassinated or injured because of their attempts to investigate stories on the illegal actions of 
high rank officers, military and police officers, as well as reports regarding the unexplained death 
of King Rama VIII. See Sommai Parichatre, Khao cho cho khao: sudvod khao pulitzer
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stimulate independent thought, much of the press shifted its focus to entertainment and 
sensationalisation, serialising romantic novels, and Chinese kung-fu fiction.
At the end of the Second World War, the press clearly became a political tool as 
they were divided into pro-Phibul, and anti-Phibul factions.74 Partisan newspapers also 
attacked one another as a part of contest for power between military cliques.75 Indeed, 
this pattern of the Thai press well reflected the Thai notion of 'semidemocracy’ -- 
competition for power was not linked with the electorate but with factions in the 
military.76 The press not only became outlets for particular individuals who led cliques 
within the militaristic government, but also a stage for launching the political careers of 
ambitious individuals. It was unthinkable in those days that a half-Chinese bom in a 
merchant family outside Bangkok would one day become an elected member of 
parliament, given the mainstream attitudes towards Chinese immigrants. However, 
Prasit Kanjanawat made this possible by launching his own weekly paper Kan-muang, 
and having an interest in another daily paper, Thai Mai, both of which aired his views.77 
Thus, the press in this period was not only sensational in nature but mostly biased in 
regard to politics.
In 1948, Phibul staged a coup d'etat and returned to the premiership after being
nungsuphim thai (Investigative News: The Best 'Pulitzer' Stories in the Thai Newspapers! 
(Bangkok: Matichon, 1993), pp. 65-66.
For example, when the result of the 1957 national election was judged fraudulent by the public 
and the press, the government prohibited all public servants from reading any other 
newspapers except Phibul's own Thammatipat.
As already mentioned, Field Marshal Phibul had his own newspaper, 'Thammatipat", and was 
closely associated with one English-language newspaper, 'Bangkok Tribune '. Police-General 
Pao Sriyanon, who headed Soi Rajakru clique or police clique, owned 'Phao Thai', and '2500', 
as well as an English-language newspaper with a pro-American stance, 'Bangkok World'. The Si 
Sao Theves clique led by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat owned 'Sanseree' and 'Thai Rai Wan'. In 
1955 approximately 8 out of 22 Thai-language newspapers at that time were said to be owned or 
supported by leaders of military clique. The contestation was so severe that the government 
even blocked the opposition papers an access to paper supplies. As most of the quality printing 
paper was imported, the opposition papers needed to convert to the poorer quality rice paper.
See Sukanya Tiravanit, "Kan nungsuphim nai prathet thai" (Thai Newspapers), op. cit, p.9.; 
and Thomas Fitzsimmons, Thailand, op. cit, p. 209.
Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "Thailand: A Stable Semidemocracy", in L. Diamond et al. (eds.), 
Politics in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 276-7.
Prasit later became deputy ministers in the Sarit and Thanom administrations. See Kasien 
Tejapira, "Imagined Uncommunity: The Lookjin Middle Class and Thai Official Nationalism", 
in D. Chirot and A. Reid (eds.), Essential Outsiders: Chinese and the Jews in the Modem 
Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe (Washington: University of Washington 
Press, 1997), pp. 82-3.
62
jailed as a war criminal. A successful crusade for a freer press was led by the Press 
Association of Thailand, in the sense that the power to censor the press was removed 
from the Director-General of the Police Department and transferred to the provincial 
governors, who were considerably less threatening agents of law enforcement than the 
police.78 Nevertheless, the direct control of press censorship returned to the Police 
Department after Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat organized a coup d''etat and ordered 
strict press control under the Revolutionary Order No. 17 issued in 1958.
'National Security' has been frequently used as an excuse by military 
governments to curb press freedom.79 Sarit claimed that 'national security' dictated the 
licensing of all publications, and any publications that were issued with statements 
alleging the instigation of subversive activities or offences caused to the King or the 
government, or the divulging of official secrets, were subject to severe punishment.80 By 
1959, there were a total of nine legal provisions that were directly associated with the 
press.81 The Sarit administration also had its Department of propaganda write pro- 
government news reports for the newspapers.82 Consequently, the press could serve 
little function but to publish official stories and avoid reporting sensitive stories. 
Journalists who did not conform to the order were to be arrested and face long jail terms 
under martial law. All charges against publications that were considered 'political cases',
Because of a decline in power, Phibul attempted to regain supports from the public. After his 
return from a tour of the United States and United Kingdom, he allowed regular press 
conferences and Hyde Park meetings at the Central Park of Bangkok. However, this public space 
continued only for a short period. The government saw it as a threat because most speech 
delivered at the Hype Park meetings and the press conferences clearly demonstrated the disunity 
within the government. See Fitzsimmons, op. cit., p. 226.
Suchit Bunbongkam has suggested that Thai military leaders have shared a very broad concept 
of ‘national security’, one which is not only limited to military factors, but also includes social, 
economic, political, psychological factors. It was also widely believed by military governments 
in the past that controlling the media was an important ingredient in creating psychological 
cohesiveness among the public, and thus, promoting national security. See Suchit 
Bunbongkam, "Thailand: The Military and Development for National Security" in J.
Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun Cheong (eds.), Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia. 
2nd ed. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 133-162.
Boonrak Boonyaketamala, "Thailand", op. cit., p. 340.
These were: Martial Law, the State of Emergency, Revolutionary Order No. 17, the Publication 
Act of 1941, the Communist Ac, Revolutionary Orders No. 12, 21,31, and 43 which largely 
empowered the officer to detain suspected communists and gangsters without going through 
court, Criminal Law, Civil Law, and Juvenile Court Regulations.
Sukanya Tiravanit, Prawatkan nungsuphim thai phai nai rabob somburanavasitthirat (History 
of the Thai Press Under the Absolute Monarchy! (Bangkok: Thai Wathanaphanich, 1977), p.
92.
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and journalists who were considered 'communist suspects', were referred to military 
tribunals and not the civil courts.83 This new law made obtaining a license for a new 
publication very difficult. Newspaper licenses thus became scarce commodities, which 
led to the practice of selling and hiring newspaper licenses for profit-making.84
Due to Sarit's sudden death in 1963, his political heir, Field Marshal Thanom
Kittikhachom, became Prime Minister. For the first time in many years, the press was
allowed to clearly express their opinions. Yet by then journalists had learnt by
experience how far they could go without risking suppression. The new Constitution
drafted by Thanom's administration still maintained that freedom of speech was
subjected to the provision of special laws, and Order No. 17 remained intact.
Nonetheless, for the first time newspaper publishing emerged as a profit-making
industry. Due to the increased competition for commercial money and higher circulation,
an increasing number of newspapers became political 'guard dogs', merely protecting
their commercial interests and preserving the status quo. The content of the Thai press
under the Thanom administration was well reflected in Boonrak's comments:
The decay of political morality resulted in unimaginative journalism which 
tamely conformed to the political whims o f the military men in power.
Businessmen who invested in newspaper enterprises in this political setting 
seemed to seek merely commercial ends from newspaper publishing.85
However, the newspapers under Thanom's administration had much more 
freedom than before, to the extent that some newspapers with neutral political 
orientations started to reflect the growing dissatisfaction of the public with the 
government's performance, which eventually led to the 1973 students' revolution. These 
democratic rallies were organized to oust Thanom Kittikhachom and his powerful aides
Dangtoi Sangchan compiled a detailed list of Sarit's suppressive order imposed on the press. 
For example, on October 22, 1958, Sarit ordered the arrest o f fifty-three editors and journalists, 
and a closure of ten newspapers, two of which were Chinese, in one day on the suspicion of 
being involved in Communist activities. See Dangtoi Sangchan, “Freedom o f the Press in 
Thailand”. Unpublished Master of Arts Thesis, North Texas State University, 1976.
The market price of a newspaper license rose from 20,000-30,000 baht to about a million baht 
or over after Order No. 17 was in use. See detailed examples of newspaper trading in this period 
in Soombooon Vorapong, Bon sen-thang nungsuphim tOn the Newspapers' Path). 3rd ed. 
(Bangkok: Dok Ya, 1995), pp. 158-62.
Boonrak, op. cit, p. 344.
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from the country.86 They successfully re-ignited the democratic spirit among the public 
to the extent that the new royally appointed interim government of Prime Minister 
Sanya Thammasak drafted a Constitution guaranteeing freedom of the press, and 
abolished the use of martial laws and Order No. 17. This was a landmark period,87 as 
Wyatt observes: "public expression was exceptionally free, and newspapers and 
magazines circulated all shades of opinion".88 Boonrak has explicitly argued that this 
period brought fundamental changes to the Thai press system ~  one of them being that 
the press progressed towards becoming the real watchdog of a democratic society.89
However, it was also evident that some newspaper journalists were not qualified 
for the 'watchdog' role. They were not used to the long overdue press freedom. Their 
news reports were biased and opinionated because of their own personal and political 
interests, especially during the frequent political turbulence in 1976.90 Evidently, some 
large national newspapers, which had close links with the administration, were 
employed by the state to create feelings of anti-communism. For instance, in 1976 the 
coverage of a series of student protests against the return of Field Marshal Thanom 
from exile to lead the life of a Buddhist monk reinforced the division between the left- 
wing groups and the right-wing groups, and accelerated the violence.91 Two influential
In 1973, the Thai government was apparently controlled by a totally corrupt and ruthless 
military trio: Thanom Kittikhachom, Praphat Charusathien, and Thanom's son, Narong 
Kittikhachom.
Indeed, during this period, there was an unprecedentedly increase in a number of small, 
Bangkok-based, articulated and critical newspapers published in favors of pro-democratic 
activities such as Prachachart, Prachatippatai, Athipat, Sieng-Mai, and so on. Sukanya 
Tiravanit, uKan nungsuphim nai prathet thaf (Newspapers in Thailand), op. cit., p. 10.
Wyatt, op. cit., p. 300.
Boonrak, op. cit., pp. 361-2.
After the student revolution of 1973, the political landscape in Thailand was filled with 
problems and conflicts between the revolutionary leftists such as peasants, teachers, laborers 
and students, and the conservative rightists including military personnel, administrators and 
public servants. There were frequent reports of rallies and protests, with some ending military 
violence. The press in this period was clearly divided into ‘pro-demonstrator’, ‘anti­
demonstrator’, and ‘neutral’ newspapers. Pro-demonstrator newspapers included Athipat, 
Prachathippatai, and other small campus newspapers. Anti-demonstrator newspapers were those 
papers with close ties with the ruling elite and the military. These included Dao Siam, Ban 
Muang, and Siam Rath. Neutral papers included Thai Rath and Sieng Puang Chon. However, 
these neutral papers also inclined to protect the political interests of the elite in order to preserve 
the status quo. See further discussion in Wilasinee Pipithkul, "Thob-thuan jud yuen 
nungsuphim jak sibsi tula thueng pathiroop kan-muang" (Revision of the Press' Standpoint 
from the Oct 14th Crisis to Political Reform), in Jub-iong tnong seu (Media Watch)
(Bangkok: Krongkam Susantiphap, 1998), pp. 102-7.
The national press carried an interview with Kittiwutto, a monk who was a co-leader of the 
Nawapol Group. He suggested that it was not sinful to kill communists.
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newspapers, Bangkok Post and Dao Siam published a photograph of the student's re­
enactment of the brutal murder of two workers, who were accused of being communists 
after distributing pamphlets protesting Thanom's return. These publications ignited the 
bloodshed of 6 October 1976, in which hundreds of students who were accused of pro­
communism were murdered, and thousands were arrested.92
On that same day, a group called the "National Administration Reform Council" 
organized a coup d' etat and issued an order to close down all newspapers, and set up an 
"Information Examining Committee" (Khana kamakan trauchsoab khaosan) to consider 
which newspapers might re-open on the next day.93 The new administration launched 
its own newspaper, Chao Praya, and further curbed the press freedom by promulgating 
Decree No. 42 (Por. Ror. 42), which outlined principles that the press must follow, in 
addition to those stipulated in the Press Act of 1941. The Decree was reminiscent of 
Order No. 17 in Sarit's era, but returned censorship power to the Minister of Interior, 
who was vested with the complete authority to close down a newspaper 94
Samrueng Kampau, a veteran newspaperman, observed three subsequent 
governments that continued to impose the Decree No.42 on the press and mentioned 
that "despite using the same legislation, each government applied it differently" 95 
Indeed, stability in a political environment was a cmcial factor in how one example of
Dao Siam newspaper, in particular, was recognized as a right-wing newspaper. It publicized the 
photograph of the reenactment by Thammasat students of the brutual murder of two workers 
who protested against the return of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikhachom. This photograph 
immediately ignited an anger among the right wing group as they began to point out that the 
photo of one of the actors resembled the Crown Prince. Although there has been no clear 
evidence whether the photographs have been touched up to inflame the situation, it is 
understood by many political activists that the private press at that time allowed intervention 
from pohtical power holders to ensure political survival and patronage. For further details of the 
event see Puey Ungpakom, "Violence and the Military Coup in Thailand", Bulletin of 
Concerned Asian Scholars. July-September 1977, 9(3), pp. 4-12.
Sukanya,Tiravanit, “Kan nungsuphim nai prathet thai" (Newspapers in Thailand), op.cit., p. 
15.
It prohibited publishing statements or pictures that were offensive to the King, the royal family, 
the nation, the government or government departments; that implicated any corruption within 
the government or presented a distorted, contemptuous, or insulting image of the government; 
that propagated communism; that were untrue and likely to create fear and endanger social peace 
and order; that were pornographic, obscene or coarse, or likely to injure the morals and culture 
of the nation; and that were official secrets. See Pira, op. cit., pp. 97-8.
Samroeng Khamphau, Mong wongkan nungsuphim (A Look Into the Newspaper Industry! 
(Bangkok: Samnakphim Phirap, 1989), p. 10.
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censorship legislation was imposed on the press in various ways. In the years of 
political crisis during the Thanin (1976-77) and Kriengsak (1977-80) administrations, 
the Decree No.42 was largely applied. Many newspapers were unjustifiably closed 
down so frequently that some avoided altogether the reporting of political news or 
critical comments.96 On the contrary, under General Prem's long-term administration 
(1980-88), censorship was very relaxed due to a close relationship between General 
Prem and major newspaper owners, and the authority to close down newspapers was 
moved from the Minister of Interior to the Supreme Court Judge. During General Prem's 
leadership, no newspaper was closed down.97
A striking similarity between the Thai military states and the military-dominated 
governments in Japan in the early Showa era (1926-1945) was marked in the sense that 
both coercive and reward instruments were applied to direct press discourse towards 
promoting nationalism. Throughout this period, the military states were portrayed as 
protectors of national security that unified and advanced the nation. In Japan, restrictive 
regulatory press controls and an extensive yet subtle network of self-censorship 
developed in the early years of the Meiji administration, continued undisrupted into the 
Taisho period (1912-1925), and into the years of military rule. It was this kind of 
practice that prompted Huffman to note that: "when possible, officials tried to win 
journalists over to their side, when that did not work, they used coercion and control" 98 
Indeed, the intricate web of coercive and reward strategies employed by the government 
was heavily reinforced by both laws and administrative techniques. For example, as the 
number of newspapers and circulations grew, the number of kisha kurabu also rose.99
For example, throughout November 1978 the printing officer of Bangkok revoked the 
publication and editors' licenses o f 57 dailies and threatened legal action against 32 other 
dailies, claiming that they violated the Printing Act since they published weekly and not daily 
as their licenses indicated. John Lent (ed.), "After 1975: Another Downswing", Newspapers in 
Asia: Contemporary Trends and Problems IHong Kong: Heineman Educational Books, 1982), 
p. 366.
General Prem Tinsulanonda had a very gentle personality. He could thus easily develop a 
very close relationship with the press. He called all journalists ‘look ’, meaning ‘son’, and the 
press called him ‘Pa’, or ‘Daddy’. Not surprisingly, no journalist during this period tried to 
bring his homosexuality into news coverage. This cosy relationship between him and the press 
has been claimed to have strengthened and lengthened his premiership for as long as eight years 
despite cabinet reshuffles.
Huffman. Creating a Public : People and the Press in Meiii Japan, op. cit., p. 165.
While there were thirty-seven clubs in Tokyo in 1925, this number rose to sixty clubs in 1936.
Further, the ties between the government and the press were reinforced by relationships 
developed at the personal level, through which more and more politicians became editors 
and journalists, and vice versa.100
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As the Japanese government undertook a course of colonial expansion, it revived 
prior press censorship on all news items connected with the military by issuing a 
special Emergency Imperial Ordinance.101 Furthermore, all matters affecting the Imperial 
Household were subjected to close scrutiny, and defamation against the Imperial family 
(fukeizai) would receive criminal conviction. Any publications with negative references 
to any members of the Imperial Family would be suspended, and their editors would be 
jailed.102 The government also commenced what Mitchell called "a relentless campaign 
of harassment"103, by using techniques of surveillance, appeals to patriotism, 
intimidation and assaults.104 For instance, Asahfs founder, Murayama Ryohei, was 
reportedly attacked by a right-wing group for printing articles about the 1918 rice riots 
in his Osaka Asahi Shimbun, which supposedly disturbed public peace.105 Following
By 1939, there were as many as eighty-four clubs. See Mizuno Takeya, "Kisha kurabu 
kanren-shi " (History Related to the Reporters' Club), Nihon Shimbun Kvökai Kenkyüio Nenpö 
1995, 13, pp. 58-9.
100 Kawabe Kisaburo, The Press and Politics in Japan: A Study of the Relation between the 
Newspaper and the Political Development in Japan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1921). Kawabe notes, for example, that Ki Inukai, the leader of the Nationalist Party (.Koknmin- 
to ), a former Minister of Education, Katsundo Minoura, and Yukio Ozaki (both leaders of 
Kenseikai who also held ministerial posts) all worked for the Yübin Höchi Shimbun, while 
Seiji Hayagawa, an ex-vice speaker of the House of Representatives, and Tokitoshi Takemori, 
an ex-Minister of Finance, were also ex-journalists.
101 According to the Article 3 of the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor could issue 'Emergency 
Imperial Ordinances' to maintain public peace or to avoid disasters resulting from such 
situations. These 'Emergency Imperial Ordinances' were similar to the Marshal Law, and they 
were issued by the Cabinet in the name of the Emperor. Okudaira Yasuhirö, Political 
Censorship in Japan From 1931 to 1945 (Pennsylvania: Institute of Legal Research, University 
of Pennsylvania, 1962), pp. 8-9.
102 The Twenty-sixth Century, an English publication, alleged a charge of forgery against Prince Ito 
and Count Hijikata, minister of Imperial Household, saying that the imperial seal had been 
wrongfully used. The charge had never been investigated but the paper was suspended and its 
printing equipment was seized as a consequence. Harry Emerson Wildes, Social Currents in 
Japan: With Special References to the Press (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), p. 
118.
103 Ibid., p. 136.
104 Ibid.
105 Even though, the samurais who attacked Murayama were later arrested, they escaped 
imprisonment. Instead, Murayama was obliged to temporarily retire from the presidency of 
Asahi as a means of showing repugnance to the liberalness of his paper. Harry Emerson Wildes, 
Social Currents in Japan: With Special Reference to the Press (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1927), p. I l l ;  Uchigawa Yoshimi and Arai Naoyuki, Nihon no iaanarizumu: 
taishü no kokoro o tsukanda ka (Japanese Journalism: has it captured the spirit of the masses?!. 
2nd ed. (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1997), p. 57; Daba Hiroshi, Daishimbunsha IBig Newspaper
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the rice riots, the government promulgated the Law to Control Radical Social 
Movements (Kageki Shakai Undo Torishimari Ho), which included a clause specifically 
dealing with socialist propaganda. 106
The subsequent government also initiated the ‘banning an article’ system as a 
framework of extralegal control. This system was aimed at preventing newspapers from 
printing any comments on topics covered by the ban. According to Mitchell, the 
‘banning an article order system’ had three categories of orders: firstly, an ‘instruction’ 
(shitatsu), or an order sent out to publishers reminding that if anything was published 
on a specific subject it would be prohibited; secondly, a ‘warning’ (keikoku)101, or a 
threat of probable prohibition; and lastly, a ‘consultation’ (kondan), or administrative 
advice not to publish on certain subjects. 108
Although these orders carried no penalties, the publishers and editors in the late 
Taisho and early Showa eras chose to follow these administrative techniques. 109 As a 
result of the state’s enactment of repressive laws, coupled with the extralegal efforts to 
exert control over the press, the press failed to act as the government’s watchdog. The 
extent of the failure of the press to accurately reflect the situation in the Japanese 
society of that time was aptly summed up in Wildes' comment:
Domestic news, thus closely supervised, is thoroughly untrustworthy,
Companies! (Tokyo: Hamano Shuppan, 1996), pp. 84-9.
Okudaira Yasuhirö argued that this piece of legislation was used not only to restrain 'socialist 
activities, but also to suppress 'democratic thought". Okudaira Yasuhirö, Political Censorship 
in Japan From 1931 to 1945. (Pennsylvania: Institute of Legal Research, University of 
Pennsylvania, 1962), p. 11; Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 190-1.
The use of warnings was the most extensive. During the depression years of 1929-1932, at least 
twenty-three warnings about the coverage of the bank failures were issued. There were nine 
warnings on lese majeste offenses following the assassination attempt on the Crown prince in 
1923, and seven warnings to silence on the reports on the pursuit of Communist suspects. See 
Gregory Kasza, The State and the Mass Media in Japan. 1918-1945 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), p. 33.
Mitchell, op. cit., p. 236. Consultations could be done through telephone calls, individual 
interviews, or group meetings arranged in conference halls or private restaurant rooms. 
According to Kasza, most of these consultation sessions were held in secret, and their contents 
were absolutely confidential. See also Gregory Kasza, op. cit., p. 173.
Okudaira Yasuhirö, for example, mentioned that, on occasion, newspaper writers avoided using 
words like 'dictatorship, proletariat, bourgeoisie, capitalism, socialism, communism, and so 
on', and replaced them with 'X' marks. For instance, instead of'communism', 'XXXXXXXXX' 
was inserted, noting that the number of Xs corresponded to the number of letters in the word. In 
one occasion, a journalist managed to fill a whole page with 'Xs' without any other letter. 
Okudaira Yasuhirö, op. cit., p. 12.
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because no perfect picture is presented of conditions in Japan. Neither the 
Japanese themselves nor foreigners can learn the truth about the Island 
Empire from the press...Within Japan itself the national solidarity is 
weakened by the failure of the press to give the full appreciation of the 
existing situations.110
Subsequent to the failed ultra-nationalist coup d'etat on February 26, 1936,111 
new censorship mechanisms came into force. The promulgation of the Extraordinary 
Control Law for Seditious Literature Bill (Fuon bunsho torishimari hoan) was 
specifically designed to punish journals and publication filled with seditious articles.112 
The Cabinet Information Committee (Naikaku jöhö iinkai ) was also established,113 as 
was the government’s Domei Tsüshinsha, a news agency designed to counterbalance 
‘anti-Japan propaganda’, and to centralize and monopolize news media.114 What is 
interesting here is how the government also incorporated certain extralegal actions to 
pressure the press into playing a more positive role in the war effort. One of the 
extralegal actions that proved extremely effective was the control of the paper supply, 
which was tantamount to forcing ‘voluntary liquidation’ among Japanese newspaper 
publishers.115 After it had been introduced, a number of daily newspapers dropped
no
in
112
113
114
115
Harry Emerson Wildes, Social Currents in Japan: With Special Reference to the Press 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927), p. 131.
Also known as "m niroku jiken". The militarists who organized the coup also attacked the 
Tokyo Office oiAsahi Shimbun, causing it to miss the evening edition. Komatsubara Hisao, in 
John A. Lent (ed.), Newspapers in Asia: Contemporary Trends and Problems (Hong Kong: 
Heinemann Asia, 1982), p. 106.
For example, anyone who distributed the so-called "seditious materials" was subject to a fine of 
up to three hundred yen. Richard Mitchell, op. cit., p. 279.
It later evolved into the Information Bureau (Jöhö kyoku) with members including 
representatives from the Army, Navy, Communication, Home and Foreign Ministries 
undertaking the duties of writing a government propaganda, and censoring publications.
Ibid., pp.281-2; See also Uchigawa Yoshimi and Arai Naoyuki, Nihon no iaanarizumu: taishü 
no kokoro o tsukandaka (Japanese Journalism: has it captured the spirits of the mass 
audiences?!. 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Yühikaku, 1997), p. 69.
Mitchell, op. cit., p. 305. This strategy involved three steps. Firstly, publishers were ordered to 
voluntarily reduced the number of their editions on the grounds that material resources had to be 
preserved, and the imported paper materials were rationed among the publications. Secondly, the 
authorities called for a policy of only one daily per prefecture (ikken isshi shugi). Lastly, the 
authorities introduced the franchising system to the newspaper publication. The number of 
dailies were further reduced as franchises to publish were awarded only to national (Asahi, 
Mainichi, and Yomiuri-Höchi), bloc (Nichi Nihon Shimbun in Fukuoka, Chübu Nihon 
Shimbun in Nagoya, Tokyo Shimbun in Tokyo, Hokkaido Shimbun in Hokkaido), and local 
papers in their respective prefectures. Press amalgamation was intensified with the sharing of 
circulation between the national and local press, in which the latter received bulk circulation 
as well as printing press from national papers. As a result of this forced amalgamation, the Big 
Three national papers - Asahi, Mainichi, and Yomiuri - were able to multiply their circulation, 
and accumulated wealth well into the postwar years. See Uchigawa Yoshimi and Arai Naoyuki, 
Nihon no iaanarizumu: taishü no kokoro o tsukandaka (Japanese Journalism: has it captured 
the spirits of the mass audiences?!. 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Yühikaku, 1997), p. 80.
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sharply from 1,200 in 1937 to a mere 55 in 1943, as most of them amalgamated and 
some permanently closed.116 Other extralegal controls the government frequently 
pursued at a personal level included kondankai (consultation meetings) and naimen 
shido (private guidance).117 These kondankai and naimen shido were largely 
implemented through kisha kurbu, and became recognized as institutionalized features 
of press controls during the war years (1937-1945).118
News and political information was further monopolized and suppressed by the 
introduction of new press laws,119 and the development of national press policy 
associations to oversee the reporters' clubs. These associations included Nihon Shimbun 
Renmei (Japan Newspapers League), established in 1941, and Nihon Shimbun-kai 
(Japan Newspapers Association), created in 1942.120 The Newspapers Association 
took over the responsibility of imposing sanctions on journalists who violated the club's
116
117
118
119
120
Ibid.
For example, editors of Tokyo's seven leading dailies and the one wire service {Domei 
Tsüshinsha ) met weekly with officials, who pressured the journalist to follow the 
government's 'Principles for the Guidance of Newspapers' issued in 1938. One of the principles, 
for example, read that "In writing any account, whether concerned with politics, economics, 
communities, or diplomacy, the editor needs to consider the following elements: its influence 
on the minds of the soldiers at the front; its influence on the mind of those at home; its impact 
upon foreign ministries; its influence on the newly established Government of China".
Okudaira Yasuhiro, Political Censorship in Japan From 1931 to 1945. (Pennsylvania: Institute 
of Legal Research, University of Pennsylvania, 1962), p. 25.
See Chapter two: The Press : The Consultation System, in Gregory Kasza, The State and the 
Mass Media in Japan. 1918-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 168-193. 
Richard Mitchell, op. cit., pp.321-334. Toward the end of the war, press policy was exacerbated 
by the Emergency Law for Control of Speech, Publication, Assembly and Association, and so 
forth {Genron Shuppan Shükan Kessha nado Rinji Torishimari Ho) promulgated in 1941, and 
the Publication Business Ordinance (Shuppan Jigyo Rei) issued in 1943. The former laws 
directly targeted at any heterodox opinion by giving the authorities a unilateral power to 
withdraw publication permission at will. The latter law forced journalists and editors to register, 
and editors were required to have professional licenses.
Mizuno Takeya, "Kisha kurabu kanren-shi " (History Related to the Reporters' Club), Nihon 
Shimbun Kvökai Kenkvüio Nenpö 1995 (1995 Annual Report of Japan's Newspaper 
Association Research Center). (13), p. 59. After the Japan Newspaper League was established, 
the number of Japanese clubs attached to governmental offices was reduced to a ratio of one per 
government office, i.e. from 30 down to 18. The name of the reporters' clubs were also changed 
uniformly to the name of each ministry, with the phrase "kisha kai" (reporters' association) 
added. In addition, the club rules were also redesigned in ways that ensured the permeation of 
the ultra-nationalist governmental policies through whole newspaper industry. The Newspaper 
Business Ordinance {Shimbun Jigyo Rei ) issued in December 1941, established regulations of 
kisha kurabu , or kurabu kiyaku. Within each club, there was also established reporters' rules or 
kisha kitei. The former association was initiated by the publishers and editors of the major 
national newspapers to work with government officials to bring the press clubs under joint 
control, and to undertake a key role in the paper rationing scheme; while, the latter replaced the 
former as a government backed organization which regulated the number of kisha kurabu by 
changing the basis of membership from individual to company basis, and limited membership 
to ten big news organizations.
regulations. These sanctions included warnings, suspension, expulsion, or removal from 
the reporters' list.121 (Notably, similar types of sanctions still exist today, though they 
are generally imposed by either the source or the individual club.) By 1945, only clubs 
attached to the military sections were functioning because all the government news and 
announcements came straight from the Information Bureau.122 Collectively suppressed 
by the purviews of both legal and extralegal control mechanisms, the Japanese press at 
the peak of the Pacific war could never question the course of events and could only 
serve as the government's tools, merely publishing official ‘announcements’, and 
‘directives’ as a consequence.
2.4 Revocation of Censorship and the Re-emergence of Partisan Press
The political and economic development in both countries has had substantial effects on 
the development of the press and political journalism. In Thailand, the political 
factionalism that has characterized the Thai politics since 1932, and strong linkages 
between the press and certain powerful political parties or individuals set the stage for a 
vicious circle of extremely partisan journalism. This trend was highly predominant until 
the years o f the economic boom in the late 1980s when the stock price and advertising 
revenue replaced private subsidies as a major source of revenue. For Japan, ideological 
differences in the press during the pre-war years were possible because, as mentioned 
previously, the Meiji Constitution guaranteed "freedom of speech". However, strict 
censorship imposed on the press, and vicious attacks on the left-wing press during the 
early war years suppressed all radical thoughts in Japanese journalism. After the repeal 
of all strict wartime censorship and guidelines imposed by the Occupation Force, the 
Japanese press became polarized. The leading national newspapers, in particular, 
outspokenly represented three ideological positions - left, middle, and right. Yet this 
extreme polarization was later weakened by the ‘catch-all’ characteristics of the 
Japanese press that were induced by excessive competition among the major 
newspapers.
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Ibid, p. 60. 
Ibid.
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Thailand during the late 1970s, the strict censorship decrees, the proliferation of 
political parties, and the growing number of newspapers strengthened the connections 
between owners of the private press and military figures and political parties. Indeed, 
newspapers were sporadically utilized for individual power struggles and survival.123 
When former General Chatichai Choonhavan became Thailand's first elected Prime 
Minister in 1988, the Thai economy grew at a double-digit rate for three consecutive 
years.124 Newspapers flourished so much that the number of the dailies increased 
threefold. Within this booming democratic atmosphere, the three journalist associations 
went on a crusade to demand more press freedom and the abolition of Decree No. 42, 
the law that gave the government arbitrary power to close down newspapers without 
providing grounds for appeal.125 A number of newspapers ran resolutions, statements, 
and highly critical editorials. While this campaign was being carried out, a number of 
local newspapers were reprimanded, and the importing of several foreign journals such 
as South China Morning Post and The Asian Wall Street Journal was forbidden.126 The 
Chatichai administration threatened to have the audit office examine the books of 
strident newspapers, and proposed a new Press Act to replace the Press Act of
Kamphon Watcharapon, the owner of Thai Rath, for example, reputedly utilized his linkages 
with military and other power centers to increase the popularity of his newspapers during this 
period. M.R. Kukrit Promoj continued to run his Siam Rath to air his royalist stance. Samak 
Sundaravej, who split from the Democrat Party to form the Prachakom Thai Party in 1979, also 
ran a newspaper, the Daily Mirror as his political mouthpiece. Banham Silapa-archa, a former 
Prime Minister and the leader of the Chat Thai Party, bought an interest in Ban Muang, a 
minor daily. A retired naval officer associated with powerful military figures, Squadron Leader 
Prasong Soonsiri, owns a stake in Naew Na, a nationwide newspaper which is famous for its 
controversial headlines. The Matichon Group, established in the early 1980s, which runs a daily 
paper, a current affairs journal and a business paper, is also believed to have a direct link with 
the powerful Class Five military clique. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand 
Economy and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 371.
Michael Falkus, "Thai Industrialization: An Overview", Paper presented at the conference on 
The Making of the Fifth Tiger?: Thailand's Industrialization and Its Consequences, The 
Australian National University, December 7-9, 1992.
The three main press associations include the Press Association of Thailand, established in 
1941, the Reporters' Association of Thailand, which was established in 1952, and the 
Journalists' Federation of Thailand, which was set up in 1965. In addition, there are about ten 
small affiliated professional associations, such as the Entertainment Reporters' Association, the 
Crime Reporters' Association, and so on, plus two provincial associations. All these 
associations fight for more freedom of expression and protect the journalists' welfare. However, 
the activities within have been limited to debate. Interview with Chutima Buranachada, The 
President of the Reporters' Association of Thailand, April 28, 1998.
In 1989, the Asian Wall Street Journal published an article suggesting that Thai Buddhism, the 
official religion, might be tainted with venality, and that its leaders might be engaging in 
questionable financial practices. In May 1990, the journal also published an article supporting 
tiie abolishment of Decree No. 42.
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1941.127 This proposed Act was, however, viewed by the press as being filled with a 
number of undemocratic provisions. One provision was to allow the establishment of a 
"Press Closure Committee".128 It can be clearly seen that the Chatichai government 
relentlessly attempted to retain the state's power to close the newspaper. The three 
press associations of Thailand again launched vigorous campaigns, and finally blocked 
the launch of this new undemocratic Act.
The confrontation between the press and the government intensified when 
Decree No. 42 was used to close down Naew Na on the charge that its headline,
"Diplomat Arrested for Murdering their Own", was "faulty, misleading and endangering 
the diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Thailand".129 Yet Wassana has 
forcefully argued that Naew-Na was closed because of political reasons, particularly its 
oppositional stance against the government.130 'Extralegal control' was also used to 
threaten the paper in many ways, for example, by bombing the house of Naew Na's 
famous columnist, and by forcing the advertisers to withdraw.131 The closure of Naew 
Na was obviously a wrong step, as the publicity and news coverage about the closure in 
both domestic and international media directed public attention towards the continued 
existence of the authoritarian decree.132 In this instance, the government lost the contest 
to control political information as it could not pass the new Press Act, and had to
127
128
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130
131
132
Sarasin Viraphol, "Media and Politics in Thailand: Some Strictly Personal Observations on 
the Role of the Media in Political Development in Thailand", in C.G. Hernandez and E. 
Pfemming (eds.), Media and Politics in Asia: Trends. Problems, and Prospects (Manila: 
University of Philippines, 1991), p. 73.
Another provision stated that all columnists must state their real names in their articles. See 
Julsarn nak-khao fReporter's Journal). 1990, p. 11, 14.
This unsolved murder case involved the mysterious killings of three Saudi Arabian diplomats. 
The authorities claimed that using the word "diplomat or toot" in the headline implicated the 
ambassador and this had strained diplomatic relations to the point where the Saudi Arabian 
embassy refused to issue visas to Thai contract workers. See details of the case and the closure 
of Naew Na in Wassana Nanuam, "Por.Ror. 42 kab kan sung pid nungsuphim Naew Na" 
(The Declaration No.42 and the Closure of Naew Na), Unpublished Bachelor Degree Sub- 
Thesis, Faculty of Journalism and Mass Communication, Thammasat University, 1990.
Ibid., p.105.
Suphap Kleekajai's comments in The Reporters’ Association of Thailand, Wiknitakarn 
seumolchon Thai phrutsapakhom 2535 (The Crisis of the Thai Media Mav 19921 (Bangkok: 
Khled Thai, 1992), p. 76.
Prime Minister Chatichai was frequently cornered by foreign reporters when visiting overseas 
countries, and asked questions regarding Declaration No.42. His fear for foreign journalists' 
questions was supposedly one reason why he hurriedly signed a bill to abolish Declaration 
No.42 just before he flew to meet then English Prime Minister, Magaret Thatcher. See 
Wassana, op. cit., p. 85, 91.
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finally revoke the Decree No. 42 in January 1991.133
However, the freedom that the press enjoyed was short lived, because a coup 
organized by a group of military generals called 'the National Peace Keeping Council', or 
NPKC, overthrew the Chatichai government only a month later. The NPKC 
immediately declared Announcement No. 14, which gave it authority to pre-censor any 
potentially subversive news, as well as temporarily or permanently close newspapers, 
which published uncensored items. Yet this Announcement was soon revoked because it 
seemed unlikely that all editors could submit their pages before publication. 
Furthermore, the press seemed to refrain from criticizing the coup organizers in the 
beginning because they were convinced that the Chatichai government was inept and 
corrupt, and that they should wait and see what the military would do to break the 
vicious cycle of corrupt politics.134
However, the press started criticizing the Council seriously, especially when the 
NPKC did not deliver on its promise of an elected Prime Minister from a 1992 general 
election, and General Suchinda Kraprayoon, one of the NPKC leaders, became Prime 
M inister.135 The NPKC wanted to curb the obstreperous press by announcing changes 
to the libel laws in February 1992. A minimum penalty of two hundred thousand baht 
($A 10,000) was replaced by four million baht ($A 200,000) for those convicted of 
defamatory charges.136 Even so, the new law never materialized, as the press and 
intellectuals launched a campaign opposing it, and more importantly, the appointed
Naew Na returned to be published under its original name on December 5, 1990.
The appointment as prime minister of the distinguished civilian diplomat, administrator, and 
businessman Anand Panyarachun, and his appointment of an interim cabinet consisting of  
outstanding technocrats, scholars, and senior officials, were signs that a new kind of coup d'etat 
had occurred. Political parties were retained, and a national legislative assembly was established 
to arrange for a new constitution and elections. The only newspaper that disagreed and attacked 
the coup was the Nation. See Wassana, op. cit.
Mr. Narong Wongwan who was a leader of a pro-military political party with the NPKC's 
support, Samakkhi Tham, and won an election on 23 March 1992 was alleged by the foreign 
press to have been involved in the illegal drug trade. The Thai press followed suite, which made 
Narong unacceptable for the post. See discussion on the 1992 election and the political 
situation which led to the May Crisis in Clark Neher, "Democratization in Thailand", Asian 
Affairs: An American Review. 1995, (21), p. 195.
Manich Sooksomchitre, "Seriphap: sing thi tong to-soo talod xvela", (Freedom: Whatt We 
Always Have to Fight For), Wan nak-khao 5 minakhom 2536 (The Reporter's Dav March 5. 
1993) (Bangkok: The Reporters Association o f Thailand, 1993), p. 66.
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Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun declined to have the new legislation promulgated in 
the Royal Gazette.137
During the May crisis of 1992, in which the massive anti-Suchinda pro­
democracy demonstrations were attacked and hundreds of civilians killed, the military 
regime used its 'extralegal' control to maintain self-censorship. A number of reporters 
were harassed, intimidated and attacked, or received death threats. Also the NPKC 
attempted to impose informal Martial Law by forewarning the press not to report 
attacks on 17 May 1992, and ordering newspapers not to publish any materials that 
might 'inflame the unrest'.138 However, the warning came a little too late, as most of the 
local papers had already been printed, except the English language Bangkok Post, which 
left blank space on its front page for fear of reprisal. Later, three orders of closure were 
issued and separately sent out to Phujadkarn Rai-wan, Naew Na, and the Nation — the 
three newspapers that gave full coverage to the crisis.139 However, these orders were 
repealed on the same day following the appearance on television of King Bhumipol, 
who urged national reconciliation.
In the aftermath of the crisis, public discourse focused entirely on the difference 
in the accuracy of news reports between state-controlled broadcasting media and the 
private-owned press.140 The print media in this case was seen as performing an essential 
watchdog role. They became information resources, increasing public participation in 
the political process, and inducing political change. In contrast, the broadcast media — 
both television and radio — were merely considered 'servants of the state’. Since then, 
the Thai press have gained much more freedom and credibility than before. The
137 Duncan McCargo, "The Buds o f May", Index on Censorship. 1993, 22(4), p. 3.
138 On the next morning, most of the Thai press covered the severe attacks on the demonstrators 
extensively, in contrast to the state-controlled broadcasting media in which news was mostly 
distorted and heavily censored. See detailed discussion in Reporters' Association of Thailand, 
"Wikrutakan seumolchon Thai phrutsaphakhom 2535" (The Crisis o f the Thai Media Mav 
19921 (Bangkok: Khled Thai, 1992); Also Duncan McCargo, "The Buds of May", Index on 
Censorship. 1993, 22(4), pp. 3-8.
139 Ibid.
140 Reporters' Association of Thailand, "Seumolchon thai: nueng pi lung het kan 
phruthsaphatamil" (The Thai Mass Media: One Year After the May Crisis), Jod-mai khao 
(The Reporters' Association Newsletter!. May 1993, pp. 2-4.
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subsequent boom in the print media with its emphasis on politics, was characterized by 
launches of new publications such as Siam Post, a daily newspaper, which dedicated 
much of its columns on political issues, and three weekly political magazines - Naew Na 
Sudsapda, Nation Sudsapda, and Khao Tai. Daily newspapers with large circulations 
such as Matichon and Khao Sod also began printing evening issues.141
It can be argued that market forces emerging in the late 1980s in Thailand were 
an impetus behind a shift away from a partisan press and a demand for more freedom of 
the press. Increased competition did turn the newspaper market into 'a marketplace of 
ideas', in which buyers and sellers of news and information bargained and competed. Yet 
newspapers with high circulation such as Thai Rath, and Daily News are still family 
businesses that are owned and operated by ten to fifteen shareholders.142 However, the 
boom in the economy motivated capital-driven large publishing groups such as the 
Bangkok Post group, the Nation group, the Manager group, the Watachak group and 
the Matichon group to go public by selling their shares in the Bangkok stock exchange 
in the late 1980s. As a result of the unprecedented boom in stock trades and high 
advertising revenue which comprised about ninety per cent of the total of newspaper 
revenue, newspaper publishing businesses became a very high growth industry, and 
were expanded extensively by a large amount of borrowed liquid capital. The collapse of 
the baht following the economic crisis in 1997 led to immediate closures among some of 
these publishing groups.143 Further deficits in cash flows and substantial decreases in 
advertising revenue also forced other publishing groups to lay off reporters or face 
foreign takeovers. The Bangkok Post, for example, closed down its comic section and
Ibid.
Watcharapol family still owns and manages Thai Rath, and the Hetrakul family maintains its 
ownership and management of Daily News.
The Manager group owned by Sondhi Limthongkul is a good case in point. In 1983, Sondhi 
started Manager Monthly, a business magazine to capture urban market readers. By 1986, the 
group launched a weekly, and a daily newspaper, called the Manager Daily. In the early 1990s, 
Sondhi launched Asia Inc, a glossy business magazine reminiscent of Forbes covering the Asia- 
Pacific market. He also published Asia Times, a daily newspaper covering Asia, somewhat akin 
to Robert Maxwell's European. Sondhi's long vision in expanding his lucrative media 
business from his Bangkok-based publication to a regional level has earned him a title of 
‘Mister Globalization’. However, the 1997 economic turmoil starting made Sondhi's dream 
fallen apart. Since he relied heavily on the capital and revenue derived from the stock exchange 
and overseas borrowings, the drastic plunge in the share prices and the baht value left Sondhi 
no choice but to close his Asia Times, and Financial Day. See Matichon Sudsapda. July 1, 
1997, pp. 68-9.
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sold its Thai language daily, Siam Post. The Nation laid off some of its newly-recruited 
staff, and had to allow foreign investors to own a bigger stake in their companies for 
purely economic reasons.144
In comparison to the Thai case, in which the pressure to abolish the stringent 
press controls emerged from within the press industry, the eradication of restrictive 
press controls in Japan came from outside pressure — the US Occupation Force.145 Two 
months after Japan's defeat in the Pacific War, General Douglas Mac Arthur issued a 
series of policies concerning the press. These included the abolition of all pre-war and 
wartime restrictive press legislation,146 particularly the 1909 Press Ordinance, and the 
deletion of Article 74 and 76 of the Criminal Code detailing punishment for the crime of 
lese majeste. The Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) also declared 
recognition of free speech and freedom of the press in the post-war Constitution.147
In contrast to the allied powers in Germany, who banned all media, the SCAP 
allowed the continuity of the media operations from the wartime years with the 
exception of the Domei Tsüshinsha, which was considered a major producer of 
propaganda machine. It was disbanded soon after the occupation, and replaced by two 
separate news agencies: the Kyödö news service to serve general dailies, and the Jiji 
news agency to supply economic and financial news. SCAP also dismissed the
Interview with Kavi Chongkitthavom, Executive Editor, The Nation. April 28, 1998.
For useful materials see William J. Coughlin, Conquered Press: The Mac Arthur Era in Japanese 
Journalism (California: Pacific Books, 1952); Monica Braw, The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: 
American Censorship in Occupied Japan (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1991); Marlene J.Mayo, 
"Civil Censorship and Media Control in Early Occupied Japan: From Minimum to Stringent 
Surveillance" in R. Wolfe (ed.), American as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in 
Germany and Japan (Carbondale: Southern Ilinois University Press, 1984); Ariyama Teruo, 
Senrvöki medeia-shi kenkvu: iivü to tosei 1945 nen- IHistorv of Mass Media in the Allied 
Occupied Japan: Freedom and Control. 1945-1 (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobö, 1996); and 
Yamamoto Taketoshi, Senrvöki medeia bunseki (An Analysis o f Media in the Allied Occupied 
Japan! (Tokyo: Hösei Daigaku Shuppan Kyoku, 1996).
There were altogether twelve press laws which were abolished by the SCAP. See details in 
Yamamoto Taketoshi, Senrvöki medeia bunseki (An Analysis o f Media in the Allied Occupied 
Japan! (Tokyo: Hösei Daigaku Shuppan Kyoku, 1996), pp. 355-6.
Article 21 of the 1947 Constitution of Japan stipulates that:
(1) Freedom o f assembly and associations as well as speech, press, and all other forms of 
expression are guaranteed.
(2) No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means o f communication be 
violated.
Information Bureau of the war years and assigned the Civil Censorship Department 
(CCD) to take full responsibility for eliminating militaristic indoctrination in the 
Japanese media, and the Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E) to promote the 
dissemination of democratic ideas.148 One of the purposes of the Allied Occupied Force 
in governing Japan was to promote democracy and free speech as implicated in the 
repeated emphases of an imposition of "minimum control" in SCAP original press 
policies. 149
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Yet both pre and post-publication censorship was extensively imposed on 
newspapers , 150 with penalties ranging from warnings and the suspension of publication, 
to jailing publishers and editors with years of hard labor. 151 On one occasion, Asahi 
Shimbun was suspended for forty-eight hours for slanting news reports. According to 
SCAP’ claims, the publication had minimized Japan's war guilt and was critical of the 
United States and of occupation authorities.152 Another reason might have well been the 
close connection between executives of Asahi Shimbun and the imperialist government 
during the war, when the Vice President of the paper was made a cabinet minister
148
149
150
151
152
SCAP later established another unit called the "Civil Information and Education Section" or 
CI&E (Minkan Jöhö Kyöiku Kyoku) to undertake and plan media policy which would promote 
democracy and propagate the Occupied Forces' messages. Marlene Mayo further argues that 
SCAP's media policy was an essential part of the larger "Cultural Foreign Policy, in which 
media, particularly short wave radio broadcasting, were used to promote a favorable image 
abroad of American life and institutions". See Ariyama Teruo, Senrvöki medeia-shi kenkyü; jivü 
to tosei 1945 Nen- IHistorv of Mass Media in the Allied Occupied Japan: Freedom and 
Control. 1945-1 (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobö, 1996), pp. 56-60; Marlene J. Mayo, "Civil 
Censorship and Media Control in Early Occupied Japan: From Minimum to Stringent 
Surveillance" in R. Wolfe (ed.), American as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in 
Germany and Japan (Carbondale: Southern Ilinois University Press, 1984), p. 264 ; See also 
Monica Braw, The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: An American Censorship in Occupied Japan 
(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), pp. 34-6.
Phrases like "hitsuyö na saijö-gen no hani" (range of the necessarily minimum control) became 
MacArthur's rhetoric in his media policy. See Ariyama Teruo, Senrvöki medeia-shi kenkvü: 
iivü to tosei 1945 nen- tHistorv of Mass Media in the Allied Occupied Japan: Freedom and 
Control. 1945-) (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobö, 1996), p. 35.
The CCD emphasized the importance of pre-censorship: two copies had to be presented to the 
Censor Board, and one would be returned to the publisher for printing. If parts of the copy 
had been deleted, the publisher had to reformat their copy to make the deletions invisible. 
Notably, this was totally different from previous pre-censorship practices, in which publications 
were allowed to publish articles with white space, or with cross marks. Uchigawa and Arai have 
noted that between March 1946 and February 1947 there were as many as 20 articles 
disapproved and 64 articles deleted from the Asahi Shimbun by way of pre-censorship. See 
Uchigawa and Arai. Nihon no Jaanarizumu (Japanese Journalism), p. 100.
Thirteen cases were trialed during the occupation. Some of these trials passed sentences to 
journalists, or editors of newspapers, whereas some were punished by being put into hard 
labour. Monica Braw, op. cit., pp. 86-7.
Marlene Mayo, op. cit., pp. 296-7.
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heading the Infonnation Bureau just before the end of the war.
In response to the attacks from the press, SCAP designed a ten-point Press 
Code prohibiting the criticism of US authorities, as well as prohibition of confidential 
information regarding the atomic bomb and its effects on the victims.153 SCAP, 
however, did not eliminate the wartime controls over paper allocation. Rather, the 
scheme was seen as an effective way to control the obstinate old-establishment press.154 
SCAP also had an essential role in restructuring the internal organization of such elite 
publications as Asahi and Yomiuri. When strikes and confrontations erupted between 
the press union and publishers, the union demanded that those who represented the 
merger between the imperialist government and the Japanese news industry during the 
wartime years should be ousted. The Allied Force supported the union by banning the 
following individuals from working in the media industry: Furuno Inosuke, President of 
Domei Tsüshinsha\ Shöriki Matsutaro, owner of Yomiuri-Hochi\ and Ogata Taketora, 
Vice-President of Asahi Shimbun, who had been head of the Information Bureau in 
1944.155 A famous Japanese press historian, Yamamoto Taketoshi, claimed that the US 
occupation brought a revolution to the Japanese press industry, whereby eighty per 
cent of the whole industry changed, particularly in the area of structure and 
administration.156
Monica Braw, op. cit., p. 41.
These ten points were:
1) News must adhere strictly to the truth
2) Nothing shall be printed which might, directly or by inference, disturb public tranquility
3) There shall be no false or destructive criticism of the Allied Powers
4) There shall be no destructive criticism of the Allied Forces of Occupation and nothing which 
might invite mistrust or resentment of these troops.
5) There shall be no mention or discussion of Allied troops movements unless such movements 
have been officially released.
6) News stories must be factually written and completely devoid of editorial opinion.
7) New stories shall not be colored to conform with any propaganda line.
8) Minor details of any news stories must not be overemphasized.
9) News stories must not stress or develop any propaganda line.
10) In the makeup of the newspaper, no news story shall be given undue prominence for the 
purpose o f establishing or developing any propaganda line.
Monica Braw, The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: American Censorship in Occupied Japan (New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), p. 83.
Ariyama Teruo, op. cit., p. 132.
Yamamoto Taketoshi, Senrvoki medeia bunseki (An Analysis o f Media in the Allied Occupied 
Japan) (Tokyo: Hosei Daigaku Shuppan Kyoku, 1996), pp. 358-9.
One of the most important activities of the Occupied Allied Force in Japan was 
the purge of persons regarded as being in association with the militarists. This purge 
continued until 1952 when the occupation ended, and extended to cover journalists, 
editors, as well as media owners who previously promoted imperialistic views. 
However, with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 -  a development which 
indicated the present threat of communism -- the CCD diverted its attention to 
publications linked to communism. The CCD suspended and closed down communist 
publications and expelled communists from positions in the media industry.157 In 
particular, SCAP ordered a thirty-day suspension on Akahata (Red Flag), a newspaper 
of the Japanese Communist Party, on the day after the outbreak of Korean War. The 
grounds for suspension were that its articles instigated subversive feelings, and injured 
public tranquility, safety, and welfare.158
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Despite its attempt to control political information by applying legal controls to 
some extent, the Occupation Force seemed to have slowly recognized the extent to 
which the successive extralegal controls, such as the system of kisha kurabu, 
encouraged the practice of self-censorship and blocked the free flow of political 
information.159 A report on the kisha kurabu completed by the CI&E in the early years 
of the occupation revealed that the reporters' club was having a negative influence on the 
fairness of the Japanese news reports.160 Reforms of the kisha kurabu were then 
imposed by the CI&E. These included reforms imposed immediately after an incident 
involving the Diet Club banning of the entire crew from Yomiuri-Höchi newspaper.161
157
158
159
160
161
Marlene Mayo, op. cit., p. 314.
Yamamoto Taketoshi, Senrvöki medeia bunseki (An Analysis o f Media in the Allied Occupied 
Japan! (Tokyo: Hosei Daigaku Shuppan Kyoku, 1996), pp. 439.
As well reflected in a statement made by Major Imboden, a CI&E officer: "Any action by 
anybody, official, or non-official, which denies access by any legitimate newspaper to 
governmental news sources cannot be reconciled with the democratic concept of the press...It is a 
disappointment to the Press and Publication division that the Japanese press...has failed to use 
its power to make impossible of any such restriction...". William J. Coughlin, Conquered 
Press: The MacArthur Era in Japanese Journalism (California: Pacific Books, 1952), p. 85. 
Yamamoto Taketoshi, op. cit., pp. 370-1.
In May 1946, a Vice-President of the newspaper joined a hunger strike embarked upon by 
Japan's Communist Party by pitching a tent in the courtyard o f the Prime Minister's official 
residence, and demanding that the Prime Minister feed them. Although the strike was over 
within 3 days, the Vice-President and his entire crews from Yomiuri-Höchi were expelled from 
the Diet club on the ground that their action impaired the dignity and the honour of the club.
See William Coughlin, op. cit.
One such reform involved refocusing the reporters' club so that it merely promoted 
friendship and professional competency (shimboku dantai to nari) and abolished its 
exclusiveness (haita teki seikaku o shömetsu) .162 Another major reform was the 
establishment in July 1946 of the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association 
(Nihon Shimbun Kyökai no Henshü Iinkai, NSK), which was aimed at "elevating ethical 
standards in reporting and protecting and promoting the media's common interests."163
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Underlying these reforms was the intention of the Occupation Force to 
counteract the increasing conflicts and movements between union-dominated newspaper 
employees and publishers with regards to editorial rights. In 1948, the NSK adopted 
'the Statement on Assurance on Editorial Rights', which identified that the editorial 
rights of a newspaper rested with its manager and managing editor.164 The NSK was 
also expected to further restructure the reporters' clubs by repealing such rules as not 
allowing non-members to attend press conferences, the unjustified dismissal of 
members, and the suspension of attendance at press conferences. The Occupation 
Forces demonstrated a real interest in changing the status quo by renaming the kisha kai 
attached to the Diet, or the so-called "naikaku kisha-kai" (Cabinet's reporter 
association), the Nagata kurabu in accordance with its location, and designing a new mle 
that opened the club to non-members.165 In response to the Occupation Force’s push 
for change, the NSK announced in 1949 that the principles of kisha kurabu would be, 
first and foremost, organs for mutual friendship, and they would not be involved in 
news-gathering activities.
These principles, however, were not strictly followed. Yamamoto has argued
Yamamoto Taketoshi, op. cit., pp. 372-3.
Nihon Shimbun Kyökai (Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association), NSK Leaflet 
(Tokyo: NSK, 1998).
The stand down of Yomiuri-Höchi employees protesting against their unfair dismissal o f a 
managing editor and his team, who were pro-communism, led to a violent riot between the staff 
and the publishers. This battle was of great concerns for SCAP. See William Coughlin op 
cit., p. 92.
Within the same year, all kisha kai attached to important ministries and governmental agencies 
were dissolved and new kisha kurabu were formed. Yamamoto Taketoshi, Senrvöki nwdpin 
bunseki (An Analysis of Media in the Allied Occupied Japan 1 (Tokyo: Hösei Daigaku Shuppan 
Kyoku, 1996), p. 372.
that all of these reforms were largely ignored by the new kisha kurabu and the NSK, as 
exemplified by a case in 1949. An Asahi Shimbun reporter was dismissed by a club in 
Hokkaido simply because he conducted his own newsgathering.166 Had the US 
Occupation Force emphasized the abolition of extralegal control mechanisms, 
particularly the close consultation between the government sources and the reporters 
and the monopolization of news through the kisha kurabu system, then the goals of 
reforming the press industry might have been fully achieved. This was mainly because 
the system of kisha kurabu was subtly maintained, and not structurally transformed. 
As Mizuno observed, "a crucial reason behind this failure has been a gap between the 
principles and the practices of the reporters' club in reality which has been largely left 
open since the occupation period".167 Indeed, this gap survived the occupation and 
persists in Japan today because it has been nurtured by the government's reward 
strategy maneuvered within the protective triangles of the established sources in the 
government, the elite newspapers, and the Japanese reporters by the system of the 
kisha kurabu.
Considering the lifting of repressive wartime controls imposed by the military 
states, the Japanese and Thai cases, however, were distinctively different. The degree of 
contestation between the state and the media in the struggle for control of information 
was heightened in Thailand, where the state and the media forcefully struggled over 
political information. The local press confronted with the state at many cmcial political 
junctures, such as the press's crusade to abolish Decree No. 42 during the Chatichai 
administration, and its mobilization of public opposition against strict martial laws 
issued by the Suchinda regime. The Reporter's Association of Thailand also played a 
crucial role in campaigning for press freedom. In Japan, on the contrary, the lifting of 
controls of the wartime years was imposed from foreign agents at the top, and not by a 
struggle from below. However, the establishment of the NSK for the purpose of 
elevating media ethics backfired, as the NSK has turned out to be a major factor in
Ibid., p. 373.
Mizuno Takeya, "Kisha kurabu kanren-shi" (History Related to the Reporters' Club), Nihon 
Shimbun Kvökai Kenkvüio Nenpo 1995 Ü995 Annual Report of Japan's Newspaper 
Association Research Center). (13), p. 60.
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gatekeeping and monopolizing political information through the system of kisha 
kurabu. Moreover, with the widespread practice of extralegal controls, the Japanese 
press at the end of the Occupation was well on its way to serve as the government's 
tool despite the repeal of legal controls.
Greater political pluralism in both countries in the following periods, however, 
seemed to encourage the press to perform a more active role. Since the May Crisis of 
1992, Thailand has had four elected coalition governments. As the military withdrew 
from the political stage after the crisis, parliamentary discontinuity weakened the power 
of the state to contest the control of political information with the private press. The 
press indeed became an independent political actor. For example, it acted as a 'watchdog' 
by bringing about the downfall of the Chuan Leekpai's administration in 1995, because 
of its coverage of corruption allegations in Phuket's land reform scandals widely known 
as Sor-Por-Kor 4-07168, and by exposing several corruption cases and alleging bribery in 
the purchase of the Swedish submarine during Banham's government (1995-6).169 The 
press, through a higher level of engagement with the general public than ever before, also 
acted as an agenda-setter by advocating political reform at the top of national agenda. 
This paved the way for the drafting of a new Constitution.170
In the case of Japan, the political pluralism involving mass protests around the 
country following the end of the US Occupation promoted pluralism in the press. This
Chuan's scheme was designed to give nontransferable land deeds to poor villagers who had long 
occupied and cultivated the land; however, it was first reported in Thai Rath that several 
businessmen, some with family ties with minister overseeing the scheme, could secure parts of 
the land which had high potential for tourism. Thai Rath traced the story every day for several 
months before other newspapers followed. Chuan government dissolved after its loss in the no- 
confidence debate on the issue in May 1995. Further detailed discussion see Bookhaaree Yeema, 
Chuan Leekpai nai kham mue nungsuphim thai (Chuan Leekpai in the whims of the Thai 
press') (Nonthaburi: Tang Duen, 1998); and Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand's 
Boom and Bust (Chiengmai: Silkworm Books, 1998), pp. 255-56.
The allegations were first made by a Swedish journalist who claimed that Banham's Chart 
Thai Party received money from a Swedish submarine manufacturers called Kockums. A number 
of Thai newspapers picked up the story; however, only a few of them investigated further. Most 
of them continued publishing comments on the original stories to keep the issue alive. One 
paper which paid a number of space on the issue, in particular, was Siam Post, which was sued 
a libel lawsuit by the Chart Thai Party. See details o f the Kockums case in Duncan McCargo, 
"The International Media and the domestic political coverage of the Thai Press", Modem Asian 
Studies. 1999, 33(3), pp. 551-579.
This role of the press will be discussed as a case study in Chapter Five.
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was exemplified in the split in ideological positions among the national dailies and the 
re-emergence of the right-wing and left-wing press. The right-wing press aligned itself 
with the LDP, big corporations, and farmers, whereas, the left-wing newspapers serve 
organized workers, students, progressive intellectuals, as well as Socialist and 
Communist Parties' members. The right-wing press included Sankei and Yomiuri, which 
tended to carry conservative and pro-establishment views. The left-wing press, such as 
Asahi, was critical of the government. Asahi successfully mobilized public opposition 
against the mling Liberal Democratic Party at several political junctures: for instance, 
the Security Treaty Crisis in 1960, whereby the press mobilized a popular force in 
rallying against the government's security policies.171 A similar role of the press in 
setting agenda, moulding public opinion, and influencing policy-making decision was 
also seen in the anti-pollution movements in 1970,172 the anti-shinkansen (bullet train) 
movements in 1980-2,173 and the exposure of the Recruit Scandal in 1988 and 1989.174 
However, the sharp ideological differences among the major press have increasingly been
See Edward D. Whittemore, The Press in Japan Todav...A Case Study (South Carolina: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1961); and Chapter S\ The Press and the US-Japan 
Security Treaty Crisis in Jung Bock Lee, The Political Character of the Japanese Press (Seoul: 
Seoul National University Press, 1985).
Magaret McKean, for example, forcefully argued that the press played a vital role in 
publicizing the mercury poisoning incidents in Minamata, Kumamoto prefecture, and 
cadmium poisoning in Toyama prefecture. The coverage of those pollution incidents was so 
extensive that it hastened the usually lengthy and time-consuming policy-making process, and 
the Environmental Bill was passed within an unprecedentedly short period of time. See Magaret 
McKean, "Pollution and Policymaking", in T.J. Pempel (ed.), Policymaking in Contemporary 
Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 201-38; See also Chapter nine: The Drive 
for Citizenship in N. Huddle and M. Reich (eds.), Island of Dreams: Environmental Crisis in 
Japan (Vermont: Schenleman Books, 1991).
Shikansen's citizen movement emerged in Nagoya prefecture and Kita Ward in Saitama 
prefecture because of citizen concerns about two problems: noise and vibration pollution 
caused by the train, and compensation for residents evicted for the project. In this case, although 
the media, in particular the local press, was significant in mobilising the campaign participants, 
the media also brought about undesirable results such as exacerbating internal conflicts among 
the movement organizers. See details in David Earl Groth, "Media and Political Protest: The 
Bullet Train Movements", in S. J. Pharr and E. S. Krauss (eds), Media and Politics in Japan 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), pp. 213-41.
The Recruit Scandal started when an Asahi reporter at the Yokohama branch started an 
independent investigation on stories alleging that the Information Services and Real Estate 
Conglomerate Recruit Company and a subsidiary bought influence in government by giving 
cash and discounted stock to top political figures in the ruling LDP, high ranking bureaucrats 
and prominent businessmen. Scholars, however, think that the media over-sensationalized the 
issues, though the intention of disclosing the corruption is considered as those of the 'watchdog' 
at the beginning. See Chapter 1: "Rikuruuto hödö no meian" (The Black and White of the 
reports on the Recruit Scandal) in Katsura Keiichi, Gendai no shimbun fNewspapers at 
Present!. 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1997); Also Yayama Taro, "The Recruit Scandal: 
Learning from the Causes of Corruption", Journal of Japanese Studies. (1990), 16(1), pp. 93- 
114.
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sidelined by the extreme competitiveness in the newspaper market, which has drawn the 
press away from strident polarization and moved it towards a central position of 
comparative inoffensiveness. The highly efficient and strong selling system of major 
newspapers based on home-delivery system carried out by sub-contractors175 and the 
price-fixing system that allows readers to buy the same paper at the same price 
everywhere in Japan has prevented newspapers from holding a distinctive political 
stance or carrying investigative scoops.176
2.5 Democracy and the Return of Regulation
Despite the repeal of repressive controls, the elected governments in Thailand and Japan 
have continued to struggle for maintaining its level of political information control. The 
development of full-fledged democracies in both countries, which promised more 
freedom of speech, has however brought with it new forms of legal and extralegal 
controls. In Thailand, new coercive measures, which are widely used to curb the press, 
include the libel law and media-monitoring centers. The continued existence of the Thai 
Press Act of 1941 and the linkages between the press and individual politicians remain 
legal and extralegal factors that constrain the press’ progressive watchdog role. In Japan, 
the imposition of legislation protecting sensitive state information and the systematic 
sanctions within kisha kurabu combine forces to create an environment most conducive 
for the press to confine itself to a role of governmental tool.
These sub-contractors are sale and delivery agents, which are independent from the companies. 
Most are sole-agent shops handling a single company's publication. Their revenue come from 
delivery fees and inserting fees of leaflets and pamphlets into newspapers. As these shops are 
very competitive in getting subscribers, they induce subscribers by using incentives and 
discounts so much in a volume that these practices have ignited incentive war among the 
agents. By October 1997, 93.1 per cent of newspapers in Japan were home-delivered, 6.3 per 
cent were sold on stands, and 0.5 per cent were sold by other means. The industrial revenue 
breakdowns also show the heavy reliance on subscription sale. In 1996, 50.7 per cent of 
newspaper revenue come from sale, 36.2 per cent from advertising fees, and 13.1 per cent from 
other sources. See NSK, The Japanese Press 1998 (Tokyo: NSK, 1998), p. 70, 83.
Since 1953, price-fixing for copyright works has been exempted from the Antimonopoly Act. 
This has allowed newspapers which were considered as a carrier of information necessary for 
everyday life to be sold at the same price anywhere in Japan. The concerns regarding the effects 
of this system on the quality of the paper reflected in the review conducted by the Fair Trade 
Commission (FTC) in 1992. However, the NSK argued that the price-fixing system is 
necessary to the maintenance of the home-delivery system which the sale of newspapers heavily 
relies on. The FTC, as a result, has not yet cancelled the exemption of the sale of newspapers 
from the Antimonopoly Act. See Köno Ichiro, "Role of the Pricing System for Copyright 
Works", The Japanese Press 1997 (Tokyo: NSK, 1997), pp. 43-4; and Köno Ichiro, 
"Newspaper Sales andThe Price-fixing System in Japan", The Japanese Press 1998 (Tokyo: 
NSK, 1998), pp. 23-5.
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In the 1990s, Thailand saw the continued existence of partisan press. Most Thai 
newspapers maintained or rebuilt direct or indirect linkages with powerful politicians. 
These linkages indicate that the continuing watchdog role of the press, one which must 
disseminate a non-partisan view, has proven problematic to realize. These pervasive 
linkages can be seen, for example, in the appointment of Squadron Leader Prasong 
Soonsiri, an editor of Naew Na, to the post of security adviser to Prime Minister Chuan 
Leekpai (1997-2001).177 From then on, Naew Na has been consistently supportive of 
Chuan's Democrat Party. The secretary of this party, General Sanan Krajomprasart, 
also owned Chao Thai Rai Wan, a national daily. Banham Silpa-acha, the leader of Chart 
Thai party, held an important stake in Ban Muang Daily. In mid-1999, his paper began 
printing a one-page exclusive report on education after his daughter, a local MP, was 
appointed to the post of Deputy Minister of Education after the cabinet reshuffle.178
Moreover, the Thai press is still biased and opinionated, with stories based on 
insubstantial rumors and allegations. As observed by Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris 
Baker,
the press (after the May Crisis) carried a torch for urban interests, 
campaigned for reforms, monitored the politicians' performance, and 
exposed corruption and malpractice. But a section of the press was 
itself susceptible to money. The line between legitimate revelation 
and interested rumour-mongering was so fine as to be invisible. The 
press surrounded parliament with a swirl o f rumour, allegation, and 
scandal.179
The frequent mishaps of the Thai press in filtering and disseminating inaccurate 
political information based on rumours and unsubstantial allegations has made libel 
lawsuits common. For example, Chuan Leekpai and Banham Silpa-archa were involved
In February 2000, Prasong was appointed as an adviser to all important intelligence agencies, 
controlling the flow of news in and out of the National Intelligence Agency, the intelligence 
sections o f the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, as well as the National Security 
Council. See "Prasong Soonsiri come back yued amnach kankhao anvutlubsudyod khong 
prachathipat" (Prasong came back to exert authority in news - Democrat's lethal weapon), 
Siamrath Sapdawiiarn. February 13-19, 2000, p. 13.
"Ban Muang chak chang - koranee perd na kansuksa rongrab 'Nu Na - Tue' " (Ban Maung 
defends allegations against the launch of an educational page especially for Nu Na and Tue), 
Matichon Sudsapda. August 3, 1999, p. 70.
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand's Boom and Bust p. 250.
in libel lawsuits with a Thai Rath columnist180 and a Siam Post editor181, whilst serving 
as Prime Minister. Four ministers of the Banham Government, including the Finance 
Minister, the Minister to the Office of the Prime Minister, the Agriculture and 
Cooperatives Minister, and the Deputy Interior Minister have lodged separate lawsuits 
against a number of newspapers in regard to alleged bribery and related practices . 182 The 
Minister of Interior under the first Chuan administration, Major General Sanan 
Khajomprasart, also took legal action against the three daily newspapers - Matichon, 
Naew Na, and Siam Post for bribery allegations involving a pawnshop concessionaire.183
Although most of the newspapers facing lawsuits were acquitted after trials, the 
relatively high likelihood of facing lawsuits has created three distinctive characteristics in 
the Thai press. 184 Firstly, since the penalty for libel is usually a suspended jail term or 
fine for an editor, Thai newspapers generally hire so-called "dummy editors", who 
specialize in dealing with legal battles or even serving jail sentences so that the 
newspaper can continue publication without major disruption . 185 Secondly, in order to 
avoid lawsuits, the popular use of abbreviations or nicknames in the news when 
referring to newsworthy persons, such as "B igJiw ", "Madam P.K.", "Dr. S", "Mr.Mee”, 
and so forth, is common. Lastly, and most importantly, libel lawsuits discourage the 
full-blown disclosure of investigative reporting, because newspapers are likely to be 
sued for any of the leading stories that they are pursuing.
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In 1993, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai sued a columnist with the pen name o f "Tai Phoon" 
who writes regularly for Thai Rath on the grounds that the columnist called Chuan 
‘authoritarian’ and alleged that Chuan used excessive force to resolve the farmers' 
demonstration. See Reporters' Association of Thailand, Jod-mai khao (Reporters' Association 
Newsletter). July 1993.
In 1995, the Chart Thai Party sued the Siam Post on defamatory charges in relation to the 
newspaper's publication of the Kockums'case. Prime Minister Banham also personally sued the 
newspaper's editor, Arun Lanlhua, on the same charge. The Reporters' Association of Thailand, 
Wan nakkhao 5 minakhom 2539 (The Reporters' Dav March 5. 1996) (Bangkok: RAT, 1996). 
"Government Wages War With the Media", Bangkok Post. June 2, 1996 (on-line edition).
The Reporters' Association of Thailand, Wan nak-khao 5 minakhom 2.U0 (The Reporters' Dav 5 
March 1997) (Bangkok: RAT, 1997), p.42.
In cases where the plaintiff was obviously defamed, the newspapers have rarely gone to the 
Supreme Court. Most of these cases ended in out o f court settlements
There is a popular saying that being an editor in the Thai press is similar to putting one foot 
into jail. Interview with Kietchai Pongpanich, Executive Editor and Publisher, Khao Sod 
Daily on April 23, 1998.
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As a result, breaking news or any unconfirmed report does not first appear as 
leading news on the first page of the newspaper. Rather, it is printed on the social page 
(usually page four) as a tidbit to gauge the reaction of the individuals involved. This has 
sometimes coincided with the use of underground leaflets by the press, or certain 
individuals disseminating breaking stories, which should they be published in a 
newspaper, would invite either lawsuits or severe extralegal measures, or both. News 
stories written in leaflets are highly controversial, but are often alluded to by the press. 
Such provocative stories have included an alleged plot linking the class five military 
clique with the assassination of Khlaeo Thanikun, the powerful Bangkok godfather,186 
and an attack on the Master's degree credentials of the Crown Prince's minor wife.187
Libel lawsuits are not the only way that Thai government officials have 
responded to attacks by the press. Thai journalists continue to be intimidated, attacked, 
or even killed by corrupt officials.188 During the coalition government of Prime Minister 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (1996-7), the press focused on the growing public discontent 
with the economic crisis, and on Chavalit's ill-mangaged administrative teams. The 
Chavalit government blamed media misreporting for the lack of confidence in the 
economy among investors and the public, and reacted by imposing controls.189
Accordingly, Minister of Interior, Sanoh Thienthong, and his deputy, Pol. Capt. 
Chalerm Yoobamrung, whose relationship with the media had always been sour,190 set
186
187
188
189
190
This story was written by 'a reporter who knew the inside story'. He claimed that Khlaeo 
Thankikun had been a major source of finance for the class five until its coup in 1991, but was 
killed before he could reveal his connection with the new government. See James Ockey, 
"Capital Accumulation by Other Means: Provincial Crime, Corruption, and the Bureaucratic 
Polity". Paper presented at 5th International Conference on Thai Studies, SOAS, London, 1993 
These leaflets were claimed to be circulated by a group of Thai Patriots'. See Craig J.
Reynolds, "Sedition in Thai History: A Nineteenth Century Poem and Its Politics", in M. 
Chitakasem and Andrew Turton (eds.), Thai Construction of Knowledge (London: School of 
Oriental and African Studies, 1991), p. 15.
As recently as January 1998, Sayomchai Vijitwittayapong, a rural stringer for Matichon, and 
Khao Sod was shot dead after he turned down a bribe of 150,000 baht to stop investigations 
into allegations o f corruption related to a building project. "Rookkart kamnan Neow bongkan 
gangphuyai- Nuey khasungharn nakkhao yong sia-Au chao pho phichit" (Hunt Neow, a village 
headman, who ordered Phuyai-Neoy's gangster to kill a reporter. This also linked with "Au", 
Phicit's Godfather), Matichon Sudsapda. January 20, 1998, pp. 88-90.
"It's not my fault, it's global - PM", Bangkok Post. October 30, 1997 (on-line edition).
Pol. Capt. Chalerm Yoobamroong was a Minister of Office of the Prime Minister during the 
Chatchai's cabinet. He was also in charge of overseeing the Mass Communications Organization
up a 'media-monitoring center' or ‘Kana kammakan klan-krong khao-san lae 
seumolchon’ on 3 June 1997. Its members were mainly police officers,191 and it was 
aimed at combating "media attacks" which created "public confusion" and "scared away 
foreign investors".192 Although the committee was not authorized to order the 
shutdown of any newspapers or broadcasting stations, it could use its independent 
judgement to censor news reports, and could issue two warnings before undertaking 
legal proceedings.193 Sanoh's establishment of this organization was reminiscent of the 
actions of former military governments, which often justified their undertakings on the 
pretext of national security. This was reflected in his comment that, "I will resort to any 
measure that will help to ensure national stability. I will use it against anyone who 
destabilized the country".194 His ill intentions became clear when he mentioned that he 
would invoke Article 116 of the Criminal Law, which directly deals with the issue of 
national security, in order to curb the aggressive press.
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According to the 1995 addition to the Press Act of 1941, newspapers cannot be 
ordered closed by any government without a court order, except under a state of 
emergency. However, the media-monitoring committee could bypass normal lengthy 
procedures by seeking a court decision to halt the sale of issues carrying defamatory 
stories, or permanently closing a publication within a day.195 Indeed, the 'media­
monitoring center'196 could be construed as the government's relentless attempt to 
control the flow of the information in order to compensate for its relative inability to 
control the political environment.
After the government's announcement of the flotation of the baht in July 1997,
of Thailand which owns Channel 9 and Channel 3. It was evident that Pol. Capt.Chalerm 
influenced the content of the news programs o f Channel 9 and used it to attack the press. 
Bangkok Post. July 21, 1997 (on-line edition).
"Panel toMonitor Media", The Nation. June 4, 1997 (on-line edition); "Ministry Shoots the 
Media Messenger", Svdnev Morning Herald. June 6, 1997 (on-line edition).
"Watchdog Represents Threat to Press Freedom' ", The Nation. June 6, 1997 (on-line edition). 
"Thai Government Threatens Media", The Age. September 15, 1997 (on-line edition).
"Pradit Offers Courts' Help to Police Media", The Nation. 9 June 1997 (on-line edition).
The 'media-monitoring center' had to be closed down within five months because of its 
ineffective admistration, and its failure in fulfilling its aim of'combating press attacks'. 
"Monitoring Center Calls It a Day", Bangkok Post. November 6, 1997 (on-line edition).
9 0
public confidence in Chavalit's cabinet as reflected in the media sank to its lowest level. 
The media-monitoring committee promptly rebuked the press by issuing forty-two 
warnings immediately after the flotation of the baht.197 Newspapers such as Naew Na 
and Thai Post were targeted by the media-monitoring center and by those who held 
extralegal power in the government, because of the publications' catchy headlines and 
severe scrutiny of the government. Naew Na received twenty-four warnings, while Thai 
Post received twenty-nine warnings from a total of eighty-eight warnings issued by the 
printing officers in 1997.198 Moreover, a Naew Na director and columnist, Squadron 
Leader Prasong Soonsiri, who long had a good relationship with the then opposition 
Democrat Party, had a grenade thrown into his house after he sharply criticized the 
government.199 In a similar vein, Thai Post 's editorial office was also the target of a 
bomb threat.200
The media-monitoring center ceased operating only a few weeks before the 
Chavalit government collapsed, partly because of protests from the media, and partly 
because of budget constraints.201 However, in response to the government's allegations 
against newspaper reports, the journalists and several press organizations of Thailand 
decided to establish the 'Press Council of Thailand' as an independent self-regulatory 
body in July 1997. The main task of the Press Council is to control and check the ethics 
of daily newspapers with an aim to boost liberty, to heighten the sense of liberty, and 
to upgrade professional and journalistic stature of the press.202 The council was, and 
remains, the first of its kind in Thailand, and its manifesto overtly states the intention to 
move away from political and legal constraints, and make a claim to autonomy. Previous 
attempts to create such an independent, self-regulatory body failed because the
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"Sanoh to Get Tough With Media: Press Blamed for Causing Economic Ills", Bangkok Post. 
September 14, 1997 (on-line edition).
The Reporters’ Association of Thailand, "Nai rob pi seumolchon Thai" (The Thai Mass Media 
in a Year Round), in Wan nakkhao 5 minakhom 2542 (The Reporters' Dav. March 5. 19991 
(Bangkok: RAT, 1999), p. 46.
"Prasong's House in Bomb Attack", Bangkok Post. August 14, 1997 (on-line edition).
"Crash Healine Lands 'Thai Post' in Trouble", The Nation. September 23, 1997 (on-line 
edition).
"Soon Pikart Sue Woon . ." (Turmoils in Media-Monitoring Center), Naew Na. October 12, 
1997, p. 1; "Chalerm Turns Off the News", Bangkok Post. October 29, 1997 (on-line edition). 
Bangkok Post. August 11, 1997 (on-line edition).
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newspapers did not appreciate the importance of establishing such a body, and the state
tried to intervene with a list of legislation.203 Indeed, Thai journalists believe that
allowing state intervention through any form of legislation could be a loophole that leads
to overt control and manipulation, and this would be disastrous for the freedom of the
press.204 As reflected in Suthichai's comments:
Some people believe that professional ethics can be legislated.
But the Thai experience have proven time and again that when 
one invites the state to set ethical standards for a certain profession, 
it will inevitably ends with misguided government control, stifling 
regulations and political manipulation.205
Therefore, a self-governing Press Council of Thailand emerged as a defensive mechanism 
against further attempts by the state to impose controls on press reports deemed 
unethical or biased.
However, the outdated Press Act of 1941, which is still in use today, has also 
been a regulatory loophole through which the government can prevent strong press 
criticism. For example, the Banham coalition government issued warnings to six national 
dailies and weeklies that mentioned the public disapproval of the premature termination 
of a no-confidence debate in May 1995, in which the Premier and two government 
ministers were at the center of corruption revelations.206 The authority who issued 
these warnings simply claimed that the newspapers interfered with the public peace and 
order, which was in violation of the Press Act of 1941. Despite many press and 
journalists' association campaigns to overhaul the Act, it remains unchanged. Yet some
The idea of establishing a Press Council of Thailand had been discussed as far back as in the 
1950s when Police General Phao Sriyanondh was in power. The council was again about to 
materialize during Kukrit Pramoj's administration in 1973. During that time, the new Press 
Act was written with an aim to set up a committee whose independent members could exercise 
their power by imposing moral sanctions in form of fines and other means on journalists who 
violated the Press Act. However, the legislation never passed the parliamentary vote. Ironically, 
the majority of the MPs were within the coalition government led by Kukrit Pramoj, an ex- 
joumalist who once fought for press freedom. Another attempt in 1990 by the Chatichai 
Government also failed because representatives from government agencies refused to stop sitting 
in a committee panel of the Press Council. See The Journalists' Association of Thailand, 
"Sapakan nungsuphim hang chart: 30 pi hang kam tor-su pua khum kan eng" (The 
PressCouncil of Thailand: 30 Years of Fighting for Self-Control), Amazing Thai Journalists 
1998 (Bangkok: The Journalists' Association of Thailand, 1998), pp. 47-53.
Interview with Mr. Manich Sooksomchitre, Senior Editor of Thai Rath, President of the 
Press Council of Thailand, April 20, 1998.
Suthichai Yoon, "Towards a Less Influential Press", The Nation. April 24, 1998, p. A4.
"Govt Wages War with the Media", Bangkok Post. June 2, 1996 (on-line edition).
92
provisions in this Press Act are incompatible with Article 39 of the newly promulgated 
Constitution of 1997, which specifically prohibits the shutdown of any press, radio 
station, or television station.207 Some provisions of the Press Act of 1941 which 
directly contradict with Article 39 of the 1997 Constitution of Thailand are:
• Section 34: To enforce law and order when necessary, the Director General of the 
Police Department may temporarily prohibit the publishing of articles on military 
affairs or in international politics.
• Section 35: In wartime or state of emergency, the Director General of the Police 
Department may impose censorship on the press.
• Section 36-40: If a story which is offensive or indecent is published, the press officers 
in charge can: warn the publisher, editor, or owner of that newspaper; or impose 
censorship; or suspend and withdraw the publishers' license. An appeal against these 
measures to the Minister of Interior is possible.
A recent attempt by representatives of Press Officers208 within the Special 
Branch of the Bangkok Police Department to rewrite the Press Act of 1941 also failed, 
as the Thai press associations disapproved the final drafted Act and called it "more 
draconian" than the current Press Act. This was because some draft provisions gave the 
Press Authority unilateral powers to curb the press, such as requiring the publishers to
Article 39 of the 1997 Constitution stipulates that:
"People have the right of liberty of expression, speech, writing, printing, publicity, and 
communication by other means.
The restriction of any freedom and liberty guaranteed by paragraph 1 is unconstitutional except 
when imposed under authority of a law specifically enacted for the purpose of preserving national 
security, protecting rights, liberties, honour, family rights, or the privacy of others, for the 
keeping of peace and order, for the maintenance of public morals, for the protection or stemming 
from the deterioration of the moral or physical well-being of the public.
It is unconstitutional for the government to order a shutdown of the press, of a radio station, of a 
television station with a view to undermine such freedom.
It is unconstitutional for the government to impose a ban on printing newspaper publishing, 
radio or television station broadcasts except if it is imposed by a court judge whose sentence is 
handed down under the authority of law.
State censorship is prohibited unless during time of war and through laws in accordance with 
paragraph 2.
Owner of media organizations must be Thai.
The state is not allowed to financially support privately-owned media organizations".
The Press Officers (Chao phanak-ngan kan-phim) in Bangkok include the Director-General of the 
Police Department, the Deputy Director-General of the Police Department, the Commander of 
the Special Branch of the Police Department, and the Police Inspector of the Fifth Section of the 
Third Precinct of the Special Branch. In addition, provincial mayors also have the same 
authority as the press officers in their respective areas. Prakart krasuang mahatthai wand 15 
phnisaphakhom 2516 ( Ministry of Interior's Gazette Mav 15. 19761.
renew their licenses every year, demanding that all journalists' and columnists' register 
their pseudonyms, and holding not only the editors but also the owners of newspapers 
accountable for criminal and civil offenses. By using court orders, the authority was also 
to be empowered to confiscate the published materials as well as the printing 
equipment, which is tantamount to forcing a closure.209 Clearly the authority to close 
down newspapers is an absolute guarantee of control over political information that the 
Thai state wants to hold on to as long as it possibly can.
Although Article 39 of the current Constitution prohibits the shutdown of the 
press and broadcasting stations, the restriction of freedom of expression, such as 
banning and censorship by a court order is, in accordance with the Constitution, 
possible only for the purpose of "preserving national security...for the keeping of peace 
and order, for the maintenance of public morals...", and newspapers are automatically 
closed after receiving three official warnings. As a matter of fact, the Press Act 
contradicts the Constitution for practical reasons, in the sense that it is the police rather 
than the courts that have the power to censor newspapers within the current structure. 
Further, censorship administration, as well as almost all other so-called 'government 
functions', are not subject to being reviewed by the court. The lack of judicial power 
over media censorship seems to have allowed an unusually high degree of bureaucratic 
discretion in interpreting such concepts as ‘national security’, and ‘public peace and 
order’.
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Manich Sooksomchitre, the President of the Press Council of Thailand, contends 
that the 1941 Press Act gives the officials "unrealistically high power", and that "they 
can decide we (journalists) are wrong just for thinking, let alone acting".210 Since 1997, 
the press organizations, media and public intellectuals, and civil activists have 
campaigned for the abolition of the Press Act of 1941, and the drafting of a more 
democratic law. Without a new law, the Thai press' ability to disseminate political
Tawatchai Jaranai, "Manich Sooksomchitre chae rangpor.ror.bor chabab 'santiban' lauk 
Egypt pad phoon phadejkarn" (Manich Sooksomchitre disclosed the new Drafted Act: 
Authoritarian and Copied from Egypt), Matichon Sudsanda. September 8, 1998, pp. 68-9. 
Interview with Mr. Manich Sooksomchitre on April 20, 1998.210
information will continue to be blocked by the Press Officers under the supervision of 
the Minister of Interior, and the courts under the jurisdiction of the Minister of 
Justice.211 The existence of the 1952 Act for the Prevention of the Communist 
Activities and the 1985 National (News) Intelligence Act, which allow the authority to 
monitor and suppress news detrimental to national security, further lessens the ability 
of the Thai press to gain access to and disseminate political information. This degree of 
accessibility depends largely on how the government and its bureaucrats, as well as the 
courts, interpret concepts like 'national security' or 'public peace and order', and how 
they apply the related laws and regulations as well as other severe extralegal controls on 
the Thai press. Without the abrogation of the existing press laws, the Thai press can be 
an active agent in the Thai political communication system only to a limited extent.
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Compared to the Thai press, which is still affected by a tough press law, the 
Japanese press looks relatively more free. Since the censorship imposed by the 
Occupation Force ended in 1949, there has not been any other kind of legal censorship 
directly imposed on the Japanese press, except the Subversive Activities Prevention 
Act of 1952 (Hakaikatsudö Böshihö), which was promulgated as a part of the US Cold 
War strategy to prevent Japan from the rising threats of communism. One section of 
this Act specifically prohibits the press from being involved in "instigation", 
"incitement", and the "crime of propaganda".212 The press industry strongly opposed 
this Act from the outset saying that it was opposed to the virtue of the freedom of 
expression guaranteed in the 1947 Constitution. However, the government passed the
At present there are six main pieces of legislation directly concerning the press: the 
Press Act of 1941 which allows the closure of newspapers; Martial Law, which has a 
disastrous flaw in that an army officer in only a minimum rank of sub-lieutenant, may impose 
censorship or prohibit selling of a newspaper in time of war or during state o f emergency; 
the Youth and Family Court Procedure Law which disallows the taping of voice, the 
publication of names, photograph, or address o f under-aged convicts; Criminal Law which deals 
with publications deemed detrimental to the royal family, national security, diplomatic relations 
and individual's reputation; the Civil and Commercial Code which imposes heavy fine and jail 
terms to those convicted in the libel lawsuits; and the Civil Court Procedure Law which 
monitors news reports concerning court cases or trials. See Pisith Shawalathawat, Kodmai 
seusanmolchon (Mass Media Law), op. cit.
In particular, Article 5 o f this Act stipulates that the publications of any organization involved 
in subversive activities can face suspension for a period o f six months, and according to Article 
38, a person involved in such activities faces up to seven years imprisonment. Nihon 
Shimbun Kyokai (The Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association), Press Laws in 
Japan (Commentary and Abstracts') (Tokyo: NSK, 1995), pp. 13-15.
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bill due to US pressure. Yet this Act exists today and has never been applied to the 
press.
Another piece of legislation that restricts freedom of the press is the Public 
Offices Election Law of 1950, which was revised in 1975. This law was designed to 
ensure strict neutrality in election campaign coverage. For example, it contains 
provisions prohibiting the publication of news designed to influence an election (Article 
148-2), and the publication of results of popularity polls prior to elections (Article 148- 
3).213 However, it is generally known that papers have often ignored these regulations. 
Politicians and political parties have consequently laid charges against newspapers on 
the grounds of "impairing the fairness of elections".214 Nonetheless, courts have always 
ruled out such charges. This has led to the development of a political information 
contest between political parties and the media, in which the parties try to exert control 
over political information, and the media respond by blocking such moves. For instance, 
the ruling LDP drafted the bill in 1993 to restrict any publication of election result 
forecasts, to coincide with the proposed refonn of Japan's electoral system. The NSK 
strongly opposed the ideas, and the bill did not even reach the Diet floor, due to the 
early dissolution of the LDP government in July 1993.215 Yet the LDP did not discard 
the idea of restricting media coverage, particularly with regards to elections and 
associated polls. In particular, after the LDP faced a substantial loss in the Upper 
House election in July 1998, the party set up its own 2,000 press monitor centers
213
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Japan has some of the strictest election campaign regulations in existence. One regulation, for 
instance, prohibits political candidates from buying space in newspapers or other print media, as 
well as airtime on broadcasting media on an individual basis other than government's provision. 
Some campaign advertisements on mass media for each candidate are allowed and 
provided by the government. Television advertisements only allow the candidate to speak to the 
audience, and do not allow the presentation of a professionally produced campaign 
advertisement. Candidates for the House of Representatives are allowed to make three radio 
broadcast o f five minutes each, three television appearances of four and one-half minutes each, 
and five newspaper advertisements o f a determined length. Although political parties are allowed 
to buy advertising time freely on a party basis, the advertising campaign must not be geared 
towards promoting a specific candidate. See, for example, Ray Christensen, "Putting New Wine 
into Old Bottles: The Effect of Electoral Reforms on Campaign Practices in Japan", Paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Asscociation of Asian Studies, Washington DC, March 
26, 1998. See also Lawrence W. Beer, Freedom of Expression in Japan (Tokyo: Kodansha 
International, 1984).
Nihon Shimbun Kyokai (The Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association), Press Laws 
in Japan (Commentary and Abstracts! (Tokyo: JNPEA, 1995), pp. 17-19.
Ibid.215
around the country. These centers are designed to check media coverage related to the 
parties which appears to be inaccurate or biased, and to report such coverage to the 
party's headquarters. Then, the party decides whether to write letters of protest, or take 
other measures, such as party sanctions.216
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Although the Japanese Diet passed its first National Public Information Act in 
May 1999, it has long had three sets of legislation that directly complicate and limit the 
process of accessing political infonnation. The first set includes the Criminal Law and 
the Civil Law, which concern the non-disclosure of news sources (Shuzai gen no 
hitoku). This set of laws states that journalists have, to some extent, a right to refuse to 
testify about a news source (kisha no shogen kyozetsu-ken), but that right can be 
waived for the sake of conducting a fair trial.217 The second set includes the National 
Public Service Law (Kokka Kömuin-hö), the Local Public Service Law (Chiho Komuin- 
ho), and the Self-Defense Force Law (Jieitai-ho) which disallow national and local public 
service officers, as well as Defence Force officers, to disclose official secrets whether 
still on active duty or retired. Those reporters who divulge such secrets are subjected to 
criminal charge.218 The third set of laws imposes criminal charges on those who disclose 
security information about US-Japan Security Cooperation.219 There was a relevant 
case when a Mainichi Shimbun reporter, Nichiyama Takichi, leaked sensitive 
information to a member of the Opposition. Nichiyama divulged information obtained 
from his lover, a foreign affairs officer, regarding the contents of secret cables sent during
"LDP Sets Up Press Monitoring System", NSK News Bulletin. December 1998, 21 (4), p. 9. 
See section on " Shuzai,hödö no jiyu" (Freedom o f Newsgathering and Reporting) at the NSK's 
website: http://www.pressnet.or.jp; and examples of famous court cases in Horibe Masao,
"Press Law in Japan", in P. Lahav (ed.), Press Law in Modem Democracies: A Comparative 
Study (New York: Longman, 1985), pp. 324-327.
Article 100 of the National Public Service Law stipulates that government employees shall not 
leak secrets that become known to them through their official duties. Article 111 makes it a 
criminal offense to induce a public servant to disclose the secrets. Nihon Shimbun Kyokai (The 
Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association), Press Laws in Japan (Commentary and 
Abstracts) (Tokyo: NSK, 1995), p. 9.
There are three pieces of legislation governing the protection of information regarding the US- 
Japan Security Cooperation: firstly, Special Criminal Law to Implement the Agreement under 
Article VI o f the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United 
States of America Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Forces in 
Japan; secondly, the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States 
of America; and lastly, the Secrets Protection Law Pursuant to the Japan-US Mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement. Ibid., p. 10.
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the US-Japan negotiations for the 1972 reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. 
The information revealed that Japan had made a 'deal' with the US before the reversion, 
and this deal had not been made known to public.220 After the story was exposed, the 
Foreign Affairs officer was charged with secrecy violations, and the reporter was 
convicted of inducing a public servant to commit a crime. However, the penalty for 
severe crimes such as secrecy violations is rather small. The maximum sentence is only 
one-year imprisonment and a small fine.221
There are other laws with provisions relating to the moral nature of 
publication.222 These laws and regulations, however, contain vaguely worded 
provisions, and the range of penalties is rather minimal. In fact, there have been 
relatively few cases of individuals convicted of violations being sent to prison. Both 
Criminal and Civil Codes in Japan do prescribe punishment for defamation.223 Yet few 
defamation lawsuits are filed in Japan because potential litigants wish to avoid conflict 
and publicity, and the award for punitive damage in civil cases is normally small whilst
This dea\ involved the payment of four million US dollars by the Japanese government. 
Lawrence W. Beer, "Freedom of Expression: The Continuing Revolution in Japan's Legal 
Culture", Occasional Papers in Contemporary Asian Studies No, 3 (Maryland: School of Law 
University of Maryland, 1991), pp. 19-20; See also Hara Toshio, Jaanarizumu no shisö 
(Thoughts in Journalism! (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1997), p. 79.
These include the Libel and Defamation Acts which require compensation for intentional 
or negligent violation of another's rights, the Juvenile Law which does not allow the 
publication of details pertaining to a juvenile delinquent under 20 (exception is made in cases of 
a suspect is expected to commit further vicious crimes, or for the purpose of searching the 
suspect), the Penal Code against the publication of obscene materials, the 
Criminal Procedure Law which concerns the courtroom coverage, the Customs Standards 
Law, which prohibits imports of "written materials and pictures harmful of public order and 
public morals", and the Securities and Exchange Law which contains provisions on 
controlling insider trading. For more details, see Nihon Shimbun Kyökai (The Japan Newspaper 
Publishers & Editors Association), Press Laws in Japan (Commentary and Abstracts") (Tokyo: 
Nihon Shimbun Kyökai, 1995), pp. 5-26.
In 1999, the Japanese Diet attempted to push through new anti-crime legislation, the so-called 
‘wiretapping bill’, to legalize the interception of communications by law enforcement authorities 
during criminal investigations. The bill first listed several professions to be exempted, such as 
medical practitioners, and legal attorneys, but not including the 
media profession. As this law, if enacted, would violate the freedom of the press by 
hampering the non-disclosure nature of news sources, media organizations heavily criticized the 
bill, and finally pressured the Ministry of Justice, which initially drafted the bill, to exempt 
the media profession from wiretapping. See "Japanese Ministry to Exempt Media 
from Wiretaps", Japan Times. August 3, 1999 (on-line edition); "Controversial Wiretapping 
Bill Clears Diet", NSK News Bulletin. September 1999, 22(3), p. 2.
In particular, the Japanese Criminal Code distinguishes between the crime of ordinary 
defamation and defamation concerning public interest. Article 230 of the Criminal Code 
suggests no punishment should be laid on those convicted on defamation charge on matters of 
public concern, or promoting public interest. See Horibe Masao, "Press Law in Japan", in Pnina 
Lahav (ed.), Press Law in Modem Democracies (New York: Longman, 1985), pp. 315-338.
98
undertaking a legal process is very costly. Final resolution for legal disputes is thus 
often sought through informal settlements.224 Japanese law has a considerably 
important role in channeling and facilitating these informal dispute-settlement 
procedures, and the dispute is always negotiable. As Beer, a scholar of the Japanese 
legal system puts it "if one has the proper social position, or skill in human relations 
with those implementing a legalism affecting freedom, impractical formalism sometimes 
softens with reasons and humanism".225
While the degree to which legal censorship imposed on the post-war Japanese 
press has been limited, the pervasive practice of extralegal censorship within the 
Japanese press structure is a different story. The juxtaposition between the absence of 
effective laws and regulations and the unwritten rules restraining the practice of self- 
imposed censorship well reflects the clear distinction between ‘tatemae’ (stated 
principles) and ‘honne’ (real intention). A good illustration here is a comparison 
between the role General Douglas MacArthur designated to the kisha kurabu, as a 
socializing organization that promoted friendship and professionalism without resort to 
newsgathering functions, and the actual practices.
In Japan today there are about 800 reporters’ clubs attached to most of the 
important state bureaus, organizations, and agencies, as well as large private enterprises 
around the country, each of which has between 2 to 361 member organizations.226 The 
clubs are dominated by the five Japanese national daily newspapers, bloc newspapers, 
local newspapers with circulation of more than 10,000 copies, two wire services and 
five broadcasting networks.227 In contrast to the articulated principle of the kisha
224 One o f the solutions is that newspapers agree to publish message of apology, or issue
corrections. For instance, Asahi Shimbun, the left-oriented paper, published ninety messages of 
apology and a total of 1,359 news corrections between 1990 and 1995. See Yamazaki Shigeo, 
"Shimbun no Shinrui-do to Seikaku-sei no kankei nitsuite” (The Relationship between the 
trustworthiness and Correctness of the Press), Nihon Shimbun Kvökai Kenkvuio Nenpö. 1998, 
(16), p. 37.
Lawrence W. Beer, Freedom of Expression in Japan : A Study in Comparative Law. Politics 
and Society (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1984), p. 150.
226 For national lists of clubs, numbers of member organizations, and details on average annual
income and expenditures, see Iwase Tatsuya, Shimbun %a omoshirokunai Rivü (The Reasons 
whv newspapers are not interesting! (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1998), pp. 295-325.
In 1997, the NSK had 163 member organizations, including 112 newspaper organizations, and
kurabu as a social club, the most important function of the press club is, in reality, to 
hold press conferences for top policy makers on a regular basis, mostly at the reporters' 
requests. The government agencies and municipal offices provide a press’ room for 
reporters to undertake their newsgathering work. Most press clubs require reporters to 
attend on a daily basis. Relationships between the sources and reporters at the club are 
easily established and accumulated over years through formal and informal press 
conferences and personal entertainment. As a result, these Japanese kisha kirabu have 
long been famous for their inclination toward collusive relations with news sources and 
uniformity in news reporting, as well as for their exclusionist character vis-ä-vis outside 
media agents, such as non-members of the NSK .228 The club rules and sanctions create 
an atmosphere in which reporters from competing companies, but belonging to the same 
press club, do not compete for news, do not attempt to deviate from the shared views, 
and ultimately work against the nature of investigative reporting.
Each press club has informal rules that govern both formal press conferences and 
informal, though systematized briefings known as kondan (chatting), commonly offered 
to reporters. The press conferences and kondan are comparable to the front (omote), 
and back {ura) of the political world. While press conferences are formal opportunities 
in which reporters can gather and report news which they can report, informal briefings 
or kondan provide reporters with opportunities to have a chat with important news 
sources about inside stories on a wide range of topics including current political ideas 
and situations, which are often not made public.229 However, there are differences 
between rules governing formal press conferences and rules governing informal briefings.
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51 news agencies and broadcasting networks. The qualification requirements for NSK 
membership in the case of newspapers, are guaranteed reporting of current affairs, or 
sports in general, the maintenance o f newspaper ethics, publication for more than six days per 
week; and a circulation more than 10, 000 copies. See the NSK web site at http: 
//www.pressnet.or.jp.
Hotta Yoshihiko, "Kisha kurabu wa mukashi kara shuzai kyoten deshita..." (Kisha Club has 
been a principal base for newsgathering since the old days) Sögö Jaanarizumu Kenkvu. 1998, 
(164), pp. 24-8.
Hirose Hidehiko, "The Press Club System in Japan: Its Past, Present, and Future", Keio 
Communication Review. 1994, (16), pp. 63-75. Hirose suggests that on average, press 
conferences at the press clubs of government ministries are held twice a week by ministers, once 
a week by vice ministers, and less often by bureau directors. Whereas kondan are held more 
frequently by these officials.
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The NSK's guidelines on press conferences state that "press clubs and newspaper 
organizations are not permitted to place any restrictions on individual journalists or 
reporters attending press conferences".230 Yet in practice, non-member reporters and 
media organizations are not allowed to attend formal press conferences. Before 1968, 
foreign journalists had not been allowed to attend press conferences which were 
generally held under the auspices of the press clubs and not public institutions, and 
from attending kondan.231 Many forceful protests from the Foreign Correspondents' 
Club in Japan led to some compromises. In 1972, foreign reporters were given 'observer 
status’ in certain clubs and allowed to ask questions, though questions had to be 
submitted in advance in Japanese. However, they were still excluded from being a full 
member of the Japan National Press Clubs (Nippon Kisha Kurabu).232 Not only foreign 
journalists in Japan but also Japanese journalists, such as those of weekly magazines 
and party papers like Akahata, are not allowed to attend the clubs' press conferences.233 
Japanese press clubs overseas have a similar reputation for exclusivity.234 A typical 
reason for the rejection of permission to attend press conferences was that the press 
club was a social club, and any decisions regarding admission of new members was at 
the club's discretion, and even the NSK could not influence the decision.
In 1993, the bar on foreign reporters attending formal press conferences in Japan 
was lifted due to the US pressure. This came in the wake of increasingly frequent and 
outrageous barring of foreign reporters from major stories, particularly those related 
with trade issues.235 Since 1993, an increasing number of foreign media organizations
Nihon Shimbun Kyokai (Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association), NSK Leaflet 
(Tokyo: NSK, 1998).
Öiwa Y uri,"Kurabu to kondan no takai kokusai shöheki" (The High International Barriers of 
Press Clubs and Informal Briefings), Asahi Shimbun Weekly Aera. (October 1, 1991), p. 20. 
Öiwa Yuri, "Gaikokujin kisha no kaiken shusseki joken” (Conditions to Attend Press 
Conferences for Foreign Reporters!. Asahi Shimbun Weekly Aera. (October 1, 1991), p. 28. 
Interview with Mr. Kawamura Shigemitsu, Editor-in-Chief, Akahata Shimbun on October 20, 
1998.
For example, the Manila Press Club's members relentlessly blocked the non-members from 
attending press conferences. They also spent "all their time trying to safeguard their privileges 
against the newcomers". See Kato Hiroshi, "Expose: A Cancer on the Japanese Press Abroad", 
Japan Echo. 1988, 15(2), pp. 56-60.
Ivan P. Hall, Cartels of the Mind: Japan's Intellectual Closed Shop (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1998), pp.60-4. ; See also Mizuno Takeya, "Kisha kurabu kanren-shi " (History 
Related to the Reporters' Club), Nihon Shimbun Kvökai Kenkvusho Nenpö 1995 11995 Annual 
Report of Japan's Newspaper Association Research Center). (13), p. 63.
have been granted membership of various press clubs, but some remain closed to foreign 
reporters. These include clubs that are attached to the courts and the Ministry of Justice 
(Hömushö). Moreover, the number of foreign journalists attending press conferences is 
restricted by each club. Foreign reporters are also not allowed to attend the cosy 
kondan. Thus, the exclusive character of the Japanese kisha kurabu is maintained, and 
the NSK, the media organizations, and their reporters avoid taking any responsibility 
regarding the problem. The NSK always denies any influence over the kisha kurabu, 
citing their voluntary and autonomous character; whereas the media organizations and 
reporters blame the problems on their sources, and the lack of language proficiency and 
non-conformist characters of their foreign counterparts.236It is interesting to note that 
the restrictions against foreign journalists in Japan is not totally unique, as foreign 
reporters in Thailand are also required to obtain a special permission to enter 
government offices.237
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Within press clubs there are embargo agreements, known as blackboard 
agreements or kokuban kyotei,238 that determine which news items arc suitable for 
release. In most cases, a joint agreement of club members is needed to release the news 
involving kidnapping or other serious crimes, or the Imperial family.239 Those who 
break these agreements are subjected to club sanctions, ranging from suspension to 
expulsion from the club. Similar penalties apply to rules governing kondan. Information 
given by sources through kondan are often kept off-the-record, or not directly cited,
Öiwa Yuri, op. cit.
"Foreign Press Seeks Improvements", The Nation. June 27, 1998 (on-line edition).
The agreements were called 'blackboard agreements' because they were usually written on the 
old-style blackboard in the club's meeting room. Putting news on hold is known as to 'hang' 
(shibari) the news. It is estimated that the news items which are put on hold per year account 
around one-third o f the total number of news items announced at press conferences at the 
reporters' clubs. For instance, the Ministry of Construction (Kensetsushö) released around 600 
news items for media dissemination per year. The reporters' club attached to the Ministry 
hung about 200 news items a year. Most o f these news items dealt with budgeting on 
construction projects, and bidding processes. See "Kisha Kurabu" (Reporters' Club), Asahi 
Shimbun. December 22, 1998, p. 29.
News attributed to royal matters was put on hold based on 'voluntarily restraint agreements'. 
For example, the news blackouts on the Crown Prince Naruhito's search for the bride as 
according to unilateral agreements among the NSK members, arranged by the Imperial 
Household News Agency and the NSK, and the way in which the Japanese media were asked to 
hold off publicizing Emperor Hirohito death until the Imperial Household could make the 
announcement. This subject of the Imperial coverage will be discussed further in Chapter Four.
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unless approved otherwise.240 Reporters who leak or expose off-the-record information 
can face sanctions from either the source or the club by being prohibited to enter the 
press rooms, or attend press conferences and kondan, for a certain period. Some 
government department and agencies also apply different rules governing kondan. For 
example, Directors and senior members of the MITI, Self-Defence Force Agency, 
Environmental Agency, and the Ministry of Finance do not allow reporters to take 
memos or directly use their names as references. Most are referred to in news stories as 
‘a leading member’, or ‘a senior member’, or ‘a high-ranking official’. Directors and 
senior members at the Ministry of State, on the other hand, do not allow taking memos 
or newspaper reports about what being discussed in kondan.241
If reporters break these rules, then there are sanctions from sources which are 
generally known as 'deiri kinshi'. These include prohibitions the whole team of reporters 
from interviewing sources, gathering information, and attending press conferences and 
kondan 242 This type of sanction is exemplified by the case of a popular politician, 
Ozawa Ichiro. In August 1993, Mr. Ozawa Ichiro, Secretary-General of Shinseito 
(Japan Renewal Party) at that time, abolished his bankisha243 and kondan as a backlash 
to the leak of his off-the-record comments to the weekly magazine 'Shükan Bunshun'.
The article in question published his complete off-the-record comments (kan ofu), 
including his strong criticisms against other political parties and their leaders.244 In
response to the publication, Ozawa imposed a series of sanctions on reporters by
240
241
242
243
244
Off-the-record comments are not attributed directly by name, but sometimes are allowed to be 
cited vaguely as given by such positions as ‘party leader’, ‘secretary of the faction’, or 
‘ministerial executives’. In most cases, reporters are not allowed to take notes, or take photos. 
Yet this depends on regulations set up by individual ministries, or the government offices to 
which the clubs are attached. For example, reporters at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are 
allowed to take notes and memos at kondan briefings and also write articles on it. Their 
counterparts at the Ministry of State, on the contrary, are not allowed to take any notes at the 
kondan briefings, and they cannot write reports about them. For more details see "[.Kondankai 
haishi ] kancho demo" (Kondan briefings also discontinued at governmental offices), Asahi 
Shimbun. August 31, 1993, p. 25.
"Kawaru seiji hodd” (Changes in political reports), Asahi Shimbun. August 31, 1993, p. 25. 
Kosuge Hiroto, "Ozawaryu masukomi taioujutsu no kenkyü” (A Research on Ozawa's style 
in dealing with the mass media), Ushio , 1993, (12), p. 106.
In Japan, political journalists are assigned to cover individual politicians. Known as 'bankisha', 
these journalists frequently follow a politician from early morning until very late night, often 
following them to their homes. See Chapter four for further details.
"Ozawa Ichirö odoroku beki ofureko hatsugen zenkokai "(Ozawa IchirO must be surprised:
All off-the-record comments are made public), Shükan Bunshun . 1993, July 29, pp. 34-7.
stopping the bankisha from following him, cancelling his routinely kondan, and giving 
only a weekly formal press conference.245 He expressed his opinion that "giving a press 
conference was not his duty, rather it was his service" .246 Two months later he imposed 
'deiri kinshi' on reporters from Sankei and Nihon Keizai Shimbun on the grounds that 
their news reports about his comments on the rice problem and electoral reform were 
taken out of context. Before one of his press conferences, reporters were warned that 
questions regarding his alleged involvement in the Zenekon corruption scandal should 
not be asked.247 Ozawa's case clearly illustrates the ability of the source to block 
reporters' access to political information at their will. Ozawa's explanation for his 
actions also confirms that such disincentive strategies can pressure the press to practise 
self-censorship on issues which in fact should be made public. It also points to the 
relationship between reporters and politicians in Japan, which is so solid that politicians 
can place comments off-the-record after making them. This Japanese practice is quite 
contrary to the Thai case, as well as universal practice, in which the source must specify 
the confidential nature of his or her comments in advance.248
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Sanctions within the clubs themselves are known as toin teishi, which means 
prohibitions to enter. One recent case involved the disclosure of off-the-record 
comments (ofureko hatsugen) made by Eto Takami, the Director General of the 
Management and Coordination Agency. In a kondan meeting with reporters, Eto made 
sensitive remarks regarding Japanese annexation of Korea. He said that "during Japan's 
colonial rule of Korea, Japan did some good things" (shokuminchi jidai nihon wa ii koto 
mo shita) . 249 Despite the fact that his comment was made before a planned bilateral 
summit between South Korea and Japan on the occasion of the APEC Meeting in
245
246
247
248
249
However, Ozawa also allowed foreign reporters and weekly magazine reporters whose 
organizations are not members o f the NSK to participate in his press conference. Personal 
interview was also allowed on a case by case basis. See Kosuge Hiroto, op.cit., pp. 102-9;
"Bankisha kondan kieta" (Informal briefings disappeared), Asahi Shimbun. August 24, 1993, 
p. 25.
Sogo Jaanarizumu Kenkyujo, "Kishakurabu 'dekigoto' shi, 90 nendai"(The Review o f the 
Incidents at the Press Club in the 1990s), Schw Jaanarizumu Kenkvu 1998, (164), p. 17. 
Ibid.
Somchai Boonluea, "Perd ja i naiyok nak khao Kavi Chongkittavorn koranee Suwat off-the- 
record" (Kavi Chongkittavorn disclosed his view in relation to the case of Suwaf s off-the- 
record), Matichon Sudsapda , April 6, 1999, p. 68.
Sögo Jaanarizumu Kenkyujo, op. cit., pp.17-8.
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Osaka, it was neither published nor broadcast. Only the November 1995 issue of a 
Japanese monthly magazine called 'Sentaku' published a part of the story without 
mentioning the source. A South Korean newspaper later received an anonymous three- 
page transcription of Eto's off-the-record comments and published the story. Two 
Japanese newspapers, Mainichi and Tokyo Shimbun, printed the story after the Korean 
daily. The story caused diplomatic strain to the extent that Korea rejected a visit by the 
Japanese foreign minister. Etö was forced to withdraw his remarks and ultimately 
resigned. Reporters from Mainichi and Tokyo Shimbun received "töin teishi" for a 
month.250
The question that needs to be addressed here is why the news media, which 
exposed such off-the-record remarks, were actually sanctioned by the press club. In this 
case, the NSK board made unilateral decisions that reporters involved should be deemed 
guilty of the leak.251 Kanise Seiichi points out that the punishment was extended 
beyond the usual verbal warnings because the actions severely broke the common beliefs 
among a great portion of Japanese journalists about off-the-record remarks. These 
common beliefs are that in order to keep the politicians’ faith in them, journalists 
automatically give them promises to keep silent, and that politicians will reveal the real 
practices (honne) of the political world based on their trust in journalists' promises.252 
Most Japanese journalists believe that this ‘trusting relationship’ (shinrai kankei) is the
Chamoto Shigemasa, "Seijika ga rekishi ninshiki wo ofureko de shika kataranai nihon no ijo" 
(Japan's abnormality: Politicians only tell their historical understanding at off-the-record 
meetings", Hösö Repooto. January 1996, (138), pp. 52-55; Nihon Shimbun Kyökai, The 
Japanese Press 1996. (Tokyo: NSK, 1996), p. 14; Kanise Seiichi, " (Ofureko bögen ) to kisha 
no shokugyö rin ri" (Off-Record Remarks and Reporters' Professional Ethics), So go 
Jaanarizumu Kenkvu 1996, (155), pp. 8-9. Another case in point here involved a Director 
General o f DefenseFacilities Administration Agency (DFAA), Hoshuyama Nobom, who held a 
kondan in which he criticized the government's renewal of a land lease with the citizens of 
Okinawa prefecture for stationing the US military base in 1996. In his criticism, he made a 
remark that the Okinawan problem rose because the Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi was 
not very smart in the first place ("Shusho ga atama ga warui kara”). Hoshuyama allowed 
reporters to quote a great portion of his comments under the credit of'a high rank official of 
DFAA. The TBS (Tokyo Broadcasting System) News 23 reported in the program that a high 
rank official o f the DFAA criticized that he could not help questioning the credibility of 
government leaders. The TBS reporters also presented the kondan notes to some top LDP 
officials. As a result, Hoshuyama resigned and the Defence Press Club sanctioned TBS by 
disallowing its reporters to enter the club rooms, press briefings or conferences for one month. 
"Leaking of Off-the-Record Remarks Stirs Controversy", NSK News Bulletin. March 1996, 
19(1), p. 2.
Kanise Seiichi, op. cit.
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most important license to gain access to sensitive political information, even though 
they know that the public will never get to know the facts.253 Two prominent 
journalists from political desks of elite newspapers — Sankei, and Yomiuri — share a 
similar view that kondan is important in their newsgathering process because "the more 
opportunity the reporters are in contact with the sources the better".254 An NSK 
survey conducted in 1992, in which nearly forty per cent of reporters in four 
prefectures believe that kondan were very important to their newsgathering process and 
provided easy access to sensitive information, confirms this point.255
However, this ‘trusting relationship’ between the journalists and their sources 
easily results in journalists identifying with the sources and enforcing a form of self­
censorship. Consequently, alleged political corruption and scandal stories are often 
published not by national newspapers but by the weekly news magazines which are 
generally not club members, and thus having no direct contact with the sources.256 
Those reporters who have direct contact with sources generally maintain their trusting 
relationship (shinrai kankei), and avoid causing any tense relationships (kinchö kankei) 
which could mean the end of their career. As the press reporters are coopted and their
See, for example, Yoshida Shinichi, "Ofureko shuzai to shirukenri: fudan no kenshö ga 
fukaketsu" (Off-the-record Newsgathering and the Rights to Know: Ceaseless Investigation is 
Essential", Asahi Shimbun: November 10, 1995; Maki Taro, "Happyösarenai nyuusu o otte" 
(Go after the news that is not allowed to be published), Nihon Kisha Kurabu Kaihö (Japan's 
Press Club Bulletin!. June 10, 1997, p. 2. Maki argues that there are few journalists in Japan 
who go after sanctioned news topic. He said that he was accused of being a socialist after 
printing an important record which contradicted a government announcement.
"Medeia Gaxva xva Hyöka to Keikai " (Judgement and Caution from the Media), Asahi 
Shimbun. August 24, 1993, p. 25.
The survey was conducted on 203 reporters in four prefectures in Central Japan - Okayama-ken, 
Hiroshima-ken, Shimane-ken, and Tottori-ken. See Nihon Shimbun Kyökai Kenkyüjo, "Shiryö 
6: shimbunkisha ankeeto kekka" (Materials 6: NSK Results of Newspaper Reporters' Survey), 
Shimbun Hodö (Kenshö) Series (Inspection Series of Newspaper Reports!. October 1996, 1(1), 
pp. 128-30.
For example, reports of the Lockheed Scandal which led to the 1974 downfall of Prime Minister 
Tanaka Kakuei first appeared in a weekly magazine, "Bungei Shunjü", which had a 
circulation in the 1970s around 700,000. Their targets were urban educated readers. The stories 
were published under a title "Tanaka Kakuei kenkyü: sono kinmyaku to jimmyaku" (An 
Anatomy of Tanaka Kakuei: His Money and His Men) and written by a freelance writer, who 
exposed how Tanaka' benefited from raising and dispensing public funds. However, not 
until after the story was mentioned by the reporters from Los Angeles Times at the Foreign 
Correspondents' Club did the Japanese press start taking up the issue seriously. See, for 
instance, Kyogoku Junichi, "The Common Sense of the Public and Political Establishment", 
Japan Echo. 1975, 11(1), pp. 13-24; and Maggie Farley, "Japanese Press and the Politics of 
Scandal", in S.J. Pharr and E. S. Krauss (eds.), Media and Politics in Japan (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1996), pp. 133-64.
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world views are shaped by sources such as politicians and the bureaucratic elite, the 
function of Japanese press in this case will hardly go beyond a mere conduit of 
information, that is to let the public know only what the state wants them to know.
Kisha kurabu has increasingly been criticized as a form of organization that 
promotes monopolization and conformity in news. There have been several attempts at 
the local government level to break away from the system. For instance, Takeuchi Ken, 
an ex-joumalist who became a mayor of Kamagura city, successfully set up a 'media 
center' at the city hall to replace kisha kurabu.251 Yet, other attempts have not been so 
successful.258 Only a few solutions have been recently put forward by the NSK to 
improve the system. In December 1997, the NSK revised its guidelines for kisha 
kurabu. These new guidelines (shinkenkai) were aimed at establishing a new recognition 
of the clubs as "venues for newsgathering and news reporting activities", in accordance 
with its actuality in a turnaround from the conventional definition of "organizations for 
promoting friendship and socialization among reporters".259 Although the revised 
guidelines include the principal of free newsgathering activities, embargo agreements 
such as kokuban kyotei on certain news items and the clubs' rules governing informal 
briefings still pertain.260
Comments from Japanese senior editors declare both the pros and the cons of 
abolishing kisha kurabu. For instance, Iwamura Tatsuro of Asahi suggests that the kisha 
kurabu system is useful in systematically gathering and managing an abundance of
See for example, Takeuchi Ken, "Kisha kurabu tono waga toso" (My Own Struggle with 
the reporters’ club), Bungei Shuniu. June 1996, pp. 202-9. Three basic rules o f this media center 
are: firstly, it is recognized as a place for newsgathering and will not be attached to public 
offices; secondly, the media center is open to all kinds o f media, such as newspapers, magazines, 
radios, specialized media, local, foreign media, as well as the public; and lastly, the center is a 
window o f opportunity for both reporters and the public to exert their right to know.
When the governor of Nagano prefecture tried to create a new press center to replace the 
traditional press club at the prefectural government building, his attempt was blocked by both 
the prefectural assembly and the media. See "Tanaka loses bid to set up media center",
The Asahi Shimbun. July 9, 2001 (on-line edition).
"Revised Guidelines on Operations of Kisha Clubs Adopted", NSK News Bulletin. March 
1998, 21(1), pp. 1-2.
Öte Tsutomu, "Kisha kurabu kaikaku ni mukete” (Towards Reforming Kisha Kurabu), So go 
Jaanarizumu Kenkvii. 1998, (164), p. 9; Nihon Shimbun Kyökai Henshü Iinkai, "Kisha kurabu 
ni kansuru shinkenkai" (The New Guidelines on the Press Clubs), So go Jaanarizumu 
Kenkvii. 1998, (164), pp. 11-4.
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information that flows in and out of state ministries and agencies on a daily basis.261 
The Editor-in-Chief of Akahata, however, argues that the closed nature of kondan and 
the unnecessarily over-detailed information given at the press conference can combine 
and work to eschew reporting other important news to the public.262 Despite the 
introduction of this revised set of guidelines, the main characteristics of kisha kurabu 
such as exclusiveness seem to prevail.263 Without a total eradication of the exclusive 
nature of the press clubs, as well as an abolition of the kondan briefings, incentives and 
sanctions will continue to nurture the collusive relationship between sources and 
reporters in Japan. This close co-operation limits the role of the press to a servant of 
the state, and inhibits a shift to a more active role.
2.6 Comparative Remarks
One Thai media scholar has summed up one prominent feature of the Thai press 
throughout its history: “the Thai press could be a responsible 'watchdog' press which 
watched for the government's wrongdoings and provided the public with a space for 
rational discourse and intellectual guidance on one day, and could become very 
sensationalized, or turned into a state propaganda machine on the next” .264 This erratic 
role of the Thai press was indeed a direct response to swift changes in the Thai political 
environment which previously often happened by means of a coup d'etat. Controlling 
the access and outflow of political information by imposing strict censorship has been a 
traditional means of seizing control employed by the military. As a result, press laws in 
Thailand consist of two major components: one set of laws enacted by the government
Interview with Mr. Iwamura Tatsurö, Deputy Chairman Editorial Board, Asahi Shimbun on 
November 18, 1998.
Interview with Mr. Kawamura Shigemitsu, the Editor-in-Chief, Akahata Shimbun on October 
20, 1998.
After the introduction of the new set of guidelines in December 1997, Shükan Gendai, a weekly 
magazine, wrote letters of application to six kisha kurabu attached to six major government 
ministries and agencies asking for membership. Beside one club that did not reply to the 
magazine's application, the rest denied the membership applications based on the interpretation 
of the new guidelines that the club system should be open to foreign media and did not mention 
anything about the local media. "Kisha kurabu [shinkenkai] de naniga kawatta no ka?" (What 
have been changed by the reporters' clubs’ 'New Views'), Shükan Gendai. July 1998, (18),
pp. 180- 81.
Wilasinee Pinpithkul, "Khwam plien plang tang-kan-muang ti mee pholkatob kab 
nungsuphim" (Effects of the Changes in Political Environment on the Press), Seu-molchon 
Parithat. March 7, 1987, pp. 11-19.
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of the day, and the other by the revolutionary group that took control of those 
governments. However, the latter has had the most influence.
In Japan, the notion of freedom of the press as a tool of democratic self- 
government, although guaranteed under the 1947 constitution, does not have deep 
historical roots. Despite the rapid progress in the development of regulatory techniques, 
freedom of expression in the early period of press development was not appreciated as 
an inviolable right secured to an individual. Rather, freedom of the Japanese press 
extended only as far as the outer limits of government regulations. The Japanese press 
was subservient to the state for the first half of the twentieth century, because it was 
heavily controlled by means of state censorship and sponsorship. The censorship 
system in Japan prior to the end of the Second World War was distinctly similar to the 
censorship system in Thailand, in that both states heavily imposed both legal controls, 
such as pre and post-publication censorship, and extralegal controls, such as the use of 
threats, and pressure. However, the extralegal controls, which involved subtle 
persuasion in inducing editors and publishers to voluntarily carry out self-censorship, 
have been more typical in the Japanese case. These extralegal control mechanisms 
included the system of consultation, administrative guidance, warnings, and the system 
of reporters’ club or kisha kurabu. The system of kisha kurabu, in particular, continues 
to be a crucial factor, which inhibits the watchdog role of the Japanese press in the 
postwar period.
This discussion of the development of press censorship systems in Thailand and 
Japan has juxtaposed descriptions of different settings of power relations between the 
state and the media. In Thailand, the state's endorsement of coercive measures was 
evident in strict press regulations, legislative measures, and violent extralegal controls. 
Yet the linkage of interest and ownership connections reflected the reward strategies 
used by Thai politicians and military officials to elicit support and patronage from the 
press, and vice versa. In the case of Japan, the extensive network of reward subsidies 
that has been built up since the Meiji years has encouraged the shift from a serious
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political press to a commercialized press, and inhibited the spread of diversity in 
political opinions through the monopolization of news and self-censorship. Although 
coercive instruments were extensively applied in the early days through the imposition 
of a multitude of press laws and regulations, reward strategies that have permeated 
through a number of subtle extralegal mechanisms, such as the system of consultation 
and kisha kurabu, are very influential in the current practices of self-censorship in the 
Japanese press.
Legal and extralegal controls are coercive and reward instruments employed by 
the Thai and Japanese states in their quest for control of political information. Clearly, 
legal control remains a key device for the Thai state to maintain control of political 
information, whereas the exchange of rewards and punishments via the system of the 
reporters' club helps the Japanese state and the press to maintain the status quo, and 
inhibits any challenge to the official discourse of political reality. As such, the Thai 
press is more likely to contest for control of political information by trying to gain 
access to and disseminate sensitive information, and fight against the existence of harsh 
press laws. In contrast, the Japanese press is compromised and too tightly restrained by 
structural limitations to actively disseminate their readily gathered political information 
to the public.
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CHAPTER THREE
POLITICAL INFORMATION CONTESTS AND 
TELEVISION BROADCASTING REGULATIONS
The 'Mong Tang Moom 'program long existed in this society 
due to its own success. It was impossible fo r  anyone to 
influence sponsors to stop funding the program because the 
program was non-commercial. The only way to eliminate it 
was to intervene by having the minister in charge o f broadcasting 
cancel the program.
Chermsak Pinthong1
Most commercial stations are submissive to the government 
demands. For example, 1 believe some compromises have been made 
when the stations have tried to obtain shares in the new BS-4 satellites.2 
In general, however, these political pressures don't come in the form o f  
direct intervention, as they do in the case ofNHK.
Adachi Hisao3
In this chapter, power relations and political information contests between the 
state and television broadcasting are discussed. Particular emphasis is given to an 
examination of the dynamics of coercion as well as the reward and incentive strategies 
that the state has applied to gain and maintain control over the political information 
accessed and disseminated by television medium. Equal emphasis is also given to factors 
that can bring about change in these power relations, and change in the political role of 
television broadcasting, such as the state’s ability to control the flow of information
Interview on 25 August 1998, Thammasat University, Bangkok. Chermsak Pinthong was a 
producer of Mong Tang Moom (Different Perspective) (1990-1995), one of the pioneers of 
current affairs programmes in Thailand. In 1998, he hosted three popular political discussion 
programmes including Phar-tang-ton (Running through end road), Khor-khid-duey-khon (Let 
me think), and Lan-ban Lan-muang (House's grounds - City's grounds).
The BSAT-lb (BS-4 satellite) was launched in 2000 to begin digital broadcasting for 
satellite channels. This new satellite carries four transponders. Each transponder can 
accommodate four channels. One channel will be used for analog broadcasting, and three for 
digital broadcasting. The five key commercial stations in Japan set up new companies to have 
their shares on these transponders to start digital broadcasting in December 2000. See 
Kaifu Kazuo, "Japan's Broadcasting Digitization Enters the Second Stage: Its Present State and 
Prospects", NHK Broadcasting Culture and Research. New Year 2000, (11), pp. 5-11.
Interview with Adachi Hisao, Editor, News Program, Nippon Television Network Corporation, 
on October 29, 1998.
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disseminated on television, the state’s ability to mobilize broadcasting elite support, and 
its responses to changes in the political environment. Four areas of television 
broadcasting regulations in Thailand and Japan are examined: firstly, licensing systems 
and restrictions to entry into the broadcasting industry; secondly, the relationship 
between broadcasting and political elite on the basis of the licensing systems; thirdly, 
control of programming standards, particularly news and current affairs programs; and 
lastly, regulatory and technological changes and their effects on power relations between 
state and television broadcasting.
3.1 Licensing Systems, Limits of Ownership, and Restrictions to Entry
The contest over control of frequencies, and over what particular infonnation or 
pictures can be broadcast to air in Thailand and Japan came much later than that of the 
press. This was due to the fact that the advent of television came a century after that of 
the press. In Thailand, since television was a technologically advanced medium and 
expensive to run, early broadcasting fell under state ownership. As soon as television 
broadcasting was begun, regulations were imposed. In Japan, on the contrary, 
regulations had been well put in place two years before broadcasting commenced. 
However, these regulations were similarly imposed on the premises that television 
broadcasting frequencies are restricted to a narrow band of nationally available 
frequencies, which should be efficiently managed and used for the collective good of the 
society, and that television is a powerful source of information that can greatly influence 
public opinion and attitudes. Therefore, it must be regulated to ensure the integrity of 
information and of those who control what is broadcast.4
Both Thai and Japanese governments in the past assumed the roles of regulators, 
of broadcasters, and of spectrum allocators. In order to maintain their level of control,
Eric Barendt, however, argues that these reasons are no longer plausible due to the advent 
o f new broadcasting technologies such as cable television and satellite broadcasting which 
brought about multiple broadcasting channels. The argument o f scarcity of public resources, in 
particular, has become thus less tenable than before. See Eric Barendt, Broadcasting Law: A 
Comparative Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); See also Hasebe Yasuo, "The 
Characteristics and Ideas of Japan's Broadcasting System", Studies of Broadcasting. March 
1989, (25), pp. 117-140.
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access to broadcasting licenses were limited to the hands of political and broadcasting 
elite. In particular, public participation in the allocation of the spectrum, as could be 
allowed via an independent commission like the Federal Communication Commission 
(FCC) in the US, has been absent in both countries. Indeed, the large financial 
investment required to run a television broadcasting service in itself narrows the field of 
potential recipients of operating licenses. Both governments gave licenses only to the 
elite whose economic positions enabled them to make such acquisitions. The purpose of 
licensing has thus been subverted, insofar as both governments have been protecting the 
economic benefits of the few broadcasting elite by limiting competition through 
restrictions imposed against new entrants. Therefore, there has been a concentration of 
influence in terms of ownership, and an emphasis on profit-oriented programs with 
content, which only serves the interests of the government and the broadcasting elite. 
These features of television broadcasting in Thailand and Japan have been shaped and 
forged by coercive and reward relations exchanged between the state and television 
medium, which center around the licensing system.
3.1.1 State-run Stations, Licensed Stations, and the first Independent Station in 
Thailand
From its inception, television broadcasting in Thailand was subject to the Broadcasting 
Act of 1955, which favored a state monopoly. Clause 5 of this Act limited private 
operators by specifically stating that "no person shall provide sound broadcasting or 
radio broadcasting without licensing from the licensing official".5 Regulations prescribed 
in the subsequent laws and decrees also limited legal ownership of television 
transmissions to state agencies, such as the Public Relations Department (PRD) and the 
Army. The first channel, Channel 4 (presently Channel 9), was established in 1955 and 
operated by a state agency, but was known as a limited company, namely the Thai 
Television Company. Fifty-five per cent of this company was owned by the PRD. The 
rest of the shareholders included the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Police 
Department, and four state enterprises including the Thai tobacco monopoly, the Thai
Broadcasting Directing Board Division, Public Relations Department, Broadcasting Act 1995.
1987 & Regulation on Broadcasting 1992 (Bangkok: PRD, 1995), p. 5.
sugar organization, the state liquor factory, and the state lottery bureau.6 The Thai 
Television Company received government funding largely through the PRD, and 
collected receivers' fees based on the number of cathode ray tubes within a television 
set.7 Unlike the public television systems in Japan and Britain, which rely entirely on 
receivers' fees and do not allow advertising, the Thai Television Company came to 
largely rely on advertising revenue after three years of operation.8
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The PRD is concerned with government public relations, and is attached to the 
Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), which ensures close prime ministerial supervision 
of broadcasting matters. One of the main purposes of the state's introduction of 
television was to use it as an effective means of conveying state propaganda, attacking 
communist ideology, and rebutting the highly critical adversarial press.9 After the 
Second World War, the Phibul government co-operated with the United States to launch 
an anti-communism campaign. The government, which had already been successful in 
using radio to propagate state ideology, was motivated and assisted by the US to 
introduce television in the country.10 Phibul also ensured that he could use television to 
serve his political purposes by appointing his close aide, General Phao Sriyanon, to the 
chairmanship of the Thai Television Company. Phao's tasks were to supervise and 
ensure that the station's programs would be completely under the government's 
direction. Yet this overt control of a television station by a government dominated by a 
political faction created an environment conducive to the development of a broadcasting 
system that quickly became a tool in the power struggle among political factions. The 
second channel, Channel 7 (presently Channel 5), was established in 1958 by the leader
Guy B. Scandien, "Thailand", in J. A. Lent (ed.), Broadcasting in Asia and the Pacific: A 
Continental Survey of Radio and Television (Philadephia: Temple U.P., 1978), p. 126.
The fees varied according to the number o f the cathode ray tubes within each set.
For example, between one to four tubes cost 25 baht. From five to eight cost 50 baht and any 
owners o f television set with more than nine tubes had to pay 100 baht. The Thai Television 
Company also collected viewing fees costing 400 baht per set. See Sinith Sitthirak, Kamnerd 
thorathat thai (2493-2500) (Inception of Thai Television (1950-195711 (Bangkok: Khled Thai, 
1992), p. 119.
Ibid., p. 118.
Ibid. , pp. 57-66.
Ibid., p. 19. The Radio Corporation of America, in particular, assisted in establishing the first 
TV broadcasting station and developing television technology in Thailand.
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of the Si Sao Theves clique and the head of the Army, Field Marshal Sarit.11 The Thai 
Television Company, which operated Channel 4 (presently Channel 9), was, however, 
dissolved and replaced in 1977 by a public enterprise, namely the Mass Communication 
Organization of Thailand (MCOT) after running at a loss.12 Yet, the Royal Decree 
maximized the overt control of government over MCOT and its stations. It stated, for 
example, that the Prime Minister and the Minister who oversaw MCOT had a right to 
appoint or cancel its director.13
In 1987, Channel 5 and Channel 9 were joined by another government owned 
station, Channel 11. Established by the PRD with financial assistance from Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and technical assistance from the Japan 
Broadcasting Corporation, or Nippon Hösö Kyökai (NHK), the main purpose of 
Channel 11 was to educate the public.14 Despite the fact that Channel 11 was modeled 
after the NHK, the key station and its eight regional network stations do not collect 
receiving fees. Without advertising, they have relied solely on the government budgets 
through the PRD and the OPM .15 As a result, Channel 11 has been subjected to 
domination by and interference from those who are in control of the government. 
Therefore, program content has not been as responsible to the public audience as it 
should have been. Rather, it has become more responsible to the state, insomuch as 
there are often state-produced documentaries to promote three orchestrated symbols of 
the Thai identity -- the Thai Royal family, Buddhism and the Nation.16 Indeed, the Thai
It is known as Channel 5 at present. This Army channel was established as a result o f an 
ongoing rivalry between factions within the military- particularly between those o f Phibul and 
Sarit. Ibid., pp. 144-45.
Krikkiet Phanphiphat and Panadda Thanasathit, "Thoratinat thai: Chak bangkhunphrom thung 
rabob daothiem" (Thai Television: From Bangkhunprom to Satellite Broadcasting System), 
Wiwatthankan seumolchon Thai (Evolution of the Thai Mass Medial. Paper presented at the 
seminar on the occasion of the year o f the World's Communication, Faculty of Communication 
Arts, Chulalongkom University (Bangkok: Buddha Bhucha Publishing, 1983), p. 147. 
Khamjom Lhuiyapong, "Ruam chalong 20 p i khong Or.Sor.Mor.Thor " (Join in to Celebrate 
20th Years Anniversary of MCOT), Lok khong seu lem 2 (Media’s World Vol.21 (Bangkok: 
Chulalongkom University Press, 1998), pp. 191-202.
JICA gave a non-loan subsidy to Channel 11 worth approximately 2,062 million yen or 300 
million baht.
The PRD's eight regional network stations include two stations in the North - Channel 7 
Pitsanulok and Channel 8 Lam Pang, two stations in the Northeast - Channel 5 Khon Kan and 
Channel 4 Ubon Ratchatani, and four stations in the South - Channel 5 Phuket, Channel 5 
Nakom Srithammarat, Channel 10 Had Yai, and Channel 12 Surat Thani.
Annette Hamilton, "Mass Media and National Identity in Thailand", in C. Reynolds (ed.), 
National Identity and Its Defenders (Chiengmai: Silkworm Books, 1991), pp. 341-81.
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official concept of a public broadcasting service is quite different from those of the 
British or the Canadian, which has been described as concerned with reinforcing the 
notion of citizenship and elevating the level of information and cultural rights of 
people.17 Strictly speaking, the term ‘public service broadcasting’ should thus be 
translated into Thai as ‘seu barikan satharana’, or the media that should be totally 
dedicated to serving the public. However, the Thai official translated version of ‘public 
service broadcasting’ is ‘seu khong charf 18 or ‘the national media’, which, in reality, 
often deprives the people of information and their cultural rights.
Licenses to operate were not given to private enterprises until the late 1960s 
when the extension of regional networks was necessary in the face of communist 
threats. In 1967, the military granted a license to operate Channel 7 to Krungthep 
Wittayu Thorathat Ltd. (later changed to Bangkok Broadcasting Co.,Ltd.), while the 
Thai Television Company gave the Bangkok Entertainment Co.,Ltd. (later changed to 
BEC World Ltd.) a license to operate Channel 3 in 1968.19 These stations were seen by 
the government as complementary to, rather than competitive with, the existing state- 
run channels for these private broadcasters, and they were only supposed to engage in 
entertainment and the dissemination of state propaganda. The state authorities could 
demand to preview programs and enforce special on-air schedules, such as news and 
special broadcasting programs provided by the TV Pool of Thailand.20
Graham Murdock, "Corporate Dynamics and Broadcasting Futures", in H. Mckay and T. 
O'Sullivan (eds.), The Media Reader: Continuity and Transformation (London: Sage, 1999), p. 
30.
Interview with Tuenchai Sinthuwanick, Director of Program Production at Channel 11 on July 
18,  2000 .
Channel 7 began broadcasting from November 1967, while Channel 3 started broadcasting in 
March 1970. See brief details of Channel 7 at http://www.tv7.com, and Channel 3 at 
http://www.tv3.co.th.
The TV Pool of Thailand was set up in December 1968, to co-ordinate a simultaneous, all­
channel broadcast. It was then chaired by an army officer, General Prasith Chuenbun.
Programs broadcast have included live-broadcasts of royal ceremonies, official annoucements, 
and special satellite-relay services. Since April 20, 1980, the state has required all evening 
news programs to be broadcast at 8 pm. An order issued by the Public Relations Department on 
December 31,1994, however, cancelled this requirement and several other orders particularly the 
Revolutionary Orders No. 15 and No. 17. Flexible broadcasting times for news programs were 
also allowed more than before, although news on royal matters were still broadcast by all 
stations at 8 pm. See Pisith Chawalathawach, Kodmai seusan molchon CMass Media Lawk 6th 
ed. (Bangkok: Dok Ya, 1995), pp. 323-326.
However, it was not until 1975 when Channels 3 and 7 really became 
commercially viable with higher audience ratings than the state-run stations and the 
government upgraded a radio broadcasting regulator to become the National 
Broadcasting Executive Board (NBEB). This event clearly reflected the government’s 
intention to secure control of broadcasting frequencies insomuch as the Board was used 
to oversee legal, administrative, and programming aspects of both radio and television 
broadcasting. Moreover, the regulating committee comprised only representatives from 
government agencies such as the PRD, the Post and Telegraph Department (PTD), the 
Police Department, and representatives from the Anny, the Navy, and the Air Force.21 
The NBEB authority was reinforced by stringent rules prescribed in Revolutionary 
Orders No. 15 and No. 17 that were imposed after the coup in October 1976. These 
regulations strictly prohibited any broadcasting content that could be detrimental to 
public morality, peace, and national security. In 1980 the NBEB issued additional rules 
that required all televisions stations to broadcast evening news at 8 pm and the national 
anthem twice daily. Only 10 minutes of advertising were allowed in every hour.22 The 
means of the NBEB monitoring was direct, as four delegations visited stations daily to 
preview programs. In the case that a station violated the prescribed rules and orders, the 
NBEB had the authority to give a warning in writing, cancel the program, or withdraw a 
license.23 During the military administrations in particular, the NBEB was the 
governments' main apparatus for bestowing rewards, imposing penalties, and pre­
censoring the news content broadcast on the commercial stations.24
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Another organization that was involved in the granting of broadcasting licenses 
was the National Radio Frequency Management Board (NRFMB), which operated 
under the supervision of the Post and Telegraph Department (PTD) in accordance with
Wilawan Wiwatthanakantang et.al, "Perd seriphap TV-witthayu 'ntaraiV (Is liberalization of  
television and radio dangerous?), Phuiadkarn Rai Duen . June 1992, p. 142.
The National Broadcasting Executive Board, Kodmai lae rahieh kiewkab witthavu krachaisieng 
lae witthavu thorathat haeng prathet Thai (Laws and Orders on Radio and Television 
Broadcasting in Thailand! (Bangkok: Preecha Kanphim, 1981).
Saitip Sukatipan, "Broadcast Media and the Politics of Thailand", in C.G. Hernandez and W. 
Pflemming (eds.), Media and Politics in Asia: Trends. Problems and Prospects (Manila: 
University of Philippines, 1991), p. 79.
Ubonrat Siriyuvasak et al., Bothbalh khong rath nai thang dan seusanmolchon (The Role o f the 
State Concerning the Mass Medial (Bangkok: Nititham, 1996), p. 22.
the National Radio Frequency Management Regulations B.E. 2518 (1975).25 To obtain a 
broadcasting license, an applicant must submit applications to both the NBEB and the 
NRFMB. In principle, if there was a channel available, the application would be 
approved and sent to the Cabinet for final considerations, as demonstrated in Appendix 
3. However, the evidence showed that neither the NBEB nor the NRFMB typically 
awarded licenses to the limits of spectrum availability. Often, they rejected every 
application outright, and claimed that all the nationally available VHF (Very High 
Frequencies) were fully in use, despite their full knowledge of a vast availability of 
alternative UHF (Ultra High Frequencies).26 The rejection was made without concern 
for the fact that only a small portion of the provincial public in Thailand had access to 
all broadcast channels.27 In contrast to the Japanese government which foresaw the 
benefits of using UHF to broadcast in rural areas and commenced broadcasting on UHF 
in 1967,28 the Thai state's wish to retain control of spectrum, and bureaucratic 
incompetence, were the underlying reasons why the first UHF broadcast in Thailand did 
not begin until 1996.
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Indeed, the closed nature of this licensing system has maintained the duopolistic 
structure of television broadcasting in Thailand for nearly three decades. This type of 
licensing system has been subject to criticism, both for its secrecy and arbitrariness in 
preserving the status-quo. Ubonrat, for example, called this type of licensing system 
"sampathan bab aphisit", or privileged concession, arguing that the logic underlying the 
awarding of licenses has been entirely based on personal relationships and profits rather
The PTD is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry o f Transport and Communications. The 
Ministry directly supervises the allocation of spectrum. However, issues of satellite broadcasting 
and telecommunications, however, are overseen by the Communication Authority of Thailand 
(CAT) which is a state-owned enterprise. It also works in conjunction with another state-owned 
enterprise -- the Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT) — on telecommunication issues. 
Ultra High Frequency, or UHF for TV, means extremely high frequency between 510-790 MHz 
that can only travel a short distance. Very High Frequency , or VHF for TV, refers to frequency 
between 47 to 230 MHz, thus can reach a greater distance, and cover a bigger area than UHF. 
See Sukran Rojpaiwong et al, "Pua hen kae chart dai prodthue hai ekkachon pen jaokhong 
sathanee TV-witthayu diewnee" (Please let the private sectors own television and radio 
frequencies for the sake of the nation), Phuiadkarn Rai Duen. July 1992, pp. 162-185.
Channel 3, for example, could cover only around 20.64 % of the whole country when it started 
in 1970. It was not until 1987 that Channel 3 started to build its 22 relay stations, which 
allowed it to cover about 80.7 per cent of the country. By 1999, the coverage became 
nationwide. See http://www.tv3.co.th/.
Shiga Nobuo, Shöwa terebi hösö-shi (%e) (The History of Shöwa Television HI (Tokyo: 
Hayagawa Shobo, 1990), pp. 23-24.
than benefits to the nation.29 In the cases of Channel 7 and Channel 3, licenses were not 
initially sold to the highest bidder or to those who offered more quality programs, but to 
those who had personal relationships or financial close ties with influential groups and 
decision-makers. Indeed, both the Kannasutra family and the Maleenont family, which 
have been the sole licensees of Channel 7 and Channel 3 respectively, had very strong 
connections with military governments in the past.30 The Kannasutra family, on the one 
hand, had a strong association with Field Marshal Praphas Charusathien, who was the 
supreme commander of the Army when the concession was granted. The owner of the 
Krungsriayuddhaya Bank, a close friend of the family, also gave a financial guarantee to 
Channel 7. The head of the Maleenont family which operates Channel 3 was, on the 
other hand, a close friend of Field Marshal Sant's brother. That friendship was passed 
on to Sarit's successor - Field Marshal Thanom, who later became the Prime Minister 
and granted the family a privileged concession. When Channel 3 was in financial trouble 
and had a little chance of getting its license renewed, the Maleenont family pulled strings 
to gain financial support from the biggest bank in Thailand - the Bangkok Bank - and 
subsequently had its license renewed.31 The alliances between Channel 7 and 
Krungsriayuddhaya Bank, and Channel 3 and the Bangkok Bank ensured that 
connections between banking institutions and television stations became absolutely 
necessary. The military-run Channel 5 developed an intricate link with the Military 
Bank32, whereas the MCOT’s Channel 9 allied with the Ministry of Finance's Krung 
Thai Bank.
Clearly, this type of privileged concession reflects the patron-client 
relationships of Thai society.33 The moral basis of these relationships is the exchange of
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Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, "Television and the Emergence of'Civil Society' in Thailand", in D. 
French and M. Richards (eds.), Contemporary Television: Eastern Perspectives (New Delhi: 
Sage, 1996), p. 185
"Song trakul sudyod thurakit TV: Kannasutra-Maleenont" (The Top Two Families in TV 
Business: Kannasutra - Maleenont), Prachachart Thurakit. January 20-23, 1991, p. 31.
Ibid.
The Thai Military Bank was founded when the military was in power in the 1960s. The Bank 
monopolized the financing of the arms trade and was a source of profit and patronage for the 
generals who took the positions as board members o f the Bank and its subsidiary companies.
See Amara Pongsapich and Preecha Khuvinpanth (eds.), Rabob-upatham fPatron-Client Systemt 
(Bangkok: Chulalongkom University Press, 1996).
incentives and rewards between patrons and clients. Mulder observes that this exchange 
is class-based, and thus always unequal because of the difference in the economic and 
political hierarchy of the patron and the client. The term ‘patron’ denotes ’’the higher 
people" (phuyai), and the term ‘client’ refers to "the lower people" (phu noi) .34 Neher 
and Marlay have also emphasized the importance of moral bonds between phu yai and 
phu noi, suggesting that they "can evolve into lifelong relationships as strong as blood 
ties" .35 In the television industry, ‘patrons’ refer to the military, which have enjoyed 
the financial support of, and guarantees from, the licensees and the banks. The ‘clients’ 
include the chosen few of corporate broadcasters, who have been allowed to make 
excessive profits from their long-term control of the airwaves by paying minimum 
license fees and holding their licenses for extremely long periods.36
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Indeed, these privileges became the linchpin of the regulatory structure for 
awarding licenses by interlocking the political, the military, and the broadcasting elite 
into an embrace of mutual patronage. The broadcasting elite dissuaded the state agencies 
that administered the frequencies from promoting new-entry competition in many 
ways. In exchange for protection from entry by new competitors and guarantees of 
license renewal, they submitted to the state agencies' demands to control, or even 
change, program content, particularly of programs that disseminated political 
information. The broadcasting elite in turn persuasively argued for broadcasting policies 
that ignored public interests and promoted their own ends. Consultations, personal 
contacts, and the exchanges of rewards and incentives were seen as important 
instruments to facilitate this process.
Niels Mulder, Thai Image: The Culture and the Public World (Chieng Mai: Silkworm Books, 
1997), p. 159.
Clark D. Neher, and Ross Marlay, Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia: The Winds 
of Change (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 15-16.
For example, the license to operate Channel 7 was granted for fifteen years in 1967, then was 
renewed for the second time for twelve years in 1983 for 151 million baht. In 1995, it was 
renewed for eleven years. This contract was, however, secretly extended by the Army to 
twenty-five years in 1998 for 4.6 billion baht. In the case o f Channel 3, the Bangkok 
Entertainment Company received a ten-year license in 1970 for 54 million baht. In 1980, it 
renewed the license for ten years, which was worth 148.2 million baht. The most recent contract 
was renewed in 1990, which granted the company a thirty-year license by the MCOT for 3.4 
billion baht. See "Chong 7 thannanpuk khruakhaihnua-sunya'ua" (Channel 7's Firm 
Grounds: More Networks, Beneficial Contracts", Prachachart Thurakit. October 22-25, 1998, 
pp. 17-18.
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This patron-client style of relationship continued when MCOT gave a 
concession to operate cable television services to two private operators in the early 
1990s. In this case only two large corporations, both of which had track records of 
ownership of other media and telecommunications, were permitted to gain access.37 In a 
similar vein, the subsequent liberalization of the MCOT and the Army radio frequencies 
have not promoted real market competition and media liberalization. Instead, it has 
favored big corporations and promoted market monopolies across broadcasting 
sectors.38 However, it can be argued that the ’patron-client’ ties between the licensors 
and the licensees in the 1990s assumed a new form, which was different from the 
traditional conceptualization. The new 'patron-client' links had a temporary nature with 
weaker bonds of loyalty than before, and were more heavily based on the pursuits of 
self-interest, and thus responsive to changes in the society. The emergence of this 
'modem' form of patron-client relationship in Thailand was largely due to the weakening 
of the military/bureaucracy alliance led by a withdrawal of the military from the political 
arena in 1992, frequent changes of government, the adoption of a profit-oriented 
corporate culture by broadcasting organizations, and rising public influence on national 
broadcasting policy.
Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, Rabob witthavu lae thorathat thai: Kron%san% thang setthakit 
kanmuang lae pholkrathob thor sitthi seriphap (Thai Radio and Television Systems: The 
Political and Economic Structures and Effects of Rights and Freedom! (Bangkok:
Chulalongkom University Press, 1999), p. 44. The concessionaires included, firstly, 
International Broadcasting System (IBC) which was owned by the Thai politician and business 
entrepreneur, Thaksin Shinawatra, who also owns three Thai communication satellites. 
Secondly, Siam Communication and Broadcasting, which operated Thai Sky TV and was owned 
by the mega-media group, Wattachak. IBC aimed at Bangkok audiences, while Thai Sky 
targeted provincial markets and broadcast more Thai-language programming. Thai Sky TV was 
forced to cease its operations after the Shinawatra satellite cut a relay service in August 1997 for 
unpaid transponder rentals. TA Telecom Holdings gained a concession from the PRD to operate 
its UTV cable broadcast via fibre optic links in 1994. However, in 1997 it decided to merge 
with IBC to become UBC due to huge losses. In 1999, Shinawatra Corp. sold its share in 
UBC to TA Telecom Holdings, and a South-African Dutch Cable Company, MIH. In 2000, 
there was one national cable TV operator-United Broadcasting Corporation (UBC), and more 
than 30 operators who are servicing upcountry. See Glen Lewis and Peter Thompson, 
"Communication Policy in Thailand in the 1990s: Liberalization and Democratization", Media 
International Australia. August 2000, (96), pp. 121-135.
Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, "Limited Competition Without Re-regulating the Media", Asian Journal 
of Communication. 1997, 7(2), pp. 57-75.
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Members of the public, led by academics and the press, recognized the 
drawbacks of the licensing system operating within the traditional patron-client 
relationship framework. These drawbacks became particularly clear during the M ay 
Crisis in 1992 when the military-backed government imposed a black-out and 
manipulated news content. After the mass uprising brought an end to the military 
regime, the public pressured the subsequent interim government headed by Prime 
Minister Anand Panyarachun to liberalize ownership of television broadcasting and to 
abolish the NBEB, as well as the orders and decrees, which allowed direct interference 
of government agencies in programming content. The Anand government, as a result, 
promulgated the Regulation of Broadcasting of 1992, which assigned existing 
broadcasters and potential new entrants to a new regulatory body called the National 
Broadcasting Commission (NBC). This regulatory body, for the first time, incorporated 
representatives from non-government sectors, including academics and representatives 
from NGOs, women's groups, and consumers' groups.39 The new regulator was directly 
responsible for policy formulation, which had been previously lacking. It also carried 
the NBEB's responsibility in supervising franchise auctions and approving licenses, and 
applying when appropriate sanctions for the breach of license conditions. It also 
exercised this authority over cable and satellite services. However, the NBEB's 
previewing duties, as well as programming and scheduling authorities were returned to 
the station's executives. Yet, the NBC was not an independent body and was 
administered by the PRD. The 1992 Broadcasting Regulation also maintained that TV 
broadcasting operators must be officially licensed, as the state retained the legal 
ownership rights of frequencies. With these rights, the NBC was authorized to issue 
licenses to whomsoever it wished and to censor program content when it saw fit.40
Broadcasting Directing Board Division, Public Relations Department, Thailand: Broadcasting 
Act 1955. 1987 & Regulation on Broadcasting 1992 (Bangkok: Office of the Prime Minister, 
1995), p. 77.
According to Clause 4 in the Regulation on Broadcasting B.E. 2535 (1992), " 'station' means 
the broadcasting station established by a government agency or State enterprise to provide sound 
broadcasting service or radio television broadcasting service permitted by the NBC and 
permitted to provide sound broadcasting service or radio broadcasting service from the Licensing 
Official under the law on broadcasting; provided that whether such government agency or State 
enterprise shall entrust other person to provide the service by any means". Broadcasting 
Directing Board Division, Public Relations Department, Broadcasting Act 1995. 1987 & 
Regulation on Broadcasting 1992 (Bangkok: PRD, 1995), p. 73.
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Ownership of the means of production and dissemination of news was a formidable 
source of influence over which the state desperately needed to keep control. As long as 
the state had ownership rights, its ability to interfere in programming content was 
guaranteed to a certain degree, albeit this interference may be disguised in the form it 
takes.
The Anand government's liberalization policy further included permission for 
24-hour television broadcasting, and a plan to create two new UHF channels via an 
open-bidding process.41 The first bid was supervised by the Chuan government in M ay 
1994. The bid was won by a consortium of twelve media and communication giants, 
such as Siam TV and Communications Ltd (a joint venture between Saha Cinema 
Holding and Management - a subsidiary of the Crown Property Bureau - and banking 
groups), Siam Commercial Bank, Broadcasting Network Thailand Ltd., The Daily News 
Group, The Nation Multimedia Group, Kantana Ltd, and so on.42 This consortium later 
established a company called Siam Infotainment Ltd., to control and operate the new 
UHF channel, namely Independent Television, or iTV. Those who lost the bid also 
included consortiums of media-related and telecommunication groups.43 The 
competition among these groups was so severe that some of those who lost the bid 
attacked the whole bidding process, claiming that it lacked transparency.44 This claim 
was not without substance, as the President of Saha Cinema Holding and Management 
was a member of the MCOT committee, and was in charge of drafting the terms of 
reference for the bid.45 Moreover, the presence of one of the biggest banks in Thailand 
and members of the committee must have secured the winning position. As discussed
See, for example, Ubonrat Siriyuwasak, "Media reform: One year on after the May crisis",
Thai Development Newsletter. 1993, (22), pp. 36-37.
The Nation replaced Dokbia Publishing Group which withdrew itself from the consortium after 
it had won the bid. See Panadda Chaisawat and Pairach Petlum, "Patibatkan iTV" (Operation 
iTV), Khoo Kaeng Rai Wan , July 16, 1997, p. 1, 14, 15.
These were such companies as Thai Rath, Telecom Holding Ltd, Bangkok Broadcasting 
Corporations, Samart Communications, Asia Vision, Media o f Media, Amarin Printing, and so 
forth. Ibid.
For example, Pramut Sutabutra, an ex-MCOT director, now heads Bangkok Broadcasting 
Corporations, argued that there were people who benefited from this deal among the committees 
which selected the winner. Khoo Kaeng Rai Wan. January 12, 1996, p. A l, A l l .
"Banawit Bunyaratana: pla muek thi nuad kamlangphan tua'ng" (Bannawit Bunyaratana: The 
octopus which is caught by its own tentacles), Phuiadkan Rai Duen. August 1995, p. 162.
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previously, the earlier alliances between television stations and banks had ensured that a 
partnership with banking institution was necessary to secure a license and guarantee the 
financial future of a TV station. Yet the bidding committee claimed that the winning bid 
entailed a 25 billion baht return to the government within thirty years, which was far 
higher than the minimum requirements and its competitors. Thus, one cannot simply 
point to a single factor, such as patron-client links, as a criterion for a license, as 
previously had been the case. Rather, the viability of license bids is now based on offers 
of highest return, track records of broadcasting expertise, access to an abundance of 
funds, and most importantly, strategic alliances with insiders who have mutual interests.
After the bidding, conflicts of interest among broadcasting elite, particularly 
between the winners and losers, caused the relationship between public and commercial 
broadcasting to become an uneasy one. Somkiet Onwimon, head of Asia Vision, who 
also lost his bid for the new channel, joined forces with the PRD's channel 11 to 
relaunch the station's news hours in 1996. Somkiet utilized his personal connection with 
Piyanat Watcharapom, Minister of the Office of the Prime Minister overseeing the 
PRD and Channel 11 at that time, to gain a three-year concession to manage Channel 
l l 's  news programs and earn rights to sell advertising, notwithstanding the Channel's 
non-commercial policy.46 Somkiet was also hired as a consultant to Channel l l . 47 
Somkiet's alliance with Channel 11 indeed had advantages over the new channel, iTV, 
because Channel 11 had a national coverage, whereas iTV's coverage was limited to 
Bangkok in 1996. Due to the relative decline in the government's financial support for 
the public broadcasting system, as well as the patron-client relations between state 
officials and broadcasting elite which pervaded the high level, Channel 11 was compelled 
to compete with private iTV  without regard for its supposed obligations to the public. 
Since these business agreements were largely based on a personal relationship between
46 Advertising is only allowed in supers running along the bottom of the TV screen, logos, or 
commercials with themes related to community or social services, or government 
commercials. The terms of the contract required Asia Vision to pay Channel 11 Bt. 70 million 
in the first year, Bt 3 million monthly in the second year, and Bt. 4 million monthly in the 
third year. See "Perd kolayut iTV-channel 11 ching TV khaosan" (Disclosure o f ITV and 
Channel 1 l's strategies to lead in television news), Krunpthrp Thurakit. July 1, 1996, pp. 7-8.
47 Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, op. cit., p. 230.
Piyanat and Somkiet, the contract between Asia Vision and Channel 11 was terminated 
following the resignation of Somkiet from Asia Vision and the company's failure to meet 
its financial commitments to the station.48
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The application of free market principles to the existing television broadcasting 
system has indeed been put to the test in the auction of a license for what became iTV, 
and in the attempts to commercialize Channel 11. However, the current system 
dominated by a new form of patron-client relations still lacks transparency. This 
condition has created loopholes, which allow existing large media corporations to weave 
their webs of economic-based networks linking themselves, non-media related business 
investors, and state officials in the process of media liberalization.
The economic crisis that began in mid-1997 delayed the government's plan to 
offer another UHF channel to bidders, and also left the government no choice but to 
approve iTV's request to delay its first royalty payment for two years without 
interest.49 Further, iTV's executives pushed the cabinet to revoke the share limit 
requirement of ten per cent allowing shareholders such as the Nation to increase its 
shareholdings, and extend its management responsibility within iTV.50 iTVs current 
financial vulnerability and the withdrawal of its major shareholders such as the Crown 
Property Bureau, has attracted the investment interest of Thaksin Shinawatra, a telecom 
tycoon who owns three Thai satellites, several radio stations, mobile phone and 
computer companies.51 Since there is no law that forbids cross-media ownership in 
Thailand, his investment in iTV inevitably means further concentration of ownership 
across various media.52 The cabinet's lifting of the ten per cent shareholding limitation 
among iTVs shareholders paved way for Thaksin's domination in the ownership of iTV.
Chularat Saengpassa and Rattana Siripol, "Channel 11 Set for Major Change Soon", The 
Nation. January 26, 1997 (on-line edition).
The approval was given on the grounds that the PRD was found to be at fault in delaying the 
process of iTV installation of transmission equipment. See "iTV Con Delay Its First Fee 
Payment", The Nation. June 26, 1999 (on-line edition).
"Nation Group: We're firmly with iTV', The Nation. September 21, 1999 (on-line edition). 
"Thaksin Plans iTV takeover", The Nation. February 2, 2000 (on-line edition); and "Two 
Blocs Fight for iTV Stake", Bangkok Post. February 3, 2000 (on-line edition).
The Nation Multimedia Group is the publisher o f the Nation, Krungthep Thurakit, Nation 
Junior,and Nation Sudsapda. It produces regular programs for iTV and Channel 9, and runs
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In May 2000, Thaksin reportedly bought forty percent of iTVs shares, and by 
June 2001 he increased his holding to 100 per cent.53 Thaksin is also the ambitious 
leader of a new broad-based, high-profile political party, Thai Rak Thai (Thais love 
Thais). His control of iTV means a direct control over the station’s programming 
content, and /7Y has become the party's propaganda machine. As Thaksin was working 
out the deal with iTV executives, the station quickly adopted self-censorship on the 
weekly program, Sarakhan, which usually ridicules politicians and current affairs. A 
section which parodied Thaksin's plan to buy iTV s shares was pulled before it went to 
air.54 The supposed reasoning behind iTVs inception was the government's positive 
responses to public demand for an impartial TV news channel. Yet an alliance between 
iTV and any political party has defeated such a purpose.
Thaksin's takeover of iTV was reportedly based on his ambition to fill the gap in 
his telecommunication and satellite businesses. However, it could be seen as being 
prompted by his ambition in politics. The results of the 2000 upper house election also 
highlighted another level of association between broadcasting and politics. Thailand now 
has at least three broadcasters as senators,55 whose direct access to television programs 
and influence on format and editorial content is the same as before the election. One of 
Channel 3's executives, Pracha Maleenont, also became a successful party-list candidate 
of the Thai-Rak-Thai Party in the 2001 election, and served as Deputy Minister for 
Transport and Communications under Thaksin. Remarkably, these alliances between 
broadcasting stations and political parties or individuals resemble the ties between 
powerful military individuals, their cliques, and broadcasting stations in the 1950s. In
four radio stations including FM 89.5, FM 90.0, FM 90.5, and AM 1107. The group, holding 
a 10 per cent equity in iTV, was invited by Siam Commercial Bank, to join the consortium and 
produce news and current affairs program on iTV. The group also plans to launch another news 
channel on a cable television in mid 2000. It is proposed to be a 24-hour channel, providing 
news in both Thai and English. See "Nations set news slot on UBC", The Nation 
March 30, 2000 (on-line edition).
"iTV approves 40% stake for Shin Corp.", Bangkok Post. May 31, 2000 (on-line edition). 
"Thaksin bid makes iTV muzzle itself', The Nation. May 29, 2000 (on-line edition).
These include a magazine publisher and veteran senator, Damrong Phuttan, a first time-elected 
political debate showhost and university professor, Chermsak Pinthong, and a veteran news 
anchor and university professor, Somkiet Onwimon.
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the 2000s, television in Thailand can again become a means of power struggle among 
political factions.
The current licensing system of television broadcasting in Thailand can be seen 
as a double-edged sword. On the one edge, the economic liberalization of the system 
promotes free competition and supports the move towards a watchdog role for 
television broadcasting. On the other edge, the culture of patronage between officials and 
the powerful broadcasting elite still prevails in this system, albeit it has taken a different 
form. This situation has limited new entrants to the industry, whilst allowing official 
interference with political information broadcast on television. Moreover, since 
regulation of cross-media ownership does not exist in Thailand, there are likely to be 
worrisome outcomes from the current licensing system. Firstly, all types of media might 
eventually be owned by a handful of big corporations. Secondly, small entrepreneurs 
and community operators may not have a chance to gain a concession. Thirdly, 
television broadcasting could limit itself to the role of a political guard dog — only 
serving the interests of its masters, the political and broadcasting elite. The public and 
media academics together addressed these concerns when the new Constitution was 
drafted in 1997. An article to overhaul the whole television broadcasting system was 
included in the new Constitution. This article will be dealt with later in the chapter.
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Table 2: National Broadcasters, their Operators and Licensors in Thailand and Japan
Country Terrestrial
Channel
Operator Licensor
Thailand 3 Bangkok
Entertainment Co.
M COT
5 Anny Army
7 Bangkok Broadcasting 
Co.
Army
9 MCOT M COT
11 PRD PRD
ITV Siam Infotainment Co. OPM
Japan NHK1, NHK2 
DBS1, DBS2
NHK MPT*
NTV Nippon Television 
Network Corporation
M PT
TBS Tokyo Broadcasting 
System, Inc.
M PT
TV Asahi Asahi National 
Broadcasting Co., Ltd.
M PT
Fuji TV Fuji Telecasting Co., 
Ltd.
M PT
TV Tokyo TV Tokyo Co., Ltd. M PT
♦Ministry o f Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) 
Source: Author compiled (1998)
3.1.2 NHK and the Commercial Network Cartel
The Japanese television broadcasting system has been dominated by a dual structure 
consisting of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation or Nippon Hösö Kyokai (NHK), and 
commercial broadcasting companies or Minkan Hösö. NHK is a public service 
broadcasting enterprise that is guaranteed by law to receive fees from every broadcast­
receiving household. Therefore, it carries no commercial advertisements. Commercial 
broadcasters, on the other hand, receive their main income from advertisements.
NHK was established in 1926 as a result of the merging of three temporary 
state-run radio stations in Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya.56 It was modelled after the BBC 
(British Broadcasting Corporation). Before the end of the Second World War, NHK was 
governed by the 1915 Wireless Telegraphy law, which gave the Ministry of 
Communications (presently the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) or
56 Omori Yukio, "Broadcasting Legislation in Japan: Its Historical, Process, Current Status, and 
Future tasks", Studies of Broadcasting. March 1989, (25), p. 13.
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yüsei-shö) full authority to govern and administer radio frequencies and programs. As a 
result, NHK's board members were mainly ex-officials of the Ministry of 
Communications. Representatives from the Anny, the Navy, and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs were also present in NHK's Program Council, where they were 
responsible for the planning and control of programs.57 According to Article 2 of the 
Wireless Telegraphy law, NHK's main task was to "execute business for the government 
as an outpost agency of the Ministry of Communications".58 This law, however, was 
repealed after the war by the SCAP, who did not see NHK as a governmental 
apparatus, but rather as a public broadcasting service. SCAP felt that NHK should have 
its own autonomy and be separated from the government. Shortly after the war, SCAP 
issued orders that NHK be directed by the Ministry only in areas such as the allocation 
and assignment of frequencies, and the prescription of procedures for the reporting and 
auditing of financial statements.59
The role of the U.S. Occupation authorities in shaping the Japanese broadcasting 
became prominent when a legislative proposal for a broadcast law was drafted by the 
Ministry of Communication and presented to the Diet. Due to strong opposition from 
the US authorities, the proposal eventually died without passage.60 The Occupation 
authority decided to draft its own set of broadcasting laws and push them through the 
Diet in 1950. The legislative package included the Radio Law, which regulated the radio 
frequencies and awards licenses; the Broadcast Law, which guaranteed the uses of radio 
waves for the public benefit and laid down sets of guidelines for the NHK as a corporate 
body in charge of public service broadcasting as well as programming guidelines for 
commercial broadcasters61; and the Radio Regulatory Commission Establishment Law, 
which established the independent Spectrum Supervision Commission (Denpa Kami
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
Catherine A. Luther and Douglas A. Boyd, "American Occupation Control over Broadcasting in 
Japan, 1945-1952". Journal of Communication. Spring 1997, 47(2), p. 43.
60 Ibid.
61 These guidelines for commercial broadcasters included such principles as 1) the maximum 
availability and benefits of broadcasting to the people; 2) assurance of freedom of expression 
through broadcasting; and 3) making broadcasting contribute to the development o f healthy 
democracy. See Hattori Takaaki, "The Administration of Radio Waves for Broadcasting in 
Japan", Studies o f Broadcasting. March 1989, 25, p. 46.
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Iinkai), similar to the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to oversee the 
allocation of radio frequencies.62 In contrast to the Radio and Broadcast Law which 
remains in effect today, the Radio Regulatory Commission Establishment Law only 
lasted for two years. It was abolished two months after the end of the U.S. Occupation 
in April 1952, because the Yoshida government claimed that the Regulatory 
Commission was beyond the jurisdiction of the Cabinet,63 and that the Commission 
should therefore be abolished to simplify the administration.64 Beneath these claims, 
however, was the fact that neither the Prime Minister nor the Minister of MPT could 
interfere with the Commission's rulings or its administration under the existing structure. 
The abolition of the Commission thus reflected the government's successful attempts to 
maintain a channel of influence over commercial broadcasters by assigning the MPT to 
reassume the role of regulator and allocator of broadcasting frequencies. Since then, any 
attempts to remove authority over frequency regulation and allocation from the M PT, 
such as those in 1953, 1959, and 1965, have met with strong resistance, and failed to 
succeed. More recently, a panel of the administrative reform council established by the 
Hashimoto government published an interim report in 1997 announcing a plan to 
establish an independent Telecommunication and Broadcasting Council (Tsüshin Hösö 
Iinkai) to regulate and license frequencies. However, the plan folded within three 
months due to strong bureaucratic resistance.65
On the day before its abolition, the Radio Regulatory Commission had granted 
permission to Shoriki Matsutaro of Yomiuri to establish Nippon Television (NTV). 
Nevertheless, due to technical delays, NTV postponed its initial broadcast until the 
following year. On the other hand, NHK, which acquired its provisional license from the 
MPT in December 1952, went to air first in February 1953.66 Its Osaka and Nagoya
62 Omori, op. cit., pp.13-6; Luther and Boyd, op. cit., pp. 52-3; Hatton Takaaki, op. cit., pp. 45- 
8; Michael Tracey, "Japan: Broadcasting in a New Democracy", in R. Kuhn (ed.), The Politics 
of Broadcasting (Worcester, UK: Billing & Sons, 1985), pp. 274-5.
63 Luther and Boyd, op. cit.
64 Hattori, op. cit., p. 47.
65 Medeia Sögö Kenkyüjo, Hösö wo shirnin no te ni (Deliver broadcasting to the citizen's hands! 
(Tokyo: Kadensha, 1998), p. 48.
66 NHK broadcasts two terrestrial channels, two satellite channels, and a HDTV Hi-Vision 
Channel. For terrestrial broadcasting, NHK1 broadcasts news, cultural programs and
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stations began broadcasting in 1954, while Radio Tokyo (presently TBS) went to air in 
1955.67 Another TV station that grew from a radio network was Fuji TV, which was 
launched in 1959. It was initially owned by Bunka Hösö Radio and Movie Co., Ltd. TV 
Asahi was started by Öbunsha Publishing Company in 1959 as an educational channel, 
namely "Nippon Educational Channel" or "NET", as was Channel 12 Tokyo by the 
Foundation for Science and Technology in 1964.68 These two stations received licenses 
to broadcast general programming in 1973, and subsequently changed their names from 
"NET" to "TV Asahi", and from "Channel 12 Tokyo" to "TV Tokyo".69 The alliance 
between national newspapers and commercial stations was first seen in the case of NTV 
and Yomiuri. Other newspaper companies accumulated shares of commercial stations 
over the years. However, the strong affiliation between major newspapers and TV 
broadcasting stations did not solidify until 1973 as a result of private exchanges of 
shares between the 'Big Five'.70
After the Radio Regulatory Commission was abolished in 1952, the Radio 
Regulatory Council {Denpa Kami Shingikai) was established to award licenses for both 
public and commercial uses. However, this Council was directly overseen and controlled 
by the MPT, which selected and appointed the candidates with the consent of both 
houses of the Diet (Article 85 of the Radio Law).71 NHK, as well as the commercial 
stations, also had to apply for a license from the Council via the MPT when it desired 
to establish a local station (Article 4, 8 and 12 of the Radio Law).72
entertainment, while NHK 2 broadcasts only educational programs. As for satellite channels,
BS1 is focused on news and sports; whilst BS2 covers entertainment, art, and culture. In 
addition, NHK also has three nationwide radio services, and provides two international services: 
Radio Japan on shortwave, and NHK World TV. See Miyajima Hiroto, "What is NHK?", NHK 
Broadcasting Culture& Research 2000, (11), p. 3.
Japan's Foreign Press Center, "Japan's Mass Media", About Japan Series No.7 (Tokyo: Japan's 
Foreign Press Center, 1997), pp. 51-72.
Ibid.
Nakasa Hideo, "Social vs. Responsibility: The Growing Criticism of Journalism in Japan", 
Studies of Broadcasting. March 1987, (23), pp. 27-50.
For example, Asahi and Yomiuri transferred their holdings o f TBS shares to Mainichi, whilst 
Mainichi and Asahi returned their shares of NTV to Yomiuri, and Nihon Keizai Shimbun 
likewise returned its shares of TV Asahi to Asahi Shimbun. See Hattori, op. cit., p. 69.
Ibid.
Additionally, Japan also has an educational station exclusively established for broadcasting 
university education. This so-called "University of the Air" is run by a non-profit 
organization called the University of the Air Foundation, and governed by the University of 
the Air Law enacted in 1981. See Nakajima Iwao, "The Broadcasting Industry in Japan: Its
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In addition to the Radio Law and Broadcast Law, ministerial notices and 
ordinances exist to fill in details left uncovered. As in many other policy areas in Japan, 
radio and broadcasting laws are vaguely written, and the relevant bureaucratic agency is 
left with the task of filling in the details through ministerial notices and ordinances. 
However, these ministerial notices and ordinances were not only written to complement 
the inadequacy of the provision in the laws, but were intended to benefit the MPT and 
the government of the day. Article 9 of the Ordinance for Essential Standards for 
Establishing a Broadcast Station, for example, was aimed at preventing the over- 
concentration of ownership of the mass media by prohibiting the control of more than 
ten per cent of the shares by an individual or entity in the three areas of media: 
television, radio, and newspaper.73 Yet a provision in Article 9 exempted cases within 
the metropolitan areas such as Tokyo on the grounds that "such multiple operations 
would not constitute an infonnation monopoly because of the existence of other 
influential mass communication media".74 A case that benefited directly from this 
provision was the Fuji-Sankei Communications Group (FCG), one of the largest media 
and communication groups in Japan. The group has been allowed to have control over 
all three types of media through its control of a national newspaper (Sankei Shimbun), 
two radio networks (JOLF, JOQR), and a television network (FNN). On the local 
scene, however, alliances across two media sectors are common, particularly between
Historical, Legal, and Economic Aspects", in H. Eguchi and H. Ichinohe (eds.), International 
Studies of Broadcasting (Tokyo: NHK Radio & TV Culture Research Institute, 1971), pp. 41- 
2; See also Japan's Foreign Press Center, "Japan's Mass Media", About Japan Series No.7 
(Tokyo: Japan's Foreign Press Center, 1997), pp. 68-9.
Article 9 of the "the Ordinance for the Essential Standards for Establishing a Broadcasting 
Station" states that "opportunities for engaging in broadcasting activities should be made 
available to as many (organizations) as possible". In accordance with the Article, the MPT 
restricts one organization from owning or controlling more than two stations, and has 
prohibited, in principle, control by one person or an organization of television, radio, and 
newspapers in the same area. In this case, the term ‘control’ means to own more than 
ten per cent o f voting rights (stocks) in another medium company, that the number o f directors 
sent to the board of the mass communication medium in question exceeds 1/5 of the total 
number of the directors, and that a director of a mass communication medium with 
representative rights is concurrently appointed to a director with representative rights of a 
commercial broadcasting company. Nihon Shimbun K yokai, Press Laws in Japan 
(Commentary and Abstracts! (Tokyo: NSK, 1995), p. 46.
Ibid., p. 53.74
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local newspaper and broadcasting companies. One representative example is the alliance 
between Kobe Shimbun and Radio Kansai (AMK 558MHz) in Kobe.75
As listed in the following table, each of Tokyo's key commercial stations not 
only has a strong affiliation with one of the Japan's five nationwide daily newspapers, 
but also serves as a hub of a nationwide television network. As such, it typically 
provides news, entertainment programs, and national advertising for local stations 
around the country. However, according to Article 53-2 of the Broadcast law of 1950,
Table 3: National Television Stations, their Links with Major Newspapers, and 
Numbers of Local Affiliated Stations
Key Commercial 
Stations
Links with Major 
Newspapers
National Commercial 
Networks
No. of Affiliated 
Stations*
NTV Yomiuri NNN 30(3)
TBS Mainichi JNN 28(0)
Fuji TV Sankei FNN 28 (2)
TV Asahi Asahi ANN 26 (2)
TV Tokyo Nihon Keizai TXN 6(0)
*As o f April, 1998
The figures in parentheses represent the number of cross-net stations, i.e., stations with more than one 
network affiliation. Notably, the number of these cross-net stations has declined sharply over the last ten 
years.
Source: Adapted from Nippon Hösö Kyökai Ron, NHK Nenkan '98 fNHK Radio&Television Yearbook 
'981 (Tokyo: Nippon Hösö Kyökai Ron, 1998), p. 566.
commercial broadcasters are restricted from entering any contract that binds them to 
receiving broadcast programs from one particular source, which would constitute the 
formation of a network. Notwithstanding such legal restrictions, Japan's commercial 
broadcasters have fully established 'quasi-networks' among themselves.76 This is
Interview with Mr.Hashida Mitsuo, Deputy Editor-in-chief, Kobe Shimbun on November 26, 
1998.
76 Komatsubara Hisao, "New Broadcasting Technologies and the Press in Japan", Studies in 
Broadcasting. March 1989, (25), pp. 77-88.
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primarily due to two interdependent reasons. Firstly, local stations are less resourceful 
than the key Tokyo stations in covering national news and in producing entertainment 
programs. Programs from key stations are therefore relayed to make up the core 
programs for local stations, which are thus able to broadcast nationally syndicated 
programs that attract both audiences and advertisers. Secondly, the key commercial 
stations require local stations to expand their coverage to attract national advertisers. 
Moreover, the key stations can cover their production costs when their programs are 
sold nationally. These commercial linkages and the exchange of benefits between key 
stations in Tokyo and local stations indicate that 'cartelism' has become a key organizing 
principle for commercial stations in Japan, similar to the alliances of networks and local 
stations in the U.S.
This alliance among the big newspaper companies and key commercial stations 
at the national level also indicates that the Japanese regulator, the MPT, has limited its 
license awards to entities that represent a coalition among the powerful elite. The slow 
introduction of CATV (cable Television) into the Japanese markets also serves to 
confirm that the powerful existing commercial broadcasters have been well protected by 
excessive regulatory measures.77 As observed by Tracey, a deep-seated fear of the 
implications of changes in communication system “served to dispel any zealousness in 
making new policy to usher in the new age”.78
Moreover, according to the Radio Law of 1950 (amended in 1988), a broadcast 
license is only valid for five years. There is no provision for the renewal of a license, but 
rather there is a process whereby the current holder re-applies and is re-issued with a 
license. Commercial broadcasters must therefore reapply for a new license every five
The Cable Television Broadcast Law was passed by the Diet in 1972. However, the Law 
stipulated that a cable station with more than 500 terminals required a license from the MPT. 
Moreover, the Law limited multiple operations and foreign ownership. It also required that the 
content o f original programs broadcast via cable must also comply with the provisions of  
Broadcast Law which governs off-air broadcasting. For more details see Michael Tracey,
The Decline and Fall o f Public Service Broadcasting (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998),
p. 228.
Ibid., p. 229.78
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years.79 In comparative terms, licenses to operate commercial stations in Thailand 
generally last for a longer period. The current licenses to operate Channels 3, 7, and iTV, 
for instance, have been given for periods ranging from twenty-five to thirty years. This 
long period ensures that those in charge of licensing will receive large kickbacks from 
long-term licensing fees. The short-term licensing period in Japan, on the other hand, 
ensures that key commercial broadcasters are kept in line with the regulators' policies 
and the government's views in order to get a new license issued without a condition 
demanding changes in programming content.80 In Japan, the reward relationship between 
the state regulator and the TV license holders is embedded within the licensing system 
which,
artificially restricts the number of broadcast licensees, centralizes media power, 
encourages blandness in programming, and fosters political involvement in the 
licensing process. It places media power squarely within the establishment 
consensus o f the socially and politically acceptable, diffusing it through shared 
authority within that class, and perpetuating communications power through 
negotiation among power structures.81
However, these characteristics of the Japanese licensing system are not the product of 
regulations or legislation. Rather, they are a product of the informal reward relationship 
between the state and commercial broadcasters that exists beyond the boundaries of the 
regulatory system. In other words, these conditions emerge out of a process of 
negotiation and bargaining. Indeed, broadcasting policy is similar to other administrative 
policies in Japan, as it revolves around the notion that the provision of extralegal 
administrative guidance to involved parties is preferable to rigidly established rules, and 
those who follow the administratively favored path are subsequently rewarded. The 
following discussion of the license-awarding process exemplifies this point.
Japan's Foreign Press Center, "Japan's Mass Media", About Japan Series No.7 (Tokyo: Japan's 
Foreign Press Center, 1997), p. 57.
This condition is based on Article 104-2 of the Radio Law which states that "in granting a 
preliminary license, an ordinary license, or a permit, a condition or a term of a period can be 
attached thereto". Taking advantage of this Article, the MPT has set up the percentage of 
educational and cultural programs for the general television service by more than 30 hours 
per week. According to Article 76 of the same law, stations whose broadcasting matters have 
infringed this condition would be suspended from operating within a period of three months. See 
Nakajima Iwao, "The Broadcasting Industry in Japan: Its Historical, Legal, and Economic 
Aspects", in H. Eguchi and H. Ichinohe (eds.), International Studies of Broadcasting (Tokyo: 
NHK Radio & TV Culture Research Institute, 1971), p. 35.
Jonathan Weinberg, "Broadcasting and the Administrative Process in Japan and the United 
States", Buffalo Law Review. Fall 1991, 39(3), p. 624.
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In awarding a license, the MPT prefers the traditional practice of ipponka chösei 
or 'unification adjustment', as opposed to an open-bid system to select a single winner 
that will operate a frequency. The latter system is similar to those conducted in the 
U.S., the U.K., and more recently in Thailand.82 In Japan, licensees are selected by the 
MPT through a process emphasizing a compromise between all influential applicants. 
This process involves the creation of a single joint venture, the stocks of which are 
shared-though not equally-by all of the financially or politically 'powerful' applicants. 
Most of these applicants include the licensees of local radio stations, local banks, and 
prefectural newspapers. National newspapers sometimes seek to participate in the 
process.83 This ipponka process still allows for the dominance of coalitions between 
local entrepreneurs, owners of local newspapers, and those local members who have 
close relationships with powerful politicians in receiving new TV licenses. A license to 
operate a UHF station in Yamanashi prefecture in 1959 was given to TV Yamanashi -- a 
station in which Kanemaru Shin, then an LDP Diet member and a close associate to 
former Prime Minister Tanaka, was a major shareholder.84
Moreover, this ipponka process allows a few media groups to dominate the 
television broadcasting industry. In particular, the five commercial key stations have 
been the key players in the process of unification adjustment in the Japanese TV 
broadcasting scene.85 When a new broadcasting license is available, these networks often 
hire their former employees or shareholders to file applications on their behalf. These 
applicants, however, only act as ‘proxies’ so that these networks can gain shares in the 
new license.86 Regulators within the MPT favor partial ownership of local companies 
by large television networks because it guarantees financial success. The unification
Hattori, op. cit., p.64; See also Weinberg, op. cit., p. 664. Weinberg translated ‘ipponka 
chösei' into ‘unification coordination’. However, the overall meaning of the term is similar to 
those previously given by Hattori.
Weinberg, op. cit., pp. 669-70.
Weinberg, op. cit., p. 671.
Ibid., p. 665; According to Westney, out of 111 broadcasting companies in 1980, Asahi (TV 
Asahi) had holdings in 36 companies, Yomiuri (NTV) in 29, Mainichi (TBS) in 13, Sankei 
(Fuji TV) in 16, and Nikkei {TV Tokyo) in 7. See D. Eleanor Westney, "Mass Media in 
Business Organizations", in S. J. Pharr and E. S. Krauss (eds.), Media and Politics in Japan 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), p. 60.
Ibid., p. 666.
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process is also long because it involves multiple stages of consultation among applicants 
and leaders within the community who are invited to deliberate the shareholdings among 
applicants.87 This slow process resulted in a minimal increase in the number of 
commercial stations during the 1960s and 1970s. Only with the revision of the 
Broadcast Law in 1988, in which the government embraced the policy of having four 
stations in one region, did a rapid increase in the number of commercial stations occur 
around the country.88
This ipponka process seems highly beneficial to both bureaucrats and 
politicians. On one hand, it helps create a consensus among all applicants, so support is 
easily mobilized and control over what to broadcast is mostly guaranteed. To maintain 
these supports and controls, the MPT bureaucrats are, in turn, required to protect 
business profits by limiting new entrants into the same market area, such as by delaying 
the awarding of new licenses. On the other hand, this unified process creates a situation 
in which the major stakeholders of a new broadcasting company may be indebted to 
politicians who might have influenced the ipponka process by accelerating it, or by 
dividing shares in a way more favorable to some applicants than others. Favored 
applicants, such as bankers and newspaper or radio station owners would then be 
obliged to offer a return in forms of political and financial support, or preferential access 
to television stations. Former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, for example, seemed to 
have gained preferential treatment and editorial support from a large number of local 
broadcasters through this process. While serving as Minister of MPT in 1957, he 
claimed to have overridden the bureaucratic red tape and hastened the ipponka process 
by approving forty-three new licenses over one weekend.89
To summarize the situation thus far, the nature of the Thai broadcasting system 
is in fact closer to those of neighboring developing countries in Southeast Asia such as
87 Komatsubara, op. cit., p. 80
By 1996, 89.8 per cent of the country (34 prefectures) have had a privilege o f accessing to four 
regional stations. See Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Tsüshin hakushn heisei 9 
nenhan (Communications White Paner 19971 (Tokyo: Ökurashö Insatsu Kyoku, 1997), p. 23. 
Jacob M. Schlesinger, Shadow Shoguns: The Rise and Fall o f Japan's Postwar Political 
Machine (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 56.
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Indonesia.90 The Thai system is highly dominated by two state-run television channels 
and two concessioned channels, whose operators had close relationship with the state in 
the past. Thailand has one public broadcasting channel — Channel 11, which is wholly 
controlled by the state agency and highly dependent on state funding.91 Thailand’s new 
UHF channel, iTV, was financially unstable and has been taken over by an entrepreneur 
who also leads a political party. The Japanese broadcasting system, on the other hand, 
is a mixture of both the British and the American systems, insofar as it has a very 
important public broadcasting sector, and strong and competitive commercial 
networks.92 Yet the Japanese and Thai broadcast licensing systems share a strikingly 
similar characteristic in that both states do not award licenses to broadcast to the limits 
of spectrum availability. The Thai state restricts licenses to broadcast because it wants 
neither to distribute its control of frequencies nor allow the frequencies to be operated 
beyond its reach. Moreover, the reward relationship based on an exchange between the 
state and the broadcasters has long preserved the status quo, thus restricting new 
entrants. The Japanese state has also been very slow and reluctant to award licenses to 
the limit of spectrum availability. This has been due largely to the nontransparent and 
slow consultation process of ipponka chösei, the process whereby the Japanese 
broadcasting and political elite — the broadcasters, the MPT bureaucrats, and the 
politicians - are satisfied and rewarded. The extent of the reward relationship between 
the broadcasting and political elite in the two countries, and their comparative 
experience shall now be addressed.
Since 1962, the broadcasting system in Indonesia has been dominated by one state-owned 
network, Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI), and had five commercial broadcasting services: 
Rajawali Citra Televisi (RCTI), Cipta Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia (TPI), Indosiar Visual 
Mandiri, Cakrawala Andalas Televisi (ANTEVE), and Surya Cita Televisi (SCTV). The 
commercial licensees were exclusively selected by the government. Therefore, the owners of 
these commercial stations are those who have close links with the government. RCTI, in 
particular, is owned by the son of former President Soeharto. For details o f linkages between 
each station and the Soeharto's clan, see Philip Kitley, Television. Nation, and Culture in 
Indonesia (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000).
Since 1998, the Thai government has planned to turn Channel 11 to an independent public 
organization which shall be run by a board appointed by the Minister in charge of broadcasting, 
and will manage its own budget. According to the PRD internal report No. 731/2542 
(November 1999), the plan is still in the research period.
The British system is dominated by its public broadcaster, the BBC (British Broadcasting 
Corporation), while the American system is dominated by its competitive commercial networks: 
the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), and the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS).
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3.2 Broadcasting and Political Elite
The concept of an 'elite' is instrumental to making sense of the structural and personal 
relationships of the men who occupy the command posts in broadcasting. The 
relationship between broadcasting and the political elite in Thailand is largely based on a 
personal relationship between the patron (phu yai), and the client (phu noi), as already 
discussed. However, the established elite, as C. Wright Mills observed, only comes 
together at certain coinciding points and only on certain occasions of crisis, as there are 
always tensions and factions among them.93 The political, military, and bureaucratic 
elite comprising the patron class is indeed not unified. In the Thai case, members of this 
elite are particularly different in ranks, and authorities. Some have an access to 
broadcasting policy, whilst others have full control of frequencies and budgets.
Due to the military and government ownership of TV broadcasting stations, the 
military and political elite has both political and financial control of the stations. For 
instance, the yearly budget of the government-run Channel 11 is received via the budget 
allocated for the PRD, which is set by the Minister in charge before being approved by 
the Cabinet.94 The Director General of the PRD who runs Channel 11 is also appointed 
and dismissed by the same Minister. Although this Minister does not have similar 
financial control over MCOT, former ministers in this position have frequently 
contested their control via the appointment and dismissal of its directors and other high- 
ranking officers.
From the establishment of MCOT in 1977 to 1991, most MCOT directors were 
appointed based on their close relationships with the Minister in charge. As shown in 
Table 3, a new MCOT director is usually appointed after a new cabinet has been
C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 277.
The budget o f Channel 11 in 1999, for example, was 411,891,600 baht (A$1.8 million), which 
was about 38.6 per cent o f the total budget received by the PRD in the same year. Channel 11 
also receives financial support from the MCOT annually. Samnak Ngobpramarn (Budget 
Bureau), Priebtieb raidai raichai ngobpramarn pi 2543 (Comparison of Revenue and 
Expenditure pf Budget 2000) (Bangkok: Budget Bureau, Office o f the Prime Minister, 2000), p.
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formed. As a result, many MCOT directors have been sacked before the end of their 
terms due to sudden cabinet changes.
Table 4: List of MCOT Directors and Their Political Alliances
Cabinet Attached Ministers of OPM MCOT's Directors Years Appointed/
Dismissed
Tanin Kraivichien Dusit Siriwan Pramut Sutabutra Appointedl977
General Kriengsak 
Chamanan
Lt. General
Bunruean
Buacharoon
Pramut Sutrabutra Dismissed 1986
General Prem 
Tinsulanond
a) General Yos 
Tephasadin na 
Ayuddhaya
b) Police Lt. Cham 
Manootham
c) Jirayu Israngkoon 
na Ayuddhaya
Boonserm Wisakul 
Montri
Chenwitthayakam
Appointed 1986 
Resigned 1987
Appointed 1987 
Dismissed 1987
General Chatichai 
Choonhawan
Police Capt.
Chalerm
Yubamrung
Rachan Husen Appointed 1988 
Resigned 1991
Anand Panyarachun 
(Under NPKC's 
Control)
Meechai
Veeravaithaya
Prasit Hitanon Appointed 1991 
Dismissed 1991
Chuan Leekpai Tuedpong
Chaiyanan
Saengchai
Sunthomwat
Appointed 1993
Banham Silpaacha Piyanat
Watcharapom
Saengchai
Sunthomwat
Murdered 1996
General Chavalit 
Yongchaiyudh
Piyanut
Watcharapom
Orasa Khunawat Appointed 1996 
Retired 1999
Chuan Leekpai Khunying Supatra 
Masdit
Sorachak
Kasemsuwan
Appointed via an 
open selection 
process 1999
Source: Adapted from Khamjom Lhuiyapong, "Ruam chalong 20 p i khong Or.Sor.Mor.Thor" (Join to 
Celebrate 20th Anniversary of MCOT), Lok khong seu lem 2 (Media’s World Vol. 2) (Bangkok: 
Chulalongkom University Press, 1998), p. 194.
The ministers who were assigned to take charge of broadcasting in the past were 
generally close aides to the Prime Minister.95 This close personal relationship was also 
an important factor in the appointment of MCOT directors by the Minister in charge of 
broadcasting. For instance, a former minister, Police Capt. Chalerm Yubamrung — then
These included Lt. General Bunruean Buacharoon, who was a close friend o f former Prime 
Minister General Kriengsak Chamanan. Three ministers during the eight-year period o f General 
Prem administration were also selected for the same reason. See Khamjom Lhuiyapong, op. cit., 
p. 195.
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the leader of Muanchon Party — appointed Rachan Husen, who was the secretary and 
spokesperson of his own party, as a director of MCOT in 19 8 8.96 As a part of 
broadcast liberalization program, the Anand administration aimed at abolishing this 
practice by canceling the Royal Decree of 1977 that governed MCOT, and replacing it 
with the new decrees which cancelled the right of the Prime Minister and the Minister in 
charge to appoint the Director.97 Instead, a panel including government representatives, 
appointed academics, and individuals would be set up to select the Director of MCOT. 
However, the government's attempts to defend its rights to directly intervene in M COT 
administration were evident in the fourth Decree introduced by the Chuan government 
in 1994, which gave a right to the Minister overseeing MCOT to appoint or dismiss any 
members of the MCOT committee (Article 16), and required the committee to seek 
consent from the Minister in charge when appointing or dismissing the Director (Article 
22).98
Furthermore, despite the establishment of the committee aimed at reducing direct 
political influence from the Minister in the appointment of the MCOT Director, the 
political connections of candidates continued to play an important role in the selection 
process. In 1993 Saengchai Sunthomwat, whose brother was an elected MP from the 
ruling Democrat Party, was appointed to the directorial position.99 There have also been 
claims of unusually strong support from Khunying Supatra Masdit, a Minister 
overseeing the MCOT, for Sorachak Kasemsuwan, the MCOT Director who was 
elected in 1999.100
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Ibid.
Similar reforms were also undertaken simultaneously within the area o f telecommunications, 
particularly in the TOT and the CAT. This owed very much to the fact that Anand Panyarachun 
accepted the premiership on the condition that he would have a high degree of autonomy from 
the military-led National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC) which organized a coup earlier. The 
Anand government was thus able to pass as many as 270 pieces of legislation, many o f which 
were implemented without military's interference. For further discussion see Sakkharin 
Niyomsilpa, "The Political Economy of Telecommunications Liberalization in Thailand", PhD 
Thesis, The Australian National University, 1995, pp. 140-46.
Khamjom Lhuiyapong, op. cit., p. 198.
"Saengchai Sunthornwat futfit forfai nai Or.Sor.Mor.Thor" (Saengchai Sunthomwat speaks 
English in MCOT), Phuiadkarn Rai Dnen. May 1993, pp. 60-2.
"Sorachak rules out political links in his nomination", The Bangkok Post September 30,1999 
(on-line edition); "Probity check will clear Sorachak for media post, says official", The Nation. 
September 30,1999 (on-line edition); "Check khluen khwamkhidphor.or. Or.Sor.Mor.Thor
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However, conflicts of policy and differences in ambition between the political 
and bureaucratic elite do exist, and they frequently introduce tension. A case of such 
contestation concerned a Director-General of the Public Relations Department, Chan 
Poonsombat and his minister, Piyanat Watcharapom. Piyanat was a politician from the 
New Aspiration Party which has vast business connections and strong personal links, 
particularly with the telecommunications giant United Communication Group 
(UCOM ).101 After Piyanat became the Minister overseeing the PRD, he awarded this 
group the operation of forty AM radio stations for twenty years. This was the first 
time a radio license was approved for such a long period. Piyanat had also been 
suspected of private gain after allowing Asia Vision to operate Channel l l 's  news 
programs in 1996. Chan was doubtful about Piyanat's desire to privatize Channel 11, 
and his doubt was substantiated by UCOM overt expression of interests in moving into 
broadcasting business and supports for Piyanat's plan.102 Chan thus rejected Piyanat's 
proposal to allow any private partners to hold a larger stake than the PRD in the 
proposed joint venture and obstructed Piyanat's plan to bypass the Cabinet's 
deliberation process over the proposal. As a result, Chan was dismissed as a director 
and transferred to an inactive post within the OPM.103
Conflicts of interest between the political and bureaucratic elite over licensing 
can even set the two parties on a collision course. In 1996, Saengchai Sunthomwat, a 
MCOT director (1993-1996), was shot dead by two gunmen reportedly hired by a 
Chiengrai MP, Thawee Puthchan. Thawee's conflict with Saengchai was based on the 
latter’s rejection of requests to renew licenses to operate four MCOT radio stations in 
the Northeastern provinces that had been given to his mother-in-law, Ubon 
Bunyachalothon, a powerful former MP known locally as "jaomae witthayu" (the radio
Sorachak Kasemsuwan..." (Checking the thinking frequency of the MCOT Director, Sorachak 
Kasemsuwan...), Matichon Sudsapda. October 19, 1999, pp. 70-1.
101 See Usanee Mongkolpom and Yingyord Manchuvisith, "UCOM signals in on broadcasting", 
The Nation. February 10, 1997 (on-line edition); "UCOM gains foothold in government", The 
Nation. October 30, 1997 (on-line edition).
102 "UCOM seeks partners to compete for TV Ventures", The Nation. February 21, 1997 (on-line 
edition).
103 "PRD Official transferred to inactive post", The Nation. May 29, 1997 (on-line edition).
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godmother).104 Ubon's radio business was badly damaged by Saengchai's rejection. 
Saengchai was also in conflict with other officials due to his disregard for compromise, 
but emphasis on transparency, impartiality, and quality in broadcasting. Upon 
conviction, Thawee received the death penalty from a lower court. His mother-in-law 
was subsequently shot, dead by mysterious gunmen in 1999 following police attempts 
to charge her according to new evidence that could perhaps bring the reasons for 
Saengchai's death to light.105 The mastermind behind Saengchai's death may never be 
known, as in countless other cases of political killings by ‘unknown gunmen’ commonly 
hired by local MPs to eliminate their political enemies and business rivals.106
The prevalence of threats resulting from conflict and increased competition have 
made it necessary for Thai corporate broadcasters to develop political affiliations to 
secure access to broadcasting licenses and protection. The case of Somkiet Onwimol, a 
broadcaster who was contracted to produce news programs for Channel 9 in 1985, 
exemplifies this point. When Police Capt. Chalenn Yubamrumg became Minister in 
charge of broadcasting, he demanded Somkiet only produce news promoting the 
government, but Somkiet denied this request. Chalerm then decided to launch his own 
news program by using internal staff and then MCOT director, Rachan Husen, to read 
the news. As a result, Channel 9 had two main news programs, the contents of which 
were sometimes in stark contrast. Finally, Somkiet was pressured to quit Channel 9 in 
January 1989, and later moved to produce news programs for Channels 7, and 5 
respectively. At Channel 5, in particular, Somkiet built his political strength by
For further discussion of this case and the rise to a "jao mae" position of Ubon see James Ockey, 
"God Mothers, Good Mothers, Good Lovers, Godmothers: Gender Images in Thailand", The 
Journal of Asian Studies. November 1999, 58(4), pp. 1033-1058.
"Death Sentence for the murder o f Sangchai", The Nation. September 26, 1997 (on-line edition); 
Chaiyakom Baingem, "Sangchai case may reopen", The Nation. December 7, 1997 (on-line 
edition); "Ubol to face fresh charges", The Nation. August 4, 1998 (on-line edition); Anucha 
Charoenpo, "Four Motives for Ubon's Killings", Bangkok Post. March 1, 1999 (on-line 
edition).
This kind of political killing began in the late 1980s, marking the emergence o f Thai 
parliamentary democracy, and reached its heyday at the end of the 1990s when almost 80 per 
cent of MPs admitted that they wore bullet-proof vests at election time. See Chapter 8: Murder 
and Progress in Modem Siam in Bennedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: 
Nationalism. Southeast Asia and the World (London: Verso, 1998); "Most MPs wear bullet­
proof vests", The Nation. January 7, 2000 (on-line edition); "Politicians top buyers o f bullet­
proof vests", The Nation. February 27, 2000 (on-line edition).
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developing close ties with the military, which later awarded him a license to pioneer 24- 
hour news and traffic reports channel on radio using a military frequency.107 In response 
to an accusation of biased reports broadcast by his radio station in favor of the military 
during the May crisis in 1992, Somkiet adhered strongly to the traditional patron-client 
mindset, considering it his obligation to favor the military, which had granted him a 
license to operate:
I don't think it's strange to feel obliged to persons who have helped us 
survive. We have been hurt many times by others' betrayal. Since the military 
helped us grow, it is not unusual if  we side with the military.108
The recent liberalization in satellite broadcasting, cable television, and radio 
frequencies has increasingly drawn influential telecommunication groups such as 
UCOM and Shinawatra Group into the broadcasting business.109 Further liberalization 
in television broadcasting in Thailand might lead to a prominent role played by these 
telecommunication groups, whose earlier success heavily relied on their connections 
with the military, politicians, and the bureaucrats.110 These connections between 
telecom operators and political parties were different from the obligatory links between 
Somkiet and the military, as mentioned above. The patron-client links between these 
telecom operators, and the political and bureaucratic elite have coincided with economic 
interests, and have been both opportunistic and volatile. For instance, the success of 
Shinawatra Group in gaining telecommunication concessions seems to have been largely 
based on its connections with the Telephone Organization of Thailand, the Army, the 
Thai Military Bank, and the Chart Thai Party.111 Thaksin Shinawatra, the owner of the
"Mue Somkiet sadud kha tua eng" (When Somkiet tumbled his own leg), Phuiadkarn Rai 
Duean. October 1991, pp. 20-26; "Pacific prub tua mai lung chong ha mai tor sunya"
(Pacific adjusted itself after Channel 5 decided not to renew the contract), Phuiadkarn Rai 
Duean. December 1992, pp. 34-36.
Ibid., p. 34.
The big four of telecommunication companies in Thailand are the Shinawatra Group, the United 
Communication Group, Telecom Asia, and Jasmine Communications. However, only 
Shinawatra, UCOM, and Telecom Asia have substantially invested in broadcasting business. 
Further discussion see also Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, Rabob witthavu lae thorathat thai: 
Krongsang thang setthakit kanmuang lae pholkrathob thor sitthi seriphap (Thai Radio and 
Television System: The Potical and Economic Structure and Effects of Rights and Freedom!. 
op. cit., pp. 269-73.
See Sakkarin Niyomsilpa, "The Political Economy of Telecommunications Liberalization in 
Thailand", Unpublished PhD Thesis, The Australian National University, 1995.
Ibid. See particularly Chapter five: Telecommunications and Political Corruption.
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group, has become a powerful politician himself, and received support from these 
alliances through various campaigns. In 1994, he was invited to be a deputy Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister in the Chuan administration. In spite of his short time as 
a minister, he secured the appointment of a close friend to the post of Minister of 
Communications to protect his telecommunication empire.112 In 1998, he established his 
own political party, which thereafter gained substantial political and business supports 
and came to take charge of the government after he won a landslide victory in the 2001 
election. Thaksin's success is the best example of how money and politics were mixed 
and utilized to monopolize the entire telecommunication markets.113
As for the UCOM Group, its connections with the Communication Authority 
of Thailand, the Ministry of Transport and Communication, and the New Aspiration 
Party were exploited to expand its telecom business.114 Two former executives of the 
UCOM Group served as cabinet ministers during the Chavalit administration in 
1997 ns The application of this type of modem connection based on coinciding 
political and economic interests between the political and bureaucratic elite and the big 
telecommunication groups can certainly be expected in the future when these telecom 
groups move fully into broadcasting, as the trend suggests to be the case. Alliances 
between political, bureaucratic, military and broadcasting elite will thus become more 
necessary than ever for the sake of securing a broadcasting license.
Whilst the reward relationship between political and broadcasting elite in 
Thailand can now be characterized as a modem type of patron-client relationship, 
reward relationships between the broadcasting and political elite in Japan is, in contrast,
Ukrist Pathamanand, "The Thaksin Shinawatra Group: A Study of the Relationship between 
Money and Politics in Thailand", The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies. 1998, (13), p. 70. 
Ibid., pp. 60-82.
Ibid.
The leader of the New Aspiration Party, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, also has a strong 
relationship with UCOM Group. One of UCOM's former executives, Poosana Premanoch, who 
had been a campaigner for him and his party for many years, was appointed Minister o f the 
Office o f the Prime Minister during his administration. Another executive, Somphop 
Benjarongkul, was appointed as Deputy Minister of Health in the same cabinet. See Usanee 
Mongkolpom and Yingyord Manchuvisith, "UCOM signals in on broadcasting", The Nation. 
February 10, 1997 (on-line edition); "UCOM gains foothold in government", The Nation. 
October 30, 1997 (on-line edition).
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more collective and systematic. The coordination-integration dynamic in Japanese 
politics indeed manifests itself clearly in this setting, as the thrust of this relationship is 
underpinned by the idea that rewards should be collective and reciprocal. This refers to 
a norm that all relevant parties give up something to achieve mutual goals. This norm of 
reciprocal consent is a basis of the "bargained nature" of the Japanese politics in which 
mutual accommodation is recognized as the most legitimate solution to political 
conflicts, such as in the case budgetary allocations.116
Yet similar to the case in Thailand, the relationship between the broadcasting and 
political elite in Japan was made and is strengthened through both formal and informal 
channels. On the one hand, the government's influence over public broadcasting is 
clearly written into the Broadcast Law of 1950, which allows for the government's 
appointment and dismissal of the NHK Board of Governors, the government's approval 
of NHK budget, funding of overseas broadcasting, as well as approvals in areas of 
research and maintenance (see Appendix 3). According to Articles 11 and 19 of the 
Broadcast Law, for example, NHK's Board of Governors are appointed and dismissed 
by the Prime Minister with the approval of the Diet. The Board of Governors consists 
of twelve private citizens who are appointed for three-year terms with the possibility 
of reappointment. The members elect from among themselves the chairman, who sits as 
the President of NHK.117 In the appointment of the NHK Board of Governors and the 
President, there has been evidence of blatant favoritism. Experience has shown that the 
Prime Minister who elects the Board of Governors also influences the Board of 
Governors to appoint the President of his choice. When Tanaka Kakuei became Prime 
Minister in 1973, he had Ono Yoshio, who once served as his Deputy when Tanaka 
was a Minister of MPT, appointed as NHK President. The appointment of Ono, 
however, reflected the tradition of appointing an OB, or ‘old boy’ of the Ministry of 
Communications as NHK President.118 This tradition proved useful for the government
116 For example, Richardson argues that this bargained nature' has played an important role in 
decentralizing power in Japanese politics. See Bradley Richardson, Japanese Democracy; Power. 
Coordination and Performance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 258-59.
117 See Japan's Foreign Press Center, op. cit., pp. 61-62; and Michael Tracey, op. cit., pp. 278-80.
118 Kawasaki Yasushi, NHK to seiii fNHK and Politics) (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1997), 
pp. 13-19.
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during and after the war, enabling it to have full control over NHK activities and the 
content of its programs.
In a parallel to the appointment of the MCOT directorial position in Thailand, 
NHK Presidents with close relationships to Prime Ministers often had their terms cut 
short by cabinet changes or political pressure. For example, President Ono served only 
three years (1973-1976) during the Tanaka administration. He was pressured by the 
opposition and the public to resign after being seen using an official car to visit the 
house of former Prime Minister Tanaka, who had been convicted in the Lockheed 
scandal. President Ikeda Yoshiso (1988-1989) was known to be close to Prime Minister 
Takeshita. He resigned (after serving less than one year) following the resignation of the 
Takeshita's cabinet because of the recruit scandal. President Shima Keiji (1989-1991) 
was sacked by the Diet after lying about his whereabouts during the failed launch of an 
NHK satellite. His dismissal, on the one hand, was seen to result from conflict of 
interests between himself and LDP politicians who opposed his ambitious move to 
make NHK compete with the private sectors by using advanced and cheaper 
technology. On the other hand, most NHK staff viewed Shima's connections with the 
LDP as being ‘too close’. Shima was regarded by many NHK staff with deep suspicion 
and unease as an ‘LDP agent’.119 This ‘close’ relationship might also have cost him his 
position. The close relationship between NHK executives and LDP politicians was 
undoubtedly strengthened by the long-term dominance of the LDP in the government. 
This relationship became a crucial factor that influenced and transformed the political 
role of NHK, from a political watchdog that confronted the state in the 1950s and 1960s 
to a servant of the state that legitimized its political master from the 1970s to the 
1990s.120
Japan has an unwritten constitution whereby authority has been applied largely 
through the informal practices of procedure, bargaining, and dealing. In the broadcasting
Ibid., pp. 6-7.
For further discussion on each individual president, see Chapter 5: "Leadership and Politics" in 
Ellis S. Krauss, Broadcasting Politics in Japan: NHK and Television News (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2000).
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scene, there is a 'fair share' norm between the broadcasting and the political elite. The 
Japanese government's influence over NHK has been largely exercised through informal 
channels and centered around an equal exchange of awards and incentives. The M PT 
internal training of NHK staff, and the appointment of the broadcasting elite to public 
advisory bodies (shingikai) are cases in point. Since 1987, NHK has dispatched its own 
talented staff to the MPT for the purpose of ‘training’. These so-called 'haken shairi, or 
'dispatched employees' are assigned to work full-time at the MPT for a period of two 
years to gain 'policy' knowledge, whilst receiving a full salary from N HK.121 However, 
these employees are neither allowed to make contact with NHK nor to collect 
information that might benefit their company. On the contrary, they are given tasks 
similar to other public servants working within the same bureau to which they were 
assigned. This MPT training scheme was also expanded to cover talented staff at the 
commercial networks such as NTV and TV Asahi in the early 1990s.122 The cost of 
paying these dispatched employees, which amounted to around 10 million yen (AS 1.4 
million), was solely borne by the TV stations.123 The disclosure of such an amount of 
money has provoked public disquiet, especially with regards to NHK, whose revenue 
purely relies on the receivers’ fees. The public claimed that such amount of money 
should not have been spent on fostering collusive relations between the MPT and NHK. 
Yet TV commercial executives saw the dispatch of employees to the MPT as a benefit, 
as their staff received training and the stations gained policy knowledge that would 
benefit them in the future. As reflected in the comments made by ltd Kunio, the 
President of TV Asahi: "Public Office is a treasure house of information. While we are in 
the multi-media age, it will be greatly beneficial if we know what the administration is 
thinking".124 However, due to increased public criticism, NHK, NTV, and Fuji TV
Sakamoto Mamori, "Hösö-kyoku no yuseishö jinzai haken" (Dispatch of Talents from 
Broadcasting Stations to the MPT), Hösö Repooto. November 1995, (137), pp. 2-5. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
Cited in Sakamoto Mamori, "Hödö kikan wo otoshimete hajinai no wa dare ka?" (Who 
shamelessly disdain reporting mechanism?), Hösö Repooto. January 1996, (138), p. 5.
121
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decided to cease sending their staff to the MPT in June 1997. TV Asahi and TBS only 
suspended sending their staff to the MPT.125
The benefit that the MPT bureaucrats received from this training scheme was a 
platform for their own post-retirement future.126 In fact, an analogy with the training of 
employees from large corporations such as car companies, banks, and electrical 
appliance manufacturers by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 
and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in the 1970s and 1980s can be drawn.127 Those 
schemes were successful in building a systematic post-retirement career route for the 
MITI and the MOF bureaucrats. This practice of employing ex-bureaucrats is known as 
amakudari, or descent from heaven. In fact, the first case of MPT amakudari to the 
broadcasting industry took place in the 1950s.128 Since then, private television and radio 
networks have regularly received MPT officials after their retirement. A number of new 
licenses for operating local TV and radio stations have been allocated on the basis of 
including MPT retirees on their boards. The practice has been so pervasive that, as 
Nakano has claimed, it has become "a condition in excliange for the MPT license 
approval".129 This condition has become a major hindrance to the emergence of real 
competition for licenses, and has opened room for bureaucratic intervention in 
broadcasting content.
Furthermore, the relationship between MPT bureaucrats and NHK staff has 
been forged at another level, wherein the latter regularly hold party receptions or give
Their announcement of suspension, instead of ceasing the program entirely, was perhaps made 
upon the MPT special request to maintain its closer supervision and work coordination with 
these two stations due to the incidents concerning TVAsahi's alleged impartial election 
coverage in 1993, and TBS's video-previewing incident of 1996, which caused the murder o f a 
family of a lawyer who had campaigned against the Aum Shinrikyö religious group.
"NHK to minpö kiikyoku no [Yuseishö jinzai haken] no iiwake" (Discussion on the dispatch 
o f NHK and Key Stations' talents to the MPT), l lös6 Repooto. November 1997, (149), pp. 12- 
15.
Ibid.
Nakano Koichi, "Becoming a "Policy" Ministry: The Organization and Amakudari o f the 
Ministry o f Posts and Telecommunications", Journal of Japanese Studies. Winter 1998,
24(1), p. 109.
Ibid. Italics added. In 1981, one FM station and two TV stations were allowed to set up with 
MPT retirees among the founding directors. Japan Satellite Broadcasting (WOWOW) also had 
an MPT ex-Vice Minister as its founding president. Likewise, FM Japan (J-Wave) was also 
launched by former MPT officials.
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party tickets to the former in order to build personal networks.130 More importantly,
there has long been a practice of appointing NHK executives and senior editors to a
number of public advisory bodies (shingikai) that are sub-governmental institutions. 131
NHK staff, as well as persons from outside the government, such as academics and
community representatives, are officially appointed to give their expert advice on
particular policy areas. Within shingikai, the NHK staff together with appointed
journalists from other media organizations, particularly from 'the Big Five', serve as
free agents and delegates of their media organizations; sources and 
conveyors of information; purveyors of political evaluation, criticism, 
and new ideas; and go-betweens and legitimizers of government policy 
positions and compromises reached by representatives of conflicting 
views and interests.132
In these advisory bodies, the broadcasting elite and other media members are appointed 
to gain access to policy-makers and are given the opportunity to comment or criticize 
on policy issues. 133 This could offer tremendous benefits to the public and increased 
public participation should the deliberations be made public. Instead, most deliberations 
of public policies by these bodies have been kept secret until very recently . 134 The 
shingikai thus became an informal channel for forging relationships between senior 
journalists, the broadcasting elite, and policy-makers, and thus made it difficult for the 
broadcasting elite and senior journalists to be critical of the appointing authorities, or 
objectively comment on the policies they deliberated upon. In particular, NHK, which 
has a large number of their staff on various advisory bodies, has devoted a high
130
131
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133
134
"NHK no yüseishö shokuin settai seiji kenkingiwaku ni tsuite" (Suspected political 
contributions and receptions between NHK and the MPT bureaucrats), Hösö Repooto. July 
1998, (153), pp. 64-5.
The appointment of journalists to public advisory bodies has existed since the Meiji period.
See Yamamoto Taketoshi, "The Press Clubs of Japan", Journal of Japanese Studies. 1989,
15(2), p. 383.
Ehud Harari, "The Government-Media Connection in Japan: The Case of Public Advisory 
Bodies", Japan Forum. 1997, 9(1), p. 32.
The shingikai members are appointed for a two-year term. They are not usually reappointed, and 
but replaced by persons from the same occupational category, and often from the same 
organizations. Members from TV commercial networks are rarely appointed, except for 
shingikai attached to the MPT, which directly deal with media issues. Ibid., p. 22.
A massive administrative reform of public advisory bodies implemented in 1998-99 increased 
the openness of these bodies. A substantial amount of information and minutes of the 
meetings of these bodies, though not all, is now available in print and online. This change can 
be observed at the MPT, particularly in meetings concerning the digitalization and a new 
multi-channeling system. Gregory W. Noble, "Freer Discussion of Predetermined Agendas: 
Reform and Continuity in Japan's Shingikai Deliberation Councils", Unpublished paper. 
Australian National University, 2000.
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proportion of its news time to coverage of these bodies.135 Yet this coverage of advisory 
bodies is mainly factual and straightforward, lacking critical editorial assessments or 
negative comments. The role of these media members thus seems to be limited only to 
'legitimizing' policy proposals, as all negotiations and formal agreements have already 
been reached elsewhere.136
An investigation into shingikai conducted by the Management and Coordination 
Agency in 1992 found that the more than one-fourth of the total 139 media members at 
various advisory bodies were from the NHK.137 The reason why these NHK executives 
and personnel decided to become members of shingikai, however, was not based on 
publicity or money.138 Rather, serving in Shingikai opens doors to attractive retirement 
positions in semi-governmental organizations, such as research or administration 
positions in policy-related public companies, research institutes, or think tanks.139 As 
proxy providers of such positions, shingikai became a forum where the broadcasting 
elite and the appointing authorities formed their reward relationships. While members of 
the media could secure their retirement future by participating in shingikai, the 
bureaucrats and politicians of the relevant appointing authorities received policy 
legitimation because the broadcasting and newspaper elite abstained from critically 
commenting on the policies over which they have deliberated. These broadcasting and 
newspaper members of shingikai thus earned merit, and could, over time, be considered 
by the bureaucrats and politicians as part of their ‘in-group’.140 Indeed, this kind of
135
136
137
138
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140
Krauss’ content analysis of 7.00 pm news on NHK in July 1983 found that 10 per cent of total 
news stories were on 'Advisory Councils'. See Ellis S. Krauss, "Portraying the State: NHK 
Television News and Politics", in S. J. Pharr and E. S. Krauss (eds.), Media and Politics in 
Japan (Honolulu: Univrsity of Hawaii Press, 1996), p. 100.
For further discussion of shingikai see Frank Schwartz, "Of Fairy Cloaks and Familiar Talks: 
The Politics of Consultation", in G.D. Allinson, and Sone Yasunori (eds.), Political Dynamics 
and Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 217-41; Gregory W. 
Noble, "Freer Discussion of Predetermined Agendas: Reform and Contiunity in Japan's 
Shingikai Deliberation Councils", Unpublished paper. Australian National University, 2000. 
Amano Katsufumi, "Seifu shingikai wa kisha no uba suteyama ka?" (Is the government's 
public advisory body a dumping place for retired reporters?), Bungei Shunju. November 1993, 
71(11), p. 296. See also "Seiju shingikai no masukomi iin" (Media Members of the 
Government's Public Advisory Bodies), Asahi Shimbun. August 4, 1994, p. 25.
The payments to shingikai members are quite low. Each usually receives only 20,000 yen 
($A285) at the opening and the closing of a session. See Amano, op. cit., p. 300.
Harari, op. cit., p. 27.
‘In-group’ and ‘out-group’ distinctions are widely cited as a basis o f Japanese culture, which 
reflects a tendency of dependent personality and collective behavior o f Japanese people. See
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reciprocal exchange of rewards within in-groups has contributed largely to the 
coordination and integration of the political and broadcasting elite in Japan, as it did for 
other groups in the Japanese political realm . 141 The integration between the broadcasting 
and political elite in Japan has contributed to a susceptibility to special requests to 
change or suppress politically-sensitive broadcasting content.
3.3 Contests and Controls in News and Current Affairs Programs
In Thailand, broadcasting content on television indeed reflects the interests of those who 
own the stations. Most Thai television stations, which have been owned and operated 
by the state for a long time, are submissive to the state’s direction over what to report 
and how to report it. However, as Mcquail argues, "the line of influence from ownership 
is often indirect and complex - and it is rarely the only line of influence" . 142 In the case 
the new private-run station, iTV, program content is supposedly free from direct state 
control, but hospitality to the governing party has been extended, and sponsorship has 
sometimes been sought. One of iTV producers of morning news program admitted that 
securing a government deferral of its license payment and the receipt of revenue from 
major sponsors during the economic crisis has had an influence on editorial decisions. 143 
Since these commercial operators are concerned with staying in business and renewing 
their licenses, they impose implicit rules and conventions on their operations and news 
productions. Yet, contestation of, and resistance to, coercive controls imposed by the 
state on news programming are evident at both the administration and production levels 
of these commercial stations.
Befu Harumi, "The Group Model of Japanese Society and an Alternative", Rice University 
Studies. Winter 1980, 66(1), pp. 169-87.
Richardson, op. cit.
Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory. 3rd ed. (London: Sage, 1998), p. 162. 
Anchaleepom Kusum, newsreader and assistant to a political editor of iTV, observed that 
negative comments against the Democrat Party were deliberately withdrawn during the 
negotiation to defer the annual payments. During the peak of the economic crisis in 1997-98, in 
particular, negative comments against advertisers were also avoided. She cited an example o f a 
suspension of a report concerned a company which released contaminated water into a river in a 
Northern province. However, iTV was reluctant to pursue this report further since the company 
is owned by a major soft-drink company, one o f the biggest advertisers in Thailand. Interview 
on May 9, 1998.
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Notwithstanding the revocation of the stringent Revolutionary Orders 15 and 17 
in 1992 and the abolition of NBEB, the subsequently elected governments led by Chuan 
I (1994-1995), Banham (1995-1996), and Chavalit (1996-1997) applied the coercive 
approach to directly and indirectly intervene in the administrative and programming 
areas of television stations. As demonstrated in Table 5, the stations administrations 
were often pressured to cancel or suspend programs, or move personnel who did not 
conform to the boundaries set by the stations and challenged official discourse of 
political reality.
Table 5 : Direct and Indirect State Intervention in the Administration and Programming 
of Thai Television Stations 0995-19971
Year Nature of Intervention Reasons for Intervention
1995 - A current affairs program called, 
"Tob Prachachon" on Channel 11 
was cancelled.
- A close aid to the Prime Minister 
made a request to Channel 5 and 
Channel 9.
- A political reporter from Channel 
7 was suddenly reassigned from the 
government house beat to another 
beat.
- Program content upset people in 
high places.
- The request was made for extra 
broadcasting time for government 
announcements.
- The Prime Minister expressed his 
dislike of the reporter's interviewing 
style.
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1996 - "Bun Ma", a song sung by 
Carabao, was banned on both radio 
and television.
- A close investigation of Channel 
7's news tidbit program called 
"Saketkhao" was ordered.
- Carabao was banned to play life- 
on-stage on Channel 5.
- The Minister in charge of 
broadcasting pressured the producer 
of a popular current affairs program, 
Mong Tang Moom, to discontinue 
on Channel 11.
- A current affairs program called,
" Veti Chaoban" (The Locals' Stage) 
on Channel 11 was suspended for a 
week.
- A Channel 7 reporter on the Army 
beat was forced to resign.
- Channel 5 transferred its political 
news editor to the computer section.
- Channel 9 set up an internal 
committee to investigate a political 
reporter.
- "Nation News Talk" program on 
Channel 9 was suspended.
- The lyric of the song ridiculed 
some cabinet ministers.
- The program made fun of the 
characters of certain cabinet 
ministers.
- Lyrics in some songs ridiculed the 
government.
- Some cabinet members considered 
the program highly partial.
- The program planned to broadcast 
an investigation on rural locals who 
have been unjustly dispersed from 
their land.
Top Army leaders disliked the 
reporter's interviewing style and her 
questions about the Army's 
purchase of armored cars.
- The editor authorized a report 
which was seen by the cabinet 
members as challenging the Prime 
Minister's leadership.
- The reporter filed a news report on 
MPs who did not attend several 
parliamentary sessions.
- The program was seen as 'pro- 
Opposition' by certain cabinet 
ministers.
1997 - A "Media-monitoring Center" was 
established to oversee news 
reported on radio, television, and 
newspapers.
- Channel 7 suspended a current 
affairs program called "Khor kid 
duey khon" (Let me think).
- A request to filter all negative 
comments on the government in 
program content was directly made 
to Orasa Khunawat, the MCOT 
director, who oversaw Channel 3 
and Channel 9.
- It was claimed to be a counter­
attack plan by the government 
against misleading reports.
- The producer planned to interview 
an important figure in a prostitution 
ring servicing people in high places.
- Certain cabinet members viewed 
that several current affairs programs, 
particularly on Channel 9, 
propagated negative views on the 
government.
Source: Khana kamakam prasanngam ongkom sitthimanusayachon (Kor.Por.Sor), Sathanakarn 
sitthimanusavachon pi 2539.2540 (Human Rights Situation in 1996-19971 (Bangkok: Kor.Por.Sor, 
1997), pp. 9-15 cited in Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, Rabob witthavu lae thoralhat thai: Krongsang thang 
setthakit kanmuang lae pholkrathob tor sitthi seriphap (Thai Radio and Television Systems: The 
Political and Economic Structure and Its Effects on Rights and Freedoms!. (Bangkok: Chulalongkom 
University Press, 1999), pp. 336-38; The Reporters' Association o f Thailand, Wan nak khao 5 minakhom 
2541 (Reporters' Dav March 5. 19981 (Bangkok: The Reporters' Association of Thailand, 1998), pp. 38- 
44; The Reporters' Association o f Thailand, Wan nak khao 5 minakhom 2540 (Reporters' Dav March 5.
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1997) (Bangkok: The Reporters' Association of Thailand, 1997), pp. 37-41; The Reporters' Association 
of Thailand, Wan nak khao 5 minakhom 2539 (Reporters' Dav March 5. 1996) (Bangkok: The Reporters' 
Association o f Thailand, 1996), pp. 30-40.
According to Ministerial Regulation No. 14 of 1994, the suspension of a 
broadcasting program is only possible (clause 17) should the licensing official find that 
the program intentionally offends the royal family, insults the religion, the nation, the 
government or the officials of any State, or any group of people, or offends public 
morality, or incites crime (clause 16).144 However, these regulations do not allow the 
licensing officials to directly cancel a program based on its political inclination. In an 
indirect attempt to do so, the Minister in charge of broadcasting can seek to put 
pressure on the program by revamping the whole programming schedule of the station, 
discontinuing a contract with the program producer, or forcing the producer to withdraw 
the program from the station. In 1995, for example, Chermsak Pinthong, a producer of 
the high-rating current affairs program Mong Tang Moom, interviewed Banham Silapa- 
archa, then a candidate for Prime Minister about his plan to include two MPs infamous 
for drug dealings on future cabinet lineup -  a question that Banham did not wish to 
address. After Banham won an election and became the Prime Minister, Piyanat 
Watcharapom, one of his cabinet ministers in charge of broadcasting, announced a 
revamp of programs on Channel 11, and hinted that Mong Tang Moom would lose its 
timeslot. However, due to a concern about possible public backlash, the Minister did 
not directly dismiss the program. Instead, he lobbied members of the Creative Media 
Foundation and the Bangchak Petroleum Refinery, which funded the program, to stop 
their sponsorship. General Prem Tinsulanond, an influential political figure, senior 
member of the Creative Media Foundation, and of the Board of the company that 
owned the office building Chermsak was renting, was reportedly lobbied heavily by the 
Banham Government. Chermsak was later forced to vacate his office on the grounds 
that the building would be refurbished. Six radio programs under Chermsak's direction
The Regulations also require that the stations shall arrange to have their broadcast program 
recorded and kept at the stations for at least fifteen days from the date o f the broadcast for 
inspection (clause 18). See Broadcasting Directing Board Division, The Public Relations 
Department, Thailand: Broadcasting Act 1955. 1987 and Regulation on Broadcasting 1992 
(Bangkok: Office of the Prime Minister, 1995), pp. 63-5.
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were subsequently cancelled by the Army, which owned the frequency. Because of 
pressures from all sides, Chermsak finally decided to withdraw his program from 
Channel 11 in February 1996.145 In August 2001, Chermsak had a similar clash with the 
premier and all of his programs on Channel 9 were cancelled. This incident followed his 
interview with Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, which was later used as evidence 
against Thaksin in his assets-declaration concealment trial.146
The level of intervention by the government in programming content has been so
pervasive that distinct organizational codes, practices and rituals have been developed
within Thai broadcasting organizations and the boundary of organizational autonomy
has also been drawn. Adisak Srisom, the former host of a current affairs debate program
on Channel 11, Krong Sathanakan (Distillation of events), said after leaving the channel
in 1999 that there were a lot of "battles for control", in which crossing the line would do
him harm rather than good.147 Adisak's production team has been dismissed after he
tried to resist political interference. Adisak viewed political interference in programming
such as special written 'orders' or 'requests' not as external constraints, but rather as
essential parts of organizational 'culture':
This is also part of the culture at channel 11. Bargaining happens all the 
time. It is normal for politicians to ask for this or that person to appear 
on TV. But we try to screen them. And we try to keep the program's 
integrity. I must say, however, that these requests have become rather ugly 
of late. One top bureaucrat even asked me to do a PR piece for the present 
administration. This is what we call 'interference'.148
While the Japanese Constitution does not contain any clauses related to the rights and 
liberties of media professionals and broadcasters, Article 41 of the 16th Constitution of 
Thailand specifically guarantees the rights and liberties of media workers.149 However, a 
discrepancy between the spirit of the Article 41 and political reality has been so wide 
that indirect interference in the programming and administration of state-owned
145 Interview with Dr.Chermsak Pinthong on August 25, 1998.
146 “War o f Words Continues: It’s punch and counter punch”, The Nation. August 18, 2001 
(on-line edition).
147 "Messy over Meddling", The Nation. July 21, 1999 (on-line edition).
148 Ibid.
149 Article 41 of the 1997 Constitution of Thailand states that, "employees of media organizations 
have rights and liberties in accordance with the Constitution and must not be ideologically 
controled by the owners. This also applies to employees o f stated-owned media organizations".
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television broadcasting stations in particular, is still pervasive. Demands from senior 
bureaucrats and politicians that cannot be accommodated comfortably within the 
established programming format and institutional routine are often made. A recent case 
in point included the suspension of Channel 9's educational program "Phasa Thai Nai 
Chor" (Thai language on screen) in 1999, after it broadcast an episode explaining the 
term apology, and making a remark that "unlike some phu yai (senior people) who make 
a mistake but refuse to apologize". The program became a political target because the 
episode went to air when Prime Minister Chuan was under attack for refusing to 
apologize after his appointment of an ex-military junta member, Field Marshal Thanom 
Kittikhachom, to an honorary military post. The Minister in charge of broadcasting 
reportedly requested a personal pre-censorship of scripts before the program resumed 
its airing on a regular basis.150
Television news and current affairs programs in Japan are equally susceptible to 
political pressure. Article 3-2 of the Japanese Broadcast Law, for example, stipulates 
that programs shall not disturb public morality, shall be politically impartial, shall 
broadcast news without distorting facts, and shall clarify the points of issue from as 
many angles as possible.151 However, penalty provisions imposed on those who violate 
these criteria are almost absent. The main penalty provisions cover the areas associated 
with receiving or demanding bribes (Article 54).152 This vagueness was apparently 
intentional, and it has left the room for the state to intervene at will.
In the case of NHK, the Broadcast law stipulates that the organization must 
submit its budget plan, projected program schedule, and amount of receiver fees to the 
MPT every fiscal year (see Appendix 4). The Ministry's bureaucrats cannot make 
revisions, but can make certain suggestions and comments before sending the plan to the
150 Sirikul Bunnag, "Cartoon caper upsets Supatra", Bangkok Post. September 2,1999 (on-line 
edition); “Supatra denies bid to pull plug on TV series”, The Nation. September 9, 1999 (on­
line edition).
151 Nihon Shimbun Kyökai, Press Laws in Japan (Commentary and Abstracts! (Tokyo: NSK,
1995), p. 44.
152 Ki-Sung Kwak, "Structural and Cultural Aspects of the Regulations of Television Broadcasting 
in East Asia: A Comparative Study", Gazette. 1997, 59(6), pp. 429-443.
Diet for debate and approval. As a result, the content of news and current affairs 
programs broadcast by NHK has been inextricably bound up in the dependent nature of 
the organization itself. There have been cases where governments have used NHK's 
submission for its financial approval as a loophole to directly interfere with 
programming content. In 1979, for example, NHK requested that the Diet raise its 
receiver fees by twenty-four per cent. The ruling party, the LDP, directed its 
communication policy division to investigate the proposal. The LDP later put forward 
four criticisms for NHK to address before the Diet's approval of the proposal. These 
criticisms were: that NHK coverage of nuclear power plants was always negative; that 
NHK's coverage of KDD scandal was biased153; that the coverage of the gubernatorial 
election in Tokyo was biased, as NHK favored a particular candidate; and that NHK 
gave more time to the opposition than the LDP during its parliamentary coverage, and 
the LDP members were often portrayed unfavorably.154 In response to these demands, 
the Chairman of NHK Board members, Sakamoto Choichi, strongly argued that "NHK 
thus has to throw away its mission of public broadcasting, and instead, adhere strictly 
to fairness and non-problematic form of broadcasting".155 The LDP issued an ultimatum 
that for budget approval NHK must promise "to make efforts to avoid political bias 
hereafter", and NHK eventually obliged.156
Direct interference by politicians and bureaucrats in NHK programs was evident
not only at the executive meetings, but also at the production level. An American
producer related of his experience while working for the NHK:
When a political story is edited at NHK, the editing booth is 
always crowded by the ghosts of bureaucrats, ministers and 
ruling and opposition parties who may be offended.157
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The KDD scandal involved illegal imports of goods by custom officials. This scandal was first 
exposed by Nihon Keizai Shimbun.
Kawasaki Yasushi, NHK to seiii fNHK and Politics (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1997), pp. 40- 
42.
Ibid., p. 42.
Ibid.
Spencer Sherman, "NHK TV Japan: East meets West in the newsroom", Columbia Journalism 
Review. March/April 1994; also cited in Duncan McCargo, "The Political Role of the Japanese 
Media". The Pacific Review. 1996, 9(2), p. 260.
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A classical case of direct political interference in programming at NHK involved a news 
program in 1981 on the fifth anniversary of the Lockheed scandal. The program had 
planned to focus on the increase in influence of former Prime Minister Tanaka on the 
LDP despite his earlier conviction in the Lockheed scandal. The producer of this 
popular news program, News Center 9, at that time had prepared several interviews 
with pro-Tanaka factional leaders as well as Tanaka's leading critics, such as former 
Prime Minister Miki Takeo. On the morning of the day when the program was due to 
be aired, a decision was made that a section of Miki's interview was to be deleted. This 
decision was made by the NHK President after he received phone calls from several 
LDP members.158 The most recent case occurred in January 2001, in which a program 
on the Japanese military's sexual enslavement of women during wartime to be broadcast 
on the NHK education channel was heavily censored before airing due to threats of 
budget cuts.159 Due to its susceptibility to this kind of political pressure, self­
censorship has gradually developed as an organizational culture within NHK.
Commercial stations in Japan are also subject to parliament in the same manner 
as NHK, because they must undergo review by the Diet to obtain re-licensing every five 
years. Often, these periods of scrutiny have profound effects on all decision-making in 
programs, which avoid charges of political favoritism from any side of the political 
community. According to one TV journalist, the commercial stations produce their news 
programs based on four principles: yasuku (cheap to make), hayaku (quick to make), 
takaku (achieve high ratings), and most importantly, mondai-naku (no problem 
follows).160 This view has been widely shared, particularly after the incident in which a 
former TV Asahi President was summoned to give evidence before the Diet. After the
158 Kawasaki Yasushi, op. cit., pp. 45-56.
159 In January 2001, NHK's education television channel (ETV) aired a four night series on "Sensö 
o do sabaku ka" (How should we adjudicate wars?). The program, which aired on the second 
night titled "Senji sei böryoku" (Wartime Sexual Violence), was largely altered from it
had originally been planned. Particularly, the section on the Women's International War Crimes 
Tribunal which was held in Tokyo in December 2000, was heavily edited, and expert 
comments were also truncated and used in misleading context. See Takahashi Tetsuya, "Nani 
ga chokuzen ni kesaretaka" (What has been directly cut?), Sekai. May 2001, 688, pp. 209-219.
160 Namino Hajime, "Minpö hödö, Seisaku genba no nayami to kadai" (News Reports on 
Commercial Stations: Troubles and Subjects at the Production Level", in Katsura Keiichi et al. 
(eds.), 21 Seki no masukomi 02: Hösö (The 21st Century's Mass Communication No. 2: 
Broadcasting!. 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Daigetsu Shoten, 1998), pp. 120-59.
fall of the LDP in 1993, the President of TV Asahi, Tsubaki Sadayoshi, gave a speech at 
a private meeting held by the NABJ (National Association of Commercial Broadcasters 
in Japan, or Minpören), claiming that he had encouraged the news reporting team to 
work with a view to help establishing a non-LDP force in a coalition government in the 
1993 election. The speech was leaked to the press, and Tsubaki was pressured to resign 
from the presidential position. Yet he and the replacement TV Asahi President, ltd 
Kunio, were both summoned to give their testimony to the Diet only a week before TV 
Asahi's license expired.161
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In this case, TV Asahi was highly vulnerable to political pressure. The station 
had to comply with the Diet’s demand for an external expert to conduct an investigation 
into the charge of biased election coverage in addition to its own investigation.162 
Although the investigation found no evidence of biased reports in TV Asahi's coverage, 
this case has set a precedent whereby the government's intervention and control of 
commercial broadcasting content as allowed by the Broadcast Law has been questioned, 
debated, and redefined.163 The Chief of the Broadcasting Bureau of the MPT, in 
particular, announced after the Tsubaki incident at a Communication Policy Council 
meeting that "the final decision about whether the program is fair or not, is made by the 
M PT".I64 He based his argument on the grounds that since the MPT has jurisdiction 
over the Broadcast Law and the Radio Regulatory Law, it can also determine what is 
broadcast.165 In 1995, the MPT also added to the Broadcast Law a requirement that 
made broadcasters keep copies of broadcast programs, and extended the period that 
they could be requested to change or correct broadcasting matters.166 In 1996, the TBS
Duncan McCargo, "The Political Role of the Japanese Media", The Pacific Review. 1996, 9(2), 
pp. 251-64; Kristin Kyoko Altman, "Television and Political Turmoil: Japan's Summer of 
1993", in S. J. Pharr and E. S. Krauss (eds.), Media and Politics in Japan (Honolulu: 
University o f Hawaii Press, 1996), pp. 165-86; Yokota Hajime, Terebi to seiji (Television and 
Politics! (Tokyo: Suzusawa Shoten, 1996), pp. 116-60.
Yokota, op. cit., p. 124.
Watanbe Kaoru, "Seiji hödö to hösö-hö no mondai" (Problems between political reporting and 
the Broadcast Law), Jo chi Daigaku Komvunikeshon Gakukai. 1995, (25), pp. 93-106. 
Tsukamoto Miyuki, "Yuseisho to shimin no ronsö: hösö-hö no kaishakn wo megutte"
(The debate between the MPT and the public on the interpretation o f the Broadcast Law),
Hoso Repooto. January 1999, (156), p. 56.
Ibid., p. 58.
Otsuka Hisashi, "The Legal Framework for Media and Channel M ultiplication in Japanese 
Broadcasting". Studies of Broadcasting. Mav 1996, (32), p. 199.
disclosure that it had allowed members of the Aum Shinrikyö group to preview a 
documentary which featured it caused an MPT uproar. This had led to the 
disappearances and deaths of family members of a lawyer who made a case against the 
group and gave an interview on the program.167 The incident forced the TBS President 
to resign and set off another controversy about the MPT reinterpretation of the 
Broadcast Law.168 The following table summarizes the conditions of the Broadcast Law 
as interpreted by the MPT before and after the Tsubaki incident, and after the TBS 
incident.
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Table 6: Summary of Points Related to Programming Content Interpreted by the MPT 
Before and After the Tsubaki’s (T9931 and the TBS’ 09961 Incidents
The government’s ability to interfere 
as allowed by the Broadcast Law 
before both incidents (as interpreted 
by the MPT)
The government's ability to interfere 
as allowed by the Broadcast Law 
after the Tsubaki (1993) and the 
TBS Incidents (1996) (as
interpreted by the MPT)
Content • The government does not 
control or oversee the program 
(1950)
• The government does not have 
the authority to regulate 
programming content (1958).
• Broadcasters should have a high 
sense of social responsibility 
(1985).
• The political fairness of 
broadcasting content is judged 
by the MPT (1993)
• The MPT can give broadcasters
guidance on programming
standards (1997).
Standards • Standards of broadcasting
programs are established by 
broadcasters (1977).
• The MPT can give broadcasters 
guidance on programming
standards (1997).
Sebastian Moffett, "Slipping Standards: Furore over Interview Highlights Problems with TV 
News", Far Eastern Economic Review. April 25, 1996, 159(17), pp. 26-27.
Tajima Yasuhiko, "Naiyö kisei ni mukau hösö gyösei" (The broadcasting admistrators head for 
content control!. Sekai. July 1996, (624), pp. 151-54.
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Judging
Decision
The MPT does not have 
authority to judge whether a 
program has violated the 
Broadcast Law. Such authority 
belongs to the Broadcast Review 
Council and other related 
committees as well as the 
broadcasters themselves (1985). 
The MPT should not criticize 
broadcasting programs (1985).
• The political fairness of the 
program is decided by the 
MPT(1993).
• The MPT has an authority to 
oversee and administer the 
Article 3-2 of the Broadcast Law 
(1997).
The figures in parentheses represent the year in which the Broadcast Law was promulgated (1950), 
revised (1958, 1977, 1985), and reinterpreted (1993, 1997).
Source: Tsukamoto Miyuki, "Yüseishö to shimin to no ronsö: hösö-hö no kaishaku wo megutte" (Debate 
between the MPT and the Public on the interpretation of the Broadcast Law), Hösö Repooto. January 
1999, (156), p. 63.
The increased political interference in broadcasting content by the authorities led 
to a sharp decline in the number of current affairs programs. NHK, for example, 
cancelled ‘Machi no ko e \ which had voiced local concerns on politics and other public 
issues.169 Existing programs, such as NHK's Nichiyö töron, or TV Asahi's Sunday 
Project, which usually invited commentary from one representative of each political 
party, were also pressured to take extreme caution to allocate equal time to each 
politician in the interviews. However, the LDP Party Secretary in 1998, Mori Yoshirö, 
circumvented meeting with the opposition in these kinds of programs. He commented 
provocatively that an LDP politician would not go to these programs alone, since one 
voice from the LDP could not possibly contradict any allegations made by a team of the 
opposition's representatives. LDP politicians would therefore be seen as bad guys in the 
public’s view.170 Such remarks have brought about a substantial change in existing 
current affairs programs. Programs such as NHK's Nichiyö töron, and TV Asahi's 
Sunday Project responded to Mori's comments without strong resistance. They 
gradually decreased the number of the opposition members, and invited more LDP 
politicians.171 Apparently, the MPT does not see these changes as ‘political bias’. The 
establishment of a ‘News Monitoring Center’ by the LDP in 1998 was directly aimed at
Tsukamoto Miyuki, "Obasan sannin yüseishö ni iku: Sent obasan hodo osoroshii mono wa 
nai! ” (Three Aunties go to the MPT: There is nothing in this world as fearful as them!), 
Hösö Repooto. November 1998, (155), p. 63.
Ibid., p. 64.
Ibid., pp. 62-7.
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monitoring ‘biased’ comments of TV newscasters. The LDP organ paper, ‘ Jiyü Shim pö\ 
launched a new column called ‘ Terebi haiken’ (See TV) in the same year to monitor and 
criticize TV news and current affairs programs deemed biased by the LDP standards.172 
Mori's hypersensitivity to criticism led to the LDP establishment ol a ‘Committee to 
Study Broadcast Revitalization’ to ensure impartial political coverage on TV, when his 
party came under a constant attack by TV newscasters and commentators for recurring 
scandals and his ineptitude as a Prime Minister in early 2001.173
"It is difficult for us to be a watchdog", claims Adachi Hisao, a news editor at 
NTV, "since there is always political pressure from one way or another".174 Political 
pressure often permeates as far as the administration of commercial broadcasting 
stations. In the past, a newsreader at TV Asahi was fired immediately after giving a 
hard-hitting commentary on the construction of the Narita Airport that had been 
pursued by the ruling LDP. A TBS newscaster was also sacked because he had critically 
commented on American policies towards Vietnam.175 In 1991, a journalist at the same 
channel, Kawabe Katsuro, conducted a series of investigations on the fast-rising trucking 
company Sagawa kyübin, and its shady financial dealings with politicians and gangsters. 
The broadcast of his investigation led a team of prosecutors to commence its own 
investigation, and to arrest Kanemaru Shin, a powerful LDP power broker, on a charge 
of tax evasion in March 1993.176 However, instead of getting a promotion, Kawabe was 
transferred to the accounts department, and immediately after there was an indication
Maruyama Noboru, "Jimintö [Hödö monitaa seido] no keihaku" (The thoughtlessness o f the 
LDP News Monitoring System), Hosö Repooto. January 1999, (156), pp. 12-15.
"Fossils who lead LDP still try to stifle criticism from within", The Asahi Shimbun (on-line 
edition), February 9, 2001.
Interview with Mr.Adachi Hisao, Editor, News Program, Nippon Television Network 
Corporation on October 29, 1998.
In the late 1960s, TBS was particularly targeted by the Japanese government for its alleged 
"misconduct" on three counts. First, Den Hideo, a newscaster of a popular program, "News 
Cup" called the US's policies in Vietnam "foolish". Second, TBS's documentary on the national 
flag was considered 'negative'. As a result, two producers of this program were transferred.
Third, TBS provided its microbuses to transport demonstrators against the construction of 
Narita Airport. See Shiga Nobuo, Shöwa terebi hoso-shi (ge) (The History of Television 
Broadcasing in the Shöwa Period) (Tokyo: Hayagawa Shobo, 1990), pp. 35-40.
Kanemaru admitted publicly that he had taken $US 4 million from Sagawa kyübin. However, 
he was only fined for less than $US 2,000 and let off by the prosecutors. Due to the increased 
media's criticism on his conduct, he later resigned from the cabinet. Further details see Maggie 
Farley, "Japan's Press and Politics of Scandal", in S. J. Pharr and E. S. Krauss (eds.), Media 
and Politics in Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), pp. 133-64.
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that the LDP would make a strong comeback to lead a coalition in the 1996 election. 
Kawabe quit to become a freelancer.177
Due to this increased state interference and control over broadcasting content, 
the definition of television broadcasting in Japan as an independent medium has become 
untenable. Particularly, the way in which the state intensified its coercive and reward 
strategies with the broadcasters after the Tsubaki incident caused a shift in the political 
role of television broadcasting in Japan from that of a 'watchdog', which it had taken in 
the lead up to the 1993 election, to that of a 'servant of the state’, which practises self­
censorship, often sends positive messages about the powerful LDP, and reinforces the 
political establishment. However, this shift seems ephemeral. The rapid technological 
changes that led to a partial reform of broadcasting regulations in Japan have become 
factors that created an environment of contestation between the MPT and broadcasters, 
thus providing room for the television medium to re-shift the course of its political role.
3.4 Regulatory and Technology Changes
The broadcasting reform process in Thailand reflects a high degree of contestation 
between the state, the media, and the public, who all struggle to gain or retain control 
over television frequencies. This media reform movement was initiated during the 
constitutional reform process in 1994-97. It was aimed at overhauling the duopolistic 
broadcasting structure, by establishing an independent regulatory agency to decentralize 
media ownership and reallocate broadcasting frequencies, allowing NGOs and 
community groups fair access to frequencies, raising standards of broadcasting content 
as well as freedom of media professionals, and guaranteeing communication and 
information rights of the public.178 The movement culminated with the placement of
Aparisim Ghosh et al., "Paper Chasers", Far Eastern Economic Review. March 20, 1997, pp. 
24-5.
Pisith Chawalathawach, "Raththammanun mattra 40 huachai samkhan khwam yutitham nai 
kan bangsanpansuan kankhrumkhrong sitthi issara khong khaosan" (The integral part of Article 
40 of the Constitution: Justita Distrbuta, Protection of Rights and Freedom of Information),
Lok khong seu lamdub thi 3 (Media World Vol. 31 (Bangkok: Chulalongkom University Press, 
1999), pp. 203-19.
Articles 39, 40, and 41 into the sixteenth Constitution, as promulgated in 1997. Article
40 deals, in particular, with broadcasting reform. It reads:
The frequencies for radio and television transmission, 
and radio communications are national resources to be used 
for public interests.
An independent state regulatory agency must be set up to supervise 
the allocation, license and regulate frequencies of radio and television 
broadcasting and for telecommunications as stipulated in clause one 
of this article.
The objectives of clause two must take into consideration the highest 
public interests at the national and local levels, in the area of education, 
culture, security and public safety and other public benefits, including 
free and fair competition.
According to the Article, radio and television frequencies are recognized as ‘national 
resources’, and to be used for ‘public interests’. This signifies a new notion that 
broadcasting frequencies are resources that must be used for the public and not state 
interests. However, Ubonrat has commented that the recognition of frequencies as 
‘national resources’ instead of ‘public resources’ still reflects the conservative mindsets 
of Thai politicians and the military, most of whom blatantly do not want to see their 
commandeered frequencies turned into ‘public resources’, which intrinsically belong to 
the ‘public’ as the name suggests.179
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Opposition from military officers, whose preoccupations were to retain their 
controls of 203 radio stations, two national television stations and 2,947 frequencies for 
telecommunication services, has been explicit and framed within the pretext of national 
security.180 They argued that the more frequencies are in private hands, the more risks 
and susceptibility the nation faces of foreign ownership domination.181 Needless to say, 
these comments were made out of their preoccupations with the revenue and kickbacks 
that they usually receive from licensing and operating these frequencies. It is reported
Ubonrat Siriyuwasak, "The Media, Cultural Politics and the Nation-State", Paper presented at 
the 7th International Conference on Thai Studies, Amsterdam, 4-8 July 1999.
In Thailand there are 514 radio stations. The military owns 203 stations. The PRD owns 145 
stations. The MCOT has 62 stations. The National Police Force has 44 stations. The Ministry 
of Transport and Communications owns 18 stations. The Parliament has 16 stations. The 
University Council owns 12 stations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 12 stations.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives own 4 stations. The Ministry of Education has 3 
stations. The Royal Palace owns 3 stations, while BBC Thailand and Voice of America have 
one station each. "Mor khao kongtap mahuema witthayu 203 sathanee thorathat 2 chong"
(The Army's Gigantic Rice Bowl: 203 radio stations and two television stations", Matichon 
Sudsapda , May 11, 1999, p. 12.
"TV and Radio and National Security", The Bangkok Post May 6, 1999 (on-line edition).
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that the military receive an estimated annual income of A$ 5 million from licensing radio 
stations, in addition to advertising revenue from Channel 5 which has been projected at 
around AS 10 million in the year 2000.182 The total revenue is sent directly to the 
Army's revenue office without being passed to the Ministry of Finance, insomuch as 
the Revolutionary Order No. 101 issued in 1972 permitted the Army to keep the 
revenue from administering and operating the frequencies within its barracks, and 
exempted this revenue from public auditing.183
There is no doubt that some of the revenue from license fees, and commercial 
revenue, is diverted from developing and maintaining the Army's affairs. Part of it is 
usually exploited, or spent to the personal advantage and pleasure of the Army's 
officers. A trip to play golf in China or a shopping trip in Australia, for instance, have 
reportedly become regular weekend activities for Army Generals.184 The loss to the 
public of these sources of revenue in the foreseeable future has inevitably forced the 
Army to secure its major source of revenue. Such measures included the Army's 
restructuring of Channel 5 as a holding company with small subsidiaries. This process 
allowed private companies to buy shares and have stakes in the station.185 Behind this 
restructuring of Channel 5 laid shady deals made between senior officers and private 
investors, in which past and present military leaders obtained substantial shares in the
"Army lays claim to 50 channels", Bangkok Post. May 6, 1999 (on-line edition); "Media firms 
anticipate its increase in earnings", Bangkok Post. June 1, 1999 (on-line edition).
According to the new arrangement made in 1999 between the Army and the Attorney-General’s 
Office, the Army's funds in some areas, though not all, will be randomly selected for auditing 
starting in 1999 fiscal year. See "Sorayuth Chulanont sayob krasae kongtapkrue..." (Sorayuth 
Chulanont pacifies the Army's discontentment), Matichon Sudsapda , May 11, 1999, p. 12; and 
Thana Poopat, "Army-run media to be scrutinized", The Nation. February 26, 1999 (on-line 
edition).
"Naipol tor.bor thalungngob bamruesuk tangdan" (Generals smash the budget, indulging 
themselves overseas), Krungthep Thurakit. May 25, 1999 (on-line edition); A colonel of the 
Thai Army was reportedly arrested for stealing at the Sydney's International Airport in May 
1999. This officer claimed that his trip was only an "educational excursion". See Peter Alford, 
"Thai Army radio hits static", The Australian. May 26, 1999 (on-line edition); and Wassana 
Nanuam, "Military Frequencies: Cash from media goes on fun trips", Bangkok Post. May 25,
1999 (on-line edition).
Channel 5 Co., Ltd. was established on March 14, 1997 with Bt250 million in registered 
capital and 25 million shares. The Army allowed the officer in the position of the Company 
Director and his three deputies to hold 10 million shares. The company has four subsidiaries: 
Channel 5 Marketing Co., Ltd; Channel 5 Production and Management Co.Ltd.; Channel 5 
Radio Co., Ltd.; and Channel 5 Publishing Co., Ltd. See Bamrung Amnartcharoenrit, "Army 
Channel 5 goes Commercial", The Nation. March 27, 1997 (on-line edition); and Prakobpong 
Panapool, "Channel 5 boss sets out defence", The Nation. November 3, 1999 (on-line edition).
new company.186 Indeed, this process could be classified as a premeditated undertaking 
by the Army's officers to maximize their personal gain before the new law to reallocate 
and re-regulate the frequencies is enacted.
The intent of the Constitution to reallocate broadcasting frequencies owned by 
the military and state agencies has opened a pandora’s box of consolidation between the 
broadcasting, military, and political elite, whose economic interests are intertwined. In 
1998, an anomaly was found in a contract renewal made between the Army and 
Bangkok Broadcasting Co., Ltd., the operator of Channel 7, despite the nine years 
remaining before the license expiration. Channel 7's contract was, however, hastily 
worked out by the Army, and signed by an Army Chief only few months before his 
retirement and before the passage of the new Frequency Bill. The Army simply claimed 
that the company needed at least a twenty-year contract so that it could be qualified to 
list on the stock market. Yet, such a crucial condition was apparently excluded from the 
contract. Moreover, the contract was approved by the Army without being scrutinized 
by the office of Attorney-General, as required by the law.187 Instead, the contract was 
discreetly renewed for 25 years, and the agreed concession fee was extremely low.188 
After the deal was disclosed, the cabinet was pressured by the public to investigate the 
deal. Due to the Army's determination to cover up the deal, the government proceeded 
with circumspection to avoid causing serious conflict. So far, what the government has 
been able to do is only to pass a resolution to prohibit other state agencies from 
renewing contracts for radio or television frequencies for more than two years, pending 
the establishment of the new regulatory body.189
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"Chuan sungsob naipol thue hun tor. tor.bor.5" (Chuan orders an investigation into 
Channel 5's shareholders), Krungthep Thurakit. March 9, 1999 (on-line edition).
"Channel 7 deal points up long-term privilege", The Nation. November 2, 1998 (on-line 
edition); "Chettha vows to take on us in TV row", The Nation. November 20, 1998 (on-line 
edition).
Bangkok Broadcasting Co., Ltd. agreed to pay only Bt. 4.6 billion over 25 years, which was 
five times lower that the amount agreed to be paid by iTV for the same period. These low fees 
were also in stark and puzzling contrast to the operator's healthy profit o f Bt. 6.8 billion during 
1994-1998. See "Chuan asks Sorayuth to review Channel 7 deal", The Nation. October 23, 
1998 (on-line edition).
Prakorbpong Panapool, "Cabinet moves to limit media contract terms", The Nation.
November 25, 1998 (on-line edition).
The foregoing discussion of the Army's deliberate undertakings merely 
foreshadows subsequent movements by conservative politicians and the state agencies 
that did not want to see any reduction in their controls over radio and television 
stations. For instance, Vijit Vutthi-umpol, Director-General of the PRD, was concerned 
that the reallocation of the frequencies will strongly affect the success of his 
organization:
It would be difficult for us to successfully promote the national development 
without media in hands. Since the annual budget we receive from the government 
is very limited, it would be much tougher for us to use this budget to buy media 
time. We may not succeed in any projects afterwards.190
A senior staff member of the PRD also pointed out that due to the nature of the
broadcasting business, which generally yields multi-million dollars income, the state
would not allow the new independent regulator to be established smoothly and exactly
as constitutionally intended.191 Indeed, the flaw in Article 40 has become a loophole
through which state agencies have tried to maintain their control over broadcasting. As
the Article was initially intended to re-regulate the broadcasting industry, the
telecommunication clause that was added later posed a crucial problem — there is no
clear demarcation between the scope of telecommunication and broadcasting businesses.
In April 1999, the Cabinet approved a draft of the Frequencies Allocation and
Broadcasting and Telecommunication Supervision Organization bill high-handedly
written by the Council of State, which suggested the establishment of one regulatory
body to oversee both broadcasting and telecommunication businesses, whilst discarding
the other draft jointly written by media academics, journalists, lawyers, members of
NGOs, and representatives of the public, which advocated the establishment of two
separate regulatory bodies. The state's version of this bill clearly did not support
broadcasting reform, as it failed to address a number of important aspects: firstly, it
failed to establish a separate independent regulatory body for each business that is
highly different in terms of technicality and content; secondly, it opened a loophole
which would allow telecommunication giants to yield influence over broadcasting
industry; and lastly, it maintained a degree of government influence on both industries
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Interview with Mr. Vijit Vutthi-umpol on September 3, 1998, the PRD, Bangkok. 
Interview with Ms. Kanha Tephasadin Na Ayuddhaya, Senior Officer of the National 
Broadcasting Commission, on May 15, 1998, the PRD, Bangkok.
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by requiring that the majority of the selection committee for the regulatory body to be 
state officials.192
Media academics, NGO representatives, particularly the Working Group 
Monitoring Article 40, and members of the public ran numerous campaigns to contest 
the Cabinet's mling, and suggested that national public hearings should be embarked 
upon to include public participation and dialogue in the process. Due to increased media 
and public pressure, the House Committee vetting the bill finally resolved in favor of 
establishing two commissions - the National Telecommunication Commission (NTC) 
overseeing telecommunication frequencies, and the National Broadcasting Commission 
(NBC) supervising broadcasting frequencies.193 The media and the public, however, 
soon faced another battle: the state swiftly proceeded with its own nomination of state 
officials and candidates who were closely connected with large media corporations to 
become the Selection Committee for the NBC.194 The state also submitted its version of 
the new Broadcast Act, which contains provisions deemed detrimental to freedom and 
autonomy of the Commission, as well as professional broadcasters. These provisions 
are, for example, that technicians, anchors, announcers, and show hosts are required to 
obtain licenses from an officer assigned by the Commission (Article 84); that 
consultation with the Cabinet must be sought when the Commission allocates 
frequencies to state agencies (Article 19); and that cooperation in broadcasting programs 
or newscasts deemed important to the public is required from license holders (Article 
70).195
"Rivals stay adamant on frequency bill", The Nation. April 8, 1999 (on-line edition); Mongkol 
Bangprapa, "Academics: Two separate agencies are necessary", Bangkok Post. April 9, 1999 
(on-line edition); Supara Janchitfah, "Control over the airwaves", Bangkok Post. May 16, 1999 
(on-line edition).
"House frequency panel votes for two agencies", The Nation. June 24, 1999 (on-line edition). 
Seven members of the new National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) will be screened and 
selected by five representatives from the state agencies including the Prime Ministerial Office, the 
Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Science, Technology, and 
Environment, and the National Security Council, four academics, four broadcasting 
professionals, and four members of the non-profit organizations. See "Khoo fong rath rub 
kammakan sanha phidkodmai" (Threaten to sue the State's move to find the Committees as 
illegal", Krungthep Thurakit. February 18, 2000 (on-line edition).
"Thai Talk: New Broadcast Bill: It's bad news all the way", The Nation. March 16, 2000 (on­
line edition).
Some media academics in Thailand are concerned that this broadcasting reform is 
fundamentally flawed due to the domination of interest groups in the process, the 
bureaucratic resistance, and the dubious character of the reform, which has been more 
about furthering an ends for the politicians and interest groups than being a means to 
meet public interests. 196 These concerns have in part been confirmed by the fact that it 
is highly likely that Frequency Bill will not affect the existing contracts, and a provision 
prohibiting media cross-ownership will not be included in the new Broadcast Act. 
Moreover, there has reportedly been a domination of the military and their crony 
associates in the appointment of the selection panel of the NBC .197 Seemingly, the 
intent of broadcasting reform in Thailand has been caught between the dialogue, 
fragmentation, and perhaps a compromise between the politicians, bureaucrats and 
broadcasting elite.
Indeed, the process of drafting broadcasting regulations in Thailand is similar to 
those made elsewhere, in its likelihood to culminate in a compromised form of legislation 
resulting from the negotiation, creation, and then discharge of obligations and direct 
manipulation. 198 As such, less positive results than expected may result from the final 
process. Yet, the most interesting aspects of this reform lay not in the probably doomed 
attempts to free broadcasting from the state's controls, but rather in the forces that 
brought together the public and the media to confront and contest with the state. The 
press and broadcasting media played a crucial role in setting an agenda for this media 
reform by providing stages for both representatives of the media and the public to voice 
their demands and negotiate, and making outright objections to the state's abuses of 
power and its maneuvers in the legislative process. Discussion programs such as Krong 
Sathankarn (Distillation of events) closely monitored the legislative process of Article
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Ubonrat, op. cit.
"Anand elected to the NBC, but conservatives still dominate", The Nation. August 26, 2000 
(on-line edition).
Article 335(2) o f the Constitution demands that all organic laws of the Article 40, including the 
new Broadcasting Act, the Telecommunication Act, and the Radio Regulatory Act must be 
enacted within three years after the Constitution was promulgated, thereby before October 2000. 
By August 2001, this has not been realized, and even the process o f appointing the Selection 
Committee for the NBC has not been finalized.
40. A week before its cancellation, a critic of the government's sponsored bill was 
reportedly invited onto the program against a ministerial order.199
This broadcasting reform process has paved way for a contestation of political 
information control between the state and the television media, in which the boundaries 
of state control are defined and redefined. In such a process, by which each side 
redefines and renegotiates its types of power relations (coercive, reward, expert, and 
legitimate), the political role of television media also changes. However, it is quite 
unlikely at this point that lower ownership concentrations of television stations in the 
hands of the state and a few of the broadcasting elite will be immediately brought about 
by the reform alone. The progress of the implementation of Article 40 has so far 
suggested that the reward strategies, which have long bound the state and the 
broadcasting elite, still retain their importance, yet perhaps to a lesser degree. 
Nonetheless, the guaranteed access of the public to television media, as intended by the 
Article 40, is expected to provide a platform for a more autonomous watchdog role of 
television in Thailand.
The broadcasting deregulation in Japan, which began in the 1990s, was by no 
means a result of internal political reforms. Several attempts to pass amendment bills to 
the broadcasting law were blocked by the ruling party, which preferred to maintain the 
existing regulatory structure. Rather, deregulation was largely brought about by 
technological change, which pressured the state to liberalize the cable television and 
satellite broadcasting markets. This opened up the restricted television broadcasting 
industry to foreign partnerships as well as to small operators who were previously kept 
out of the industry.200 As mentioned earlier, the existing licensing process in Japan 
based on the principle of the MPT-orchestrated unification adjustment (ipponka chosei) 
— to guarantee the satisfaction of all participants, protect major terrestrial broadcasters, 
and preserve bureaucratic and political interests — has impeded the development of
"Messy over meddling", The Nation. July 21, 1999 (on-line edition).
Gregory W. Noble, "Let a Hundred Channels Contend: Technological Change, Political 
Opening, and Bureaucratic Priorities in Japanese Television", Journal of Japanese Studies. May 
2000, 26(1), pp. 79-109.
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broadcasting technology. The first commercial satellite broadcaster was introduced as 
late as 1991, due to a delay caused by the ipponka process. Due to the M PT 
preoccupation with preventing excessive competition in a fully liberalized market, it had 
to arrange for all 264 private applicants from various kinds of businesses, ranging from 
commercial TV operators, newspapers to insurance companies, to merge into a single 
broadcaster called the Japan Satellite Broadcaster or JSB, which is also known as 
Wow ow.201
In the late 1980s, the MPT fell under attack for its status-quo oriented policies 
and slowness to keep up with the growth and diversification of broadcasting 
technologies, particularly in comparison with the M ITI.202 The MITI oversaw the 
rapidly-advancing business of computer technology, and had overlapping interests in 
telecommunication with the MPT. In trying to retain its supervision of the 
telecommunication business, the MPT submitted to MITI’s demands for radical reform 
in 1984, when the Electric Communications Business Law and the Nippon Telegraph 
and Telephone (NTT) Corporation Law were passed. As a result, the principle of 
competition was introduced into the telecommunication business, and NTT was 
subsequently privatized. Based on this success, the MPT reorganized its internal 
structure by re-orienting it towards long-term policy formulation, something that had 
previously been lacking. Realizing the weaknesses of its technological position, the 
MPT concentrated on plans to carry out the liberalization of cable television and 
communication satellite broadcasting, as well as digitalization.203
In combination with public pressure for a radical move from the government to 
deal with the bubble economy in the early 1990s, domestic economic and political 
factors in Japan compelled the MPT to deregulate cable television and broadcasting via
201 Kawasaki Hisao, "New Development in Japanese Broadcasting and Borderless Television 
Signal" in Hyeon-Dew Kang (ed.), Changing National Order in Northeast Asia and 
Communication Policies (Seoul: Nanam, 1992), p. 140.
202 For discussion on the rivalry between the MITI and the MPT in the 1970s-1980s see Jonathan 
Weinberg, "Broadcasting and Administrative Process in Japan and the United States",
Buffalo Law Review. Fall 1991, 39(3), pp. 615-735.
Kaifu Kazuo, "Japan's Broadcasting Digitalization Enters the Second Stage, Its Present Stage 
and Prospect", NHK Broadcasting Culture & Research. New Year 2000, (11), pp. 5-11.
communication satellite (CS) markets.204 In 1992, the MPT revised the Broadcast Law 
and the Radio Law. It also established the consignment system (jutaku-itaku), which 
separated facility supplying broadcasters (jutaku hösö jigyösha) and program supplying 
broadcasters (itaku hösö jigyösha). The latter do not need to have broadcasting licenses 
but cannot broadcast any programs to general household audiences. This new system 
broke the conventional rule that licensed broadcasters must also produce programs, as 
well as reducing barriers for new entrants in the CS business.205 In 1993, the MPT also 
allowed an easing of regulations on media ownership concentration for ten years to 
allow terrestrial broadcasters to enter the CS business.206 The MPT also revised the 
restrictions on controlling multiple broadcasting stations. This enhanced the 
introduction of digital signal compression technology which, by using only one set of 
relaying equipment, allows for four to six times the amount broadcast by analog 
systems. In 1996, the MPT applied this revision to digital broadcasting via 
communication satellites, thus allowing each provider to broadcast multiple channels.207
The MPT demonstrated greater acceptance of liberalization by repealing 
legislation that limited cable TV companies to only one operator per town, village, or 
ward of a large city, and barred investments from foreigners and firms outside the 
district.208 In 1993, the Hosokawa Cabinet also announced regulatory changes for cable 
television by allowing outside firms to invest, and by permitting foreigners to hold up to 
thirty-three per cent of the shares in Japanese cable firms. The MPT further allowed 
cable companies to operate multiple systems nationwide.209 This lift in foreign 
ownership allowances produced a surge in a number of US firms joining with local 
companies to invest in cable TV. In 1996, there were 937 cable TV operators in Japan
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Weinberg, op. cit.; and Noble, op. cit.
Kaifu Kazuo, op. cit.; and also Otsuka Hisashi, "The Legal Framework for Media and Channel 
Multiplication in Japanese Broadcasting", Studies of Broadcasting. May 1996, (32), p. 196. 
Kaifu Kazuo, op. cit. ; and Otsuka Hisashi, op. cit.
Kaifu Kazuo, "Internationalization, Market Deregulation, and Digitalization: Restructuring 
Japan's Broadcasting Industry", NHK Broadcasting Culture & Research. Autumn 1997, N o .l, 
pp. 5-12.
At a municipal level, the local unit o f administration are the city (shi), the town (chö or machi) 
or the village (son or mura), which are designated according to population and a degree of 
urbanization. In Tokyo, the ward (ku) has a special administrative status.
Gregory W. Noble, op. cit.
supplying original programs, and the number of subscribers had reached around 12.62 
million.210
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Another legal revision that the MPT undertook was the deletion of the clause in 
the revised Commercial Law of 1966 that made it the duty of each commercial 
broadcaster to seek an endorsement from the board of directors prior to transferring 
company stocks, and to include this provision in its company articles. For nearly thirty 
years, the Japanese commercial broadcasters had refrained from listing their company 
stocks, thus preventing takeovers and foreign partnerships. In assisting commercial 
broadcasters to reach the MPT deadline of changing all television, cable TV, and satellite 
broadcasting systems into the digital systems by the year 2010, the MPT removed its 
restrictions on stock listing in 1994.211 As a result, commercial broadcasters were able to 
procure funds necessary for them to participate in the MPT satellite broadcasting and 
digital television projects. However, the MPT still guards the terrestrial broadcasting 
industry against foreign partnerships. In contrast to the cable TV and satellite operating 
Finns whose levels of foreign capital have been lifted to one-third of total capital, the 
ratio of foreign capital of terrestrial broadcasting companies still stands at twenty per 
cent.212 The MPT has been unwilling to change Article 5-4 of the Broadcast Law, which 
has long protected the major five commercial networks from foreign penetration. This 
Article states that no license shall be granted to stations with foreign capital "taking hold 
of more than one-fifth of the voting rights".
However, Article 5-4 did not prevent global media moguls such as Rupert 
Murdoch, the President of News Corp., from channeling his interests into the traditional 
broadcasting market in Japan. In 1996, News Corp. joined forces with the largest
210 Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, White Paper: Communications in Japan 1998 
(Tokyo: MPT, 1998), p. 71.
211 Kaifu Kazuo, "Internationalization, Market Deregulation, and Digitalization: Restructuring 
Japan's Broadcasting Industry", NHK Broadcasting Culture & Research. Autumn 1997, (1), pp. 
5-12.
212 As of 1999, the level of foreign investment at TBS was 19.9 per cent, approximately 15 per 
cent for NTV, and 8.34 per cent for Fuji TV. See Asian Mass Communication Bulletin, 
January-February 1998, 28(1), p. 9; and Asian Mass Communication Bulletin. November- 
December 1998, 28(6), p. 9.
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software retailer in Japan, Softbank, to launch a CS operator called J Sky B. In finding 
program suppliers, News Corp. and Softbank jointly purchased 21.4 per cent of TV 
AsahVs shares that were held by Obunsha Publications, without the knowledge of TV 
Asahi's management.213 The existing group of shareholders, with Asahi Shimbun at the 
center, strongly opposed the foreign newcomer. It did so at first by bringing together the 
disparate shareholdings -- which were held in individual names and by other means -  
under the control of Asahi Shimbun, thereby reinforcing its position as the largest 
shareholder.214 Then, it appealed to MPT regulations barring foreigners from serving on 
the boards of broadcasting companies.215 Finally, it demanded that both News Corp. 
and Softbank sign an agreement to refrain from buying more shares and participating in 
the management of TV Asahi.216
Confronted with strong opposition, News Corp. and Softbank finally sold their 
shares back to Asahi Shimbun the same price at which they had originally been 
purchased.217 Soon after, News Corp. and Softbank announced that they had found a 
new partner, Fuji TV, to supply programs. They had also taken over another carrier, 
PerfecTV, and had been operating under the new name, Sky PerfecTV, which was 
gaining more subscribers than the other existing carrier, DirecTV.218 Competition 
between these operators, aimed at securing content produced by terrestrial broadcasters, 
has intensified. A new alliance was also formed between TBS and Sumitomo Corp., one 
of the biggest corporations in Japan, to launch a new business involving transmitting 
programs via satellite to cable TV stations in various Asian countries.219 Due to the 
increased market pressures, it may also be inevitable for Japan to adopt an open-sky
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Gregory W. Noble, op. cit., p. 95.
Dentsu Inc., Japan 1998 Marketing & Advertising Yearbook (Tokyo: Dentsu, 1998), p. 155. 
Gregory W. Noble, op. cit.
Dentsu Inc., op. cit.
"Tere Asa kabu Asahi shimbun ni zenkabu baikyaku" (Selling of all TV Asahi's stocks to Asahi 
Newspaper! Gekkan Shimbun Daiiesuto. May 1997, (368), p. 73.
At the end of January 2000, DirecTV  had 400,000 subscribers, whilst Sky PerfecTV had 1.66 
million. Sky PerfecTV also announced that it would buy DirecTV's, shares from its US 
shareholder, Hughes Electronics Corps. This takeover would inevitably allow Sky PerfecTV to 
monopolize the broadcasting via communication satellite in Japan. See "Japan's Sky 
PerfecTV to Absorb Rival Satellite Broadcaster", AFP. February 28, 2000 (online edition). 
Dentsu Inc., op. cit.
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policy that will permit the commercial reception of programs from any ol the satellites 
in the region in the near future.
Japanese policy on broadcasting technology has been driven largely by economic 
and industrial considerations. Most policy interests were finely in tune with corporate 
strategies of large broadcasting companies, and not political and social utility as they 
have been in the Thai case. Digitalization has also brought more scrutiny on to the 
existing Broadcast Law. The MPT moved towards drafting a new law, yet several 
recommendations made thus far have indicated the continuing dominance of economic 
and industrial factors in the policy judgments. These are, firstly, that there should be no 
limitations of foreign investment in the CS and cable TV businesses. Secondly, the 
regional stations would suffer financial crises in expanding equipment investment in the 
transitional process. The bar on foreign investment in terrestrial broadcasting should be 
lifted to help increase funding in this area. Finally, the existing prefecture-based licensing 
system and prohibition on media cross-ownership may have to be revised for the same 
reason.220 Indeed, the MPT move towards multi-channel broadcasting systems not only 
created a space that has allowed foreigners, who had virtually been kept out of the 
broadcasting market, to penetrate but also shifted the fundamental basis of the industry 
from the compromising and accommodating positions traditionally favored by the M PT 
to more competitive responses to market pressures.
Although the adoption of new broadcasting technologies cannot be avoided, the 
MPT is not completely powerless in resisting influences considered undesirable. The 
MPT realized that multi-channel broadcasting would make interference and content­
monitoring increasingly difficult. Therefore, in 1996 it decided to establish an ‘Advisory 
Board on the Convergence of Communications and Broadcasting toward the 21st 
Century’. The committees of this Board included representatives from the NHK, the
220 In May 2000, the Posts and Telecommunications Ministry established a study group to
consider revision of the Broadcast Law of 1950. The study group is assigned to establish a new 
definition o f broadcasting, which may include internet and cell phones, to review NHK's 
activities, and to design new regulations for commercial broadcasting. See "Broadcasting at odds 
over updating o f a law", Daily Yomiuri. June 22, 2000 (on-line edition).
commercial networks, academics, lawmakers, and were chaired by MPT representatives 
with an aim to draw up several countermeasures to monitor the increased volume of 
information, prevent a decline in program quality, and focus on politically-biased 
content made possible by multi-channel broadcasting.221 The Board also drafted 
programming guidelines for satellite operators to follow. Due to the bureaucratic 
domination and lack of public participation in this process, these countermeasures have 
been criticized as merely confidential agreements that the MPT has made in an attempt 
to establish better conditions for itself within the confines of a reward relationship with 
the broadcasters.222
The MPT has, however, been facing a critical dilemma. On the one hand, it must 
continue fostering and bringing about new broadcasting technologies due to rapid 
technological changes and bureaucratic pressures. On the other hand, with the advent of 
multi-channel broadcasting, which brings greater competition between different channels 
catering for the same audiences, the MPT cannot sustain its control of the industry. 
News, information, political debate, and current affairs programs will become more 
available and more competitive. This is exemplified by the broadcast of a 24-hour news 
service on Murdoch's CS service, and the live broadcast of daily parliamentary debates, 
known as kokkai terebi. As the basis of imposing control on broadcasting has been 
entirely rooted in the issue of spectrum scarcity, multi-channel broadcasting will make it 
impossible for the MPT to tighten regulations on the flow and content of information 
broadcast. Moreover, any strict regulations on broadcasting content will fend off new 
investors, thus undermining the growth in these new sectors. This technological change 
is thus expected to cause a shift in a political role of television broadcasting more 
towards a watchdog role.
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Tajima Yasuhiko, "Naiyö kisei ni mukau hösö gyosei" (The broadcasting administrations head 
for content control!. Sekai. July 1996, pp. 150-54.
Ibid. -, See also Hattori Takaaki, "Mokuzen no föchaneru jida i] to hösö gyosei, hösö gyökai" 
(The imminence of multi-channel age, the broadcasting administration, and the broadcasting 
industry), Sekai. May 1999, pp. 117-21.
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Yet, this dilemma has inexorably strengthened the MPT's position in 
contestation with the new broadcasters, particularly the extra-terrestrial broadcasters, 
over the control of political information. Nevertheless, this political information contest 
induced by technological change in Japan is different from the political information 
contest caused by the media reform process in Thailand, because that particular contest 
was fought by various groups of the public. In Japan, on the contrary, most agreements 
and negotiations regarding the deadline and characteristics of the new digital receivers 
and broadcasting programs were exclusively made between the MPT, the TV 
manufacturers, and the terrestrial and extra-terrestrial broadcasters. The public voice in 
the liberalization process of multi-channel broadcasting in Japan clearly has been absent.
3.5 Comparative Remarks
Both the Thai and the Japanese states have regulated television broadcasting frequencies 
on the premise that television broadcasting frequencies are scarce resources, and that 
television is the most influential medium to mould public opinion. In Thailand, the state 
applied coercive and reward instruments that forged control over television broadcasting 
in terms of administration and broadcasting content, fostered the domination of a few 
broadcasting elite, and restricted entry into the industry. In Japan, the weakness of TV 
broadcasting regulations provided the state with reasons to channel its covert control 
over the national public broadcaster, NHK. The discussion on the licensing systems in 
both countries, however, demonstrated that both the Thai and Japanese states preferred 
to apply reward strategies to the broadcasting elite, rather than coercive strategies. 
Clearly, most arguments over the control of broadcasting have been resolved by informal 
process rather than by legal means. This is perhaps due to two reasons: there has been a 
small group of broadcasting elite in both countries, whose economic positions enabled 
them to have resources to negotiate with the state, and the distinctive cultural factors of 
both countries. Patron-client relationships in Thailand and reciprocal consent in 
Japanese political culture each accommodate the state's applications of reward strategies 
with the most responsive environment.
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These distinctive cultural characteristics have forged and perpetuated the 
collusive relationship between the broadcasting and political elite. In Thailand, personal 
relationships based on the principle of the patron-client system yielded both political 
and economic advantages for the political elite or phu yai. The political elites who 
received political or financial benefits from phu noi, or the clients, were expected to 
reward them with broadcasting licenses. However, the underlying feature of patron- 
client relationships between these instituted elite in present-day Thailand has changed 
from the traditional moral concept to a modem form that emphasizes coinciding 
economic interests. The relationship has thus become more materialistic and has weaker 
loyalty bonds.
In Japan, the relationship between the broadcasting elite and the political elite is 
more systematic and institutional. The mutual accommodation between these elite 
groups occurred reciprocally and was made through both fonnal and informal channels. 
Former NHK Presidents were formally obliged to heed the Diet and the MPT requests 
for administrative changes and content intervention for the sake of approving increased 
receivers' fees. NHK, as well as the five commercial networks, also informally 
accommodated the demands of the MPT by sponsoring their staff to train at the M PT, 
and allowing their senior staff to be appointed as media members of various advisory 
councils. However, these accommodations have encouraged practices of self-censorship 
and assisted the MPT to control programming content at both NHK and the commercial 
stations. The summoning of the President of TV Asahi to testify in the Diet to secure a 
license reissue marked a major setback for television media, insomuch as Japanese 
commercial television left the watchdog position it had assumed prior to the election in 
1993.
In Thailand, despite the removal of regulations and special decrees strictly 
controlling broadcasting content in 1992, state control and interference in TV 
broadcasting content still largely existed due to political pressure and internal 
censorship. The attempt to remove the state authority to intervene was clearly evident
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in Article 40 of the Constitution, which aimed at overhauling the entire broadcasting 
system by removing state ownership rights of major broadcasting media. This reform 
has constituted a political information contest between the state, the public, and the 
media. The Thai state, which has always understood the prime role of television in the 
promotion of national identity and protection of the status quo, tried to defend its 
media ownership. The media and the public, on the other hand, fought for a more 
transparent and more accessible broadcasting system. The liberalization process induced 
by technological changes that has been taking place in Japan has likewise put the 
Japanese state in a defensive position of contesting to maintain its level of control. Like 
the Thai state, the Japanese state is losing its domination of, and control over, political 
discourse on television. Reward strategies that have been highly useful for the MPT to 
consolidate agreements among traditional broadcasters are less likely to be viable in the 
age of rapidly changing media technologies, the basis of which relies more on 
competitive arrangements than co-option or compromise.
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CHAPTER FOUR
POLITICAL INFORMATION CONTESTS AND JOURNALISTIC
PROFESSIONALISM
Journalists need to recognize the borderline between their duty 
o f social responsibility, their freedom, and their links with the 
powerful state and other influential groups. It can't be denied 
that journalists and these powerful groups are connected in 
some ways. But it is an ideal fo r all journalists to be able to 
strike a balance between these vested interests and their own 
responsibility.
Sommai Parichatre1
In Japan, there is a saying - "koketsu ni hairazunba 
koji wo ezu"(nothing ventured, nothing gained) .2 This 
means that journalists have to get close to politicians, who 
are a major source o f information. Journalists are thought 
to approach sources for information individually. However, 
in Japan, a group o f journalists usually approaches a source 
together, and obtains the same information. Yet, the more 
information they retrieve, the less likely they will report 
all about it.
Kawamura Shigemitsu3
In political information contests, the media struggle against sources of political 
information, such as politicians and bureaucrats, to gain control of information. These 
sources wish to retain control because they feel that they would lose their influence on 
the manner of its presentation once that information is handed out to the media and 
reaches the public. The media’s ability to triumph in this contest varies according to 
journalistic success in gaining access to sources, interpreting as well as filtering and 
disseminating information. As suggested by Ericson et al., the power of the controller of 
the information is matched by the power of the reporters to define what is news and to 
give that information meaning.4 The high degree of expertise and morality required to
1 Interview Sommai Parichatre, Executive Editor, Matichon, April 23, 1998.
This phrase literally means ‘if  you do not enter the tiger's cave, you won't acquire the baby 
tiger’.
3 Interview Kawamura Shigemitsu, Editor-in-Chief, Akahata, 21 October 1998.
4 Richard Victor Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek, and Janet B. L. Chan, Negotiating Control: A 
Study of News Sources (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989), p. 14.
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complete these tasks has meant that journalists have come to regard themselves as
professional. However, a debate about whether journalism can be considered a
profession, in which conduct is enforced voluntarily through norms that allow
journalists to resist outside pressure and still allow them to make right decisions on
behalf of the public is in progress.5 Indeed, even the journalistic profession in Western
countries, such as the U.S. and Australia is not yet fully developed to fit the sociological
definitions of professionalism, which is said to require stringent forms of knowledge,
independent organization, a degree of autonomy, socially-responsible service, and a code
of ethics.6 As Julianne Schultz argues, the goal of self-enforced journalistic
professionalism remains far-fetched, because
journalists themselves lack the ability to restrict access to the occupation, 
their autonomy is limited, they have a poor record of self-regulation 
and would strongly resist the statutory registration which applies to other 
professions, because of a commitment to the media as the Fourth Estate, 
a watchdog, independent of government.7
As suggested with the political information contest model in Chapter One, the 
ability of media to gain control over information is considered a variable factor impinging 
on the occurrence of political information contests and changes in the media's role. The 
ability refers to the extent of the media’s expert relations, which particularly concern the 
expertise that relies on the degree to which journalists can gain access to political 
information, to accurately construct the meaning of that political information, and to 
correctly disseminate that information. These forms of expertise can thus be measured 
by five elements: knowledge, organization, autonomy, a high degree of social 
responsibility in service, and ethical codes. To assess the status of these elements in the 
journalistic profession in Thailand and Japan, this chapter discusses education,
Michael Meadows, "A Sense oiDeja Vu: Canadian Journalism Education Ponders Its Future", 
Australian Journalism Review. July /December 1992, pp. 100-113.
For a discussion of sociological literature regarding professionalism and journalism,, see John 
Henningham (ed.), "Is Journalism a Profession?", Issues in Australian Journalism (Melbourne: 
Longman, 1990); For Australian examples, read Julianne Schultz (ed.), Not Just Another 
Business: Journalists. Citizens and the Media (NSW: Pluto Press, 1994); Sally White, 
Reporting in Australia. 2nd ed. (South Yarra, Victoria: Macmillan, 1996). For the American 
examples see Timothy E. Cook, Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political 
Institution (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Shanto Iyengar and Richard 
Reeves (eds.), Do the Media Govern? (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997).
Julianne Schultz (ed.), "The Paradox of Journalism", Not Just Another Business: Journalists. 
Citizens and the Media (NSW: Pluto Press, 1994), p. 36.
recruitment and training systems as well as professional ideologies of journalists in both 
countries. In this way, journalistic professionalism is gauged not only by the level of 
each journalist's knowledge and their experience, but also by the extent to which each 
individual pursues his or her work with a professional attitude and consciousness. Next, 
the newsgathering process within news organizations, journalists' autonomy from 
outside interference, and norms in interpreting and disseminating practices are analyzed. 
This analysis is conducted based on the premise that the news which journalists 
produce is shaped by their immediate work environment and organizational factors. 
These include many of the routine methods that journalists employ to decide upon and 
produce the news. This process is influenced by the structure and division of labor, and 
the requirements and normative news practices of the media organizations for which 
journalists work.8 Moreover, ethics and morality are important factors, which determine 
judgments and assumptions about the news value, about what news is and what it is 
not, and about what to select and what to omit. These ethical and moral values, together 
with attitudes concerning social responsibility, influence ways in which news is 
presented. These ethical and moral values help journalists to debate and adapt 
perceptions - to see themselves as professionals and to apply professional standards to 
news. In this regard, elements that can deflect journalists from their own professional 
ethical standards, such as widespread corruption practices among the Thai and Japanese 
journalists, are discussed and compared.
4.1. Journalism Education, Recruitment, and Training Dilemmas
The teaching of journalism at a tertiary level in Thailand began in 1939 at Chulalongkom 
University.9 However, it did not become a popular subject until 1954, when a 
Journalism Faculty offering Bachelor degrees was established at Thammasat University. 
Chulalongkom University followed suit with such formal arrangements in 1965. Earlier 
teaching programs and texts in journalism borrowed heavily from the U.S. syllabus.10 In
Ian Ward, Politics o f the Media (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1995), p. 208.
Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, "Kan suksa nithetsart nai prathet thai" (Communication Arts Studies 
in Thailand", in Wiwatthanakan seumolchon Thai ^Evolution of the Thai Mass Media") 
(Bangkok: Buddhabucha, 1983), p. 162.
As Sulak mentioned, "during this period (from the mid 1960s to 1970s), Thai academics and
1 8 2
10
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the early 1980s, there was an increase in the number of the U.S. educated lecturers who 
returned to Thailand and commenced teaching at several leading universities. 
Unsurprisingly, these foreign graduates started writing texts by reproducing mainstream 
U.S. approaches to journalism and applying them to the Thai experience.11 Such 
approaches, which emphasize the application of technical knowledge over the 
strengthening of theoretical knowledge and professional understanding, remain an 
important feature of many journalism study programs and texts in Thailand.
This emphasis on technical knowledge has greatly influenced the way in which 
the journalism curriculum is constructed. Appendix 4, which tables core courses of
journalism programs in three public universities — Chulalongkom, Kasetsart, and 
Thammasat — shows that students are required to develop a basic knowledge of 
important disciplines such as law, economics, and politics during their first and second
years of study. The remainder of their four-year courses concentrates on writing and 
reporting techniques, as well as other forms of technical training.12 Malee, a senior 
journalism educator at Thammasat University, explained that the curriculum planning of 
journalism programs tends to accommodate industry demands because the industry does 
not have proper in-house training. She also argued that "the curriculum is designed in 
response to the industry demand because the industry provides employment. Since 
they expect a ready-made product which can be instantly put on the job, we are thus 
obliged to supply".13 However, it is ironic that only a handful of annual journalism 
graduates from schools of communication at prestige universities such as Chulalongkom,
administrators were, on the whole, trained en bloc in the USA. American teachers and 
researchers not to mention military personnel - penetrated through all our institutions". See 
Sulak Sivaraksa, Siam in Crisis, z ed. (Bangkok: Rung Seang, 1990), p. 151.
Thai textbooks on journalism,, such as Malee Boonsiripunth's Lak kan tham nungsuphim 
buangton (The beginning principles of newspaper-makingl (Bangkok: Prakaipruek, 1988), rely 
very much on American sources. Suwipa Sukcharoen also suggests that the reproduction o f U.S. 
approaches occurred in all areas of communication studies in Thai tertiary institutions, 
particularly in development communication studies. See Suwipa Sukcharoen, "The 
Emergence and Use of Development Communication Studies in Thailand: An Analysis o f Its 
Origins, Texts, Teaching and Research Programs", Unpublished Thesis, Master of Arts in 
Communication, University of Canberra, Australia, 1993.
For example, in order to graduate, students must complete an internship at newspaper 
companies or broadcasting stations based on their specialization. Kasetsart University, Kasetsart 
Academic Catalog (Bangkok: Office of the Registrar, Kasetsart University, 1996), p. 437. 
Personal communication on April 17, 1998.
Thammasat, Kasetsart, and Chiengmai Universities eventually land jobs in journalism. 
Poor starting wages divert graduates to better-paid jobs in related areas, such as 
advertising or public relations.14 As a consequence, most working journalists graduate 
from other fields such as political science, law, arts, or the humanities.15
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Despite the fact that journalism in Thailand is a low-paying vocation, the rapid 
expansion of the private media sector during the bubble economy of the early 1990s saw 
a enormous surge in demand for journalists, and a subsequent increase in the number of 
journalism students.16 Consequently, journalism programs have since produced an 
estimated 4,000 new graduates per year.17 As Thai public and private universities could 
only accept a relatively small number of students per year,18 thirty-six Teachers’ 
Colleges (Satahban Rajabhat) were upgraded to tertiary institutions in 1995. Since then, 
these Colleges have offered both degree and diploma courses in journalism,19 and they 
produce as many as thirty per cent of newly recruited journalists.20 However, some of
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
According to Sommai, Executive editor of Matichon, monthly wages among newly recruited 
reporters in 1998 started at around Bt. 12,000 ($A600) before tax, while the average 
earnings of young Japanese reporters were about 211,586 yen ($A3,000 approximately) per 
month. See Figure 13: Model Monthly Wages in Yen, The Japanese Press '98 (Tokyo: NSK, 
1998), p. 81.
Sunan Kasemchainan conducted a survey on 124 reporters working for newspapers and 
television stations in 1993. She found that about eighty-six per cent of them held bachelor 
degrees in other areas than journalism or communication. See Sunan Kasemchainan, 
"Thatsanakati thangkanmuang lae kanmee suan ruam thangkanmuang khong seumolchon 
Thai suksa priabthiab phuseukhao nungsuphim lae phussukhao thorathat saikanmuang" 
(Political Participation and Attitudes Among the Mass Media: A Comparative Study of 
Political Reporters of Newspapers, and of Television Stations), Unpublished Masters Thesis, 
Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, 1993, p. 109.
There was an extensive expansion of tertiary education in Thailand during the 1990s.
According to Hewison, there were only 100,000 students enrolled in seventeen state universities 
in 1972. In 1990, there were more than 360,000 students enrolled in some forty universities and 
private tertiary institutions. See Kevin Hewison, "Thailand: On Becoming a NIC", The Pacific 
Review. 1992, 5 (4), p. 332.
The Reporters' Association of Thailand, Nork Krong (Outside the Cage!. April 1997, p. 9.
For example, of the annual 500 student intake at the Faculties of Communication of 
Chulalongkom and Thammasat universities only about 150 students graduate with journalism 
majors. Private universities, such as Bangkok and Rangsit Universities, produce about 120 
journalism graduates every year. These figures are based on my own inquiries into the 
journalism programs at these universities in May 1999.
For example, a Bachelor of Arts in Mass Communication and an Associate Diploma in Mass 
Communication are now offered at all of the Rajabhat Institutes. See Ministry of 
Education, Office of Rajabhat Institutes Council, (Bangkok: Sasana, 1997), p. 23. For 
further discussion see Chai Chatrapong," Wikrit wichacheep nak-khao: phap luang ta bon phong 
saboo" (The crisis of journalistic profession: A bubble fantasy), Matichon Daily. September 4, 
1997, p. 21.
The Reporters' Association of Thailand, Wan nak khao 5 minakhom 2537 (Reporters' Dav 5 
March 19941. (Bangkok: RAT, 1994), p. 36.
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the colleges lack qualified and experienced lecturers to provide students with extensive 
theoretical knowledge and intensive training, and are seen as producing a large number of 
poorly qualified journalism graduates purely for commercial gain.21
Indeed, industry demand for journalists with technical skills has led to an under­
emphasis on journalism concepts and cross-disciplinary programs in universities. Thai 
media organizations, as a result, are full of reporters with good technical skills but 
lacking in thinking skills and critical perspectives. Boonrak has observed that limited 
interdisciplinary training has caused Thai journalists to be recognized as ‘generalists’ 
rather than ‘specialists’.22 He further suggested that it is necessary that journalists 
should specialize in a certain discipline. Due to the increasingly specialized nature of 
areas such as economic and finance, journalists need to have real expertise and depth of 
knowledge in their specialty areas to be able to screen a mass of information for relevant 
news, and provide in-depth analysis on important issues. It is therefore necessary to 
change the emphasis of university curricula to reflect current realities. Boonrak's 
comments, however, were not taken seriously until the Asian economic crisis hit 
Thailand in July 1997. The lack of a strong economic background and financial 
knowledge essential to conduct investigative reporting became an urgent problem. A 
large number of university professors and lecturers in economics were hired to write 
news about the crisis. This situation certainly led to increased discussion about 
curriculum planning, with suggestions of more interdisciplinary course input into 
journalism programs in Thai universities.23
Interview with Associate Professor Aruneeprapha Homsettee, Mass Communication 
Department, Faculty of Humanities, Ramkhamhaeng University on 31 August 1998. Associate 
Professor Aruneeprapha Homsettee is also the President of Mass Communication Academics 
Institution of Thailand (Satahban Nukwishakam Suesarnmolchon Haeng Prathet Thai). Due to 
the general concerns about the graduate quality from these Rajabhat Institutions, she has 
pioneered a project which provides assistance and training to their lecturers in mass 
communication.
Boonrak is a lecturer in journalism and communication at the Faculty o f Journalism and Mass 
Communication, Thammasat University. See Boonrak Boonyaketamala, Thanandorn thi 
si: Chak rabob lok thung rath thai (The Fourth Estate: From the World System to the Thai 
State). 2nd ed. (Bangkok: Amarin Printing and Publishing, 1996), p. 151.
See for example, Wirat Seangdowchai, "Tob-tuan kan son nithetsart ya son tae technic ngan 
'rcheep" (Revise Communication Arts Teaching Programs: Don't Teach Only Technical 
Skills", Wan Nak Khao 5 Minakhom 2541 (Reporters' Dav 1998) (Bangkok: Reporters' 
Association of Thailand, 1998), pp. 93-95.
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Remarkably, this situation parallels that of Japan, where newspapers reported 
inaccurate and false details regarding the restructuring of the country's financial systems 
in 1998-99. During October 1998, Yomiuri Shimbun felt the need to run a series of 
commentaries on the role of media reports on the financial reform, most of which urged 
the dissemination of more accurate reports and the interpretation of difficult financial 
and economic information in more simplified terms than before.24 One article written by 
the President of the Housing Loan Administration Corporation (Jyütaku Kinyü Saiken 
Kami Kikö), for example, strongly criticized the press's lack of understanding of the 
whole troubling issue of housing loans (jyüzen).25 As in the Thai case, the problems of 
inadequate knowledge in finance and economics amongst Japanese reporters partly have 
their roots in the journalism education, recruitment, and training systems.
In Japan, there are about fifteen universities that have undergraduate courses in 
journalism, and about five two-year junior colleges provide vocational training.26 
However, almost all of the 25,000 active reporters today are university graduates.27 The 
University of Tokyo was the first to offer a program for journalism studies (Shimbun 
Kenkyü Shitsu) in 192 8 28 However, formal journalism education at the undergraduate 
level did not start until 1932, when a Department of Journalism was established at
Nakabö Köhei, "Kinyü hödö ni tarinu kihonteki imi no rikai" (Insufficient Reports o f the 
Financial System and Comprehension of Basic Meanings", Yomiuri Shimbun. October 2, 1998, 
p. 19; Higuchi Hirotaro, "Hödö ga yoron wo jösei, shakai henkaku wo atooshi " (Reports to 
Brew Public Opinion to Support Social Reform), Yomiuri Shimbun. October 9, 1998, p.25; 
Yamasaki Yasuhiko, "Nenkin meguru hödö wa shimin no me no takasa de” (Reports on the 
Reform o f the Pension at the Public's Level o f Understanding), Yomiuri Shimbun. October 16, 
1998, p. 17.
Nakabö Köhei, "Kinyü hödö ni tarinu kihonteki imi no rikai" (Insufficient Reports of the 
Financial System and Comprehension of Basic Meanings", Yomiuri Shimbun. October 2, 1998, 
p. 19.
Ito Yöichi and Tanaka Norichika, "Education, Research Institutes and Academic Associations in 
Journalism and Mass Communications Review", Keio Communication Review. 1992, (14),
p. 22.
The figure is as o f 1997. See Japan's Foreign Press Center, "Japan's Mass Media", About Japan 
Series No.7 (Tokyo: Japan's Foreign Press Center, 1997), p.41. _
This program was established by Professor Ono Hideo,. who earlier published the first book on 
Japanese journalism called "Nihon Shimbun Hattatsu-shi" (The Historical Development of  
Japanese Newspaper). Despite Ono's earlier visits to schools o f communication in the United 
States and Europe, he did not import directly the US or European models of newspaper studies. 
Rather he insisted on adopting a more cultural approach to studies of newspapers.
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Sophia (Jöchi) University.29 Nevertheless, the first generation of journalism graduates 
from universities had no influence on the course of journalism and the newspaper 
industry during the war. One reason for this suggests that these graduates might have 
been too young to report the war, as they only finished their studies in 1936.30 Another 
reason might have been that journalism courses fell under the government’s watchful eye 
at that time, and the demand for journalists in the newspaper industry was shrinking 
due to the government's control of the paper supply.
Under the supervision of the SCAP during the occupation period, a program for 
journalism studies was established at Keio University in 1946, as well as in other 
universities. These departments and schools constructed their curricular for journalism 
courses according to the American model, which emphasized professional hands-on 
skills and technical training. This kind of American approach to journalism studies also 
gained influence over the newspaper studies program at the University of Tokyo after 
the war.31 Yet this emphasis on the American-style of technical training in university 
curriculum continued at these prestigious universities for only a short while. The course 
curriculum was then reconstructed to become more and more ‘basic course oriented’, to 
meet with the tradition of academic orientation at these universities, and to suit 
industrial needs.32
As shown in Appendix 5, courses on communication and journalism offered at 
the three prestige universities -  the Tokyo, Keio, and Waseda Universities — are mostly 
theoretically and socially oriented. The system of lifetime employment (,shüshin 
koyösei) within Japanese mass media companies allow journalists whom the company 
hires to stay remain in its employ until retirement. Therefore, what companies need are 
not so much graduates with professional skills for the job, but rather individuals with
29 Ito Yöichi and Tanaka Norichika, "Education, Research Institutes and Academic Associations in 
Journalism and Mass Communications Review", Keio Communication Review. 1992, 14, p 
17.
30 Ibid.
31 In contrast to Ono Hideo's emphasis on European-styled, cultural approach to media studies, 
Koyama Eizö, Ono's successor, emphasized an American-style audience-oriented approach to 
newspaper studies.
32 Ito Yöichi and Tanaka Norichika op. cit., p. 19.
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general knowledge from any faculty who have the potential to learn through practical 
training provided. As journalism is the most popular occupation after banking, most 
young graduates enter this career without knowing what the employment actually 
entails. In recent times, many have quit after a few years in journalism through dislike 
for the job and a lack of endurance.33 The relative decline in the job continuity ratio of 
newspaper employees in the 1990s has also indicated the likely breakdown of the 
lifetime employment system. In 1987, 30.6 per cent of employees in the whole 
newspaper industry had been working continuously within that industry for a duration 
of ten to nineteen years, whilst only 18.9 per cent were reported in the same category 
recorded in 1997.34 These statistics suggest that present employees are more likely to 
change jobs before they retire.
As with most Japanese companies that adopt the system of lifetime 
employment, media companies tend to train new recruits themselves. These media 
companies found that the technical skills the students learned at the university became 
‘obstacles’ in the company training programs. As Professor Takeichi Hideo put it, 
"they want to train raw recruits themselves and mould them into ’their kind' of 
reporters"35. For this reason, broadcasting networks and big newspaper companies 
introduced an entrance examination as an important part of their annual recruitment, 
similar to the system of civil service recruitment.36 However, unlike the bureaucracy, 
which generally recruits law or economics graduates from highly prestigious universities 
such as Tokyo and Kyoto Universities, each major media company recruits around 100 
graduates annually from any field of study, and from all the best universities. 
Nevertheless, as with civil service recruitment, applicants are required to take a written 
exam and undergo an interview, which critically assesses essay writing ability, foreign
Interview with Professor Takeichi Hideo, Department of Journalism, Sophia University, on 
October 14, 1998.
34 See Figure 11: Number o f Employees classified by continuity,, in Nihon Shimbun Kyokai, The 
Japanese Press '98 (Tokyo: NSK, 1998), p. 79.
Takeichi Hideo, "Journalism Education in Japan: Its Present State and Problems" Jochi 
Daiyaku Komvunikeshon Kenkvu (Sophia University Research on Communicationi. 1996, (26), 
p. 36.
See, for example, Ellis S. Krauss, "Japan: Divided Bureaucracy in a Unified Regime" in J.
Pierre (ed.), Bureaucracy in the Modem State: Introduction to Comnarative Public, 
Administration (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 127-28.
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languages, and general knowledge. Questions related to journalism per se are absent.37 
The mass media companies do not give preferential treatment to journalism graduates. 
Instead, as argued by Professor Takeichi, "they discriminate against graduates in 
journalism, because these students would ask questions they cannot answer",38 and 
they "would like to receive new recruits as 'white handkerchiefs' which they may dye 
any color they wish".39 Further, a culture of nepotism in which executives and senior 
editors of newspaper and television companies employ their own offspring or relatives 
also adds to this problem.40
Discrimination against hiring women exists in Japanese media organizations. 
Until 1986, the labor law prevented Japanese women in most occupations, including 
media, from working after 10 p.m. Moreover, before 1986 some publications and wire 
services had a policy of hiring women only for secretarial posts, and not as reporters.41 
However, the situation has little improved, notwithstanding the repeal of the labor law 
and the enactment of the equal opportunity law. There was only one female in every ten 
journalists hired in the entire Japanese newspaper industry during 1999.42 Nakajima 
Gengo of the NSK explains that only a small number of women are hired by the 
newspaper companies because they are less mobile than men, and tend to quit after 
marriage.43 Most women reporters only work an average of a five to nine year span 44 A
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
The exam is held in April, and is usually known as the Spring Exam. The topic on essay 
writing is not at all related to journalism. It revolves around topics like ‘peace’, and ‘culture’. 
The essay topic in the exam at Asahi Shimbun in 1998, for example, was ‘Settai Bunka\ or 
‘Reception Culture’. Applicants can choose one of the three foreign languages in the exam. 
These include English, French and German. Exams on general knowledge include basic 
mathematics, history, geography, and current affairs. Interview with Professor Takeichi Hideo, 
Department of Journalism, Sophia University, on October 14, 1998.
Ibid.
Takeichi Hideo, "Journalism Education in Japan: Its Present State and Problems" Jochi 
Daigaku Komvunikeshon Kenkvu (Sophia University Research on Communication!- 1996, (26), 
p. 36.
Iwase Tetsuya, for example, notes that a culture of nepotism has played a certain role in the 
recruitment of new reporters at Asahi Shimbun. See Iwase Tetsuya, "Shimbun ga 
omoshirokunai rivu" (The Reasons Why Newspapers are not Interesting! (Tokyo:
Ködansha, 1998), pp. 169-171.
Hatano Ruriko, "Japanese Women in Media", Media Asia, 1987, 14(4), pp. 216-17, 239.
In 1999, there were 2,062 females of the total 20,651 reporters working in ninety newspaper and 
wire service companies which responded to the NSK 1999 survey. See "Women Reporters 
Reach 10% for the First Time", NSK News Bulletin. December 1999, 22 (4), p. 10.
Interview with Mr. Nakajima Gengo, Manager of International Affairs Department, the Japan 
Newspapers Publishers and Editors Association on October 23, 1998.
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majority of them work in the 'Home and Family' section, the target readers of which are 
also women.45 Similar trend was also found in the broadcasting industry wherein the 
ratio of female workers stood at less than ten per cent in 1993.46 The ratio of female 
reporters working in the Thai newspaper industry, however, is relatively higher. In 
1998, there was an average of one female to every two male journalists in Thailand.47 
Yet the proportion of female reporters for the English language press is higher than of 
the Thai language press. The growing popularity of hiring female reporters in Thai news 
organizations was observed by Kavi Chongkitthavom, the Executive Editor of the 
Nation: "Female journalists have more privilege than male journalists for a cultural 
reason that female approaches are more gentle and less threatening than male. In 
particular, Thai men, especially most high-ranking bureaucrats and politicians, are 
womanizers".48 His explanation, however, emphasizes the views of senior reporters on 
the necessity for junior reporters to secure close contact with their political sources. 
Yet, despite the increasing number of women reporters, Thai news media organizations 
continue to lose young journalism graduates from prestigious universities to other higher 
income professions. Indeed, the Thai situation indeed produces a similar result to the 
discriminatory recmitment system of Japanese newspapers. The result has been that 
there are not many journalism graduates from the prestigious universities working in the 
newspaper industry. However, the recruitment of television journalists in Japan, 
particularly those work forNHK, is different from that of the newspaper journalists in
See Figure 11: Number of Employees Classified by Continuity in Nihon Shimbyn Kyokai,
The Japan Press 1998 (Tokyo: NSK, 1998), p. 78.
Newspaper companies hire women journalists especially to work for the Home and Family 
section^ because male journalists prefer not to deal with stories on 'pots and pans'. Yet the 
status of journalists o f the Home and Family sections remains subordinate inside the companies. 
See Hayashi Kaori, "The Home and Family Section in Japanese Newspapers", Journal of The 
European Institute for Communication and Culture. 1998, 5(3), pp. 51-63.
According to the 1993 survey results o f NHK and three networks in Japan, female staff 
accounted for only nine per cent. See Muramatsu Yasuko, "Seikai no medeia no josei no 
sankaku" (Women's participation in the world media), I Id so Repooto. September 1995, 136, 
pp. 43-50.
There was an approximate 226 female among 681 reporters in 71 newspaper organizations. 
These figures were gathered from the lists o f registered members o f Reporters' Association of  
Thailand as of 1997. Reporters' Association of Thailand, Wan nak khao 5 minakhom 2542 
(The Reporters' Dav 5 March 19981. pp. 252-261.
Interview with Kavi Chongkitthavom, Executive Editor, The Nation, on April 28, 1998.
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that most were directly recruited from elite universities, such as Tokyo, Keio and 
Waseda Universities.49
In comparison to Thai newspapers, which have few local branches and heavily 
rely on their local stringers for local news stories, the major Japanese newspapers have 
an abundance of local, not to include overseas branches, which become ideal training 
grounds for new recruits. Asahi Shimbun, for example, has 104 local bureaus in the 
country, as well as twenty-five overseas bureaus for training and rotating their 
journalists.50 According to Ise, new recruits of major Japanese newspapers are trained 
to be either general reporters (ippan kisha), regional reporters (chiho kisha), or 
specialized reporters (senmon kisha). A general reporter will spend a couple of years at 
the headquarters, then will be transferred to a local office in a prefecture. A regional 
reporter will be assigned to a local office in the region in which he or she was bom or has 
lived in. A specialized reporter will spend 3 to 5 years, or sometimes 6 to 7 years, at a 
local bureau before being transferred to the headquarters in Tokyo, or to other major 
cities.51 In particular, a reporter who aims to work in a political section (seiji bu) will 
not be trained directly as a political reporter from the beginning. He or she will start as a 
general reporter in sections, such as the social section (shakai bu), for a couple of years 
before being transferred to other sections at other local bureaus. Therefore, a newly 
recmited graduate may take about 7 to 10 years to be transferred back to Tokyo as a 
political reporter. Tase Yasuhiro, a veteran journalist working for Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, has been critical of the current training system. He contends that the current 
in-house training system of journalists has been one of the factors that prevent the 
Japanese media from becoming proactive. The lack of genuine experience and critical 
views among Japanese journalists has been generated by various unproductive ways of
49 NHK sent a limited number of application forms to these institutions this year, so the 
universities could give them only to students whose qualifications are demanded by NHK. More 
details o f NHK system of recmitment see, Chapter six: Occupational Role and Politics in Ellis 
S. Kruass, Broadcasting Politics in Japan: NHK and Television News (Ithaca: Cornell 
University, 2000), pp. 151-176.
50 Asahi Shimbun, Anata no Asahi Shimbun (Y our Asahi Newspaper! (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 
1995), p. 2; See also Nihon Shimbun Kyokai, Nihon shimbun nen kan'97/'98 nen han (The 
'97/'9R Annual Reports of Japanese Newspapers! (Tokyo: NSK, 1997), pp. 64-65.
51 Ise Akifumi. Shimbun wa köre de ii no ka?: Seiiibu kisha no daraku (Is the press really good 
enough?: The corruption of political reporters! (Tokyo: Nisshin Hödö, 1993), pp. 84-5.
in-house training. He commented that young journalists were sent out to local bureaus 
to work as case reporters (jiken kisha). They were often assigned to work on the police 
beat (satsu mawari), on which they would not be trained to develop an analytical mind. 
Rather they were trained to write about whatever they stumbled upon.52
The weakness of the Thai newspaper organizations is, on the contrary, found in 
the lack of local bureaus for training junior reporters, and the traditional beliefs of a 
substantial effectiveness of the on-the-job training system. The high frequency of job 
changes among young journalists in recent years also seems to have discouraged the 
news organizations from investing in human resources.53 Most young Thai reporters 
receive limited training, except for those working in the few Thai media organizations 
that offer several months of full course training. For example, during the years of bubble 
economy, Phuchadkarn Newspaper Group provided an eight-week training session for 
new recruits. Yet the training was neglected when the Group faced devastating financial 
problems caused by the economic crisis in 1997. Since then, there have been no new 
graduates recruited by the Group.54 Special course training and overseas training are 
supported and encouraged by some national papers; however, these courses are often 
too specialized, too short, and only available to experienced reporters with impeccable 
work records.
The lack of a complete fit between the ideal kinds of journalism education 
programs, recruitment systems, and training courses and the realities in both countries 
illustrates critical dilemmas. These dilemmas exist not only for educators and the news 
media organizations, but also for journalists. The current structure of journalism 
education and recruitment systems in both countries is shaped by the economic 
interests of the industries. In Thailand, journalism education is largely constructed in 
response to market demand, whereas the system of lifetime employment in Japan
Tase Yasuhiro, Seiii Jaancirizumu no Tsumi to Batsu (Crime and Punishment in Political 
Journalism!. (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1996), pp. 103-7.
Interview with Mr. Sommai Parichatre, Executive Editor, Matichon, April 23, 1998.
Personal communication with Jittanart Limthongkul, son of the media magnate, Sondhi 
Limthongkul and a reporter at Phujadkan on February 10, 1999.
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allows the recruitment of individuals with no prior knowledge of journalism. The 
training systems have apparently done little to help these journalists develop their own 
professional presumptions which underline the way the news should be reported. 
Journalists are left to face the dilemma of how to develop a professional ideology, one 
that is not too politically motivated, or bound to their own self-interests, but one that 
empowers them to exercise their expertise to accurately access, interpret, and 
disseminate political information that serves public interests.
4.2 Professional Ideology of Journalists
The principles of 'objectivity' and 'impartiality' that are held by journalists are core 
values, which determine whether individual journalists develop expert or legitimate 
relations with the state in gaining access to, interpreting, and disseminating political 
information. In Thailand, objectivity and impartiality stem from the Western values that 
accompanied printing technology when it was imported to the country in the 19th 
century.55 When the first royal printing plant was set up, a number of American 
missionaries with experience in printing and journalism were hired by King Mongkhut 
to assist in establishing a royal printing press.56 It is evident that the notion of 
'objectivity and impartiality' was then adopted as something akin to lkan mai lam 'eng’ 
in the press reports. For instance, King Mongkhut closed down the Bangkok Recorder 
in 1865 on the grounds of the 'press biases' and its 'constant criticisms' against the royal 
court.57 In a famous essay, "The Press and the People" (Nungsuphim kab rassadorn) 
published in Sri Krung in 1932, the author suggested that "the press ought to develop a 
sound criticism" (kan tichom ratthabarn yang mee lak) "and impartiality" (kan mai 
lam'engj.58 Yet this concept of impartiality was not fully understood or adopted by 
Thai journalists until much later. The dominance of partisan papers during the 19308-
Dr. Dean B. Bradley, an American missionary, cast the Siamese letter printing type in 1942. 
King Mongkhut, while he was a monk, bought one set o f printing type from Bradley to start his 
own printing plant. See Sulak Sivaraka, Siam in Crisis. 2nd ed. (Bangkok: Rung Seang, 1990), 
p. 138.
56 Ibid., p. 139.
Matthew Copeland, "Contested Nationalism and the Overthrow o f the Absolute Monarchy in 
Siam", Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, The Australian National University, 1993, p. 15.
Phaya Issarapakdi Thammathivet, "Nungsuphim kab rassadorn " (The Press and the People),
Sri Krung, March 25, 1932, p. 3, 15. The second and third parts of this essay were published 
in the same newspaper on 26th and 28th of the same month.
1950s, for example, reflected little appreciation of the virtue of this professional 
concept among certain groups of Thai journalists.
After a formal education program in journalism had been established, the terms 
‘objectivity and impartiality’ were adapted into a more formal, abstract term known as 
‘khwam-pen-klang\ This term includes the meanings of both ‘objectivity’ and 
‘impartiality’ as well as 'neutrality', and has been defined in a nutshell as an opinion-free 
type of news, or a complete reflection of actual events. In order to achieve 'the truth of 
the event', or objectivity, journalists must be impartial in their newsgathering methods, 
and interpret news events without any prejudices, interests, or biases.59 The 
constitution of the Press Council of Thailand (PCT), established in 1997, dedicates five 
articles of its professional code of ethics to emphasizing this notion of'objectivity and 
impartiality':
• Article 4: The press shall adhere to facts, accuracy, and complete truth.
• Article 5: The press shall present news in a way that benefits the public, not seek selfish private
or collective gains.
• Article 6: The press shall display every attempt to give balanced coverage.
• Article 1\ The press shall not in any way inflate or fabricate reports in ways that render them
inaccurate or beyond credibility.
• Article 8: The press shall avoid covering news under the influence of prejudice or partiality.60
Although these articles define in general terms the way that journalists should 
report the news, they say very little about what should and should not be reported. 
Indeed, the code of ethics is filled with phrases pointing to the need for balanced 
coverage and fairness, but at no point attempts to define what is meant by those vague 
and elusive terms. Thus, what objectivity and impartiality actually mean in practice is 
left largely to the common sense of journalists. Discrepancies between meanings of 
these concepts of objectivity and impartiality adopted at the ideological level, and 
meanings applied at the practical level by individual journalists, remain topics of an
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Worapol Prommikabut, Thisadee khwam pen khlang khong seusantnolchon (Theory of 
Objectivity of the Mass Medial (Bangkok: Krong Kam Tagrieng Rua, 1997).
The Press Council o f Thailand, "A Code for Professional Ethics for Journalists", Press Release. 
April 22, 1998.
60
ongoing debate elsewhere.61 Similarly, this abstract notion of professional ideology is 
also found in the professional journalistic code in Japan. This code emphasizes 
impartiality (fuhen), non-partisanship (futö), neutrality (chüritsu) and fairness (kösei) as 
the four major principles in achieving objective reports (kyakkan hödö).62 The concepts 
of ‘fuhen futö’ (impartiality and non-partisanship) have been an unwritten law of 
Japanese newspapers since the Meiji period, but were only formally adopted in the 
early Taisho period by the Osaka Asahi after it received a banish order (hakkö kins hi) 
for publishing a story about the rice riots in 1918. Osaka Asahi adopted the concepts of 
‘fuhen futö ’ when looking for a guarantee from the authorities that the newspaper would 
not again be a subject of censorship. Once Osaka Asahi gained strength in Tokyo, after 
the Tokyo earthquake in 1923 that had destroyed many Tokyo based political papers, 
other newspapers followed suit by adopting these principles of impartiality and 
nonpartisanship as means to avoid state censorship.63 In 1945, one of points in the ten 
point Press Code adopted by SCAP, as a guideline for news reporting, also stressed the 
notion of nonpartisanship by denouncing adherence to any propaganda line in news 
stories.64 During the six years and eight months of U.S. Occupation in Japan, one of the 
CI&E activities included "pressure on the Japanese media to adopt new ethical codes 
and professional practices, such as less mixing of reporter-editorial opinion in the 
news".65
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However, in the postwar period, these concepts of impartiality and non- 
partisanship have worked against a more proactive political role for the Japanese press.
John Hurst, "Journalistic Objectivity and Subjectivity in News Reporting and News Selection", 
Australian Journalism Review. January-December 1991, 13, pp. 23-30; Matthew Kieran, "News 
Reporting and the Ideological Presumption", Journal o f Communication. Spring 1997, 47(2), 
pp. 79-96; and Matthew Kieran (ed.), "Objectivity, Impartiality and Good Journalism", Media 
Ethics (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 23-36.
See Chapter 2: Fuhen futö to seijiteki köhei (Impartiality, Non partisanship, and Political 
Fairness) in Hara Yoshio, Jaanarizumu no shisö (Thoughts in Journalism! (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 1997), p. 95.
Ibid., p. 96.
Monica Braw, The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: American Censorship in Occunied Japan (New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), p. 41.
Marlene J. Mayo, "Civil Censorship and Media Control in Early Occupied Japan: From 
Minimum to Stringent Surveillance", in R. Wolfe (ed.), American as Proconsuls: United 
States Military Government in Germany and Japan 1944-1952 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1984), p. 317.
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To achieve objective reporting, journalists have been influenced by these concepts to 
refrain from political advocacy, and to convey only statements approved by editors. 
The concept of 'editorial rights' (henshü-ken) adopted by the NSK, which allows the 
final responsibility for editorial content of the newspaper to rest with its manager and 
managing editor, particularly strengthens this political position. As such, a concept of 
editorial rights ensures that there will be no independent voice that expresses views 
differently from others working in the same company; and thus, conformity is 
guaranteed within the newspaper.66 In addition, the Commercial Code (Law No.212 of 
June 8, 1951) ensures that there will be no influence from any outside business pressure 
on the editorial policy of the press. Article 212-1 of this Code prevents the sale or 
transfer of stock to people other than employees or current shareholders. When a 
shareholder is no longer connected with the company (such as in the case of retirement), 
he or she must transfer the share back to persons who are connected with the 
company.67 Therefore, the ownership of newspapers is highly concentrated among the 
family and employees of the companies concerned, thus preventing takeovers and 
external influence on editorial policy.
The concepts of impartiality and non-partisanship, have also maximized the 
press's economic position by expanding its circulation through acquiring readers with 
broad party affiliations. In 1946, the concepts of neutrality and fairness (chüritsu to 
kösei) were included as editorial policy standards of Japanese newspapers by the NSK. 
The concepts of impartiality, nonpartisanship, neutrality, and fairness have since been 
specifically identified as boundaries of freedom of the press. They were explicitly 
pronounced in the Canon of Journalism espoused by the NSK as the subject of 
voluntary restraint for journalists:
• The fundamental rules of news reporting are to convey fact accurately and faithfully.
66 In some occasions, different voices were expressed by guest writers, or those who wrote letters to 
the editors. By and large, these people are not representatives o f the newspaper companies. Hara 
Yoshio, Jaanarizumu no shisö (Thoughts in Journalism) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997),
pp. 98-99; and Hirose Hidehiko, "The Development o f Discussions on Journalism in Postwar 
Japan". Media. Culture, and Society. 1990, 12, pp. 465-476.
67 Nihon Simbun Kyökai, Press Laws in Japan (Commentary and Abstracts! (Tokyo: NSK, 1995), 
p.27.
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• In reporting news, the personal opinion of the reporter should never be inserted.
• In treating news, one should always remember and strictly guard against the possibility of such 
news being utilized for propaganda purposes.
• Criticism of individuals should be limited to what could be said directly to the individual 
involved.
• Partisanship in editorial comments, which knowingly departs from the truth, undermines the 
true spirit o f journalism.68
The concept of neutrality, in particular, has convinced the press to stand strictly 
in the middle of the political spectrum. As such, a politically neutral press could enlarge 
its readers' base. Yet this concept has induced the press to suspend reports that lack 
substantial evidence and make judgments in response to the whole political situation, 
while expressing opinions only on mainstream issues. This concept has also helped the 
newspaper to avoid controversy during election coverage. Some major dailies censored 
news items considering favoring or disfavoring one party over another, while some 
rejected to print advertisements of one party that were directly critical of another 
party .69 The selling system based on home-delivery and the price-fixing that guarantees 
selling targets and profit has also reinforced this neutral position. Political reporters 
have often blamed the lack of press reports on political scandals substantial ‘objective 
facts’ to write ‘fair’ reports. These controversial subjects are thus left to the weekly and 
monthly magazines, which according to a weekly magazine chief editor: "present articles 
that the newspapers should write but don't touch" .70 Scandals are not primarily 
reported in the newspapers due to journalistic commitment and concerns about the 
'trusting relationship' with the sources involved in the scandals.71 However, it seems 
that Japanese journalists do not fail to report scandals due to the lack of objective facts. 
Rather scandalous stories become unnecessary because the sale figures are readily 
secured by the strong home-delivery system. As commented by Professor Sugiyama,
Nihon Shimbun Kyökai, The Japanese Press '98 (Tokyo: NSK, 1998), p. 6.
Scott C. Flanagan, “Media Influences and Voting Behavior”, in S. C. Flanagan et al., The 
Japanese Voter (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 302.
Suzuki Tetsu, editor-in-chief o f Shükan Gendai, cited in Howard French "Race and Scoops in 
Land of a Very Cautious Press, Racy Weeklies Party Fill the Gap in Japan", International 
Herald Tribune. February 7, 2000 (on-line edition).
Mr. Nakayama quoted a famous phrase once uttered by the leader of Japan Renewal Party 
(Shinseitö), Hata Tsutomu, to characterize Japanese newspaper reporters: "shitte ite kakanai 
seijikisha” (do know but do not write type of political reporters). Interview with Mr. Nakajima 
Gengo, Manager o f International Affairs Department, The Japan Newspaper Publishers and 
Editors Association, on October 23, 1998.
"whatever articles a particular newspaper may carry, its circulation figure is wholly 
dependent on the marketing efforts of individual sale agents".72
These abstract concepts of objectivity and impartiality have become a 
cornerstone of journalistic professionalism in both Thailand and Japan, at least at the 
ideological level. They remain ideals because journalists are generally sincere in their 
attempt to be as objective and impartial as they can, but some admit that they are 
neither totally objective nor impartial.73 Moreover, it is quite difficult to claim absolute 
impartiality and objectivity in news reports, because a journalist's worldview and 
understanding of events is necessarily mediated by interpretative and evaluative 
frameworks set up by their own professional experience and media organizations. 
Curran suggests that these concepts of objectivity and impartiality are not guaranteed 
within organizations whose aim is not to practise professional norms.74 For the Thai 
press, the notion of objectivity (khwam-pen-klang) is embraced as a professional goal 
by many independent newspapers. Yet in reality, it is hardly achieved by some because 
of existing linkages between publishers or editors and the authorities, or powerful 
interest groups. In the Thai broadcast media, the notion of "kwam-pen-klang" has often 
been distorted within the context of'national security' as espoused by the military from 
the 1930s. Notably, the state owned television channels have always served the state by 
only presenting news from the powerful administrative side of politics, such as by 
focusing on the Prime Minister, the Army Chief, party leaders, and other high ranking 
officials. In-depth discussions on legislative proceedings, or alternative ideas of non­
mainstream group, were rarely-featured on broadcast news until recently.
In Japan, on the contrary, television has increasingly been perceived to provide 
more unbiased reports than the press. Former Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, for example, 
excluded press reporters from his last press conference as a Premier on a grounds that:
Sugiyama Mitunobu, "Media and Power in Japan", in J. Curran and Myung-Jin Park (eds.), 
De-Westemizing Media Studies (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 193.
Interview with Sommai Parichatre, Executive Editor, Matichon on April 23, 1998.
James Curran, "Mass Media and Democracy: A Reappraisal", in J. Curran and M. Gurevitch 
(eds.), Mass Media and Society (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 99.
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"the press is always biased. I prefer to appeal directly to the public via television".75 
Japan's public broadcasting network, NHK, has particularly been praised by politicians 
as a model producer that provides impartial and nonpartisan news reports and current 
affairs programs (which many would describe as very dull, and at no point stimulating). 
This is, in part, due to the Article 3-2 of the Japanese Broadcasting Law, which 
explicitly stipulates that the broadcaster shall "be politically impartial", and "broadcast 
news without distorting facts".76 As discussed in Chapter Three, the government's 
covert influence over the management of NHK is in fact the underlying reason why 
NHK news producers exercise more caution than their counterparts in commercial 
networks.
The commercial networks can, ostensibly, keep government pressure more at 
arm-lengths than NHK. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the President of Asahi 
Television was pressured to resign following the success of the station's news and 
political discussion programs, such as News Station and Sunday Projects, in allegedly 
influencing voters and bringing about the fall of the LDP in July 1993. This, in turn, 
illustrates that the safeguard of impartiality and nonpartisanship morals has also been 
used as a raison d'etre for government intervention. This case also suggests that the 
emphatic concepts of nonpartisanship and impartiality prevent all Japanese 
broadcasting networks from presenting information and disseminating it more freely 
than is allowed for by the established professional orthodoxy. It also prevents these 
media from emerging as a pluralistic force with ideological distance from the state. The 
media have thus become preoccupied with the form rather than the content of the 
message.
However, apart from the ownership factor, there may be other inherent 
limitations restraining journalists' sincere attempts to achieve impartiality and 
objectivity. As Golding contends, "a journalist may well be impartial towards the
Quoted in Hara Yoshio, Jaanarizuniu no shiso (Thoughts in Journalism^ (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 1997), p. 94.
Nihon Shimbun Kyökai, Press Laws in Janan (Commentary and Abstracts1 (Tokyo: NSK,
1995), p. 44.
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material on which he works, yet fail to achieve objectivity...due to the inherent 
limitations in newsgathering and processing" .77 As the discussion below will reveal, the 
bureaucracy-like structure within the news organizations, the newsgathering process, 
and journalist's normative practices represent the greatest impediments for achieving 
absolute objectivity and impartiality. These impediments also limit the media’s 
autonomy, and its ability to contest the control of political information with the state.
4.3 News Organizations as Bureaucracies
Journalists work in bureaucratic organizations characterized by hierarchy, the division 
of labor, and routinization of working operations through relatively standardized rules 
and procedures. Yet unlike bureaucracies, the aim of news organizations is to achieve 
profit maximization and the lowest possible cost of production. The operational goal is 
therefore to procure efficiency in accessing, gathering, interpreting, and disseminating 
information. The system of hierarchy in news organizations that centralizes authority in 
decision-making is, nonetheless, similar to that of a bureaucracy. Such authority is 
controlled by a few people at the management and senior editors levels, who by and 
large draw on their past performance to establish and implement editorial policies of the 
organizations.78 The following discussion will concentrate on this bureaucracy-like 
structure of newspaper organizations in Thailand and Japan. The internal structure and 
production of TV news are not discussed here because the production sections within 
television organizations in both countries are structured much like the newspaper 
organizations. This newspaper-model of organization encompasses a specialized 
assigned structure for reporters, a desk-centered process of story selection, and 
journalists' standard news values guiding the selection process.
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Peter Golding, "The Missing Dimensions - News Media and the Management o f Social 
Change", in E. Katz and T. Szecskö (eds.), Mass Media and Social Change (London: Sage, 
1981), p. 78.
In Thailand, the owners of the biggest two newspapers, namely, the Watcharapol family who 
ovmsThai Rath and the Hetrakul family o f the Daily News, play active roles in the day to day 
operation of the newspapers. Some o f these owners also sit on the editorial boards, making 
decisions on a daily basis. In Japan, on the other hand, leading shareholders o f the newspaper 
companies, such as those of Asahi, do not usually take active part in newspaper management 
and operation.
At Thai newspapers, the news departments are divided according to the topic 
section dubbed by the prefix ‘to’ (desk) (see Appendix 6). In Thai terms, the political 
desk is known as ‘to kan muang'.19 Sharp divisions between the responsibilities of each 
desk in dealing with different types of news have generated similar conflicts and 
problems as those found in departments within bureaucracies. For example, some news 
involving a number of interest groups can draw attention and competition from many 
news desks that claim jurisdiction over the stories. However, other stories dealing with 
the less influential groups in society are sometimes totally ignored. This arbitrary 
division of news desks, as McCargo argues, is a main cause for the failure of most Thai 
reporters to link important issues to encompassing economic, political, and other 
imperative angles.80 The presence of this rigid hierarchy not only inhibits the free flow 
of information between news desks within the organization, but also hinders any further 
development of news stories. The result has been a lack of breadth and depth in news 
analysis in the Thai media, as well as a quick disappearance of news stories, most of 
which have involved scandalous public issues.81
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This concrete division between news sections is also evident in the news 
department in Japanese news organizations. Asahi Shimbun, for example, divides its 
news department into sections such as the political section (seiji-bu), economic section 
(keizai-bu), social section (shakai-bu), science section (kagaku-bu), sport section 
(supootsu-bu), and so forth (see Appendix 7). All sections are assigned separate pages
At the Matichon Daily in 1998, for example, there were twelve desks* including the 
political desk, economic desk, educational desk, police desk, judicial desk, environmental desk, 
sports desk, entertainment desk, agriculture desk, women's and society desk, foreign desk, and 
provincial desk. Interview with Mr. Somphop Praison, Chief Reporter (Front Page), Matichon 
on April 29, 1998.
McCargo gave an excellent example on Matichon's coverage of the murder case of Pravien 
Bunnak, a teacher in Loei province, and also a leader o f a local NGO. Due to the scope o f the 
story which intricately linked provincial politics, corruption and violence, and environmental 
issues, Matichon failed to either coordinate a group o f reporters to cover the story, or despatch a 
top reporter to the province due to high costs. Instead, it let the story be handled by a local 
stringer. See Duncan McCargo, "Reforming the Thai Media", Paper presented at the 7th 
International Conference on Thai Studies, University of Amsterdam, during July 4-8, 1999. 
Somphop Praison, a chief reporter at Matichon Daily, suggested the lack o f evidence and 
coordination among reporters from different desks in covering the story was the major reason 
why the Salween Logging Scandal in 1997 - which exposed a network o f corruption between a 
number of government organizations such as the Ministry o f Interior, the Forest Conservation 
Office, and the Customs Office - soon disappeared from the front page o f Matichon Daily. 
Interview with Mr. Somphop Praison, Chief Reporter (Front Page), Matichon, on April 29, 
1998.
in the paper. However, the clearer distinction is drawn between reporters covering ‘hard 
news’ (köha), and reporters covering ‘soft news’ (nampa). Those who cover "hard 
news" are usually from the political, foreign and economic news sections, whereas those 
covering ‘soft news’ come from the social affairs section. However, at local newspapers, 
the political section is often combined with the economic section known as the politics- 
economics section or kei-sei-bu, in which reporters are assigned to cover both local 
politics and economic stories. Stories on national politics are provided by major news 
agencies, especially the Kyödö Tsüshin.82
Social affairs reporters cover a wide range of topics such as court and police 
investigations, welfare, Imperial households, crime, environment, many of which 
overlaps political and economic issues. Political and economic reporters, on the 
contrary, cover a relatively narrow range of topics. For example, some political 
journalists are only assigned to cover individual faction leaders, and the inner circles of 
the LDP during their inter and intra factional disputes. Although political reporters 
cover each politician quite closely, they have not generally been responsible for 
uncovering the political scandals in which these politicians are involved. Instead, most 
of the exposures of scandals are written by social affairs reporters, and reporters outside 
the political information loop such as freelancers, reporters working at local bureaus, or 
foreign reporters .83 Stories on politicians who are arrested on bribery charges, for 
example, are covered by social reporters who cover the crime and court beats. The 
foreign news reporters handle reports from overseas correspondents and translate them 
from foreign wire services or from foreign newspapers. The economic reporters, on the 
other hand, generally focus their attention on a narrow range of topics, providing 
detailed analyses of personnel shifts in major corporations.84 They are viewed as being
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Interview with Mr. Hashida Mitsuo, Deputy Editor-in-chief, Kobe Shimbun on November 26, 
1998.
Maggie Farley, "Japan's Press and the Politics of Scandal", in S. J. Pharr and E. S. Krauss 
(eds.), Media and Politics in Japan (Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press, 1996), p. 159.
Ise Akifumi, Shimbun wa köre de ii no ka?: Seiii kisha no daraku Us the press really good 
enough?: The corruption of Political Reporters! (Tokyo: Nisshin Hödö, 1993), pp. 90-122.
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mere extensions of the PR sections of major corporations and big banks, which are the 
sources of their stories.85
Fierce competition for more space in the newspaper, and conflicts over 
jurisdiction between the "hard news" reporters and "soft news" reporters often occur.86 
When the subject of a story is in dispute, each section is reluctant to pass on 
information to the others. In particular, a social reporter who has come up with a lead 
during an investigation of a political scandal will not wish to share his information with 
the political section in fear of a leak of the story to the politicians involved. As a result, 
such reporters may sit on the story for a day or two; knowledge which could have been 
pooled is not; news sources are not approached for information; the wrong section ends 
up writing the story; and, often, the final reports are badly written. Disputes between 
political and social affairs sections often occur during the coverage of political scandals.
To cite one example, during the coverage of HIV-infected blood products scandal 
surrounding the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) in 1996, the news angle shifted 
between the MHW, covered by political reporters, the High Court reporters, and the 
social affairs reporters covering the AIDS-infected plaintiffs. It is evident that there was 
a lack of co-ordination and exchange of information between these three groups of 
reporters because of the conflicting interests of sources. The political reporters relied on 
information from the MHW and intensely reported about how the Ministry was 
handling the problem. The Court reporters covered and closely followed senior MHW 
officers and medical specialists charged in the case. The social affairs reporters covered 
the AIDS-infected victims and their social networks. The hostile confrontation among 
these sources was highlighted when the three groups of reporters became increasingly 
uncooperative, and stopped sharing information. As a result, the coverage on this issue 
lacked consistent details of political events, as well as critical analyses of the links 
between bureaucratic irresponsibility and the complicated decision-making structure
Interview with Mr. Iwamura Tatsuro, Deputy Chairman Editorial Board, Asahi Shimbun on
November 18, 1998.
Tase Yasuhiro, Seiji Jaanarizumu no Tsumi to Batsu (Crime and Punishment in Political
Journalism). (Tokyo, Shinchosha, 1996), p. 107.
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surrounding this issue .87 Among the three groups of reporters following the case, the 
political reporters assigned to the MHW club seemed to have had the privilege of 
deciding the news direction, and what to report on the story. For example, the press 
conference calling for a public demonstration in front of the MHW covered by social 
affairs reporters went unreported. The MHW press release on that same day filled the 
political pages in most newspapers.88 Indeed, the close relationship between political 
reporters and their high-ranked official sources, as Hayashi argues, "fortifies a hierarchy 
within the newspaper company, mirroring exactly the hierarchy of the authorities they 
were in charge o f ' . 89 These close relations also make it difficult for reporters to face 
their sources when their papers publish unfavorable reports. Therefore, some political 
reporters even feel that social affairs reporters from the same company are their rivals, 
whilst they develop close connections with political reporters from other companies 
and regard them as their peers.90
An organizational emphasis on seniority also plays an important role in limiting 
reporters’ autonomy in initiating news direction. Junior reporters assigned to the 
reporters’ club have relatively little autonomy to develop their own issues or agendas, or 
decide how to approach the sources independently. Their handling and writing of stories 
are closely supervised by three or four senior reporters in the same team (chimu), one of 
which usually with the longest experience will serve as a captain (kyappu) while another 
will serve as a deputy captain (sabu kyappu). As Tase mentions, his job as a junior
Mochinaga Kazumi, for example, was a director of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau in 1983 
where he failed to prevent the provision and use of HIV-infected blood products. Professor Abe 
Takeshi was a Vice-Chancellor of Teikyö University and was leading an AIDS study group set 
up by the MHW in 1983. In his research, he found that untreated blood products could spread 
HIV among patients who had blood transfusion, but failed to raise the alarm. See analyses o f the 
press coverage on the case in Yokagawa Yoshio, "Yokonarabi shiko kara no datsukyaku wo 
mondai ishiki wo söshitsu shitsutsu aru kishatachi" (Eradicate from 'Pack' Ideas: the Loss of 
Sensing Problems among Reporters), Masu Komunikeshon Kenkvu. 1996, (48), pp. 86-100; 
Kawada Ryuhei, "Kisha kurabu wo benrina ketsueki seizai ni shinai de" (Don't make the 
reporters' club like blood products), Shimbun Kenkvü. 1997, (1), pp. 13-15.
Ibid.
Hayashi Kaori, "The Home and Family Section in Japanese Newspapers", Journal o f the 
European Institute o f Communication and Culture. 1998, 5(3), p. 57.
This point reflects the notion of tatewari gyösei (vertical administration) in the Japanese 
bureaucracy, where there is severe competition among bureaucratic units. The staff within 
these units feel loyalty only to those directly above and below them in the chain of command, 
and not to other units in the same 'horizontal' level. See Young Park, Bureaucrats and Ministers 
in Contemporary Japanese Government (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of 
California Berkeley, 1986), p. 114.
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political reporter on the Prime Minister beat was only about jotting down the Prime 
Minister's speeches and comments, and handing them over to the captain, who would 
decide how the whole story would be written.91
The process of newsgathering at the reporters' clubs is also highly routinized.
The regular workday of Japanese reporters at a reporters' club, as Feldman observes:
begins after the team meeting [usually at 10:00 A.M.] and continues until 
evening. There are occasion, such as at the time of cabinet reshuffles, 
when reporters stay at the club until late at night or early hours of the 
following day. ..On a regular day, when there is no need for certain types 
of information or a feature story, reporters spend the morning covering 
press conferences or listening to briefings given by various persons in the 
agency they cover.. .At noon, they have lunch and then, remaining in the club 
until 2:00 P.M., write stories for evening edition of their newspaper, 
watch television, read magazines, play mah-jong, take naps...From 2:00 to 
4:00 P.M., reporters make rounds to meet and chat with officials in the agency 
in search for information; and the hours after 4:00 P.M. are spent in receiving 
handouts, listening to lectures by representatives of the agency, or in writing 
stories for the next morning's edition of their paper.92
In comparison with their Japanese counterparts, Thai reporters are less prone to be 
subjects of direct intervention and interference by the sources, but they are less 
autonomous in initiating news stories. At Matichon, a paper widely circulated amongst 
the Thai middle-class, a daily news meeting will begin at 11 am on a regular working 
day. At the meeting, the chief of each news desk will meet with the front page chief, 
editor, senior editors, and executive editors. They will create lists of the top agendas of 
the days and brainstorm for new angles to approach the news stories. The senior editors 
and executive editor will assist in adding comments, and naming and contacting sources 
to interview. The chief of each desk will then summarize the news points and send 
directives to reporters on various beats to follow-up particular issues. These news 
chiefs and senior editors will meet again at 3.30 pm to report progress of news stories, 
and decide which news items are to be reported in the next edition. A proprietor of
91
92
Tase Yasuhiro, op. cit., pp. 64-5. Tase described his three main duties when he was a junior 
reporter watching the Prime Minister’s Residence: first, gather the list of people that the Prime 
Minister has met, and is going to meet, and should there be any person whom the prime 
minister has met of importance, contact that person for the content of the meeting: second, check 
the PrimeMinister's schedule and inform other clubs, when the Prime Minister happens to go to 
offices to which other clubs are attached; and third, leam about political structure and political 
connection within the Prime Minister's political circle.
Ofer Feldman, Politics and the News Media in Japan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1993), p. 75.
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Matichon sometimes sits in the news meeting and makes a crucial decision in news 
selection. The seniority system also holds its importance in the decision-making process 
within news organizations, as it does elsewhere in the Thai society.93 Yet, despite the 
existence of such a seniority system, and centralization in the chain of command, 
reporters in the field have a certain degree of autonomy to initiate their own news 
stories by pushing forward the boundaries of acceptability through the process of 
negotiation.94
Journalists’ career paths are quite similar to those of public servants in 
bureaucracies, for whom promotion is generally based on seniority. However, in 
comparative terms, political journalists in Japan have a more organized career route than 
their counterparts in Thailand, who have a relatively higher rate of mid-career job 
changes.95 For a Japanese political reporter, there is a strict hierarchy leading up to the 
news desk. After being transferred into Tokyo in the sixth or seventh year of his or her 
career, a junior reporter is then assigned to a specific government agency or the Prime 
Minister’s residence. In the latter case, after spending one or two years closely watching 
the prime minister, the reporter will then be moved to the Diet to cover either the ruling 
or the opposition parties. By the fourth or fifth year, that reporter will be promoted to 
cover the LDP, and assigned to follow a specific faction within the LDP. After about 20 
years in this beat career, the reporter will be called back to the political desk and will 
work his way up to editorial and administrative ranks. However, promotion to an 
editorial position is made on the basis of seniority rather than merit and competence.96
In Thailand there is an old saying: "follow the elders, and the dog won't bite you", which 
reflects the traditional preference of submissive roles for juniors within the society. See, for 
example, Niyaphan Pannasiri, "Seniority System in the Thai Society: The Thai University 
Campus Emphasis", Warasan san^khomsat lae manusavasat. January-June 1998, pp. 52-61. 
Interview with Mr. Suchart Srisuwan, Editor, Matichon on 29 April 1998.
During the period o f bubble economy in Thailand (from the late 1980s to 1997), there were high 
rates of job changes among journalists to other related areas such as public relations, and media 
production. Due to lack o f expertise in journalistic profession during that time, some even 
spent their rest days undertaking freelance employment. However, career uncertainty has 
emerged since the economic crisis engulfed Thailand in July 1997. Many journalists have lost 
their jobs, and some have had their salaries and bonuses cut. Interview with Chutima 
Buranachada, President of the Reporters' Association of Thailand (1997-98), and the news chief 
of the Daily News on April 28, 1998.
Tase Yasuhiro, Seiii iaanarizumu no tsumi to batsu (Crime and Punishment in Political 
Journalism!. (Tokyo: Shinchösha, 1996), p. 106.
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A major proportion of reporters tends to stay with their own organizations until 
retirement at the age of sixty.97 Moreover, these reporters, particularly in administrative 
positions, may be rehired within the same company group after retirement. Asahi 
Shimbun, for example, has 156 related companies that are best known as retirement 
sanctuaries for Asahi executives, or amakudari saki (descending route from heaven).98 
Additionally, there have been a number of cases in which these reporters have used their 
experience and contacts gained in the profession as a bridge into successful political 
consulting careers.99 The drawback of these appointments is reflected in bland and 
uncritical coverage of the stories related to the political organizations in which they are 
involved. The most recent case was an appointment of a former Yomiuri Shimbun chief 
editor to the National Public Safety Commission, which is in charge of reforming the 
Police Force.100 Yomiuri's bland and straightforward coverage on the issue was in a stark 
contrast to Asahi Shimbun’s discerning coverage of the same topic.101 There were also 
cases where senior reporters became political candidates even before quitting the 
journalism.102 Major newspapers such as Yomiuri, Mainichi, and Asahi have thus 
established a mle that such candidates have to stop reporting during their election 
campaigns and to quit should they be elected. However, there are often cases in which 
reporters, especially from the regional newspapers, have used their columns to publish
97
98
99
100 
101 
102
According to Mr. Nakajima Gengo, although the retirement age is set at sixty, most 
companies support their employees to accept retirement schemes at the age of fifty-five. However, 
the retirement age is also extended for those who sit in the boards of the company. Interview 
with Mr. Nakajima Gengo, Manager of International Affairs Department, Japan Newspapers' 
Publishers and Editors Association (NSK) on October 23, 1998.
These related companies are Asahi Culture Center Tokyo, Asahi Culture Center 
Fukuoka, Asahi Building, Asahi Gakusei Shimbunsha, and so forth. See Iwase Tetsuya, 
"Shimbun ga omoshirokunai rivu" (The Reasons Whv Newspapers are not Interesting!
(Tokyo: Ködansha, 1998), pp. 175-183.
Tase Yasuhiro, Jaanarisuto no sahö (Etiquette of Journalists 1 (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai 
Shimbunsha, 1998), p. 87.
Hanai Kiroku, “Media Credibility is at Risk”, Japan Times. July 25, 2000 (on-line edition). 
Ibid.
For example, an editor working for Nihonkai Shimbun in Shikoku became a local candidate in 
an election for a mayor of Tottori prefecture. Another reporter working at Shikoku Shimbun 
became a candidate for the next lower house election. See "Nihonkai Shimbun kisha tottori 
chijisen rikköho hyömei ato mo shomei ronsetsu wo keisai" {Nihonkai Shimbun still carries 
a by lined editorial article written by a reporter after his announcement of candidacy for a Tottori's 
mayor), Mainichi Shimbun. February 23, 1999, p. 25.
campaign material.103 Table 7 shows a sample of renowned Japanese politicians and 
Prime Ministers who have had journalistic backgrounds.
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Table 7: A List of Former Japanese Ministers and Their Journalistic Backgrounds
Press Organizations Politicians Former Ministerial 
Posts
Cabinets Attached
Asahi Shimbun Ogata Taketora Deputy Prime 
Minister 
Minister of State
Yoshida Shigeru 
Yoshida Shigem
Kono Ichiro Minister of State Sato Eisaku
Tagawa Seiichi Minister of Home 
Affairs
Nakasone Yasuhiro
Hosokawa
Morihiro
Prime Minister Hosokawa
Morihiro
Mainichi Shimbun Hori Shigem Administrative
Management
Secretariat
Tanaka Kakuei
Abe Shintaro Chief Cabinet 
Secretary
Fukuda Takeo
Yomiuri Shimbun ltd Soichiro Director-General of 
Defence Agency 
Director-General of 
Science and 
Technology Agency
Suzuki Zenko 
Takeshi ta Nobom
Fujio Masayuki Minister of Labour Suzuki Zenko
Sankei Shimbun Mori Yoshiro Minister of 
International Trade 
and Industry 
Minister of 
Construction 
Prime Minister
Miyazawa Kiichi
Murayama Tomichi 
Mori Yoshiro
Nihon Keizai Ichida Hirohide Chief Cabinet 
Secretary
Minister of Labour 
Minister of 
Transportation
Ishibashi Kanzan
Ikeda Hayato 
Miki Takeo
Tanaka Rokusuke Minister of 
International Trade 
and Industry
Suzuki Zenko
Source: Author compiled.
There are also a number of Thai politicians who have crossed over and engaged 
in journalistic activities, or launched their own newspapers while assuming political
103 "Kakanai koto ga shimbun hito no moraru" (Not writing is the newspaperman's morality), 
M amkhl Shimbm, February 23, 1999, p. 25; and "NSK Wams against Managing Editor's 
Abuse of Newspaper for Election Campaign", NSK News Bulletin. June 2000, 23(2), p. 1.
209
positions. These included a former Prime Minister, M.R. Kukrit Pramoj, and 
outspoken politicians such as Wira Musikapong, and Samak Sundaravej. Recently, there 
have increasingly been cases in which Thai TV broadcasters have used their public 
persona and reputation as a bridge to a political career. For instance, two elected 
members of the Democrat Party (1997-2001), including Jakkapan Yomjinda and 
Ladawan Wongsriwong, were once news anchors for state-owned channels - Channel 7 
and Channel 5 respectively. Newsreaders and showhosts of current affairs programs, 
such as Somkiet Onwimon and Chermsak Pinthong, were elected to the Upper House in 
March 2000, when Upper House Elections were introduced for the first time. However, 
not all of these newscasters have become a political success. Sansanee Nakpong, for 
example, quit her news reading job at Channel 7 to represent the Buddhist reform Palang 
Dhamma Party in 1992. Four years later, she returned to her news reading post at the 
same channel after failing to gain enough votes in the 1996 general election.
4.4 Newsmaking Process
Herbert Gans has defined news as “information which is transmitted from sources to 
audiences, with journalists -  who are both employees of bureaucratic commercial 
organizations, and members of a profession -  summarizing, refining and altering what 
becomes available from sources in order to make the information suitable for their 
audiences”.104 In the process of political newsmaking, journalists thus interact and 
contest for political information with sources. This contestation occurs at three levels of 
newsmaking process: when gaining access to political information, when interpreting 
political information, and when disseminating political information.
4.4.1 Access: Pack Journalism
The journalists’ ability to gain access to political information is often inhibited by the 
practice of pack journalism. Pack journalism is the practice of different reporters writing
Herbert Gans, Deciding What’s News (New York: Pantheon, 1979), p. 80, cited in Todd 
Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making & Unmaking of the New  
Left (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 251.
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virtually identical stories. 105 It is the result of rigid, bureaucracy-like organizational 
structures of news media organization. One characteristic of news organizations that 
mirrors bureaucracy is the beat system, which assigns journalists to gather news 
routinely at particular governmental offices, and hence ensuring that they work 
alongside politicians and bureaucrats. Such a system discourages initiative and limits 
personal autonomy. As Bennett observes, the beat system “brings reporters from 
different national news organizations to the same information sources and, as a result, to 
much the same stories” . 106 Moreover, to guarantee the steady supply of news, 
journalists must make sure to tap certain sources on their beat who provide continuous 
information that may be used to make news. Such sources also organize permanent 
access to the journalists, such as by providing exclusive information. As a result of this 
routine tapping, journalists partly share the interests of these sources, and ultimately 
apply legitimate relations with them. Their news production routines are finely tuned to 
the representation of the sources' actions, their point of view, and their ideology . 107
In the Japanese case, both print and broadcast journalists have been bound by a 
rigid structure of newsgathering dominated by factional reporting and reporters' clubs. 
The fact that the conservative LDP party was in power for a long time had a significant 
influence on how the newsgathering process of the news media organizations were 
structured. Accordingly, media reports on the party center around the factions 
(habatsu) which make up the LDP. These reports are more concerned about political 
infighting within and between factions than political policies.108 As these factional 
leaders are the most influential and important sources of political stories, two to three 
journalists are assigned to cover each main faction within the LDP, one of which will be 
assigned to follow each factional leader very closely. 109 Most reporters are also allowed
105 David L. Paletz and Robert M. Entman, Media. Power. Politics (New York: The Free Press, 
1981), p. 19.
106 W. Lance Bennett, “An Introduction to Journalism Norms and Representation o f Politics”, 
Political Communication. 1996, (13), p. 373.
107 See, for example, Rodney Tiffen, News & Power (NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1989).
Tase Yasuhiro, Seiii laanarizumu no tsumi to batsu fCrime and Punishment in Political 
Journalism). (Tokyo: Shinchösha, 1996), p. 14.
109 According to Feldman's survey of 395 Diet members in 1993, 99 members from the LDP met 
with reporters about three times or more per week. Feldman farther argued that the more 
political experience the Diet member has, the more frequent he is likely to be approached by
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to see the leading politicians on a daily basis, simply by knocking on their doors. 
According to Feldman's survey on the relations between reporters and Diet members, 
most Diet members regard meetings with reporters as priorities because the media, 
particularly the national press, not only gives them the most effective channel to reach 
millions of voters, but are also their sources of information. For Japanese reporters, 
meeting with these politicians is not a guarantee of access to abundant information. 
Rather it is an opportunity to learn about political dynamics and the interrelationships 
between political figures, which may impinge on decision-making and have policy 
implications.110
Media organizations in Japan generally assign a group of political reporters to 
eleven main clubs in Tokyo.111 They are also divided and assigned to follow factional 
leaders, influential members of the LDP, and leaders of coalition and opposition parties 
whose names have been included on the reporters' watch lists since the decline of LDP 
in 1993.112 These reporters are known as ‘bankisha’ or ‘night watchers’. They are 
assigned to follow important politicians from the time they leave home in the morning 
until they return at night. They even visit these politicians after working at their houses. 
In doing so, these bankisha use numerous tactics such as making night attacks (youchi), 
night rounds {yomawari), or morning visits (asagake) to their houses.113 Some of these 
reporters have become involved in the politicians' activities so deeply that they become
reporters. See Ofer Feldman, Politics and the News Media in Japan (Arm Arbor: University 
o f Michigan Press, 1993), p. 36.
Ibid., pp. 40-52.
These main clubs include the Prime Minister's Residence (Kantei Kurabu)', the LDP 
Headquarters (Hiragawa Kurabu); the Opposition at the Parliament Fa/d Kurabu)-, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (Kasumi Kurabu)-, the Defence Agency (Böeichö); the Ministry of Labor 
(Rödöshö); the Ministry of Health and Welfare (Koseisho); the Ministry o f Education 
(Monbushö); the Ministry of Justice (Hömushö); the Ministry of Home Affairs (Jijisho); and the 
Management and Coordination Agency (Sömuchö).
See, for example, a series o f Asahi Shimbun's columns on "Kawaru seiji hödö”
(Changes in Political Reporting) in "Bankisha kondan kieta" (Nightwatchers' Informal Briefings 
Disappeared!. Asahi Shimbun. 24 August 1993, p. 25; "[Kondan haishi] kanchö demo" (Kondan 
Briefings Also Discontinued at Government Offices!. Asahi Shimbun. August 31, 1993, p. 25. 
According to Feldman, "the 'night attack' is practised much often than the 'morning visits'. This 
is because...'night attacks', which begin at 8.00 pm, give reporters three or four hours to write 
stories before morning edition dateline. Night rounds can also serve as a method of squeezing 
information of a reporter who find himself without any item o f news at the end o f the day"
(p.90). See more details about youchi, yomawari, asagake, habatsu kisha, and bankisha in 
Chapter four: Reporting the Diet, The View from the Press Club in Ofer Feldman, Politics and 
the News Media in Japan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 63-93.
messengers for factions, carrying messages from one to another when there is a dispute. 
Some become the factional leader's right hand men, giving comments and suggestions on 
party policies. 114 Some even write memos for Prime Ministerial press conferences, 
advising on how to deal with sensitive questions.115 Because political information is 
accessed in this way, journalists are not encouraged to develop critical perspectives on 
politicians and their policies. Sometimes political factions also conduct reviews of 
journalists' reports about them, and should critical comments be found, there is a strong 
likelihood that the journalist will be shut out of the information loop. Consequently, 
factional reporters (habatsu kisha) tend to develop strong loyalty to the factions they 
cover. They even refer to their assigned faction as uchi (home). As the demarcation 
between uchi (home), and soto (outside) is strictly observed in Japan, these factional 
reporters are quite protective of their factional bosses, and do not share information 
they retrieve, even with other reporters from the same company . 116 Although most of 
these reporters agree that they do not need to get permission from these sources before 
publishing an article, they concede that they would not publish an article that might 
trouble their sources. 117
2 1 2
114
115
116
117
Writing from personal experience, Tase argues that factional reporters are easily manipulated 
by the factional bosses they are covering. Their positions in the faction are elevated as though 
they are "number two" within the political factions to the extent that they cannot make a clear 
distinction between their jobs as news gatherers, or policy makers. See Tase Yasuhiro, 
Jaanarisuto no sahö" (Etiquette of Joumalistsi (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1998), p. 
85.
In June 2000, a reporter from Nishi Nippon Shimbun found a memo written by an NHK reporter 
at the Diet Club. The memo was written to Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro a day suggesting the 
PM how he should respond at the upcoming press conference to media's inquiries about his 
remarks that “Japan is a nation of gods with the Emperor at its center” (kami no kuni). The 
story was first published by Nishi Nippon Shimbun, and later picked up by late night TV news 
programs, and weekly magazines. However, whether Prime Minister Mori actually read the 
memo could not be confirmed. See “Hitoku Joho' (Confidential Information), Shukan Bunshun. 
June 15, 2000, pp. 39-44; and Kawazaki Yasushi, “Shiru kenri wo fuminijitta seiji kisha no 
shishitsu ’ (The right to know was trampled by typical political reporters), Sekai. August 
2000, pp. 21-25.
These factional journalists use the word "uchi", which literally means "home", or in this case 
"we or us, or our faction", when interviewing or discussing with factional leaders or members, 
and even with their journalist counterparts. Tase Yasuhiro, op. cit., p. 84.
In 1993, a survey was conducted by the NSK of 1,735 political journalists working at 
newspaper or broadcasting companies. Around 40 per cent of respondents conceded that they 
have not fulfilled the role of a public watchdog by not closely and impartially watching 
powerful politicians, bureaucrats, as well as influential figures in the corporate world. About 
58.4 per cent of respondents suggested that they would not publish articles that would 
jeopardize their sources. See Akao Mitsufumi, "Nihon no kisha no idaku [Shimbun no kino] 
kan oyobi, [Shuzai hödö ni kakawaru koi no zehi] kan to sono közö no bunseki. . . " (Analyses 
of Reporters' Views about "the Functions of the Press", and the Structure and Views of 
"Newsgathering Activities and News Reports" . . .), Nihon Shimbun Kvokai Kenkvüio Nenpn 
1995, pp. 80-94.
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Reporters assigned to follow the Prime Minister closely, for instance, are known 
as 'son-ban' or ‘shushö-ban' (‘Prime Minister's watchers’). This group comprises 
mostly junior reporters who have just been moved to political affairs sections. Each 
news organization usually sends three or four reporters to this 'ban'3 18 These reporters 
use tactics such as ‘burasagari' (hanging), meaning hanging around or getting close to 
the Prime Minister or influential politicians as much as possible, or 'hako nori' (riding a 
box), meaning getting a ride with these politicians or following them in a separate car. 
However, in practice, only one reporter (usually from either Kyödö or Jiji news 
agencies) is allowed to walk or ride with influential sources, and is obliged to share all 
information retrieved from the sources with their fellow reporters.119
This practice of sharing information is tantamount to pack journalism (yoko 
narabi hödö), due to the way in which the press clubs organize and shape the content of 
information to reporters on a daily basis.120 This is because almost all major media 
organizations in Japan share the same kind of information sources, and receive almost 
identical types of information from the same channels on a daily basis, through the 
newsgathering activities at kisha kurabu. At Nagatachö, most of the reporters from 
various news organizations work together: they chat and exchange opinions among each
The usual participators of this beat include reporters from Kyödö, Jiji, Asahi, Mainichi,
Yomiuri, Nikkei, Sankei, Tokyo, and NHK. Reporters from commercial broadcasting are not 
always present.
It is important to note here that news agencies such as Kyödö and Jiji are major sources of 
political information for local papers, foreign correspondents, as well as weekly papers and 
organ papers like Akahata, which are not members of the reporters' clubs. See more about 
Kyödö and Jiji news services in Japan's Foreign Press center, Japan's Mass Media. About Japan 
Series No.7 (Tokyo: Foreign Press Center, 1997). "Bankisha kondan kieta" (Nightwatchers' 
Informal Briefings Disappeared), Asahi Shimbun. August 24, 1993, p. 25; "[Kondan haishi] 
kanchö demo" (Kondan Briefings also Discontinued at Government Offices), Asahi Shimbun. 
August 31, 1993, p. 25.
Ofer Feldman, Politics and the News Media in Japan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1993). In this book, Feldman emphatically argues that the Japanese reporters' clubs have 
shaped and determined: the nature and scope of political communications in Japan, the 
functions of the press and other channels of communication, the role of reporters, and the 
content of the information gathered and made known to the public. In his previous article, 
Feldman conducted a content analysis of news stories during the 1986 Japanese election 
campaign. He argued that political reporters tended to develop the same type of news frames, 
and the national newspapers often published similar items on the same day because most media 
organizations in Japan share the same channels of information, and, more or less, of the same 
nature, and the same scope of information. See Ofer Feldman, "Political Parties, Politics, and 
the Japanese Media". Keio Communication Review. 1991, (13), pp. 13-38.
other, and most importantly, they ask questions and receive answers from the official
sources in front o f each other in press conferences (kaiken), lectures (rekucha), and
informal briefings (kondan).121 Press conferences are usually short, and only a few
questions are asked by reporters, all of whom have previously been given press
releases.122 Lectures are usually given by top officials at a designated time, once or twice
weekly. In recent years, more and more reporters have become accustomed to heavily
relying on the press releases, and information received at the lectures in writing their
reports. A number o f critics have called this practice as happyö jaanarizumu
(announcement journalism).123 Consequently, news stories that appear in different
newspapers are sometimes almost identical. The lecture system has significantly been
generating news conformity among major newspapers. As de Lange notes,
It is the lecture system that diverts Japanese journalism of its 
vitality through stiffened procedures and endless repetition. The 
conformity of methods and the complete predictability of which 
the majority of news gathering activities embodied in the lecture 
system are executed ultimately result in a form of journalism that 
lacks any individuality of style and fresh insights.124
The collapse o f the LDP in 1993 was first regarded to have brought significant 
changes to the system of factional reporting and reporters' clubs. For instance, a number 
of reporters' clubs attached to government offices cancelled their kondan, and a larger 
number o f political reporters were assigned to cover small parties which made up the
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Nagata Kurabu , the largest reporters' club in Japan is located on the 2nd floor of the building 
which is next to the Prime Minister's residence. The club occupies a room of 288 square meters. 
In 1993, it had 608 members from ninety-seven news companies. See Iwase Tatsuya,
"Shimbun ga omoshirokunai rivu" (The reasons whv newspapers are not interesting).
(Tokyo: Ködansha, 1998), p. 297.
According to the statistics from the Monbusho kurabu (the reporters' club which is attached to 
the Ministry of Education), there were a total 110 press conferences, 162 lectures given by 
various people from the Ministry, and 786 press releases in 1994. Yoshikawa Yoshio, a reporter 
from Kyödö news service, commented that since the reporters have been spoon-fed, they became 
heavily dependent on government agency for information, thus, became too attached to the 
sources. See, Yokogawa Yoshio, "Yokonarabi shikö kara no datsukyaku wo - mondai ishiki 
wo shitsutsu aru kishatachi " (Eradication from pack journalism -  the recognition that has been 
lost from journalists’ thoughts), Masu Komvunikeeshon Kenkvu. 1996, (48), pp. 86-100.
Hara Yoshio, Jaanarizumu no Shisö (Thoughts in Journalism! (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
1997), pp. 155-56; Hirose Hidehiko, "The Press Club System in Japan", Keio 
Communication Review. 1994, (16), p. 73.
William de Lange, A History of Japanese Journalism: Japan's Press Club as the T ast Obstacle 
to a Mature Press (Richmond, UK: Japan Library, 1998), p. 187.
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coalition government.125 However, the return to power of the LDP led by Prime 
Minister Hashimoto as a governing coalition in 1996 brought back the monolithic 
structure of factional reporting.126 An NSK announcement of a new official view on 
clubs as venues for newsgathering in 1997 neither reduced the dominance of the 
reporters' club system nor abolished its exclusiveness. Moreover, the prevalence of the 
reporters' club system today not only determines the nature and scope of the press and 
its newsgathering function, but also the shape and functions of television news. As 
Krauss notes,
The club system's effect on newsgathering is magnified in the case 
of television news. Because the need for visual materials to accompany 
the news, advance warning of where and when stories are likely to break 
is crucial. This is why 'stage events', such as press conferences, and 
interviews, play a large role in the representation of television news.127
However, the breakaway from the reliance on the reporters' clubs as gatekeepers of
information can be seen in the recent popularity of 'life-interview' TV political
programs. Programs such as Sunday Projects, and News Station have provided TV
reporters a degree of autonomy to ask relatively more independent questions of
politicians than those asked in the non-confrontational environment of NHK programs.
To gain access to political information in Thailand similarly involves high profile 
official sources, such as the Prime Minister, ministers, party leaders, and senior 
bureaucratic officials.128 News organizations, in general, assign journalists to regular 
beats, known in Thai as ‘sai khao\ Important ‘sai khao’ includes the Government
See the series in Asahi Shimbun on "Bankisha kondan kieta" (Nightwatchers' Informal 
Briefings Disappeared), Asahi Shimbun. August 24, 1993, p. 25; "[Kondan haishi] kancho 
demo" (Kondan Briefings also Discontinued at Government Offices), Asahi Shimbun. August 
31, 1993, p. 25; "Shushöban [Hosokawa Ryu] ni tomodai mo" (Prime Minister's watchers were 
at a loss by Hosokawa's Style], Asahi Shimbun. September 2, 1993, p. 29; "Spokesman 
Takemura Ryu no Ikagetsu" (During a Month of Takemura, spokeperson), Asahi Shimbun. 
September 8, 1993, p. 29.
Kurashige Atsuro, a political journalist at Mainichi, suggests that despite the fall of LDP in 
1993, factional reporting is still a predominant factor determining news direction. In the press, 
in particular, news reports on political situation (seikyoku) largely dominates reports on policies 
(seisaku ). See Kurashige Atsuro, "Tsutaerarenai kokkai katsudö" (The Diet's Movements that 
are not conveyed!. So go Jaanarizumu Kenkvu. 1995, (152), pp. 68-73.
Ellis Krauss, "Portraying the State: NHK Television News and Politics", in S. J. Pharr and E.
S. Krauss (eds.), Media and Politics in Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996),
p. 110.
Other sources of domestic political news on which both Thai and foreign news organizations 
rely are such as the Thai News Agency (Sam Nak Khao Thai) which is state owned and attached 
to the Mass Communication Organization of Thailand (MCOT), INN News Agency and ABN 
News Agency which produce news specifically for radio broadcasting.
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House, the Parliament, the Army, the Ministry of Interior, and so forth. For example, 
there are about 120 journalists from the local media covering the Government House 
beat.129 These are people working closely on a daily basis with important official 
sources. Yet these Thai journalists working on such important beats do not get much 
opportunity for scheduled press conferences. Unlike their counterparts working on the 
same beats in Japan, who routinely wait for official press releases in the press club, 
Thai journalists usually run around an area in front of office buildings with microphones 
and cameras, or tape recorders, waiting to interview their sources as they arrive or 
depart the buildings. Due to the lack of a press gallery, journalists who work at the 
Parliament House beat usually have only one press briefing in a week -  after the cabinet 
meetings every Tuesday.
With few opportunities to conduct exclusive interviews, and a scarcity of 
information, Thai journalists are often forced to work in packs. They pursue a similar 
line of questioning in interviews, mostly focusing on the reaction of individual 
politicians to new developments, or the so-called news current (krasae-khao), in order 
to build up a news agenda (praden-khao). They share copies of released documents, 
transcripts of interviews, and manuscripts. Consequently, the news content from 
different media outlets offers few scoops or news breakthroughs coming from 
journalists on official beats. During the economic boom, these junior reporters were 
often hired right after graduation. They were then put to work with little training. 
Lacking experience, they could not predetermine news issues, and therefore could not 
pose appropriate questions during interviews. They frequently asked for news briefs 
from around a dozen of elder and better experienced colleagues on the same beat who 
were generally considered as ‘agenda-setters’ of their day. News stories from the same 
beat, therefore tend to be highly uniform. Even so, both newspaper and television
Each newspaper, radio and television station usually sends at least two reporters to station at the 
Government House beat to cover a number of important organizations located within the 
Government House including the Prime Minister's Office, National Security Council, Office of 
the Ministry's Secretariats, and so forth.
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broadcasting organizations prefer to appoint junior reporters as beat reporters because 
of their endurance and active nature. 130
Meetings with official sources of news do not always take place in government 
offices or Parliament House. They are sometimes held at party headquarters, or at 
houses of the secretary-generals of political parties or at houses of group (kloom) 
leaders. Some group leaders, for instance, open their house every weekend for press 
receptions and exclusive interviews.131 This practice highlights a distinctive similarity 
between the Thai and Japanese political party systems -  the preponderance of cliques, 
factions, or groups within main political parties.132 However, Thai political reporters do 
not gravitate towards groups within major political parties, since such groups (kloom) in 
the Thai political landscape are more easily dissolved or amalgamated than are factions 
in Japan.
Although the strategies Thai reporters use to gain access to group leaders are not 
as aggressive as their Japanese counterparts (who usually follow their news generators 
from morning until night), this practice of home visiting leads to similar results in that 
journalists are easily captured and manipulated by the sources whom they regularly tap. 
These reporters will neither reveal their sources' names when not allowed, nor criticize 
their sources because of a long standing custom which entails that reporters must be in 
awe of their sources (kreing chai lang khao). On the one hand, junior reporters are 
advised to ‘kreing chai’ their sources, or to have a sense of affiliation with their sources
130
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See, for example, Krikiet Phanphiphat, "Kwam pen meuarcheep...Singpung Prathana nai 
thorathat thai" (Professionalism...It is what we need in the Thai television broadcasting), in 
Kanchana Kaewthep (ed.), Lok Khong Seu (Media World Vol. 11 (Bangkok: Chulalongkom 
University Press, 1997), pp. 83-9.
Since the Democrat Party, led by Chuan Leekpai, was elected in 1997, General Sanan 
Kajomprasart, the secretary-general of the party, held a weekly press conference and reception 
in a suburb called Sanam Bin Nam in Nonthaburi province, which was known among reporters 
as the "Sanam Bin Nam Beat". The former secretary-general of the New Aspiration Party, Sanoh 
Thienthong, also known as the head of the "Kloom Wang Nam Yen", arranged similar meetings 
with the press every weekend at his house at Muang Thong Thani, or the so-called " Wang 
NamYen Beat". Interview with Somphop Praison, Chief Reporter (Front Page) on April 29, 
1998.
For discussion on the comparison of the political party systems in both countries see Likhit 
Dhiravegen, "The One-and-a-half Party System and the Halfway Democracy: A Comparative 
Perspective", in Yoshihara Kunio (ed.), Thai Perceptions of Japanese Modernization (Kuala 
Lumpur: Falcon Press, 1989), pp. 68-90.
in order to secure friendship. On the other hand, these junior reporters feel insecurity 
and a sense of fear (kreing klua) when faced by those who have high authority in 
political realm. The best thing they can do is feel ‘kreing chaf to achieve harmony and a 
non-problematic result. Reporters who cannot distance themselves from politicians are 
often used as informants to report political trends to politicians on a daily basis. Some 
of them end up parroting what politicians say.
A good illustration of this was the lack of media attention when some 3,000 
farmers camped outside Thai Government House from February to June 1998, 
demanding compensation for land lost as a result of government's construction of dams. 
The farmers camped for more than five months in front of Government House, but 
received little attention from the groups of journalists working inside. Reasons given for 
this lack of attention included a comment that "Our duty is to follow the work of the 
government, we cannot devote our time to covering the stories of people here"; and that 
"I suspect they get paid. I suspect some politicians are behind these people".133 
Notwithstanding their suspicions about the farmers' motivations, no journalists working 
inside Government House attempted to investigate these issues. Instead, they viewed 
the protest as 'not newsworthy' and blurred the dividing line between journalist and 
politician by making the same type of comments as those expressed by the Government 
House politicians themselves. Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, for example, had 
previously said: "I wonder where these people get money to cover all expenses while 
staying here".134 This case made what Paletz and Entman said about the American 
journalists nearly twenty years ago very applicable to Thai journalists nowadays: 
"Reporters find it expedient to see the world from the perspective of their sources".135
4.4.2 News Interpretation
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Cited in Supara Janchitfah, "A Conspiracy of Silence", Bangkok Post. June 21, 1998 (on-line 
edition).
Cited in “Rathaban Chuan kab mob mak chob long thi leod..namta' (The Chuan 
administration and rallies often ended in blood and tears), At hit. January 30, 1998, p. 30. 
David L. Paletz, and Robert M. Entman, Media Power Politics (New York: The Free Press, 
1981), p. 20.
The media’s ability to challenge state discourse depends largely on journalists’ ability to 
interpret news. Their task is to interpret political information by explaining the 
significance of ’facts', and to put them into proper context by offering relevant 
background information. One factor that determines such interpretation is the news 
value of the organizations.136 News value refers to the working rules of and guidelines 
for newsroom practices. However, such value is not simply given and available. It is 
constructed, interpreted, and elaborated in the actual setting of news work. It is used as 
the main criterion of selection of what constitutes news and what does not. It also 
guides the presentation of news items suggesting what to emphasize and what to omit. 
In Thai newspaper organizations such as Matichon, the five standard criteria applied in 
selecting news are: prominence, newness, freshness, extremity, and conflictuality. 137 As 
discussed below, extremity and conflictuality are generally the most crucial news values 
held by the Thai journalistic professionals.
Most Thai political journalists usually look for conflict in the political world 
during interviews. In doing so, they tend to look for conflicts between people rather 
than conflicts in the substance of policy issues. They conduct interviews by asking 
politicians to comment on other people's comments. In this way, an endless chain of 
arguments and counterarguments is created to fill newspaper space, or newsholes on 
television news. This so-called 'ping-pong' style of news reporting (khao ping-pong) 
consists of phrases like, "with regards to the restructuring of the Police Department, the 
Minister of Interior suggests that...and in response, the Chief of Bangkok Police 
Department argues that...” While a few journalists will analyze the pros and cons of the 
restructuring of the Police Department, most will try to interview key players involved 
in the process, and position these players in the news reports as if they were 
opponents in a boxing match. Yet, the practice of conflict-seeking in news reporting is 
based on the traditional school of journalism that teaches journalists to look for the 
controversy and disagreement that gives a story tension and drama. Although this kind
136
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John Hurst, "Journalistic Objectivity, Subjectivity in News Reporting and News Selection", 
Australian Journalism Review. January-December 1991, (13), p. 27.
Interview with Sommai Parichatre, Executive Director, Matichon Newspaper on April 23, 1998.
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of reporting does not necessarily convey any knowledge to audiences or readers, it 
appears to satisfy them. A Thai social activist, Dr. Prawase Wasi, views these practices 
as commercially driven. He claims that, ’’journalists present political news like reporting 
a boxing match because Thai people like boxing. Because of the audience’s preferences, 
the Thai news media continue to be shallow and nonsensical. Yet the news well reflects 
Thai society and its people”.138 Tannen also agrees that journalists, in general, have a 
tendency to present news as conflict, because readers and audiences enjoy watching 
fights. So the most extreme views are presented.139 Since news organizations are 
strongly driven by commercial motives, journalists are trained to look for disagreements. 
They eventually lose the ability to capture the essence of a story, or find any doubts or 
alternative views necessary to produce informative news.
Japanese journalists, to the contrary, do not determine news value in terms of 
conflictuality or extremity. Rather, they decide what is or is not news by reference to 
the source’s interests, which often outweigh the 'public's right to know’. In this regard, 
the close relationship between journalists and official sources play a major part in the 
process of news selection. The press's blackout of racist comments made by Prime 
Minister Nakasone in September 1986 provided a good example here. While giving a 
speech at the training session of young LDP members, the Prime Minister commented 
that the presence of ‘blacks’ and Hispanic American such as "Puerto Ricans and 
Mexicans” was the reason behind a supposed decline in American intelligence levels. 
Despite the fact that this LDP training session was attended by large numbers of 
reporters from both Nagatachö and Hiragawa kurabu, Nakasone's comments did not 
make headlines in any national newspapers. Tokyo Shimbun was the only paper that 
published the story, as a political tidbit. Although these comments were not made off- 
the-record, most reporters mutually and silently agreed that they were the kind of joke 
that Nakasone often made, and hence they did not score much news value. However, 
Akahata newspaper, which stands outside of this tight information loop, picked up the
138 Prawase Wasi cited in the Reporters' Association of Thailand, Wan nakkhan 5 minnkhom 2537
(The Reporters' Dav 5 March 19941. p. 69.
139 Deborah Tannen, A Destructive Culture of Critique (1994), cited in Paz H. Diaz, "The 'New
Edge' in Asian Journalism", Media Asia. 1998, 25(4), p. 191.
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story and featured it as a headline. The US media followed suit, and politicized it to the 
extent that Prime Minister Nakasone had to make a formal apology.140 This incident 
vividly demonstrates that the relationship between the information source and 
journalists in Japan has become too close for the journalists to establish their own 
judgement on news values that are different from the source's interests.
Yet standards of news value used to evaluate and present news in news media 
organizations, whose main goal is profit maximization, are largely determined not merely 
by their intrinsic significance — the presumed interest that readers and the audience may 
find in it -- but also by its commercial implications. The following case indicates that the 
economic crisis, which has impinged on the survival of the press in Thailand, has also 
affected the process of news interpretation together with the selection and production 
of news.141 During this crisis, news judgment in reporting certain ‘facts’ seemed to be 
less political and more commercial. Due to the economic slump that preceded the 
devaluation of the Thai baht in 1997, the overall advertising revenue of the media 
industry has diminished by a half. Consequently, each media organization has been 
struggling for advertising money. In this harsh situation, the news media have been 
easily manipulated by advertisers who are keen to pursue their own interests.
The case of news reports on the building of the Yadana Gas pipeline project 
between the Thai and Burmese borders illustrates this point. This project was 
undertaken by a consortium that comprised Myanmar Oil and Gas Exploration and the 
Thai government represented by the Petroleum Authority of Thailand {Por.Tor.Thor or 
PTT). The project was scrutinized by the media when a group of environmentalists and
140 Katsura Keiichi. Gendai no shimbun (Newspapers At Present! (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997), 
pp. 32-3.
141 The economic crisis had an enormous impact on the organizational structure and the future 
direction of the Thai press. Large newspaper groups with a large sum of overseas debts have to 
seek foreign investors to roll over their debts. For instance, the Nation Multimedia Group, 
owner of the English language daily, The Nation, had to allow foreign investors to own bigger 
stakes in the company for purely economic reasons. The increasing rate of foreign ownership 
of local media may foreshadow a possible change in the news value of these media 
organizations. In this regard, Kavi Chongkitthavom, an executive editor of the Nation, 
expressed his concern that the Nation will become more commercially oriented, and more 
regionally-oriented than locally-oriented due to pressure from foreign investors. Interview with 
Kavi Chongkitthavom, Executive Editor, The Nation on April 28, 1998.
human rights protesters, led by Sulak Sivaraksa, a famous social critic, filed reports that 
people from Burmese ethnic minorities had been used as forced labor to build the gas 
pipeline, with some allegedly killed. The reports also drew attention to the fact that the 
government's decision to pursue the project had been made without public consultation, 
and that they ignored substantial damage caused to the forest environment and local 
fauna, as well as communities in Kanchanaburi province through which the gaspipe was 
laid.142
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For its part, the PTT went on the counter-attack by threatening to withdraw its 
advertisements from the newspapers which had published sharp criticisms against the 
project. Amidst the crisis, no newspapers wished to lose big advertisers and the revenue 
they offered. Most of them chose to stop criticizing the PTT. Some newspapers even 
became more supportive of the PTT Yadana project than before. The PTT also 
launched a new PR campaign that aimed at promoting public and local support. In this 
campaign, the PTT purchased advertising space in both national and local dailies to 
publish its public relations advertisements, which took the form of normal news articles. 
Without using any references or the PTT logo, and instead employing headlines such as 
"Dusit Poll tells public's support for gas pipeline", these advertisements could be easily 
have been mistaken by readers as news items. These advertisements published in a 
number of high-profile dailies such as Matichon, Phujadkarn, Naew Na , Krungthep 
Thurakit and Thai Post, were highly supportive of the project, while distorting various 
facts .143 The PTT generously paid journalists and provincial media to write or report 
positive accounts on its behalf, as well as sponsoring television and radio stations to 
make special reports in support of the project.144 The government, led by the PTT,
Sulak Sivaraksa organized a demonstration in Kanjanaburi forest. He and a number of activists 
were later arrested and charged by the police for obstructing the construction o f the pipeline. See 
discussion of this case and samples of media coverage in Sulak Sivaraksa, Panvashon kahoth 
nam-pueng vod diew (An Intellectual's Rebel. A Single Drop o f Honevl (Bangkok: Song 
Siam, 1998).
Although some o f these materials were published in an ‘advertising space’, elsewhere they 
appeared not so much as advertising but rather as news items with the byline ‘by a designated 
reporter’. See Thawatchai Jaranai, "Tor gas pu parrd rai som, Por. Tor.Tor. turn ngob 
khosana" (The Gaspipe Laid Across the Orange Orchard, The PTT Heavily Advertised", 
Matichon Sudsapda. February 24, 1998, p. 68.
Rom Israrath, "Naew ruk dan tor gas ja k  Por.Tor.Tor pan sumolchon (The PTT's Counter 
Attacks Against the Media", Siam Rath Sapdawiiarn. February 22, 1998, p. 85.
eventually succeeded in finalizing the project by minimizing public space in which 
oppositional views could be aired. Given the economic crisis, journalists as well as 
media organizations were susceptible to the PTT and the government’s manipulation. 
Indeed, the PTT capital influence caused journalists, editors, as well as publishers to 
deviate from their objectivity, and to select and produce only positive views of the 
project.
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Commercial implications of news reports are considered cmcial factors in the 
process of selection and interpretation of news stories. In Japan, unfavorable reports 
involving major sponsors, advertisers, or creditors such as large commercial banksT and 
security companies often go unreported. Dentsu, the largest advertising company 
controlling around fifty per cent of Japanese advertising market, is credited with the 
power to control much of what is printed in the Japanese press about its client 
companies.145 The coverage of business malfeasance of big corporations, as a result, has 
been avoided by commercial televisions, as well as by Japan's public service broadcaster 
— NHK. For instance, when senior executives of Japan's largest brokerage house, 
Nomura, were arrested for agreeing to make up losses for major clients in 1991, NHK 
agreed with the company not to report the story in an exchange for its commitment to 
provide daily stock market commentary.146 As for newspapers, due to low profit levels 
and restriction on trading their shares in the stock market, companies have become 
heavily dependent on bank loans for capital investment.147 Accordingly, the press rarely 
names big banks when publishing unfavorable pieces. A case in point involved an 
exclusive report in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun morning edition of November 22 1997 of 
the collapse of Yamaichi Securities.148 A week before the publication most reporters
Peter Hadfield, "Japan: Keeping in with the Club", Index on Censorship. July 1991, 20(7), 
p. 16; Mr. Nakajima Gengo of NSK also admits that the influence o f Dentsu in directing the 
news reports are undeniable. Interview with Mr. Nakajima Gengo, Manager o f International 
Affairs, Nihon Shimbun Kyokai on October 23, 1998.
Spencer Sherman, "NHK Japan: East Meets West in the Newsroom", Columbia Journalism 
Review. March/April 1994 (on-line edition).
D. Eleanor Westney, "Mass Media as Business Organizations: A US-Japan Comparison", in S. 
J. Pharr and E. S. Krauss (eds.), Media and Politics in Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1996), p. 56.
Nagano Yoshikazu, " [Yamaichi shöken jishu haigyö] e no sukuupu"] (Anecdote on Scoop of 
Collapse of Yamaichi Securities! Shimbun Kenkvii . 1998, 10, pp. 15-18.
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attached to the press club at Yamaichi Securities suspected that something had gone 
wrong, when the negotiation between executives of Yamaichi Securities and foreign 
investment companies came to a dead end. Yet most reporters did not pick up any 
signal of the seriousness of the issue. They did not even believe that such a first rate 
company, which was a hub of financial information as well as a major creditor to a 
number of media companies, would easily collapse. 149 On the following day, Yamaichi’s 
stocks dropped sharply, and rumors of further drops in price also circulated. Despite all 
these ‘objective’ facts, no reporter attempted to investigate the situation, or report the 
true causes of the problems. The story had been discreetly kept behind closed doors for 
a week before being exposed by Nihon Keizai Shimbun.150
4.4.3 Dissemination
To disseminate news, political information that has been gathered is sorted and 
packaged in a way that reflects media organizational rules and journalism norms. Since 
the onset of journalism education in Thailand, students have been taught that a sharp 
line should be drawn between facts and opinions. ‘News’ is simply defined as ‘fact’. 
Any simplification or elaboration of the journalist's opinions and emotions cannot be 
incorporated into news reportage. Instead, this is to be located within ‘comments’. 
However, it has often been the case that this dividing line becomes blurred, because 
‘facts’ in Thai news are not pure facts, or facts that come from solid evidence or proven 
sources. Instead, they often originate from rumor mongering, anonymous letters, fax 
sheets from unidentified sources, or documents dropped by an unknown messenger who 
quickly disappears. Yet rumor and materials from unconfirmed sources have long been 
important sources of ‘facts’ in the Thai news media. It is believed that rumor occurs 
when there is an imbalance between urgent demand for information and a failure in 
supply . 151 Indeed, supply of political information in Thailand, especially from 
centralized bureaucratic sources, is inadequate and often released with exploitative goals,
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Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid.
Jeremy Tunstall, Journalists at Work (London: Sage, 1971), p. 17.
such as to attack political opposition, or to cover up the real story. The reliance on 
rumor was explained by Suthichai Yoon, an editor-in-chief of The Nation:
You learn soon enough in this profession not to trust facts especially 
when they come from the authorities. The more senior they are, the 
more suspicious you should be of their "facts". But with rumor, you 
know you are up to something very interesting. They offer you the 
whole range of "facts" to choose from.153
Thus, ‘factual’ political stories in the Thai press are in fact based almost entirely on 
rumor, which might in fact be entirely somebody's opinion. Yet this practice of heavy 
reliance on rumor as a tip for "facts", especially in the press, has left editors and 
publishers to become increasingly vulnerable to libel lawsuits.
In the Thai press, there is an important norm that news and comments are to be 
presented separately. Comments are caged in the editorial columns. News that is all 
about ‘facts’ commands the news pages, and each piece is usually very long. The 
distinction is institutionalized in the contrast between reporters and columnists. News 
is written based on information mostly provided by junior reporters who work on beats 
and send ‘facts’ to the news desk by phone or fax. These facts are then edited by the 
so-called 're-writer', and presented as ‘news’ in a broadsheet style . 153 Comments, on the 
other hand, are generally presented in editorial and other specialized columns. They are 
produced by columnists, who present their own opinion on popular issues, which 
sometimes do not conform to the stance presented in the news content on the front page 
or in any other columns. Often they ‘fun thong’ or ‘strike a flag’ by making judgments 
and speculating on issues by deciding the rights or wrongs, or what will happen usually 
without seeking out the ‘facts’ or relevant material. Most of these columnists are 
experienced journalists, who are well connected and have a large network of news 
sources. Because of their extensive connections, most comments made by these
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Suthichai Yoon, "In Defence of Political Rumors", Thai Talk (Bangkok: Nation 
Publishing, 1995), p. 203.
Duncan McCargo, Policy Advocacy and the Mass Media in Thailand (Bangkok: Institute of  
Public Policy Studies), p. 26.
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columnists are often biased, merely reflecting their own vested interests . 154 Television 
journalists have also recently highlighted this practice of separation between "facts" and 
‘comments’. Using a newspaper format, an iTV evening news program has attached a 
short news analysis, which purely reflects journalists’ opinion on the lead story of the 
day.
In the Japanese case, the ideological division between 'facts' and 'opinion' is, on 
the contrary, not held so firmly by television journalists. Earlier findings of an analysis 
of news content of TV news programs suggested that news anchors and reporters often 
insert overt political opinion and comments into news items. 155 However, this is not the 
case as for newspaper journalists. Current practices of newsgathering activities and 
news reporting indeed do not allow such a mixture of facts and comments in Japanese 
newspapers. Political news articles are already filled with the government's news 
releases and official speeches, leaving little room for any analysis. A couple of editorial 
columns written by senior editors thus become the only space where the press presents 
its opinion. Moreover, a reporter's name, or the so-called 'by-line' (shomei) attached to 
the news article, becomes a signal of whether that article is based almost entirely on 
facts, or embedded with personal opinion. In order to claim objective reporting, and to 
avoid causing source-reporter conflicts, Japanese newspapers have not carried many by- 
lined articles (shomei kiji) until recently. 156 Most newspapers tend to believe that by- 
lined articles allow reporters to present different views, which could jeopardize the 
'trusting relationship' with their sources. Mainichi Shimbun, for example, has adopted an
Two recent cases confirm that Thai columnists have used their influence and connections to 
achieve their own ends. The first case involved two well-known columnists who had a personal 
sideline in the tree selling business successfully lobbied the Ministry of Interior for building 
two pub he parks in Bangkok rBangkok Post. July 20, 1998 (on-line edition)]. The second case 
revealed that a number of leading columnists had used their influence to place their offspring in 
an elite primary public school fThe Nation February 4, 1999 (on-line edition)].
A comparative study of news content of NHK's 7 o'clock news and TV Asahi's News Station 
suggested that more frequently, reporters or anchors give a commentary or analysis far more 
often on News Station than on NHK, particularly on the topics concerning politics and 
government. See Ellis S. Krauss, "Changing Television News in Japan", The Journal o f Asian 
Studies. August 1998, 17(3), p. 673.
There have been two major changes in news presentation in Japanese newspapers during recent 
years: the size of news articles have been larger, and there have been more by-lined articles than 
before. See Tamaki Akira, "Kawari hajimeta nihon no shimbun" (Japanese Newspapers Began 
to Change), Sogo Jaanarizumu Kenkvii. 1996. (156), pp. 18-23.
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internal guideline regarding by-line attachment: journalists must not attach their by-line 
to police, judicial, or political matters because this may cause harm to the journalists; 
they must not attach their by-line when a news source is identified, and the source may 
be troubled by such identification; and they must not attach their by-line to articles that 
are written based entirely on personal opinion or observations.157 In practice, by-lined 
articles are not encouraged by the current newsgathering structure in which news 
reporters are assigned to work not individually, but as a team. Moreover, editors feel 
that a uniform and consistent position must underscore the treatment of similar stories 
throughout the papers. As a result, such normative practices preclude representing 
views different from others.
4.5 Self-Censorship
Another level of normative practices within news media organizations that limits the 
media’s ability to disseminate political information concerns self-censorship. To 
prevent interference from authorities that try to uphold the existing social and political 
orders and prevent any contestation, both Thai and Japanese journalists impose self- 
restraint on coverage of their monarchical systems. In Thailand, any critical analysis of 
the monarchy, any publication of speech or comments that are deem detrimental to the 
monarchy, as well as publication about the crime of lese-majeste itself, is discouraged by 
the threat of a lese-majeste charge. According to Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Law, 
whoever commits the crime of lese-majeste or min-pramat (causing injury to sovereign 
power) against the king, heir apparent or regent shall face three to fifteen-year 
imprisonment.158 As the Thai monarchy has been placed at the epicenter of the Thai 
sociopolitical life and the national identity, any injury caused to the monarchy can be 
seen as disloyalty not only to the monarch but also to the Thai national government.159
157 These kinds of opinionated articles include comments about the mental state o f power players in 
politics. Therefore, they are usually written by reporters who closely follow the politicians such 
as factional reporters and nightwatchers (bankisha). Hara Yoshio, Jaanarizumu no shisö 
(Thoughts in Journalism! (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997), p. 164.
158 Manit Sooksomchitre, Koo-meu kodmai thi na roo samrab nak-khao (Legal Manual for 
Reporters! (Bangkok: Press Development Institute of Thailand, 1995), p. 2.
159 See a critical analysis of the case of lese-majeste in nineteenth-century Siam in Craig Reynolds, 
"Sedition in Thai History: A Nineteenth-Century Poem and Its Critics", in M. Chitakasem and 
A. Turton (eds.), Thai Construction of Knowledge (London: School of Oriental and Asian 
Studies, 1991), pp. 15-36.
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However, most journalists are unwilling to report news that may tarnish the 
image of the royal family not only because of the threat of a lese-majeste charge, but 
also of genuine belief that under the present king the monarchy is above criticism. 
According to Kobkua, Thais view the current King Rama IX, or King Bhumibol, as a 
’’constitutional monarch in his own class”, who has united the country and has at least 
twice led the country out of a dangerous political impasse, in 1973 and 1992, when all 
other means had failed.160 A foreign academic also asserts that the King is seen by the 
Thai public as having an important role in the development of the Thai political system 
and its course of democratization, although the King's conservatism has influenced the 
way in which the pivotal position of the monarchy are preserved through such 
course.161 Another academic went so far as to say that the King's political involvement 
is seen by the public as national salvation. The King has held out solutions for many 
pressing problems ranging from traffic, flooding to violent political crises.162 For these 
reasons, the King continues to be regarded by the Thai public as "revered, sacred and 
inviolable”.163
By and large, the Thai monarchy does not receive critical coverage because the 
les-majeste law is often strategically utilized by political factions or military cliques to 
threaten and attack their political enemies. As breaches of the les-majeste law are 
categorized as one of the "violations against the national security of the state" in the
In Kobkua's words, "In the eyes of the world, the source of Bhumibol's unique power is the 
respect, esteem, love and thrust of his people. Bhumibol has made his own version of 
constitutional monarchy a reality" (p. 11). Kobkua also argues that King Bhumibol has 
established a 'Thai way of constitutional monarchy' of which the King would have a role to 
intervene during the country's political crises, as well as when the country and its people facing 
insurmountable difficulties. His recent initiation of projects and ideas to overcome the countrys 
economic difficulties brought about by the devaluation of the baht could be seen as a good 
example here. See Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, "The Post-1972 Constitutions: Preliminary 
Analysis of Constitutional Monarchy a la Thailand", Paper presented at the 7th International 
Conference on Thai Studies, University of Amsterdam, July 4-8, 1999.
Kevin Hewison, a political economist, argues that the King is inherently conservative, and has 
sought to define a conservative polity which would preserve the power of the monarchy. To that 
end, the King has acted outside the limits of the constitutional monarch, by involving in the 
political and legislative processes. For further discussion see Kevin Hewison (ed.), "The 
Monarchy and Democratization", Political Change in Thailand (London: Routledge, 1997), 
pp. 58-74.
David K. Wyatt, "The Student Prince Who Saved A Monarchy", The Asia-Pacific Magazine. 
June 1996, pp. 17-24.
Section 2, Article 8, the 1997 Constitution of Thailand
Criminal Code, those who commit the crime are thus seen as national perpetrators. For 
instance, Wira Musikapong, a former Deputy Minister of Interior, faced a les-majeste 
charge for saying in a 1986 campaign speech that if he could choose where he could be 
bom, then he would choose to be bom in the heart of the Grand Palace. In fact, Wira's 
case would not have made it through the court should political conflicts among the 
politicians and the military had not escalated. Despite his formal public apology and 
pledge of loyalty to the King, Wira was accused by the military of harboring communist 
links, and given a four-year prison term on lese-majeste charges as a consequence.164 
Streckfuss summed up the case by arguing that "lese-majeste creates a space in which 
threats to the monarchy can seem almost infinite and can be read into almost 
anything”.165 All Thai journalists seem to know that most of the lese-majeste charges 
laid in the past were politically motivated. Journalists can too be easily silenced should 
they go beyond the discursive norms relating to the monarchy as allowed by the state, 
which has claimed for itself the duty to protect the King’s honor.166 They have also 
leamt that dissemination of the crime itself can also lead to charges of lese-majeste.167 
Foreign journalists covering Thailand voluntarily exercise self-censorship because they 
fear being banned from the country, as comments on the monarchy are easily construed
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David Streckfuss suggests that this was largely a political case, in which Wira, a leading 
member of Democrat Party traditionally opposed to the military, was charged with the most 
serious political crime. The military and the opposition parties then carefully insinuated 
communist connections and warning of its threat to national security. He also argues that the 
fact that Wira was given a royal pardon after a month in prison demonstrated that the charge of 
lese-majeste was used as an opportunity for the state to temporarily silence its opposition. See 
David Streckfuss (ed.), "King in the Age of the Nations: The Paradox of Lese-majeste as 
Political Crime in Thailand", in Modem Thai Monarchy and Cultural Politics: The Acquittal 
of Sulak Sivaraksa on the Charge of lese-mqieste in Siam 1995 and Its Consequences (Bangkok: 
Santi Pracha Dhamma Institute, 1996), pp. 54-80; See also Sulak's case in which his dissent 
against the ruling military force (The National Peace Keeping Council) allegedly slandered 
the monarchy in the same volume.
Ibid., p. 457.
Another good example here is that a lese-majeste charge was filed against Dr.Pradit 
Chareonthaithawee, a physician, who commented on the health of His Majesty on television. In 
the television interview, the physician appealed to the politicians to stop fighting for power for 
the sake of the King's ailing health. A politician who filed a charge against him was Piya 
Angkinan, an MP from Petchaburi province who claimed that the physician's comments caused 
people to panic. See "Lese-majeste Filed Against the Physician", Bangkok Post. November 7, 
1997 (on-line edition).
In 1973, Siam Rath was suppressed by the Print Act of 1941 for publishing the Thai National 
Salvation's Movement condemnation of the Monarch. M.R Kukrit Pramoj, the newspaper's 
publisher, who considered himself a royalist, defended the decision to publish the criticism, 
by claiming that the newspaper was obliged to defend the monarchy when it was attacked. 
However, the newspaper was eventually charged for publishing what the officials saw constituted 
lese-majeste. See David Streckfuss, op. cit., pp. 460-61.
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by the Thai state as criticism. In 1994, an Australian newspaper, The Age, published a 
cartoon showing the King in what appeared to be a party hat, and accompanied this 
with a story about a royal pardon given to an Australian drug smuggler on the occasion 
of the King's birthday. Thai government officials later rejected applications for working 
visas to Thailand by two Australian journalists.168 The Melbourne radio station 3AW 
was also obliged to apologize on air for a story aired by a breakfast announcer which 
referred unflattering terms to the King.169
Both the les-majeste law and the self-censorship of journalists indeed play a 
large part in preserving the state construction of what it contends is a sacred national 
identity with the monarchy at its center.170 The narratives on the monarchy that appear 
in the Thai media, as a consequence, emphasize coverage of his Majesty's sociopolitical 
achievements and activities. Gossip surrounding the royal family, and any critical 
analyses of the powers or privilege assigned to the Throne which are exercised or abused 
by the King or members of his family, are wholly suppressed by means of self­
censorship (unlike the way in which the British media generally report about their 
monarchy). Moreover, the practice of self-censorship by broadcast journalists is also 
reinforced by the Ministerial Regulation on Broadcasting No. 14, which was issued in 
1994 under the 1955 Broadcasting Act, and which emphasizes that broadcast programs 
should not offend or insult the King, but should promote knowledge, understanding, 
responsibility, and awareness in Thai democracy with the King as Head of State.171 All 
television channels must also broadcast a clip on royal news every day at 8 pm. In 
television coverage, the King is always seen in motion, visiting farmers, or with map in 
hand directing rural development projects in the distant villages, and the Queen is shown
168 Nick Carter, "Angry Thais Ban Two Journalists", Daily Telegraph Mirror. October 7, 1995.
169 Ibid.
170 For further discussion on the role of the mass media in the construction of an authorized national 
identity of "nation, religion, and king" in Thailand see Annette Hamilton, "Rumors, Foul 
Calumnies, and The Safety of the State: Mass Media and National Identity in Thailand", in C. 
Reynolds (ed.), National Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand. 1939-1989 (Chieng Mai: 
Silkworm Book, 1991), pp. 341-79.
171 Clauses 14 and 16 in the Ministerial Regulations on Broadcasting No. 14 issued in 1994 under 
the Broadcasting Act of 1955. See Thailand : Broadcasting Act 1955. 1987 & Regulation
on Broadcasting 1992 (Bangkok: Public Relations Department, Office of the Prime Minister, 
1995), p. 63.
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supervising women's handicrafts and other off-farm works, while the Crown Prince and 
Princesses are seen distributing clothing, food, and medicine to villagers, or attending 
Buddhist ceremonies at temples. The Thai press echoes these reports of royal activities 
by printing pictures distributed by the Royal Household Bureau (Samnak 
Phraraatchawang), with small captions in official honorific language. The royal family 
is seen as making merit or 'tam bun', with the king presenting the locus of barami, or 
charisma, acquired through accumulation of merit in past incarnation. As Jorgensen has 
argued, media coverage of the King's activities could be seen as a means of diffusing that 
'barami7 throughout the kingdom.172
Unlike the Thai monarchy, the Japanese Emperor system (tennosei) is not 
considered sacred, but it is mystified by conflicting narratives and myths, which in turn 
keep it sublime yet lacking a clearly defined position in the society.173 M yths 
surrounding the emperor system are "situated in the so-called 'empty-center' that 
harmonizes conflicts which renders them invisible".174 Accordingly, these conflicts have 
upheld the emperor system and the Imperial family in a peculiar social position. Before 
the Second World War, the Emperor (tenno) was a living deity, and therefore sacred and 
inviolable.175 Crimes against the dignity of the sovereign were subject to the Penal Code 
of 1880. After the war, this Code was rescinded and the Emperor system was subject to 
a process of depoliticization and humanization largely by the mass media's
Only recently has alternative discourse on the Thai monarchy increasingly become an object of 
mass consumption. Pictures of third-generation royal heirs in different wardrobes, and their 
exclusive interviews frequently appear on leading fashion magazines. Stories about Prince and 
Princesses' unsuccessful marriages, which were previously kept discreet, are now allowed to be 
published, with royal permission. Although the sacredness of the monarchy seems to be 
lessened in this light, certain subjects surrounding the monarchy regarded as 'taboos' remain 
unassailable. These subjects include the mystery surrounding the untimely and accidental death 
of King Rama VIII, the subject of Crown Prince's committing adultery, and the question of 
future successor to the Throne. For detailed discussion on the monarchy, the media, and 
identity creation inThailand. See Nickolas E. Jorgensen, "Media and Identity Creation in 
Contemporary Thailand", Unpublished Thesis, Master of Science, San Jose State University, 
1995.
See discussion on competing discourses on the Emperor system in Fujitani Takashi,
"Electronic Pageantry and Japan's Symbolic Emperor", The Journal of Asian Studies. November 
1992, 51(4), pp. 824-50; and Fujitani Takashi, Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in 
Modem Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
Inose Naoki, Mikado no shözö (Portrait of the Mikado 1 (Tokyo: Shogakkan, 1986); Quote in 
Fujitani Takeshi, "Electronic Pageantry and Japan's Symbolic Emperor", op. cit., p. 826.
The Japanese word for "emperor" is "tenno”, meaning 'the ruler of the heaven', which signifies 
the traditional belief that the Japanese emperor is a god in human form.
visualization.176 The abolition of penalties for the crime of lese-majeste and the 
guarantee of free speech in Japan have also allowed various competing discourses on the 
monarchy to be pursued by the media.177 Through these discourses, the monarchy has 
been treated like stars, and eventually it became a product for mass consumption. In 
particular, the Japanese monthly and weekly magazines, which are famous for their 
sensational muckraking, have spearheaded such pursuits.
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On the other hand, there is a traditional view among Imperial Household officials 
that Imperial affairs should be kept private and dealt with in secrecy. The public should 
obtain only official narratives of the affairs of the Japanese monarchy as directed by the 
Imperial Household Agency (kunai-chö). There has recently been a resurgence of this 
view as exemplified by a ban on the media's reports on the true nature of Emperor 
Hirohito's illness during the months before his death in 1989, although the media were 
allowed to report on his symptoms and vital signs.178 In 1992, the Imperial Household 
Agency also requested that the NSK impose a three-month news blackout on Crown 
Prince Naruhito's search for a bride.179 Any kondan meetings between reporters and 
members of the Imperial family are considered off-the-record. Reporters of publications 
that published leaked stories or content from the informal meetings are banned from 
entering the Imperial Palace.180 The Agency's institutional position has also enabled
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The remaking of the Emperor involved the denunciation of a divine Emperor and the 
humanizing process including the physical appearances of the Emperor and Empress at national 
functions and events, and their contacts with people by travelling around the country. This 
humanizing process was intended to familiarize people with the royal family, and at the same 
time, the frequency and banality of appearances via the mass media made them less sacred. See 
ibid, and also Sugiyama Mitsunobu, "Shinkenpö shita de daijösai wa do atsukai beki ka?" 
(How should Daijösai be handled under the new Constitution?), Shinbun Kenkvu. 1990, (472), 
pp. 57-64.
In Japan, the sentence for those found guilty for the crime of lese-majeste before the end of the 
Second World War was a two-month to five-year sentence. This lese-majeste law was 
abolished by the SCAP during the occupation period.
Sugiyama Mitsunobu, "National Essentialism and the Emperor System in Japan", Review of 
Media. Information and Society (University of Tokyo), 1996, (1), pp. 19-43.
In February 1992, the Imperial Household Agency and the Nihon Shimbun Kyökai agreed 
to suppress reports on the prince's search for bride on the grounds that excessive coverage on the 
issues had led to the violation of privacy of bridal candidates. The Imperial Household Agency 
demanded 'a quiet environment for choosing a Princess'. The NSK agreed to the news blackout, 
but asked for the continuation for newsgathering. As a result, when the ban was lifted after the 
Washington Post had reported that Owada Masako was a likely candidate, most major 
newspapers and broadcasting channels had two or three-page scoops or special broadcast 
programs prepared well in advance. Interview with Mr. Nakajima Gengo, Manager of 
International Affairs Department, Nihon Shimbun Kyökai on October 23, 1998.
In March 1996, a women’s magazine, Josei Sebun, published an article detailing the content of
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them to request a ban on certain news stories, or photographs deemed detrimental to the 
image of the Imperial family. To cite one example, when Prince Akishino married 
Princess Kiko in June 1990, a Kyödö wire service photographer, Nakayama Toshiaki, 
took a picture of Princess Kiko touching Prince Akishino's forehead during an interval of 
the wedding photo session. The Imperial Household Agency considered the picture 
unsuitable for publishing and requested the Tokyo Photographers' Association to stop 
releasing such photographs. The Association rejected the request as it came after the 
photograph had been released. The Agency then sent a request for a ban on that photo 
to Reuters, which is generally in charge of releasing photographs to foreign media. Being 
in awe of the Agency, Reuters has never released that photograph. The Agency also 
suspended Nakayama from working at the court. Feeling disappointed by quiet 
responses from the NSK and major media on the issue, Nakayama resigned from 
Kyödö.181 Although most journalists and their associations in Japan perceived such the 
Agency's maneuvering as a clear violation of press freedoms, no journalist representative 
has been willing to stand up and say it publicly. This again reflects a key component of 
Japanese culture -  Könne’ versus ‘tatemae\ or ‘real intention’ versus ‘stated 
principles’.182
Although the Agency's functionaries play important roles in gatekeeping offical 
information, breaking royal news based on leaks and gossip often slips through the 
reporters' club attached to the Imperial Household Agency.183 The Japanese mainstream
the informal meetings with the Crown Princess. Although the published content was merely 
about the kind o f food that she liked cooking, and what book she was reading, the Imperial 
Household Agency considered that the reporters attended the informal meetings broke the off-the- 
record rule. The Agency considered to stop arranging such meetings for reporters. See 
Maruyama Noboru, "Köshitsu tabuu kishakurabu Kötaishihi [kareeto Oe] hatsugen ojureko 
södöno ayashii) (The Imperial Family's taboo and the problem concerning the off-the-record 
disclosure of the Crown Princess fondness of curry and Mr. Öe's book), Tsukuru. 1996, (5), pp. 
108-117.
Katö Kazuo, "[Köshitsu hödö] görika ron ni miru - Botsu minshushugi kankaku" (Viewing 
Rationally on Reports of Imperial Family - They are truly undemocratic senses", Bunka 
Hvöron. September 1990, (355), pp. 222-225. For more details on the case o f Princess Kiko’s 
photograph see Nakayama Tetsuaki, Kiko hi no migite (Princess Kiko’s Right Handl (Tokyo: 
Joho Sentaa Shuppan Kyoku, 1992).
See also Yamazaki Kazutami, "Press Freedom Japan-Style: Bow and Scrape", Nikkei Weekly. 
April 4, 1992, p. 7.
On December 10, 1999, Asahi Shimbun broke the story of the possible pregnancy of Princess 
Masako.The entire story was based on "exclusive news sources in the Imperial Household".
This Asahi's scoop was followed by an ambiguous response from the Household Agency which 
led other major papers and sensational weekly magazines to cover the story in details. Twenty
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media are, however, cautious in covering reports of such stories. Threats from right- 
wing groups in Japan have forced Japanese journalists to improvise some forms of self- 
restraint (jishuku).m  There have been a number of cases in the past in which those who 
made critical comments about the Emperor and the Imperial System were physically 
assaulted by right-wing groups. For instance, the Mayor of Nagasaki, Motoshima 
Hitoshi, was shot and seriously wounded for asserting that the Showa Emperor was 
responsible for the Pacific War. A house owned by a professor who attacked the 
Imperial Household for spending public money on extravagant religious ceremonies was 
also shot at.185 The monthly and weekly magazines such as Takarashima 30 or Shükan 
Bunshun which had made critical comments on the Empress Michiko in 1993 also 
received similar threats. Both magazines were eventually forced to publish formal 
apologies to the Empress.186 During the coverage of the Emperor Hirohito's illness in 
1988-89, taboo subjects such as Korean minorities and Asian colonialism, which would 
have linked the Showa Emperor to the Pacific War, were omitted by the media.187 
Instead, they upheld the policy of forgetfulness by confining their coverage to only 
about the Emperor's achievements and his liberalist views after the War. In a few 
instances, the media used public opinion polls or external contributors to express
days later, the Agency announced that the Princess has been pregnant but has suffered a 
miscarriage. The public blamed the media pressure. Other media shifted the blame on Asahi 
which first reported by relying the story solely on leaks without official confirmation. See 
"Covering Imperial Pregnancy", NSK News Bulletin. March 2000, 23(1), pp. 4-5.
"Heisei no köshitsu hödö '89-97 wo tettei kenshö suru: uyoku tero,kunai-cho atsuryoku ni 
masukomi wa kusshitaka" (Thorough Examination of Reports on the Heisei Family '89-'97: 
Were the mass media daunted by the right-wing terrorism and pressure from the Imperial 
Household Agency?i. Shükan Gendai. November 29. 1997, pp. 170-73.
Ibid. On April 12 1990, Professor Yuge Tooru, a former Vice Chancellor of Feris Graduate 
Women's University, and professors from three other Christian Universities publicly opposed 
the use of public money for religious ceremonies during the enthronement of Emperor Akihito. 
Ibid. In July 1993, Takarashima 30, a weekly magazine published an article based on a source 
working in the Imperial Palace. The article slandered the Empress, saying that her Majesty 
asked for instant noodles even at 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning. Two months later, Shükan 
Bunshun, a weekly magazine, critically commented on her Majesty's dislike of the 
Defence Force uniform, and her dishonoring of her husband's father by ordering the cutting down 
of trees in the Palace. The Imperial Household Agency held a press conference to 
denounce the magazines' comments, and pleaded the media to stop harassing her since her 
Majesty was so depressed by the comments that she lost her voice.
The Koreans living in Japan are descendants of those who were brought to Japan by force labor 
or came to make a living in Japan, which came to a peak during the Second World War. At the 
end of the War, the Koreans who decided to stay in Japan were considered 'aliens'.The third 
and fourth generations of these Koreans were constitutionally declared as 'foreigners' and had to 
live with social discrimination. See Hanami Makiko, "Minority Dynamics in Japan: Towards a 
Society of Sharing", in J.C. Maher and G. Macdonald (eds.), Diversity in Japanese Culture and 
Language (London: Kegan Paul International, 1995), pp. 121-46.
criticism . 188 In short, most of the mainstream media in Thailand and Japan publish 
stories about their royal families, which reflect dominant viewpoints and avoid issues 
that might provoke threats of lese-majeste (in the Thai case), or attacks from right-wing 
forces (in the Japanese case)189, or negative responses from conservative readers (in 
both cases). As a result, most media limit their royal reports to weddings, births, and 
travels.
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4.6 Journalism Ethics
Journalism ethics are one of the key determinants of the media’s ability to interpret and 
disseminate political information accurately. The lack of personal values in professional 
ethics can result in journalists’ legitimation of the state’s version of political discourse. 
The very nature of the profession allows journalists to be in close contact with their 
sources, including powerful and wealthy politicians, businessmen, as well as local mafia 
figures. In the Thai case, journalists are easily drawn into a vicious circle dominated by a 
culture of patronage and money politics, in which the practices of "gift-giving" 190 and 
"kin muang" 191 have been largely prominent. 192 Corruption among Thai journalists has 
existed since the end of the Second World War, when the practice of factional politics 
was at its peak and partisan newspapers proliferated. As Bowra has argued, political 
survival or patronage were traditionally the basis for the associations between the 
power holders and journalists in the past, whereas present day journalists tend to give 
greater consideration to benefits being derived in a given context. 193 This may be due to
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Sugiyama Mitsunobu, "National Essentialism and the Emperor System in Japan", Review of  
Media. Information and Society (University of Tokyo), 1996, (1), pp. 19-43.
In June 2000, two right-wing extremists attacked the editor and deputy editor o f "Uwasa 
no Shinsö, a weekly magazine which published an on-line report on its margin addressing 
Princess Masako without an honorific "sama" saying that she may be pregnant again. It is a 
protocal for Japanese media to refer to Princess Masako as "Masako-sama". The extremists 
demanded an apology from the editor and his deputy, and attacked them when they refused. See 
"Japanese extremists attack editor, deputy editor over princess reference", The Associated Press 
June 8, 2000 (on-line edition).
Patrick Jory, "Corruption, the Virtue of Giving, and their Political Culture", Paper presented at 
the Sixth International Conference on Thai Studies, Chieng Mai, Thailand, October 14-17 
1996.
'Kin muang' can be defined as a custom in which officials make use o f their posts to earn extra 
income.
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan, Corruption and Democracy in Thailand 
(Bangkok: Chulalongkom University, 1994).
Ramaimas Bowra, "Media and Political Communication in Thailand: The Role in Policy 
Advocacy", Political Advocacy and the Media in Thailand (Bangkok: Institute o f Public Policy
the fact that since the late 1970s, political power in Thailand has changed hands quickly, 
and there is no necessity to commit to a relationship with certain political figures. News 
has become a commodity exchanged for money, assets, and favor between powerful 
persons and some journalists.
The scale of this type of corruption has been identified in three kinds of 
practices: that of nungsuphim sopenee (newspaper prostitutes), or journalists who have 
been hired to write in favor of someone, or to attack someone in exchange for money or 
favors that suit their own interests; that of nungsuphim joan (newspaper thieves), or 
the activities of economic and entertainment journalists who can easily blackmail 
businesses and movie or TV stars for their own benefits; and that of, song khao 
nungsuphim (newspaper’s white envelope), which generally refers to money or gifts 
received from government offices or private sector bodies in return for favors.194 During 
the bubble economy, lavish parties and luxury goods such as mobile phones, laptop 
computers and overseas trips replaced the old form of money and cheque in 'white 
envelopes'. It has been claimed that some reporters working rounds at the Government 
House and the Parliament, in particular, have received a monthly wage, or lump sums of 
money from the politicians they covered, in exchange for favorable-treatment. As there 
is little space in newspapers and television news spots are very brief, and a lot o f favors 
need to be returned, journalists are forced to omit other important news items which do 
not present their sources' or their own interests.
Because of growing concerns about the pervasive nature of corruption among 
Thai journalists, the Press Council of Thailand (PCT) was established in July 1997 as 
an independent regulatory body to control and check the ethics of daily newspapers and 
their journalists.195 The Constitution of 1997, which guarantees the protection of rights 
and liberties of employees of media organizations (Article 41), saw a panel of media 
experts set professional standards and ethical guidelines for broadcasters. Due to the
Studies, 1997), p. 72.
Boonlert Changyai, Song khao nungsuphim (Newspaper's White Envelopes! (Bangkok: 
Matichon, 1996).
"Cleaning Up the Press", The Bangkok Post. August 11, 1997 (on line edition).
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unprecedented freedom and protection guaranteed to the media by the Constitution, it is 
likely that some journalists will abuse these new rights for their own benefit. The 
economic crisis in 1997 brought about the closing down of newspapers and the 
reduction of salaries and staff.196 The establishment of the above-mentioned 
organizations was therefore necessary, timely, and appropriate. However, concerns 
regarding the effectiveness of such a self-governing body as the PCT have been raised 
because of its recent failure to discipline or impose sanctions on corrupt journalists.
In early 1999 a weekly political magazine, Siam Rath Sapdawijarn, published a 
leaked copy of the ledger of a well-known Cabinet minister. The ledger detailed the 
personal expenses of the minister including the payment of 150,000 baht to a named 
Bangkok Post journalist as a down payment on a car, and another 100,000 baht to an 
unnamed Thai Rath reporter. Both journalists covered the Government House beat. 
Other reporters covering the Government House and the Parliament submitted a 
complaint to the PCT urging it to investigate the matter and reprimand the journalists 
who were alleged to have received bribes.197
The list of journalists receiving bribes in the ledger further prompted the 
associated newspapers to conduct their own internal investigations. The Bangkok Post 
immediately suspended its journalist. However, the accused journalist argued that it was 
his money which he had spent on the down payment for the car but had used the 
minister's name in order to get an early delivery of the vehicle. Owing to a lack of 
evidence, the PCT could only find him guilty on the grounds of using his status as a 
journalist to acquire a privilege. Despite his action, this journalist did not receive any 
social sanction and was soon hired by another leading newspaper, Naew N a.m  In the 
case of the Thai Rath reporter, the PCT also failed to press any charges due to a lack of
196 Since the economic crisis took off in July 1997, there have been about 12 national dailies and
more than 40 provincial newspapers closed down, and about 3,600 journalists and media related 
personnel out of work. See Kavi Chongkitthavom, "Think Thai/Economy Threatens Media 
Freedom", The Nation. April 21, 1998 (on-line edition).
"PCT Urged to Probe Pay-Offs to Journalists", The Nation. February 2, 1999 (on-line edition).
It is interesting to note that his relationship with the same Cabinet minister is still strong. 
Apparently, his new job contact was made through Prasong Soonsiri, a senior columnist of 
Naew Na.
evidence.199 These recent corruption cases prompted English-language papers such as 
Bangkok Post and The Nation to review and tighten their codes of conduct in order to 
preserve their long-standing reputations.200 Most Thai-language papers, however, seem 
to keep their faith in the PCT, whose effectiveness as an independent, self-governing 
body based its authority on member companies' disciplinary procedures and social 
sanction has become increasingly doubtful. Many critics suggest that, like other 
investigative bodies in Thailand, the PCT has become a mere 'sua kradat’ (paper tiger), 
meaning a body which has power on paper, but is inept at imposing penalties.201 Its 
credibility has been undermined entirely by the voluntarism on which it rests.
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A culture of patronage and an intimately close reporter-source relationship has 
also been a major cause of impropriety among journalists in Japan, where gift-giving 
customs have deep cultural roots and play an important part in politics.202 Former 
Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, for instance, was well known to have given reporters a 
bundle of money for spending on funerals of their relatives.203 An investigation by local 
ombudsmen into systematic corruption within the Japanese bureaucracy, in which a 
large amount of taxpayers' money was spent on receptions for bureaucrats known as
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At the same time, another case of journalistic impropriety was revealed during a police 
investigation following the arrest of an illegal migrant. Wolfgang Ulrich, a German real estate 
developer known as "No. 2" among the foreign Pattaya mafia figures, was alleged to have used a 
Bangkok Post journalist in the Pattaya Branch as a go-between for passing money to his lawyer. 
Although it was originally suspected that the money would be used to secure the release of 
Ulrich through the journalist's political connections, it was shown in the police evidence that 
the money was only a legal fee. Therefore, the Press Council did not bring forward any charges 
and the Bangkok Post considered the matters closed. It was, however, discovered later that 
another reporter working for the Thai language business paper, Krungthep Thurakit, had a 
substantial share in the legal office used by Ulrich. The Press Council did not investigate this 
case since no complaint was filed. Even so, Krungthep Thurakit disciplined the reporter, cutting 
his salary and suspending him from work for six months. See the rulings of each case at 
http://www.bangkokpost.net/presscouncil.html.
Rom Israrath, "Post'puedprachapijam rang janyaban import" (The 'Post' Opened a Forum to 
Draft an 'Imported' Code of Conduct), Siam Rath Sapdawiiarn. March 14-20, 1999, p. 87; 
Thawatchai Jaranai, "Kae klong Kavi Chongkittavorn nayok samakhon nakkhao pu ma kab 'mai 
kwad' lae kamsung 'ow wine pai kuen " (New President of the Reporters' Association of 
Thailand, Kavi Chongkittavorn, Who came with 'Sweeper' and Order to 'Return the Wine'), 
Matichon Sudsapda. March 9, 1999, p. 68.
Suravitch Wirawan, "Sapha Nungsuphim: San phraphum" (Press Council: Spirit House), Siam 
Rath Sapdawiiarn. February 7-13, 1999, p. 43.
As Mitchell observes, "gift-giving acts as a glue that bonds a society; reciprocity was demanded 
of politicians". See Richard H. Mitchell, Political Bribery in Japan (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1996), p. 143.
Interview Mr. Nakjima Gengo, Manager of International Affairs Department, The Japan 
Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association on October 23, 1998.
'kankan settai’, was conducted in 1997-98.204 The findings revealed that some public 
money was also spent on receptions for bureaucrats and reporters, known as 'kanpö 
settaf.205 ’Kanpö settai' are generally held as a setting for 'kondari meetings, or as a 
thank you dinner party to reporters after such meetings. Other forms also include 
gorufu taikai (golf meeting), and enkai ryokö (travel banquet) at luxurious hot springs or 
ski resorts. The findings disclosed that, during 1994 and 1995, the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government held as many as sixteen receptions with a total value of about six million 
yen ($A86,000) for reporters working at the two reporters' clubs attached to its 
office.206 In his national study of public money spent on reporters' clubs, Iwase gave an 
estimate of about fifty million yen ($A700,000) of public money being spent on 
receptions for reporters and bureaucrats each year.207 In another case, it was evident 
that money spent on the lavish receptions was not public money, but bribery money 
that officials had discreetly received.208
2 3 9
Once reporters are treated in this way, they are obliged not to write anything 
that could jeopardize their relationship with the sources whom they meet almost every 
morning at the reporters' club, and sometimes eat and drink with at dinner receptions. 
As such obligations are essential to the 'trusting relationship' with these sources, 
reporters tend to 'legitimize' their wrongful conduct, and act against 'the public right to
know' by keeping quiet on issues. For instance, it is known that reporters at the club 
attached to a tax office in the Kansai area are regular guests at tax officers' expensive 
dinner parties. These reporters admitted that they were asked not to cover scandals
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This investigation resorted to the Public Information Act at the local government levels. 
Shimizu Yasushi, "Kanpö Settai to Jöhö Kökai" (The Press-Bureaucrats' Reception and the 
Disclosure of Public Information), Hösö Repooto. March-April 1998, (151), pp. 2-8.
The two clubs attached to the Tokyo Government Office are Yüraku kurabu and 
Kajibashi kurabu. There are altogether 23 media companies and 78 media personnel assigned to 
these clubs. Reporters assigned toYüraku kurabu are from Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, 
Yomiuri Shimbun, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Tokyo Shimbun,Kyödö Wire Service, and NHK. 
Reporters assigned to Kajibashi kurabu. are from Sankei Shimbun, Nikkan Kögyö Shimbun, 
Nihon Kögyö Shimbun, Jiji Wire Service, Naigai Times, Japan Times, Nihon TV Tokyo 
Broadcasting, Fuji TV, TV Asahi, TV Tokyo, Cultural Broadcasting, Nippon Broadcasting, 
Radio Japan, FM Tokyo, Tokyo Metropolitan TV. See Ibid., p.3.
Based on questionaires responded by 800 reporters' clubs around the country, Iwase gave 
detailed analyses and figures of how much both national and local governments have spent to 
operate and maintain each reporters' club. See Iwase Tatsuya, "Shimbun %a Omoshirokunai 
Rivü” ^Reasons Whv Newspapers are not Interesting) (Tokyo: Ködansha, 1998), p. 24.
Shimizu Yasushi, op. cit., p.5. It is reported that the monthly lunch with reporters paid by the 
Hokkaido City Government has been made possible by bribery money.
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surrounding the office in exchange for information on tax evasion allegedly committed by 
some well-known persons.209 In 1994, a group of local ombudsmen in the city of Kyoto 
utilized confidential information made available through the local Public Information Act 
to sue the City Mayor and his administration for using large amounts of public money 
to pay for the City reporters' club's telephone bills, kondan, and kanpö settai. The High 
Court ruled in favor of the Kyoto City Administration, against the argument that the 
Kyoto City authority had used public money to exploit the mass media to act against 
the public’s right to know.210
Whilst Thailand has the Press Council as a sanctioning body, Japan has a self- 
regulatory body -- namely, the Mass Media National Ethical Council. This council was 
established in 1955 with the purpose of improving the standard of reporting. Because 
the Council is loosely based on co-operation among media organization members, it has 
not had much success in solving ethical problems, as any agreements or 
recommendations cannot be directly enforced.211 Moreover, most newspapers do not 
report irregularities within their own organizations, and do not criticize other 
newspapers. Instead, most media organizations believe that matters should be dealt with 
by the company itself, and therefore prefer self-imposed sanctions. These self-imposed 
sanctions are usually applied to deal with the common problem of false reports. Once a 
report is found to be based on false information, the reporter who filed the report is 
obliged to resign. In some cases, the President of that newspaper would also resign to 
convey his responsibility and express the company's guilt to the public.
To cite one example, on April 20, 1989 Asahi Shimbun published on its front 
page a large colored photograph of an initial K.Y. carved on destroyed coral near 
Okinawa. The article that accompanied the photo condemned the carving, suggesting
209 "Gokuhi [shimbun kisha settai] no shösai deeta wo kokai suru" (Disclose Detailed Data of 
the Confidential 'Reporters' Receptions), Shükan Bunshun. February 26, 1998, p. 35.
210 See details of the rulings in Tajima Yasuhiko, "Kisha kurabu bangumi kakunin seikyü, jöhö  
kökai wo megutte" (Reporters' Club, Demand for Early Viewing o f Programs, and the 
Information Disclosure!. Shimbun Kenkvu. March 1997, (548), pp. 86-89.
211 Takeichi Hideo, "Ethics Problems o f Japanese Media", Komvunikeeshon Kenkvu. 1995, (25), 
pp. 67-77.
that it was an act of environmental destruction. Later, it was found that the Asahi 
photographer was in fact the carver. He admitted that he committed the act because he 
could not find much damage on the coral in the area. He was immediately fired from 
Asahi, and the company President resigned soon after. Asahi later established an internal 
committee to monitor and probe into its ethical problems.212 For the first time in the 
history of Japanese newspapers, Asahi also launched a 'media column' in June 1991 to 
report development and changes in the media industry and the journalistic profession. 
This move was quickly mirrored by other newspapers such as Mainichi and Sankei.2U 
Yet it is apparent that the rule of not criticizing others in the same industry is still 
strictly observed in these media columns.
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The recent increase in cases of journalistic impropriety regarding false reports 
and kanpö settai prompted the Japan's Newspapers Union Alliance (Nihon Shimbun 
Rödö Kumiai Rengö) in February 1997 to launch a sanctioning body similar to the 
system of the Press Council.214 This so-called Media Council was established to 
revitalize journalist attitudes towards social responsibility. In the same year, the NHK  
and the Japan's Commercial Broadcasting League (Nihon Minkan Hösö Renmei) also 
allied to set up a Broadcasting Human Rights Committee (BRC), or Hösö to Jinken 
nado Kenri ni kansuru Iinkai, to investigate complaints concerning the nature of public 
and commercial broadcasting programs.215 Unlike the existing Mass Media Ethical 
Council, members of these two new councils will comprise legal advisers, academics,
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Ibid., p. 69.
Takahashi Ikuo, "Asahi Shimbun [Medeia ran] no kokoromi" (Attempts of Asahi Shimbun's 
Media Column), Sögö Jaanarizumu. 1992, (140), pp. 82-85.
Japan's Newspapers Union Alliance (Nihon Shimbun Rödö Kumiai Rengö) observes and tries to 
improve ethics among journalists at the individual level. Japan's Newspaper Publishers and 
Editors Association (Nihon Shimbun Kyökai), on the other hand, monitors ethics among media 
organization members at the industrial level. Sometimes, these industrial and individual 
positions brought the two organizations into conflicts. For instance, Japan's Newspapers Union 
Alliance was in dispute with Japan's Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association when the 
latter dismembered Nara Newspaper on the grounds that it had spent all money donated 
through it for the victims of Kobe earthquake for its own purposes. The dismembering has led to 
unjudged dismissals o f individual journalists working for Nara Newspaper from all reporters' 
clubs. Katsura Keiichi, "Kisha kurabu wo shin no shuzai kyoten to suru tameni" (In order to 
make reporters' club to be a real ground for newsgathering", Shimbun Kenkvu. June 1998, (563), 
pp. 43-45.
Committee 21, " [Medeia to shimin-hyögikai] wo teian suru,shimbun,zasshi.shuppan ni shimin 
akusesu no shigumi wo” (Propose to Form a Committee Between the media and the public - An 
Instrument for the Public in Gaining Access to the Press, Magazines, and Publications), Sekai. 
November 1999, pp. 149-58.
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media researchers, and representatives of the public.216 The Japan's Newspapers Union 
Alliance, in particular, launched a Declaration compiling a long list of journalist's 
reporting guidelines, of which some articles seem difficult to put into practice. For 
example, Article 1(5) suggests the disclosure of off-the-record comments when the 
reporters consider that the information will benefit the public. Article 2(1) suggests that 
by-lines should be attached to all articles. Article 3(1) recommends that reporters shall 
be critical on all subjects, including the subject of Imperial Family.217 These unrealistic 
recommendations have also cast doubt over the plausibility and effectiveness of the new 
Media Council in imposing penalties and improving ethics among journalists.
4.7 Comparative Remarks
Journalists are the principal representatives of the media. Thus, they are expected to act 
professionally in a political communication system. In other words, they are expected 
to have good knowledge and understanding of their profession, to work autonomously 
within an organization, and to deliver good services with high ethical standards. 
However, the foregoing discussion of the practices of Thai and Japanese journalists 
suggests that journalistic practices in both countries are still constrained by a number of 
dilemmas and problems which, in turn, can limit the scope in which the media can resist 
the state's push to have more control over political information by imposing legal and 
extralegal measures on the press, or strengthening its rewarding ties with the 
broadcasting elite. Consequently, it is difficult for the journalists to act professionally 
and employ the utmost level of their expertise when reporting about the state.
These dilemmas and problems include the system of education, recmitment and 
training that prevents journalists in both countries from acquiring professional 
knowledge necessary to arrive at a judgement of public interests. The lack of 
understanding of the professional concept of ‘objectivity and impartiality’ among Thai 
journalists, and the rigid boundary built around the concept by the Japanese media
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Nihon Shimbun Rödö Kumiai Rengö, Shimbun hito no rvöshin sengen (Declaration of 
Jounalists' Conscience) (Tokyo: Shimbun Rören, 1997), p. 4.
Ibid., pp. 1-2.
undermine journalists’ abilities to achieve their presupposed professional goals. The 
newsmaking process involving gaining access to, interpreting, and disseminating political 
information in Thailand appears to obstruct the flow of essential political information to 
the public. The beat system, and the press club system in Japan, confines journalists to 
seeking political information within limited geographical areas, and dissuades them from 
actively searching for news. The emphasis on personal rather than policy conflicts, and 
the arbitrary division between news and comments have also constituted a lack of 
analysis. In Japan, particularly, the monolithic and hierarchical structure of 
newsgathering system dominated by factional reporting and the system of reporters’ 
clubs allows journalists little autonomy to undertake their own professional action, and 
leaves many loopholes for external interference. The role of journalists is, as a result, 
relegated to that of ‘messengers’ who passively convey governmental directives to the 
public .218 In addition, an anomaly in Japanese culture, through which consensus and 
conformity is promoted by social sanction, encourages journalists to be conformist and 
bound by the informal rules and sanctions imposed by the reporters' club and the 
sources. Wakamiya Yoshibumi, a deputy managing editor at Asahi Shimbun comments 
on the importance of these rules and journalistic practices: "in Japanese society, it is 
difficult to hold healthy debates...We have to get information from our politicians. If 
you ask sharp questions, you may end up being isolated, even from other 
journalists" .219 Similar rules and sanctions are absent in Thailand. Although young Thai 
reporters feel in awe (krieng chai) of their sources, there are no sanctions imposed when 
they conduct their own investigations into news stories. However, the sources may 
impose sanction on Thai journalists should they dislike the journalist, or personally feel 
that their interests are threatened by journalists’ investigation. However, the sanctions 
imposed on Thai journalists are usually on an individual basis, not on a group basis like 
those in Japan.
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The term "messenger" was coined by Feldman to call political reporters at Nagatachö B eat. 
See Ofer Feldman, "Nagatachö Beat: Messengers or Minions?", Japan Quarterly October- 
December 1996, 43(4), pp. 20-28.
Cited in Howard French, "Sex and Scoops in Land o f a Very Cautious Press, Racy Weeklies 
Partly Fill the Gap in Japan", International Herald Tribune. February 7, 2000 (on-line edition).
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Normative practices of self-restraint on the issue of the monarchy in both 
countries further limits journalists’ autonomy to pursue questions that would perhaps 
challenge the legitimacy of the existing political systems, where allegiance and identity is 
still largely organized. Moreover, the recent establishment of sanctioning bodies, such as 
the Press Council in Thailand and the Media Council in Japan, signals attempts at both 
the industrial and societal levels to deal with the alarming problems of journalistic 
corruption and improprieties. As knowledge, organizations, autonomy, service 
responsibilities, and ethics of these journalists constitute their professional expertise, 
the deficiencies in these qualities undermine the likelihood that the mass media can have 
expert relations with the state, and thus reduce the media's ability to resist the state's 
push for more control over political information. The improvement of these qualities 
would increase the media's ability to contest with the state, and promote the shift to a 
more active role for the Thai and the Japanese mass media.
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CHAPTER FIVE
POLITICAL INFORMATION CONTESTS AND CHANGES IN THE 
POLITICAL ROLE OF THE DOMESTIC PRESS
The press played a crucial role in assisting the constitutional 
drafting process by getting the public to become involved 
and debate the pros and the cons, by gaining support from  
the public, and by criticizing those who were campaigning 
against radical reform, all o f which eventuated in the cabinet's 
passage o f the Constitution.
Boonlert Changyai1
As much as seventy per cent o f the Japanese press plays an 
adversarial role to the government. There have been a number o f  
cases wherein major political corruption was exposed. However, 
this critical information was entirely based on special investigations. 
Routine newsgathering at kisha kurabu does not allow journalists 
easy access to such information. Politicians, themselves, block 
the flow  o f essential political information to the public. Some o f them 
do not even know what is political information.
Iwamura Tatsuro2
As discussed in Chapters Two and Four, the legal and extra-legal measures that 
both the Japanese and Thai states have imposed on the press, as well as a number of 
shortcomings incurred by normative journalistic practices, have undermined the press's 
ability to struggle with the state for control over political information and perform a 
watchdog role. However, to what extent has the press in these countries successfully 
struggled with the state to construct and define its own political discourse despite such 
limitations, and what other political roles has the press performed? This chapter seeks 
to address these questions by discussing the overall nature of the press in both 
countries. Emphasis is placed upon press coverage of domestic politics, as well as four 
case studies of press coverage in both countries.
Interview with Boonlert Changyai, Executive Editor, Matichon Daily on April 24, 1998. 
Boonlert was also an elected member of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA). 
Interview with Iwamura Tatsurö, Deputy Chairman Editorial Board, Asahi Shimbun on 
November 17, 1998.
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5.1 The Domestic Press in Thailand and Japan
Before discussing the nature of the domestic press in each country, it is necessary to 
point out distinctive similarities and differences apart from censorship and journalistic 
practices that have shaped the structure of the Japanese and the Thai press systems. 
Firstly, the number and circulation of Japanese newspapers is much larger than that of 
the Thai press. In 1998, the annual ratio of newspaper circulation per 1,000 people in 
Japan was 577 copies -  the highest per capita rate in the world -  whereas newspapers 
in Thailand had an average circulation of 194 copies per 1,000 people per year.3 Japan 
is famous for its superb mass education system, which has produced a literate public. In 
Japan, the compulsory education system was introduced in 1872, and by 1890s school 
attendance had already risen above 50 per cent in Tokyo.4 By contrast, Thailand only 
enacted the first compulsory primary education law in 1921,5 and twelve-year 
education will only become compulsory in the year 2002. Compared to Japan where the 
literacy rate is almost a hundred per cent, Thailand still has a mass illiterate public. As a 
result, a written rather than a visual news culture is more likely to be sustained in Japan 
than in Thailand. Another reason why Thailand had low circulation per capita was due 
to the fact that circulation did not accurately reflect readership. Thai people read 
newspapers but they do not buy them. According to an official survey in 1989, as many 
as 54.1 per cent of the Thai total households did not buy or subscribe to newspapers, 
but read newspapers provided at governmental or private facilities.6
Secondly, the strong nationwide distribution system and the reliance of the 
Japanese press on subscription revenue rather than advertising income has long 
encouraged fierce competition in expanding readership rather than competition in 
content among major newspapers. In contrast, the distribution of Thai newspapers is 
less organized, as it primarily occurs through wholesale and retail outlets, and 
newspaper boys at traffic intersections, rather than by subscription. Moreover, Thai
Nihon Shimbun Kyökai, The Japanese Press 2000 (Tokyo: NSK, 2000), p. 75.
4 James Huffman, Creating a Public: People and the Press in Meiii Japan (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 1997), p. 171.
David Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (Bangkok: O.S. Printing House, 1984), pp. 228-229.
National Statistical Office, Office of the Prime Minister, Reports of the Newspaper Reading
SlttYSy (Bangkok: National Statistical Office, 1989), p. 24.
newspapers have relied heavily on advertising revenue and only became increasingly 
competitive in the 1990s due to extensive capital input derived from the stock market. 
This was when most papers started printing four-color advertisements, and taking 
different political positions in their editorial lines. Newspapers also started printing 
separate sections on business, sports, and special features, and marketing them as selling 
points. Yet following the sharp fall in advertising revenue and the plummeting of their 
stock price precipitated by the economic crisis in 1997, these newspapers had to 
increase their retail prices by up to fifty per cent.7 The Thai newspapers’ heavy 
reliance on advertising revenue also made them susceptible to influence from advertisers, 
especially those in connection with political parties such as Shinawatra Corporation 
and the Thai Rak Thai Party.
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Thirdly, both the Thai and Japanese press face a decline in advertising revenue 
and readership. The recent economic downturn in both countries seemed to contribute 
to this decline.8 In Japan, there has been a sharp reduction in the number of subscribers 
among the younger age group, particularly in the 1990s. Results of a market survey in 
the Tokyo area in 1998, for instance, showed that more than forty per cent of single­
person households did not subscribe to newspapers, and sixty per cent of women in 
their 20s led a life in which newspapers had no part.9 As a result, the NSK has 
embarked on a “five minute more” campaign targeting young people to spend more time 
reading newspapers every day. More importantly, both the Japanese and Thai readers 
believe that the newspapers are becoming less trustworthy than before. In 1997, the 
NSK conducted a national survey to gauge reader valuation of seven characters of the 
press: correctness, socialization, dailiness, fairness, dignity, human rights concern, and 
trustworthiness. The survey revealed the lowest level of correctness and
Interview with Suchart Srisuwan, Editor, Matichon Daily, on April 29, 1998.
For further discussion on this issue in relation to Thailand see Kavi Chongkitthavom, "Think 
Thai1 Economy threatens media freedom", The Nation. April 21, 1998, p. A4; For discussion 
on Japan see Katsura Keiichi et al., "Fukyö chokugeki! shimbunkai wo nayamasu nanmon 
sanseki" (Economic slump hits! The newspaper industry is facing with piling problems) 
Tsukuru. 1999, (3), pp. 12-25.
Suzuki Takao, "The Course of Newspapers in the Digital Age", The Japanese Press 1998 
(Tokyo: Nihon Shimbun Kyökai, 1998), p. 31.
trustworthiness in eighteen years.10 In Thailand, various surveys of public opinion have 
found that the majority of people think that newspapers were less trustworthy than 
other media, particularly television. As suggested by a Thansettakit Poll in 1993, the 
majority of Bangkokians believed that television news had increasingly become a more 
reliable and impartial source of information than newspapers.11 Yet, despite such public 
recognition, this chapter will demonstrate that the press in both countries still has 
substantial influence on reflecting, articulating, and constructing public opinion.
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5.1.1 The Thai Press
Thailand has seventy-one national newspapers. Of these, fifty-eight are printed in Thai, 
six in English, five in Chinese, and two in Japanese, with circulation ranging from 20,000 
to 1,000,000 copies. By far the largest newspapers are the Thai language — Thai Rath 
(1,000,000) and Daily News (750,000). The two largest circulation Chinese newspapers 
including Sin Sian Yit Pao (80,000), and Tong Hua Yit Pao (80,000), are both larger than 
either of the two largest circulation English newspapers - Bangkok Post (65,000), and 
The Nation (48,000).12 In 1997, there were approximately 159 non-daily newspapers in 
seventy-six provinces around the country. However, with the recent economic 
downturn, approximately ten national dailies and more than forty provincial 
newspapers closed down.13 Popular provincial newspapers are Chiang Mai News (in 
Chiang Mai), Thai Nimitra Raiwan (in Lopburi), Seri Nakhorn Rai Wan (in Nakhom
The NSK has been conducting a survey o f between 2,000 and 9,000 newspaper readers every 
two years since 1979. See Yamazaki Shigeo, “Shimbun no shinrui-do to seikaku-sei no kankei 
ni tsuite' (The relationship between trustworthiness and correctness of the press), Nihon 
Shimbun Kvökai Kenkvüio Nenpo. 1998, (16), pp. 27-51.
Thansettakit used a sample of 804 Bangkokians. More than sixty per cent of respondents agreed 
that television was the most reliable source of information, while newspapers came 
second, and radio ranked third. However, more than sixty per cent of respondents also suggested 
that all mass media were, in some ways, subjective when reporting news stories. See 
" Thansettakit's Poll: Rumwipaak seumolchon - mai Pen klang, hanghern kwam 
c/n>jg"(Thansettakifs Poll: Critiques o f Mass Media -  Subjective and Devoid of the Facts), 
Thansettakit Kanmuang. June 3-5, 1993, pp. 62-65.
Far East Advertising, Media Guidebook Thailand '97-98 (Bangkok: Far East Advertising, 
1997), pp. 25-6.
Thueng wan lom salai ‘SondhV luek eek chabab suethurakit rerm lasam' (Disastrous days for 
newspapers, Sondhi folded one of his paper, Business papers started to fall), Matichon 
Sudsapda, July 1, 1997, pp. 68-69; Thawatchai Jaranai, "Samruat-rai phuthorn p id  tua laew 
kwa 40 chabab ti Ihuea radkhemkhad sudkheed” (Examine provincial press: More than 40 
papers closed down, The rest tightens their belts tightly), Matichon Sudsapda. February 17 
1998, p. 68.
Sawan), and Prae Khao (in Prae). Most of the provincial newspapers are published bi­
monthly to coincide with the announcement of the state lottery . 14 Moreover, a content 
analysis of provincial newspapers from five regions in Thailand suggests the 
newspapers' emphasis is on the printing of lottery results, local advertisements, and 
gossip, rather than locally or regionally important news . 15 These local papers have 
circulation of only few thousand copies. They also have little influence on local politics, 
as both the election of local MPs and the appointment of local council administrators 
were highly centralized until recently. As such, most news published in the local papers 
is crime news, whereas political news is often a shorter version of what is published in 
the national dailies, and news about local development tends to follow government press 
releases. 16
On the other hand, the content in the national press is Bangkok-oriented. The
priority given to Bangkok's issues in the Thai press perhaps stems from commercial
reasons. Bangkok is where the majority of the influential urban readers live, and where
the main interests of newspaper owners, reporters and columnists lie. As such, this
Bangkok focus of the national press has led the press to serve the middle class, the
group which has recently become politically and economically influential and can afford
to consume more information. Yet this focus overlooks the interests of the peasants
who live in the rural areas. Provincial news is often limited to stories about crime and
natural disaster, except during local or national elections, when the coverage of
influential politicians in the provincial areas is usually highlighted. The lower literacy
rate in the upcountry area is also an important factor in the national papers' focus on
Bangkok readers. The Thai national press is thus considered an urban medium, as is well
summed up in Somkuan Kaviya's words:
The main purpose of the press is to produce a profit for 
the owners. Development subjects are taken up only if 
they are profitable. The main target group of the press 
is people who are literate, most of whom live in urban 
areas. The content of the press, therefore, reflects this
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Only Chiang Mai and Nakhon Ratchasima have daily newspapers.
Pisith Chawalathawach, Patiroop  seutnolchon thonpthin (Community Media Reform 1 
(Bangkok: Double Nine Publishing, 1999).
Surat Numnonda, "Thai Provincial Newspapers”. Media Asia. 1987, 14(2), pp. 73-75.16
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audience.17
In 1984, Boonlert Suphadilok classified Thai national newspapers into two 
types according to their content -  ‘quantity newspapers’ and ‘quality newspapers’.18 
This typology is still a useful means to categorize Thai papers today. ‘Quantity 
newspapers’ are the tabloids, which are mass-oriented and tend to concentrate on crime 
and entertainment and use slanderous headlines and unabashedly sensational stories; 
whereas ‘quality newspapers’ refer to those newspapers which pay more attention to 
serious issues such as politics and economics, and have specific groups of readers. Thai 
Rath and Daily News, both of which have the highest circulation, are categorized as 
‘quantity newspapers’. The format and regular features in Thai Rath and Daily News are 
similar. They are printed in broadsheet, with a colored front page and many 
photographs. They run about six to seven issues a day, but only the morning and 
evening issues are sold in Bangkok and metropolitan areas. In these papers, most space 
is dedicated to news on sports, entertainment, the serializing of popular TV series, and 
advertisements. They compete for circulation by featuring brash headlines, sensational 
stories, plenty of gossip and tidbit columns, and half-nude photos of stars or beauty 
pageant contests on the front page. Political columns often appear inside, yet they are 
politically influential as they have large readerships. These columns are written in a 
provocative language by senior and veteran columnists using catchy pseudonyms, such 
as Sai loepha (lightening rod), and Chatham Khiew (green shark).
The ‘quality newspapers’ include Naew Na, Matichon, Thai Post, and business- 
oriented papers such as Phujadkan Daily, as well as the English language papers — The 
Nation and Bangkok Post. Phujadkan, in particular, is famous for combining business 
news with political commentary. Tulsathit Thapthim, the Deputy Editor of The Nation, 
suggested that the English language newspapers and the business-oriented newspapers
17 Somkhuan Kaviya, "Communication Policy-Making and Implement for Rural Development in 
Thailland: Problems and Prospectives", Paper presented at a seminar on The Role of Mass 
Communication on Rural Development in the Next Decade at Thammasat University
on June 12-13, 1985, p. 167.
18 Boonlert Suphadilok, Sitthi Kansuesan nai Prathet Thai (The Right to Communicate in 
Thailand) (Bangkok: Sathaban Thaikhadisuksa, Thammasat University, 1984), p. 83.
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in Thailand such as Phujadkan are very politically influential. He also claimed that when 
the Thai newspapers make many page one comments, the effects are minimal. However, 
when the English papers or Thai papers, like Phujadkan, and Matichon, which have high 
levels of influence on urban readers, make page one comments, they have a great 
impact.19 Another distinctive aspect of these 'quality* papers is that they regularly 
feature special columns written by academics and public intellectuals on current political 
or economic issues. The subject and content of these columns is sometimes highly 
controversial, and they promote debate and engender a public sphere. The results of a 
1999 survey indicated that as many as 228 Thai public intellectuals regularly 
contributed to newspaper and weekly magazine columns.20 For Thai intellectuals, print 
media has recently become an accessible platform for initiating and participating in 
political and social debates, and for communicating ideas to the public. For journalists 
and editors, academics and intellectuals are considered better-qualified to promote 
political and social ideas, or criticize governmental policies, and a reliable source of 
supply for articles.21 Both Phujadkan and Matichon are popular for having a pool of 
famous lecturers and public intellectuals to contribute to their columns each day of the 
week.
English-language newspapers in Thailand are important both domestically and 
regionally. At the domestic level, they are widely read by policy-makers, and thus 
influential in shaping domestic politics. At the regional level, they have become a source 
of regional information for foreign press agencies, as well as for neighboring countries 
whose press and other media technology are underdeveloped or strictly controlled by 
their governments. However, for Thai local readers, the English-language papers are 
generally not the only paper that they read. Rather, they serve as ‘additional papers’ 
that provide only a ‘summary of events’ and ‘foreign perspectives’.22 Despite their high 
circulation, Chinese newspapers are not politically important in a domestic sense
Tulsathit Thapthim, "New Agencies in Transition", Paper Presented at the conference on 
Intersection with Asia at University of Technology of Sydeny, November 11-12, 1996. 
Suchart Sriyanara, "Public Intellectuals and Useful Knowledge", Paper presented at the 7th 
International Conference on Thai Studies, Amsterdam, July 4-8, 1999.
Interview with Suchart Srisuwan, Editor, Matichon Daily on April 29, 1998.
Interview with Kavi Chongkitthavom, Executive Editor, The Nation, on April 28, 1998.22
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because of their neutral and 'low key' coverage of local political issues. Rather, they 
focus on community and local business news, business linkages with the mainland 
China, and news translated from Chinese newspapers published in Taiwan and 
Singapore.23 This is perhaps due to the fact that several critical Chinese newspapers in 
the 1950s, especially those with Pro-Peking orientations, such as Chuan Min Pao, and 
Nan Chen Pao, were targeted by the Anti-Communist Law. Indeed, the Phibul regime 
was suspicious of the loyalty of the Chinese, and kept the Chinese community under 
close watch. The seriousness of punishments according to the Criminal Code created 
great fear among the Chinese publishers and editors, and led to a gradual change to a 
rather conservative style of reporting in the Chinese press.24
Due to the economic boom in the early 1990s, which increased competitiveness 
in the newspaper industry, this demarcation between the so-called 'quality’ and 
'quantity’ newspapers began to blur. To increase both circulation and advertising 
revenue, some 'quality’ newspapers have transformed themselves bodily and textually 
by reducing their editorial comments and adding more sensational stories, entertainment 
columns and advertising space. For example, when Siam Rath was owned by a critical 
writer and former Prime Minister Kukrit Pramot, it was categorized as a 'quality 
newspaper’. After the newspaper ownership changed to a recently elected senator and 
well-known gambling den owner, Chatchawan Khongudom, it started printing half-nude 
photos of famous stars on the front page and serializing stories of popular TV soap 
operas. Also Matichon had to enlarge its target group owing to increased competition - 
from urban, well-educated readers to a wider group of readers - and add sensational and 
soft news stories to attract a larger readership. The Bangkok Post also simplified its 
English language and made its news columns more concise than previously in order to 
widen its readership. Moreover, ample evidence of increased competitiveness in the 
newspaper industry was the 1994 launch of a daily newspaper called Khao Sod (Fresh
Bua Khao, “Thurakit nungsuphim cheen nai muang thai” (Chinese newspaper business in 
Thailand), Wan nak khao 5 minakhom 2542 (The Reporters’ Dav 5 March 1999^ (Bangkok:
The Reporters’ Association of Thailand, 1999), pp. 74-76.
24 Paul Blackburn, “Communications and National Development in Thailand, Burma, and
Malaysia: A Comparative Systemic Analysis”, Ph.D. Thesis, The American University, 1971,
News), which captured the middle-ground between 'quantity' and 'quality' newspapers. 
Using an Alsatian as its logo, the newspaper has become known as a 'light' and an 
'investigative' front-runner.25 The paper has pioneered investigations of the 
environmental impact of the construction of the Burma-Thailand gas pipeline in 1997. 
However, the paper also dedicates considerable space to running TV soap series and 
entertainment news similar to Thai Rath and Daily News.
5.1.2 The Japanese Press
There are 122 daily newspapers in Japan, five of which are national. The rest include 
bloc newspapers (regional newspapers) and local newspapers. Forty-eight newspapers 
issue morning and evening editions as sets. Fifty-eight newspapers only issue morning 
editions, and only sixteen newspapers have evening editions.26 The ‘Big Five’ national 
papers are Yomiuri (14,548,387), Asahi (12,745,666), Mainichi (5,878,701), Nihon 
Keizai (4,657,856), and Sankei (2,901,884). Together they account for more than 50 per 
cent of Japan's total newspaper circulation. Unlike Thailand, where the number of local 
newspapers is small and less significant than the national press, Japan has widely- 
circulated regional or bloc newspapers such as Hokkaido Shimbun (1,966,305) in 
Hokkaido, Chünichi Shimbun (3,237,727) in central Japan, and Nishi Nippon Shimbun 
(1,040,694) on the island of Kyushu, as well as important prefectural and local papers. 
Comparatively speaking, Japanese local newspapers, such as Hokkaido's Döshin and 
the Okinawa Times, are far more influential in local politics than the Thai local papers. 
They frequently expose scandals involving local politicians and bureaucrats and 
promote citizens' movements on issues concerning local interests.27
Another type of newspaper that is very influential in domestic politics is the 
party paper, such as the Japan's Communist Party’s Akahata. The paper is neither a 
member of the NSK , nor Japan's Press Club. As a result, it is sharp and outspoken, and
"The Watchdog Bites: Thailand's Press Increasingly Shows its Teeth, Helped by Greater 
Official Transparency", Far Eastern Economic Review. December 24, 1998, pp. 25-6.
Dentsu, "Japan 1998 Advertising and Marketing Yearbook", (Tokyo: Dentsu, 1998), p. 136.
See, for example, Murakawa Wataru, "Chiiki seiji to chihöshi no yakuwari" (The Roles of 
Local Newspapers in Local Politics), Masu Komvnnikee.shon Kenkmi. 1996, (49), pp. 14-24.
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often carries information that is not released by the press clubs. It publishes scoops on 
controversial topics, such as issues concerning the American military bases in Okinawa, 
and the raising of the consumption tax and its consequences. As observed by 
Tsukamoto Mitsuo, a mass communication professor at Chuo University: "it is a hard 
fact that when the country is in turbulence, Akahata has become the most reliable paper 
from which people can know the truth".28 As the paper heavily depends on news 
agencies and unofficial yet reliable sources for information, it is used by the major 
national press as an important alternative source for political scoops. The paper is 
distributed nationwide, and its daily circulation reached almost 2 million copies in 
1998.29 The number of English newspapers in Japan and their circulation are greater 
than their Thai equivalents: Japan Times (67,176); Daily Yomiuri (52,046); Mainichi 
Daily News (48,570); and Asahi Evening News (38,800). Nonetheless, compared to the 
English press in Thailand, the English press in Japan is seen to only provide 
"interpretative angles" to Japanese news for reading by foreign expatriates, and not by 
the local elite or the general public.
Japanese newspapers rely primarily on subscription sales. Readers subscribe to 
both morning and evening editions as a set. As of October 1997, 93.1 per cent of 
newspapers were home-delivered, 6.3 per cent were sold on stands, and 0.5 per cent 
were sold by other ways.30 The industrial revenue breakdown shows that 50.8 per cent 
of newspaper revenue derives from subscription fees, 35.4 from advertising fees, and 
12.3 per cent from other sources.31 Due to an industrial agreement on a fixed price 
system and a heavy reliance on subscription fees, there has been excessive competition 
(katö kyösö) among wholesalers of major newspapers to gain subscribers. In addition, 
there is a high level of circulation of free papers that are distributed in most local areas
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Cited in Miura Kazuo, "Akahata: A Paper for the People", Dateline Tokyo November 1995, 
(30), p. 4.
Interview Mr. Kawamura Shigemitsu, Editor, Akahata on October 21, 1998.
Nihon Simbun Kyökai, The Japanese Press 1998 (Tokyo: NSK, 1998).
Nihon Simbun KyokaiM hon Shimbun Nenkan 1998. 1999 Nenhan (The 1998/ 1999 Annual 
Report of Japanese Newspapers) (Tokyo: NSK, 1998), p. 439.
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around the country. According to a 1999 survey, there were as many as 688 editions of 
free newspapers and their combined circulation reached nearly 79 million copies.32
As mentioned in Chapter Four, Japanese newspaper companies are not generally 
listed on the stock exchange. Therefore, newspaper ownership is highly concentrated in 
private hands and amongst employees of the company. The 'Big Five' are held by a 
tightly knit group of family members of the papers’ founders and top management. 
Asahi Shimbun, for instance, is owned by Murayama Michiko and Ueno Junichi, 
descendants of Murayama Ryohei and Ueno Riichi, who founded Asahi in 1879. Sankei 
Shimbun is controlled by the Shikanai family, which founded the Fuji-Sankei media 
group. Yomiuri Shimbun's primary owner is Shoriki Toro, whose father, Shoriki 
Matsutaro, acquired the newspaper in 1924.33 Mainichi Shimbun is still owned by the 
Motoyama family, after Motoyama Hikoichi had rescued the dying paper and turned it 
around within a short period. In Japan, there has not been a single newspaper company 
which has sold its shares publicly. There are as many as thirteen newspaper companies 
whose employees hold 100 per cent of the issued shares, and fifteen companies whose 
employees hold more than fifty per cent of the issued shares. There is no foreign 
ownership of any Japanese newspaper. As such, most newspaper companies have 
heavily borrowed from financial institutions to raise capital.34 Not surprisingly, these 
financial ties between the banks and the newspapers are seen as factors influencing the 
newspapers to be reluctant to critically report the recent bank collapses as a result of 
Japan’s financial difficulties.
The 'Big Five' national newspapers have no ownership links amongst 
themselves. Although some have bought small local papers, vertical expansion through 
which big papers acquire small papers to form media groups, as is the case in Australia, 
is not common. However, horizontal expansion, where big papers acquire other media, 
is prevalent in Japan, despite the existence of regulations against cross-media
Nihon Simbun Kyokai, The Japanese Press 2000 (Tokyo: NSK, 2000), p. 77.
Jon Vanden Heuvel and Everette E. Dennis, The Unfolding Lonis: East Asia's Changing Media
(New York: Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, 1993), p. 87.
34 Ibid.
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ownership. These media groups have also ventured into entertainment and sport 
businesses, such as travel agencies, amusement parks, symphony orchestras, and 
baseball teams. For example, Yomiuri finances the entire baseball team, the Yomiuri 
Giants. Yomiuri and its NTV network enthusiastically promote the team during the 
baseball season.
In general, Japanese newspapers can be divided into two types: quality 
newspapers, and sports newspapers. The quality newspapers include the Big Five, the 
Bloc, and the local newspapers, most of which publish both morning and evening 
editions, except on Sunday when only morning editions are published. On the other 
hand, sports newspapers are tabloids, sold mostly as evening papers for urban-working 
men to read on their way home. Stories published in the sports newspapers generally 
include sports news and related gossip, the entertainment industry and related rumors, 
violence, sex, tragic accidents, and crime involving gangsters. With regards to political 
coverage, the front pages of these papers often cover the abuse of power by the LDP, 
with flashy headlines outlining heated arguments between members of the LDP and 
those of the Opposition in parliamentary sessions. The back page often features 
controversial stories in popular sports, such as baseball and sumo wrestling.
With the exception of the Nikkei, which specializes in economic news, the four 
remaining papers — Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, and Sankei — carry almost equal amounts 
of political, economic, cultural, science, and sports stories. The front pages of these four 
papers are quite similar in appearance. The stories featured in these papers are often 
dominated by domestic political or financial news, and they are full of facts, while 
lacking comment and opinion. As discussed in Chapter Four, there are few by-lines 
related to these topics. Moreover, the very high circulation rate of these quality papers 
does not reflect a diversity of the news content. Rather, uniformity in news content is 
usually detectable between these papers. The system of kisha kurabu plays an 
important part in building the standardization of news reporting. The monopoly of 
media ownership dominated by the 'Big Five' is also an obvious indication of the
monopolization and conformity of news media, such as newspapers and television, 
particularly those from the same group.35 Although differences in the daily content of 
political news among these quality papers are subtle, slight variations in the language 
and the placement of political articles on the front page and on the political page can be 
detected. Each of these quality papers also claims to take a different stance in their 
editorial lines. Broadly speaking, this ideological difference is characterized by the 
bipolarity of the two main groups in the Japanese political system: the conservative 
(,hoshu), and the progressive (kakushin). For instance, Asahi has long been considered a 
progressive newspaper. During the campaign against the Security Treaty in the 1960s, 
Asahi even claimed to espouse pro-left editorial lines. Although its pro-left inclination is 
less pronounced today, its progressive stance still largely affects its editorial content. 
Yomiuri, the largest paper, once secured the middle-ground. However, since it formed a 
close connection with the ruling LDP in the late 1970s, especially through a personal 
relationship between former Prime Minister Nakasone and a former President of 
Yomiuri who were university classmates, Yomiuri has been seen as a conservative 
paper.36 Moreover, certain privileges that Yomiuri has received from the government 
must also have strengthened its pro-LDP stance. For instance, the paper was offered the 
opportunity to buy land in Tokyo at a price well below market value. Sankei has also 
built a close relationship with the state agencies. It was reported that staffs from the 
Self-Defence Force Agency were sent to Sankei to be trained as reporters on an annual 
basis.37 Undoubtedly, the paper has adopted a conservative, pro-LDP stance, similar to 
that of Yomiuri. Noticeably, Sankei has developed a strong nationalist position over the 
year, and this clearly manifested in its coverage of the controversial textbook issue in 
early 2001.38 Mainichi, on the other hand, sporadically shifts between conservative and
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progressive, as does the Nikkei, the daily financial paper, which was modelled after the 
Wall Street Journal
5.2 Press Coverage of Domestic Politics
There are distinct similarities and differences in the coverage of domestic politics 
between Thai and Japanese newspapers. Firstly, the Thai press generally uses catchy 
headlines on the front page, followed by extensive details under numerous subheadings 
in the following pages. These details, which try to link political events, can run up to 
two or three pages. Additional information on the current political atmosphere and 
speculations can also be read between the lines in the gossip column on the social page. 
The Japanese press, on the other hand, tends to keep political news to the front and 
political pages, which are allocated according to the desk system and occupy no more 
than two pages. News stories usually do not continue on to a separate page. A political 
tidbit column usually appears in a small section at the bottom of the political page. In 
comparison to Thai news, Japanese news is much more concise, and places more 
emphasis on the visual aspects of page layout to allow readers to rapidly absorb large 
amount of information simply by scanning headlines that are often written in short but 
very expressive Chinese characters. Therefore, news stories usually consist of multiple 
headlines, flow charts, and graphics. Moreover, whilst Thai newspapers have a 
deductive macrostructure (the main points precede the details) like most Western 
newspapers, the Japanese seem to have an inductive macro structure (the main points 
follow the details).
Secondly, editorial content in the Thai press does not necessary follow the 
front-page political news, and different opinions on the same story are sometimes 
presented. According to interviews with editors of various Thai newspapers conducted 
by Piangpen Toomanon, the lack of agreement between the front-page news and 
editorials is largely due to the freedom given to the editorial team to write whatever they 
see fit.39 Moreover, the sharp division of news and comment in Thai news organizations
39 Piangpen Toomanon, "Editorials in Thai Daily Newspapers: Content and Writing Process", 
Unpublished Master of Arts in Communication Thesis, Chulalongkom University, 1993, p.
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also allows the editors to voice their own views. In addition to the editorial column, 
there are several columns in Thai newspapers that are dedicated to politics. As 
mentioned earlier, experienced political columnists or university lecturers and public 
intellectuals regularly contribute to these columns. Similar practices are also found in the 
Japanese newspapers. However, political columns in the Japanese papers and their 
headlines are more uniform, yet they are often not by-lined. Although the Japanese 
press often makes claims about the neutrality and objectivity of its political coverage, an 
earlier study on the Japanese press found that editorials attributed much more 
importance to news from the LDP and its coalition than to information from the 
Opposition.40 This is because of the reliance on information from kisha kurabu and the 
limited number of official sources. As the LDP was in the government for a long period 
of time, and has continued to lead a coalition since 1994, most of these official sources 
are LDP members, who are in charge of important government ministries and agencies.
Thirdly, political news in both the Thai and Japanese press is mostly about 
political conflicts and alliances between groups and factions, from which the press 
attempts to set a political agenda. Reports of policy are, on the other hand, usually 
dictated by the parliamentary progress of important legislation. Therefore, the content 
of political news features lengthy quotations of what politicians said, with references to 
whom on the issue. However, a summary of analysis is usually available at the end of 
political news stories in the Japanese press. The lack of analysis in Thai press often 
results in stories abmptly finishing with quotations. As the political stories reported in 
the Thai and Japanese press are usually written by a team of reporters, they do not 
carry by-lines.
Fourthly, there is a similarity in the way in which the international media have 
an influence on the reporting of domestic political stories in both countries.41 In the
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past, several cases of domestic political corruption were exposed by the international 
media before being reported in the local press. The credibility of these international 
media has also ensured an enormous political impact. Duncan McCargo, for instance, 
examined domestic coverage of alleged corruption in the buying of Swedish submarines 
by Prime Minister Banham and his party. The allegation, which had been made by a 
Swedish newspaper, was picked up by several Thai national papers that covered the 
allegation extensively. McCargo concluded that the Thai press is likely to use foreign 
sources to campaign against the abuses of power locally.42 A similar case in Japan 
occurred in press reports of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's involvement in the 
Lockheed scandal. The story was first reported by a local magazine, Bungei Shunjü, but 
was ignored by the mainstream Japanese newspapers. These big newspapers only 
picked up the story after it had been reported in the Washington Post. Systematic 
collusion between journalists and their powerful sources, and potential sanctions from 
kisha kurabu, were cited as the main reason why the story went unreported 
domestically.43 A similar situation is also evident in the reporting on the Japanese 
Imperial Family. Rules and sanctions on reporting about the Imperial Family strictly 
imposed by the Imperial Household Agency seem to have encouraged frustrated local 
reporters to tip off banned information to their foreign counterparts.
Finally, the Japanese press seems to rely more on public opinion polls to 
represent public judgments on political issues than does the Thai press. This is largely 
due to the fact that opinion polls were conducted in Japan since the early period. In 
1853, more than 250 questionaires were sent to feudal landlords by the central 
Tokugawa government asking their opinion on how to respond to the official letter from 
the President of the United States, which demanded that Japan open up the country.44 
However, the first nationwide public opinion poll was not undertaken until 1940, when
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Mainichi questioned the public on middle school entrance examinations.45 In the 1980s, 
approximately 150 polls were conducted annually by newspaper organizations. Each of 
the major newspaper organizations -- particularly Yomiuri, Asahi, and Mainichi — carry 
out nationwide opinion polls several times a year at regular intervals, but special 
emphasis is placed on pre-election polls. Their polls are planned by the public opinion 
poll section of the main editorial office, and then conducted by the news bureaus 
throughout the country. This is similar to the practices in the U.S. where major 
newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post use their own 
professional research staff to conduct public opinion polls.46
Public opinion polls are popular in Japan because, as suggested by Nishihara, 
the Japanese people are more concerned about the collective thoughts of their reference 
groups than expressing their own ideas. The publication of the polls thus helps people 
to place themselves within the distribution of opinions, or among the people who have 
no opinion.47 However, for the Japanese press, the involvement of editors and reporters 
in the planning and usage of such polls, the process through which they can elicit 
opinions suggests that the Japanese press directly functions as a mediator of the 
public's will in political and economic decision-making. As Negrine argues, "it is perhaps 
more usual to rely on public opinion polls as a summary of the public's verdict on 
events, and where such polls exist there is often little argument about 'what the public 
thinks’ ”.48
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The polling tradition in Thailand lags well behind that of Japan. The first 
nationwide public poll on the subject of politics was conducted in 1983 by a group of 
liberal academics on the amendment of the Constitution proposed by General Arthit 
Kamlangek, the then Army Chief, regarding the power of the Upper House and the
Nishihara Shigeki, "Political Opinion Polling in Japan", in R. M. Worcester (ed.),
Political Qpionion Polling: An International Review (London: The Macmillan Press, 1983) p 
152.
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ability of military and bureaucrats to concurrently hold a cabinet position.49 In the 
1990s, public opinion polling in Thailand was conducted more extensively than before 
by a number of tertiary and research institutions, such as Suan Dusit Poll, Bangkok 
University Poll, ABAC Poll, Ramkhamhaeng University Poll, and Thai Farmers Bank 
Research Center Poll. Each undertook about 100 polls a year on a wide range of social, 
economic, educational, and political issues. Pre-election polls were conducted as often as 
once a week.50 However, polls conducted by educational and research institutions have 
been criticized for having unreliable sampling sizes, as most surveys only took place 
within Bangkok and surrounding areas. According to these pollsters, the lack of 
telephone access in the provincial areas proved to be a major obstacle.51 Moreover, 
most surveyors are not professional statisticians, but university students hired to 
conduct interviews. Only a small number of Thai daily newspapers including Matichon 
and Daily News conduct or finance opinion polls. Others have cited the lack of expertise 
and financial limitations as main reasons for not directly engaging in opinion polls.52 
Thai business papers, on the other hand, such as Prachachart Thurak.it, Thansetthakit, 
and Phujadkan, regularly carry out opinion polls. Poll reports are considered 
newsworthy by Thai editors and journalists and are thus published whenever available. 
However, the way in which the Thai press frames these poll results to elicit conclusions 
in line with its own political inclinations has drawn severe criticism, including claims 
that most newspapers are "data rich but analysis poor" and technical details of the 
polling are usually omitted.53 The press coverage of pre-election polls, in particular, is 
mainly limited to "who's ahead and who's behind" reporting. The close relationship 
between pollsters and particular politicians is also another source of criticism of 
partiality of these opinion polls. One critic has labeled such operations as "opinion
49 Prudhisan Jumbala, Nation-building and Democratization in Thailand: A Political History 
(Bangkok: Chulalongkom University Social Research Institute, 1992), p. 100.
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See, for example, Pira Chirasophone, "Rai ngan khao poll: cheua thue dai khae nai?" (Poll 
reports: Can we believe them?), Wan Nak Khao 5 Minakhom 2S1R tRenorters' Dav 5 March 
1295) (Bangkok: The Reporters' Association of Thailand, 1995), pp. 67-70.
polls by and for the middle class" .54 Nevertheless, the prevalence of poll reporting in 
both Thai and Japanese newspapers does not necessarily imply that these newspapers 
disregard other forms of public opinion reporting. Newspapers in both countries also 
carry letter-to-the-editor sections, which are often important spaces for fruitful political 
debate.
5.3 The Agenda-Setting Role of the Press
It cannot be denied that the most important role of the press in a democratic society is 
that of a watchdog which keeps the state in its sights and exposes its wrongdoings. 
However, the Thai and Japanese newspapers are able to perform this role less 
frequently than the British newspapers, which, “though biased in their presentation of 
the news and current affairs, are allowed to print most of what they wish to say 
without fear of reprisal or falling foul of the law” .55 As mentioned in Chapters Two and 
Four, the legal and extralegal controls, as well as certain normative journalistic practices, 
have influenced the Thai and Japanese press to refrain from printing criticisms or 
controversial stories, thus limited their opportunities to perform the watchdog function. 
Another role of the press that is more prevalent in the Thai and Japanese cases is an 
agenda-setting role, that is, influencing the way in which readers think about politics. 
The news-gathering system and the close linkage between journalists and politicians in 
both countries allow journalists to receive a wide range of daily political information, 
sometimes at a range and depth unparalleled by their counterparts in other countries. 
Consequently, the Thai and Japanese press is generally in the position that can provide 
their readers with information and education about political affairs and encourage public 
involvement and participation in political issues.
By and large, the attention and amount of time the press gives to an issue is a 
crucial factor determining the agenda-setting role of the press. The American mass
Mike Hayes, "Constructing the Public: The Public Voice and the Public Body in the Thai 
Media". Paper presented at the Conference on Research on Thailand in the 1990s, The 
Australian National University, August 18-19, 2000,.
Duncan Watts, Political Communication Today (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1997), p. 197.
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communication model has defined agenda setting as a ‘cumulative process’, or, as the 
amount of attention to a story given by the press increases over time, more agenda­
setting effects are produced.56 One important effect is that, over time, a press agenda 
will turn into a 'public agenda', and into a 'policy agenda', because the dynamics of the 
agenda-setting process do not involve only the 'thinking of audiences', but also the 
actions and thinking of those who are responsible for the agendas, including political 
actors, interest groups, social activists, as well as journalists.57
The attention from both the Thai and Japanese press to political reform was 
substantial. As the press coverage lasted longer than a year in both cases, they provide 
appropriate data for a comparative study of the press' role as an agenda-setter. In the 
Thai case, press coverage of political reform from November 1996 to October 1997 in 
two newspapers, Thai Rath, and Matichon, will be discussed. As for the Japanese case, 
coverage of Japan's political reform in selected editions of Yomiuri and Asahi from April 
1993 to March 1994 will be examined. A stratified sampling technique was employed to 
select the sample in both case studies. In doing so, one-week of newspapers of every 
month were selected. The method to select the appropriate weeks used a procedure 
known as constructing a "composite week".58 This involved selecting seven daily issues 
(Sunday to Saturday) published on the first week of the selected month as the first 
selected seven issues, and the second selected seven issues were those published on the 
second week of the following month. This was continued through one-year period (see 
Appendix 8).
Overall, the results were derived from the analyses of a total of 168 issues of 
Thai newspapers and 168 issues of Japanese newspapers. In collecting the results of 
analysis, coding sheets were prepared according to three sets of questions on the pattern 
of press coverage on political reform (see Appendix 9). Firstly, how much and how did
56 Alex S. Edelstein, Ito Yöichi, and Han M. Kepplinger, Communication & Culture: A
Comparative Approach (New York: Longman, 1989), p. 224.
57 Ibid., p. 228.
Roger D. Wimmer and Joseph R. Dominick, Mass Media Research: An Introduction. 3rd ed.
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1991), p. 163.
the press cover the political reform? Were there specific issues which the press 
emphasized? Who were major sources for stories? And how were stories presented in 
general — as news stories, or commentaries? Secondly, did the press generally initiate 
interest in the issue, or select to discuss certain related issues, and set an agenda? Or, did 
it act as a passive agent by mostly reporting debates and arguments among politicians 
and related parties on the reform? Lastly, was the content of the coverage for or against 
reform in general? What sub-issue seemed to dominate press coverage on political 
reform -- was it the direction of the refonn, the timing of the reform, or obstacles to the 
reform?
5.3.1 Thai Press Coverage of Political Reform: An Agenda-Setter for the Middle- 
Class
A movement towards political refonn in Thailand emerged after the watershed of events 
of May 1992, when a group of protesters was murdered and a military-backed 
government was overthrown. A group of NGOs and activists, and another group of 
technocrats and political scientists who led a quasi-think tank called the Institute of 
Public Policy Studies (IPPS), came up with proposals for constitutional reform as a 
way to restructure the whole political system.59 The core thesis of these proposals was 
that there should be a change to the existing constitution because it locked the country 
into a vicious cycle of money politics and corrupt politicians. This situation had 
frequently opened the way for the undemocratic process of government change by 
means of a military coup d'etat. A constitutional change was thus recommended to 
prevent the recurrence of military rule. However, most of the previous constitutions 
were wntten by military juntas, which took over governments without popular 
support. These constitutions contained a number of loopholes, which maintained 
privilege for the juntas and special interests backing them, and allowed those interests to 
act with impunity.
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An earlier study that looked at the role of the press in advocating political 
reform and mobilizing movements in support for constitutional change during 1994- 
1996 suggested that Thai quality newspapers had an indispensable role in advocating 
reform.60 This study argued that a group of IPPS political scientists and public 
intellectuals used newspaper columns, primarily in Phujadkan, to advocate their reform 
agenda. It was concluded that the debates on political reform created a wholesale shift in 
the emphasis of national newspapers, from focusing on personal conflicts in local 
politics to discussing a wide range of debates on political issues that should undergo 
reform.61
During 1994-1996 most quality newspapers indeed devoted much of the space 
to debates by university scholars and public intellectuals on political reform. However, 
attention from the Thai quantity press, which has a much larger national circulation, to 
the concept of political reform was actually prompted by the hunger strike for 
constitutional change by a popular political activist, Chalard Vorachat, in April-May 
1994. This hunger strike drew vast publicity and precipitated the official formation of 
the Democracy Development Committee (DDC) under the leadership of Dr. Prawase 
Wasi, a pivotal figure in the local discourse of public morality and wisdom. This 
committee considered proposals for reform.62 The deliberations of the DDC report 
submitted to Parliament in 1995 were covered extensively in the national press, and the 
contents were considered favorably. According to Connors, the publicity of the DDC 
report brought together a political reform movement consisting of "an unlikely alliance 
between reforming state bureaucrats and civil servants, public intellectuals, the press, 
progressive politicians and the developmental NGOs and democracy activists".63 After 
that, the term "political reform" (kan patiroop kan-muang) became so highly 
popularized that it was employed as an election promise by Chat Thai party.
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Figure 1: Size of Articles on Political Reform in Matichon (n=224) 
and Thai Rath 6n=l 36") from November 1996 to October 1997
u /o
Very brief 
< 1/8 page
Brief 1/8- 
1/4 page
Medium 
1/4 - 1/2 
page
Long 1/2 - 
1 page
Very long 
> 1 page
D Matichon 7% 31% 33% 27% 2%
□  Thai Rath 16% 59% 16% 7% 1%
Figure 2: Topics of Headlines of Articles on Political Reform from November
1996 to October 1997
Issue in the 
reform
Key decision­
makers
Opposition to 
the reform
Tuning of the 
reform
D Matichon 64% 17% 14% 6%
□  Thai Rath 52% 15% 19% 13%
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Subsequently, constant coverage of this political reform movement in both 
quality and quantity newspapers helped sustain pressure on the Banham and Chavalit 
governments to carry on the process of constitutional drafting. For instance, attacks 
from the press put pressure on the Banham government not to include MPs in the 
membership of the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CD A). The CD A consisted of 
ninety-nine members, seventy-six of whom were selected through a rather tedious 
voting process, representing each of the seventy-six provinces. The remaining twenty - 
three were selected for their experience and expertise in particular fields. Although 
several ex-MPs were finally added to the CDA, the press's interests in the issue meant 
that parliament could not safely exclude all activists, particularly those from NGOs. 
Press coverage also mobilized enormous support for the DDC decision to reject any 
interference from theparliament in the drafting process, only allowing its control of the 
final say -  by either accepting or rejecting but not amending the draft.
According to the results of the content analysis, the issue of constitutional 
reform was consistently covered by both Matichon and Thai Rath from November 1996 
to October 1997 — from the selection of the CDA members to the promulgation of the 
Constitution. Matichon's coverage of political reform was far more extensive than that of 
Thai Rath. There were 224 articles on political reform in the selected issues of Matichon, 
but only 136 articles in the selected issues of Thai Rath over the same period. 
Moreover, as shown in Figure 1, about sixty-two per cent of political reform articles in 
Matichon occupied a space ranging from a quarter of a page to more than one page. The 
political reform articles in Thai Rath, on the other hand, tended to appear as factual 
reports in smaller columns. Sixty-four per cent of Matichon's articles discussed political 
reform issues. Whilst the paper offered daily reports of the CDA deliberations on the 
draft on page two, most of its commentaries on the draft were written by university 
lecturers and public intellectuals on the following pages. Familiar names addressing the 
topic of political reform included Prawase Wasi, Nidhi Aeusrivongse, Kriengsak 
Charoenwongsak, Kasien Tejapira, Bawomsak Uwanno, and Likhit Dhiravegin, to 
mention only a few. Apparently, Matichon relied more heavily on the contributions
from these intellectuals, whom they regarded as accredited sources, those who had the 
authority to represent the voices of society .64 These intellectuals employed newspaper 
space to influence the public, as they believed that public pressure would expedite state 
transformation.65
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In contrast, Thai Rath had its own political columnists write most of the
commentaries on political reform. Most columnists use pseudonym. According to
McCargo, these columnists were: "adept at presenting themselves as 'in the know' on
salient political issues, possessing both insider information about news stories and a
capacity to represent the views of the public about those stories" .66 Consequently, they
often wrote their commentaries using emotional language, which was sometimes even
sleazy and abusive. Their sentences and wording were often riddled with metaphors and
their messages were hidden between the lines. The following excerpts are from
commentaries published in Matichon and Thai Rath, which illustrate the sharp
distinction in style and content between the two. Both were written in similar contexts
of a discussion about 'how to succeed in political reform'. Matichoris commentary was
written by a public intellectual, Dr. Prawase Wasi, who expressed his desire to see
Thailand become a broad-minded society that could deal with a wide range of political
reform issues. The commentary from Thai Rath, written by a political columnist under
the pen-name 'Lom plien-tid , aimed at inciting public support for the CDA's agenda, and
attacking conservative politicians who tried to obstruct the reform process.
Matichon: Thailand has a lot of serious and complicated problems to solve.
Yet, these problems appear to be too difficult for anybody to solve. However, 
if they remain unsolved, the country cannot avoid crisis. Thus, it is necessary 
for the Thai society to learn how to solve these difficult problems. Political 
reform is one serious and difficult problem that challenges the capability of Thai 
society. To succeed in such a task, we need a big mind, not a small mind, and a 
big thinking frame enough to sustain many different kinds of ideas and thoughts.67
Thai Rath: I believe that the direction the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) 
is taking is the right one. You have to dare to reform, dare to to change the oppressed 
and corrupt political system to a principled and ethical one. The most important 
thing is that the CDA members and all mass media need to co-operate to promote
Interview with Suchart Srisuwan, Editor, Matichon on April 29, 1998.
Dr. Prawes Wasi, Personal Communication on July 5, 1999.
Duncan McCargo, Politics and the Press in Thailand: Media Machinations (London: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 139.
Prawes Wasi, "Cha patiroop kan-muang hai samret dai yang rai" (How to succeed in political 
reform). Matichon Daily. December 10, 1996, p. 2.
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public understanding and participation in the process, and fight against vicious 
politicians who obstruct the reform.68
In addition, on every Sunday the team from Thai Rath's political news staff employed a 
whole page, usually page 3, to feature their analyses of the progress of the political 
events revolving around the drafting of the Constitution, under the pen name ‘ team kan- 
muang’ (political team). In contrast to Matichon's analysis, these analyses were written 
in a clearer and simpler language, suitable for low brow, mass-market readers.69
Press coverage of political reform in November 1996 was overshadowed by the 
1996 general election, in which the ex-General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh led a conservative 
coalition to power. As a result, a conflict of ideas on political reform between reformers 
and conservative politicians gradually emerged in December 1996. Attempts from 
conservative groups to influence the constitutional drafting process were clearly evident 
when they tried to insert their proxies into the 19,335 candidates applying for 
membership to the CDA. These attempts were harshly criticized by a Thai Rath 
columnist:
Those with wicked minds have in many ways helped apply their proxies into the 
CDA. They hope that their proxies would help them gain more votes without 
knowing that they are imprinting their sin onto the society.70
After the ninety-nine CDA members had been selected and the first proposal had 
emerged, there were constant reports of clashes between three dominant groups: the 
conservatives, who did not want to lose their authority and privilege and warned of a 
civil war or a possible coup d'etat’, the progressives, mostly the elite and technocrats, 
who were eager to change yet did not want change to be too radical; and the reformists, 
who desired to oust corrupt politicians, get rid of pork-barrel and military politics and 
under-the-table commissions. The press coverage closely monitored the disagreements 
among these groups on the topic of rights, the introduction of new judicial and quasi­
judicial bodies, and particularly the discussion about electoral reform, in which the CDA
Lorn Plien-tid, "Patiroop tong kla ta-tai" (Reform requires a strength to challenge), Thai Rath. 
February 27, 1997, p. 5.
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proposed the introduction of a combination of a proportional representation system (or 
party list) and single-member constituencies. As reflected in the press coverage, the 
major disagreement was not so much about the new system. Rather, it involved crucial 
clauses that were aimed at raising the standard of politics by requiring that MPs hold at 
least a bachelor’s degree or equivalent, by lessening vote-buying and allowing only 
elected MPs from party list ballots to become cabinet ministers, by prohibiting M Ps 
from concurrently hold ministerial portfolios, and by establishing an election 
commission.
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Press articles on electoral reform alone comprised about twenty-three per cent of 
articles in the selected issues of Matichon, and thirty-four per cent of articles in the 
selected issues of Thai Rath. The majority of these articles from both papers did not 
analyze or extensively discuss the new voting system. Rather, they focused on the 
number of seats in each ballot and the controversial clause (Article 204) that aimed to 
bar MPs from concurently holding ministerial portfolios. Both papers appeared to give 
full support to these clauses, though they were different in style and content. For 
example, Thai Rath's editorials were highly opinionated and severely criticized 
conservative politicians who rejected the proposal. A Thai Rath cartoon, for instance, 
acutely portrayed a large group of vicious-looking politicians with long fangs, standing 
behind Prime Minister Chavalit under the banner "Politicians with Fangs Club", and 
laughing at the reform-oriented Chairman of CD A, Anand Panyarachun, who was trying 
to lift up a heavy copy of the draft. This cartoon was headlined "Heavy weapon against 
many enemies".71 On the contrary, articles in Matichon were almost factual and featured 
quotes detailing the rationale of major political parties in objecting to the proposed 
clauses.
Thai Rath: As for politicians, we know that they are more concerned with 
political privileges they are likely to lose as a result o f the new Constitution, 
which attaches a clause about prohibition of MP to become cabinet minister.
Moreover, they also dislike the proportional representation system, and 
single member constituencies, and hate to disclose their assets or declare 
their taxes. The clause applies to all levels o f politicians - both national 
and local. Concern about losing privileges has been the real hidden agenda 
behind the local and national politicians' objections to the proposal which
71 Thai Rath. February 27, 1997, p. 3.
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they never stated directly.72
Matichon: This clause has been a subject of controversy since the beginning 
of the drafting process. Attempts to remove it still exist and seem to 
continue. A number of political parties have submitted their objections to Head 
of the CD A. For instance, the New Aspiration Party stated, "objects to the clauses 
and suggests that a more open system is desirable". Chat Thai Party declared 
its objection: "the principle of these clauses is from the republic system, and not 
suitable in a parliamentary system under the constitutional monarchy "...These 
clauses reflect popular demands for a separation o f power between MPs and 
cabinet ministers. This will eradicate a lot of problems, and create efficiency in 
the administration. As such, it is the time to separate the two posts.73
There were a small number of articles in Matichon and Thai Rath that used direct 
quotes from government officials. Twenty-seven per cent of articles in the selected 
copies of Matichon and nineteen per cent of articles in the selected issues of Thai Rath 
had direct quotes from government officials. There were several reasons for the press to 
be independent from government sources in covering political reform. Firstly, the major 
source of the stories were CDA members, who were independent from the government, 
as well as public intellectuals, NGO members, and other political commentators. As 
such, the press was as an active agent in setting an agenda by depending on unofficial 
and alternative news sources. At the same time, it narrowed down and simplified 
political discourse on the complicated issue for readers by framing and focusing on the 
controversial attached clauses rather than analyzing and debating the whole electoral 
system. This approach also reflects a local political culture that tends to center on 
conflicts rather than the repercussions of political issues.
Secondly, according to Suchart Srisuwan, Matichon's chief editor, it is customary 
for Thai reporters not to quote either the names of their official sources or their 
positions, particularly on policy issues, but instead to use a phrase like ‘according to a 
source {lang khao) within a department or party’. As such, direct quotes were often
Sai Lo-Pha, "Khaya kan-muang" (Political garbage), Thai Rath. July 7, 1997, p. 6. 
Boonlert Changyai, "Chab cheepachorn phak kan-muang koranee sor.sor pen rathamontri" 
(Checking political parties' pulse on the issues o f MPs being cabinet ministers), Matichon 
Daily. June 27, 1997, p. 10.
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Figure 3: Agendas of Political Reform Articles in Matichon fn=224Y 
and Thai Rath (n=136) from November 1996 to October 1997
U 7 o -
Pro-reform Anti-reform Neutral
■  Matichon 52% 7% 41%
B Thai Rath 60% 2% 38%
Figure 4i Priority of Reform Issues as Interpreted in Thai Newspapers from 
November 1996 to October 1997
Providing the 
right direction 
for reform
Expediting the 
legislation 
process
Blaming officials 
or systems
B  Matichon 73% 11% 16%
□  Thai Rath 58% 21% 21%
omitted because "the real political information is not easily accessible and these sources 
do not want to take any responsibility as the revealed information is confidential. They 
let you know only if they think they would gain something for themselves".74
As shown in Figure 3, most news articles published in Matichon and Thai Rath 
gave strong support for political reform. Evidence of biased comments suggested that 
both papers were not really committed to the concepts of neutrality and objectivity. 
Reformers and their ideas were often mentioned in a better light than conservatives and 
their criticisms. This biased coverage was obviously intentional and was so frequent that 
it drew a great deal of criticism.75 However, Matichon's coverage of the drafting of the 
constitution appeared to be more consistent in focusing on a wide range of issues than 
that of Thai Rath, which seemed to be driven fundamentally by political events. Indeed, 
as a quantity newspaper, Thai Rath was not primarily interested in policy per se, but 
rather in the controversy that political issues generated.
As shown in Figure 4, Matichon's reports on political reform were more 
concerned with discussing the direction and details of the refonn, whereas Thai Rath had 
a high percentage of coverage which emphasized the urgency to expedite the reform 
process, and attacked the conservatives who had tried to obstruct the change. In 
particular, the economic crisis and financial turmoil that was set off by the devaluation 
of the baht on July 2, 1997 further exacerbated Thai Rath condemnation of the 
conservative government's mismanagement of the economy, and its attempts to block 
the movement towards reform. Reports of the political divide between the reformers 
and conservatives were also accentuated when the constitutional draft was being 
finalized.
Thai Rath : A group of politicians was not satisfied with the constitutional 
draft which is now being polished by the members of the CDA before submitting 
to the parliament. Politicians from both camps, the conservative government and 
the progressive opposition, have voiced their objections to some articles, particularly 
to the clause which bars MPs from concurrently holding ministerial portfolios. In this
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Interview on April 29, 1998.
"Social critic urges press accuracy, Claiming charter report misleading", Bangkok Post. 
May 23, 1997 (on-line edition).
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case, the conservative politicians will go against their principle if they vote for the 
passage of the Constitution. Yet they are not daring enough to vote against the passage, 
fearing outside pressure, and especially the public backlash. As a result, there has been 
a voice from the government camp suggesting that there will be attempts to make 
the draft aborted in the CD A before its submission to the parliament.76
During July and September 1997, the components of political divisions were in 
place to ensure an intensive period of press concern about the prospects for the new 
Constitution. Discussion about the passage of the Constitution became intensified right 
after the signs of economic downturn had appeared. The Constitution was, to a certain 
degree, portrayed by the press as a solution to the country’s economic problems. 
Moreover, the conflict between the conservatives and the reformists heightened. A 
number of conservative movements to block the submission of the draft to the 
parliament dominated press coverage. These included: several demonstrations in front of 
the parliament by rural village headmen mobilized by conservative politicians to protest 
against the clause on administrative reform that would instantly dismiss them from local 
councils should the draft be enacted; a petition campaign run by conservative politicians 
and senators to submit a motion that would enable the parliament to alter the draft; and 
allegations made by senior politicians, such as Snoh Thienthong (interior minister), 
Samak Sundaravej (deputy prime minister), and Chalerm Yubamrung (deputy interior 
minister), against the architects of the reform such as Prawase Wasi, Thirayuth 
Boonmee, and Chairman of the CDA, Anand Panyarachun, for having a hidden agenda 
behind their reform movements. Some went so far as to suggest that the draft as a whole 
was too extreme, and characterized the reform movement as a part of communist plots 
against the nation.77 Snoh, in particular, mobilized village officers under his command to 
Bangkok, and revived the village scout movement, which had orchestrated a campaign 
against communism in the 1970s.
Movements by the reformists were, on the contrary, more subtle. These 
included: a peaceful demonstration by white-collar employees in the central business
"Team kan-muang fokus sor.sor.ror. rub phan khabuankan chonglang raththammanoon"
(The political news team focuses on the CDA's tactics to encounter attempts to abort the new 
Constitution), Thai Rath. July 6, 1997, p. 3.
"Constitution showdown", Bangkok Post. September 27, 1997 (on-line edition).77
district demanding a change of government and a passage of the Constitution; a petition
campaign among university lecturers in support of the draft; and a successful green
campaign that persuaded the general public to show their support for the draft and to
pressure the parliament to accept the draft by attaching green stickers, ribbons, or flags
to motor vehicles, or wearing green shirts or dresses. The press harshly condemned the
conservative movement and its allegations, and manipulated them to emphasize a need
for change. More significant was the part the press played in promoting the green
campaign in support of the passage of the Constitution among the public.
Matichon: The success of the political reform depends on the public's waving 
of the green flag to support the draft, to pass the organic laws, to accept some 
revisions, and to leam about their constitutional rights and liberties. The campaign 
to promote the real understanding of this Constitution among the public has 
been significant in building a groundwork of democracy, and permeating 
democratic spirits into public life.78
Thai Rath: This constitutional campaign received supports from all the Thais in the 
country. Until this minute, there is no need to ask if the parliament will pass the 
Constitution. Today is so historically significant that we should remember. I would 
like to review how this Constitution has come about, how it has progressed, and 
how it has succeeded. Yet, the only answer to all o f these questions is that politicians' 
wickedness is no longer acceptable by the public.79
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As mentioned in Chapter Four, the nature of Thai journalistic practices in 
gathering, interpreting, and disseminating news often limits press coverage of politics to 
political events. The press coverage of political refonn, which largely revolved around 
political events involving the drafting of the Constitution, also illustrated the same 
‘rule’. After the passage of the Constitution, the lack of political events concerning the 
Constitution reduced its news value, and thus, press coverage about the ongoing process 
of drafting organic laws and establishing various commissions subsided. Indeed, 
journalists, in general, are more likely to select and report the less complicated issues. 
As suggested by Deacon and Golding, "the less complex and ambiguous an issue is, the 
more readily it can be personalized and dramatized, shown to have clear and immediate
Knengsak Charoenwongsak, "Kao to pai khongprachachon lung rub rang raththammanoon" 
(The next step for the public after the passage of the Constitution), Matichon Daily October 8, 
1997, p. 17.
Chalam Khiew, "Prawattisart" (History), Thai Rath. September 27, 1997, p. 6.79
implications, and is consonant with previous news frameworks, the more likely it is to
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be reported".80
It is clear in this analysis that both the quantity and quality press in Thailand 
were supporters of political reform. Matichon Daily, in this case, also indicated that the 
Thai quality press could become a means to increase public awareness and educate the 
public about the new Constitution, while also serving as a crucial platform for public 
debate on political reform and its broader implications. Yet Matichon's limited 
circulation and target readers suggested that its campaign on political reform was largely 
urban, and mainly reached the middle-class. Nidhi Aeusrivongse, a well-known historian 
and public intellectual, also agreed that "the mass media directly captured the middle- 
class as the main supporter for the Constitution".81 He further suggested that media 
attention responded well to demands from the middle class for political reform, which 
reflected their strong desire to re-negotiate their political power and social position.82 
The mobilization of the middle class opinion by the press can also be seen as the 
press’s tactics to use the urban middle class force against the strong rural supports for 
the New Aspiration Party, which led the government at the time. The juxtaposition of 
‘urban’ and ‘rural’ concerns, as suggested by Rungrawee, is often employed by the Thai 
press to prioritize political issues.83 The discourse of middle class opinion in the press 
thus ensured that pressure was being put on the government to expedite the reform 
process.
The political reform campaign culminated in the parliamentary approval of the 
new Constitution on September 27, 1997, two days after a no-confidence debate against 
Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. The extent to which Matichon and Thai Rath 
increased public understanding of important basic principles embedded in the new
David Deacon and Peter Golding, Taxation and Representation: The Media. Political 
Communication and the Poll Tax (London: John Libbey & Co., 1994), p. 185.
81 Nidhi Aeusrivongse, "Thong khiew kab khon chan klang" (Green Flag and the Middle-Class), 
Matichon Daily. October 24, 1997, p. 17.
82 Ibid.
Rungrawee Chalermsripinyorat, “The Politics of Representation: The Assembly of the Poor and 
the Use of Media Space to Challenge the Hegemonic Discourse in Thailand”, Paper presented 
at the 53rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, March 22-25, 2001.
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Constitution cannot be determined by this content analysis alone. Yet, it is clear that 
both newspapers, along with other media, successfully campaigned for public 
participation and support for the passage of the Constitution by engendering the 
national sentiment for reform, and by setting 'a new Constitution as a key to political 
reform' as a public agenda.
5.3.2 Japan's Press Coverage on Political Reform: Agenda-setter or Servant of 
the State?
Following the 1976 Lockheed bribery scandal and the 1988 Recruit Cosmos shares-for- 
influence scandal, there was an immediate surge of demand from the public for political 
reform. Thereafter, political reform (seiji kaikaku) became a political buzzword. After 
the LDP’s comeback in the 1990 general election, Prime Minister Kaifu made a serious 
effort to introduce electoral reform as a means to clean up the house and eliminate the 
roots of pork-barrel politics. However, the unpopular Prime Minister received little 
support from within the LDP, and his plan was soon swept under the carpet after he 
was replaced by Miyazawa Kiichi in 1991. The size of Shin Kanemaru's tax evasion and 
illegal funds, which came to light in 1992, added to the Sagawa Kyübin scandal that 
revealed the involvement of LDP far-right groups in mainstream political funding. These 
events turned the argument from electoral reform to political reform, or from mere 
cleaning-up measures to wholesale restructuring. To this momentum was added the 
intense rivalry among LDP factions for the chairmanship of the Takeshita faction 
vacated by Kanemaru. An LDP faction led by revisionists, such as Hata Tsutomu and 
Ozawa Ichiro, left the LDP in 1993 after losing the contests, and formed a new party 
with the aim to realize political reform.
However, the Miyazawa government was brought down in Summer 1993 for 
failing to deliver on its televised promise of political reform. After the 1993 election, a 
seven-party coalition was formed led by the Nihon Shinto Party (or New Japan Party) 
leader, Hosokawa Morihirö, with political reform as its platform. Later that year, the 
Hosokawa administration submitted four comprehensive political reform bills to the
Diet: a bill to revise the Public Election Law to introduce a new lower house electoral 
system based on a combination of single-seat constituencies (250 seats), and a 
proportional representation system in a single national constituency (250 seats); a bill 
to establish a committee for the demarcation of the new single-seat constituencies; a bill 
to revise the Political Funds Control Law; and a political party subsidy bill. The 
government-endorsed bills faced a strong resistance from the LDP. Although the bills 
were passed by the Diet in late 1993, they were rejected in the House of Councilors. 
After a number of behind-the-scenes negotiations between the LDP and the Hosokawa- 
led coalition government, an electoral reform bill, which combined single-seat 
constituencies (300 seats) and a proportional representation system in eleven 
constituencies nationally (200 seats), was put to the Diet and approved in January 
1994.84
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The Japanese press gave large space and attention to the coverage of political 
reform for several reasons. Firstly, political reform was the main issue that had led to a 
split in the LDP and brought about the fall of the LDP after its thirty-eight years of 
uninterrupted rule, and it was central to the election campaigns run by most parties in 
1993. Asahi Shimbun, for example, published a comprehensive table of contents listing 
each party's movements and policies on political reform during 1992-1993 prior to the 
1993 election.85 This is confirmed by an earlier study of election coverage in Asahi and 
Yomiuri conducted by Takeshita and Mikami, which revealed that political reform was 
the most prominent issue in the 1993 general election.86 Secondly, when the LDP fell 
from power after the election, this signaled a major political change. Thus, the struggle 
between old and new power, that is, the LDP and the non-LDP coalition government, in 
shaping the direction of political reform was carefully monitored by the press. Lastly,
For more details on Japan's political reform see Yamaguchi Jirö, Nihon seiii no kadai: Shin 
sßiii kaikakuron (Current Issues in Japanese Politics: A New Annroach to Political Reformt 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1997); and Albert L. Seligman, "Japan's New Electoral System: Has 
Anything Changed?", Asian Survey. May 1997, 37(5), pp. 409-420.
"Kono ichinenkan no seiji kaikaku wo meguru ugöki (Movements towards political reform in 
the past one year), Asahi Shimbun. June 20, 1993, p. 7.
Takeshita Toshio and Mikami Shunji, "How Did Mass Media Influence the Voters' Choice in 
the 1993 General Election in Japan?: A Study of Agenda-Setting", Keio Communication 
Review. 1995, (17), pp. 27-41.
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Prime Minister Hosokawa himself pledged to bring about political reform. In his first 
press conference after being appointed as Prime Minister, he stated that he would "take 
political responsibility" should political reform not be realized by the end of the year.
The close attention given by the press to political reform was evident in the large 
number of articles related to political reform in selected issues of Yomiuri and Asahi. 
The content analysis revealed that there were a total of 303 articles on political reform 
in the selected issues of Yomiuri, and 358 articles on political reform in the selected 
issues of Asahi from April 1993 to March 1994. This number easily outstrips the 
number of articles on political reform in the selected Thai newspapers.
The content analysis started with issues published in the first week of April 
1993, when splits between a reform faction and a conservative faction within the LDP 
loomed, leading up to the actual splits in June 1993. In June 1993, the number of articles 
was high as they covered the legislative process of the LDP reform proposal, and the 
vote of no confidence that brought down the Miyazawa administration. However, in 
July 1993, the stories on political reform were overshadowed by the election coverage. 
Stories on political reform resurfaced in early August 1993 after Hosokawa had been 
appointed to the premier post. The number of stories on political reform reached a peak 
at the end of the year when the government-sponsored bills were submitted to the Diet 
and later rejected in the House of Councilors. Stories about party bargaining on political 
reform bills dominated the political issues in January 1994, as the position of Prime 
Minister Hosokawa was at stake. The number of articles concerning political reform 
clearly declined during February-March 1994. The 'political reform' agenda began to 
disappear from the press and was replaced by new agendas. Yomiuri, for example, began 
to heavily attack Prime Minister Hosokawa for his alleged corruption. Asahi, on the 
other hand, embarked on an editorial series about administrative reform in March 1994.
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Figure 5: Size of Articles on Political Reform in Yomiuri (n=303) 
and Asahi (41=358) from April 1993 to March 1994
U/o-
Very brief 
< 1/8 page
Brief 1/8- 1/4 
page
Medium 1/4 - 
1/2 page
Long 1/2 - 1 
page
B Y omiuri 10% 70% 17% 3%
□  Asahi 18% 59% 22% 2%
Figure 6: Topics of Headlines of Articles on Political Reform from April 1993
to March 1994
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On average, there were two to three articles on political reform published daily 
in the selected issues of Yomiuri and Asahi from April 1993 to March 1994. As shown 
in Figure 5, fifty-nine per cent of articles in selected issues of Asahi, and seventy per 
cent of articles in selected issues of Yomiuri were not larger than a quarter of a page. Yet 
Asahi published more half-page articles on political reform than Yomiuri. As shown in 
Figure 6, the headlines of these articles suggested that the stories in selected Yomiuri and 
Asahi were dominated by comments and actions of key decision-makers involved in the 
reform. Moreover, fifty-five per cent of Yomiuri's articles included direct quotes from 
government officials, whereas forty-nine per cent of Asahi's articles contained direct 
quotes from governmental sources. Yomiuri, for instance, ran a series of interviews with 
various politicians about their views on political reform in May 1993. Noticeably, most 
of the ordinary news articles referred to their sources not by their names or exact titles, 
but by citing their general positions, such as a source (suji), a party executive (kanbu), a 
senior government official (seifu shunö), or a top LDP official (jimintö shuno). This 
reliance on governmental sources by both papers indicates that the government played a 
major role in setting the agenda of press coverage on political reform.
While the news stories, in general, were about conflicts and compromises 
between parties about the direction and details of political reform, and were based on 
press conferences, kondan, interviews, party policy meetings, and advisory council 
reports, a number of articles consisted of independent analysis by an editor or a political 
reporter based on a combination of previous information gathered, or a presentation of 
public opinion surveys conducted by the paper. Noticeably, Asahi tended to offer its 
own analysis of the progress of political reform and critical independent viewpoints. 
Fifteen per cent of articles in selected Asahi issues were in this category, and only eight 
per cent of articles in selected Yomiuri issues appeared as editorials or commentaries 
with by-lines.
Approximately eighty per cent of articles on political reform in selected Yomiuri 
and Asahi issues were about electoral reform. Stories on political campaign contributions
and political party subsidies accounted for only about twelve per cent. The remaining 
stories were presented in conjunction with issues of administrative refonn and 
constitutional reform. Politically speaking, although issues of political campaign 
contributions and political party subsidies were equally as important as the electoral 
reform, they were not frequently discussed and debated by politicians, and this lessened 
their news value. Moreover, once electoral reform was discussed, Diet members of all 
parties were more concerned with how to change the electoral system so as to retain 
their seats than with wider issues like anti-corruption measures. A great deal of space in 
the newspapers was allocated to description and comment about various proposals for 
the new election system. For example, interview articles airing views of proposals held 
by various politicians in Yomiuri and Asahi were merely reflections of what these 
politicians thought would happen to them and their parties under each proposal, and 
how the proposals they favored would affect their interests.
Thus, most stories on electoral reform were presented as conflicts or 
compromises between the reform group (kaikaku-ha), and the conservative group 
(shukyü-ha). However, the terms -- reform group (kaikaku-ha), and conservative group 
(shukyii-ha) -- were not initiated by the press, but coined by a pro-reform politician, 
Ozawa Ichiro, who left the LDP to form the Japan Renewal Party (Shinseitö). Ozawa 
branded politicians who were in support of the introduction of the new single-set 
constituency system in place of the existing multi-member constituency system "the 
reform group", and those who were against the new system "the conservative group". 
The press copied these terms and applied them according to Ozawa's typification .87 For 
the press, Ozawa was unsurprisingly an important source who offered a useful insight. 
Ozawa served as an adviser to the Prime Minister during the Hosokawa administration, 
and was also known as a "shadow shogun", or behind-the-scenes power holder who 
kept the coalition together. Therefore, in the case of political reform in Japan, it is
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(e<Is-)> 21 Seki no masukomi 01: Shimbun (Mass Communication in the 21st Century: 
Newspaper) (Tokyo: Ötsuki Shoten, 1997), p. 67.
arguable that politicians significantly set the press agenda on political reform, rather 
than the press itself.
Direct attacks by the press on politicians who were branded "conservative” 
(shukyü-ha, or the less direct term, shincho-ha, meaning careful) simply by advocating 
an alternative route to the mainstream thinking on political reform was exemplified in 
the following excerpt from an Asahi editorial. The subject of this attack was the LDP 
Chief Cabinet Secretary to the Miyazawa government, Kajiyama Seiroku, who 
suggested that the political campaign contribution bill should be introduced prior to the 
electoral reform. This suggestion caused an uproar among the Opposition and the press, 
which had been portraying 'political reform' as a national urgency. Asahi's editorial on 
May 11, 1993 harshly commented, "If Mr. Kajiyama has committed to any serious 
debate, it is not unreasonable to grasp his real intention as 'I wish to crash the reform of 
the electoral system'. However, it is desirable for us that he would stop his roundabout 
way of talking, and should instead engage directly to find a common ground".88
The majority of newspaper articles on electoral reform were overwhelmed by 
debates between the reform group and the conservative group, as well as many insights 
about behind-the-scene negotiations and lobbying. Few stories seriously discussed the 
main differences, or the advantages and disadvantages between the existing and the 
proposed systems. Most coverage was based on the logic that the old system of the 
multi-member constituencies penalized the small parties and necessitated candidates 
from the same party to fight for the same seat. In the existing system, there was no 
policy differentiation among candidates, election campaigns were focused on individual 
appeals, and therefore became costly as each candidate had to subsidize its own support 
group (koenkai). This also became a source of corruption and pork-barrel politics. When 
the reform group within the LDP split, and all of the Opposition parties flagged 
political reform as the main agenda in their election campaigns, editors from both Asahi 
and Yomiuri reminded these politicians about the basic importance of political reform:
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88 "Kusei kaikaku e selten wo motomeru michi" (A road to seek a common ground in the reform of 
electoral constituency). Asahi Shimbun. May 11, 1993, p. 2.
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Yomiuri: It is clear that the 'political reform' slogan is flagged in every comer of the 
political world. But, as far as the various groups' with the LDP and the Opposition's 
movements or the whole refoim group phenomenon, so to speak, are concerned, the 
substantial content in their claims of what will change and how become rather vague.89
Asahi: Even if the new election system and political fund control measures were put 
in place, they would only constitute a step towards a long path of political reform. 
After long-term governing by the LDP, the financial and administrative reform must 
be next, and the question of how to tear apart the closed and suspicious relationship 
between political, bureaucrat, and business circles must be tackled.90
However, after seven parties won the election and formed the first coalition
government, the political reform agenda was reduced to the mere topic of election
reform. As mentioned earlier, while most news articles tended to cover the exchanges
between the reform and the conservative groups, only a handful of articles tried to
explain why the change of the electoral system was really important to the political
reform process. Electoral reform, as portrayed by the press, represented an end in itself,
rather than a means of achieving a better kind of party politics. A good illustration of
this can be seen in these selected Yomiuri and Asahi editorials:
Yomiuri: The single-seat constituency system that casts only a single candidate 
from a constituency will bring about the two-party system, and a possible 
power change. However, this system can be seen as only benefiting a large party, 
and causing a large number of unsuccessful candidates. But the proportional 
representative system, which distributes seats according to the proportion 
of the poll, has merits in that it accurately reflects public opinion, amplifies 
party policy differences, and brings about a political change.91
Asahi: Some politicians might have said that the topic of the electoral 
system has occupied parliamentary sessions far too long. Although this 
may technically be true, the discussion in the parliament has not even 
touched the fundamental importance of the question of for whom and for what 
the election is contested.92
In contrast to Yomiuri, editorials in Asahi, albeit only a minority, reminded 
readers that political reform was an on-going process, and suggested that other aspects 
besides electoral reform should be taken into account.
"Kaikakuzö wo motto kutaiteki ni shimese" (Show reform appearance more concretely), Yomiuri 
Shimbun. June 24, 1993, p. 3.
Moriyama Jiro, and Tomatsu Yasuo, "Heiritsusei meguri kakutö ni zure" (Gap in party policy 
concerning the mixed system), Asahi Shimbun. August 4, 1993, p. 7.
"[Heiritsu]jikuni ikkatsu kaikaku no jitsugen isoge" (Do hurry to realize the reform by using the 
mixed system), Yomiuri Shimbun. July 15, 1993, p. 3.
Ichigawa Masanori, "Kihon wo wasurete imasenka" (Do you forget the basis?), Asahi Shimbun. 
September 14, 1993, p. 1.
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Asahi: First of all, political reform does not stop at the reform of election system 
and political funds control. Rather it should proceed to free the policy-making process 
from being heavily dependent on bureaucracy and political institutions.93
The view that election reform was tantamount to political reform was more pronounced 
in Yomiuri than in Asahi. A Yomiuri cartoon, published when negotiations between 
Prime Minister Hosokawa and the LDP leader on details of the new election system 
was intense, expressed this view well. Prime Minister Hosokawa in a traditional 
costume was shown being blindfolded, trying to catch a geisha who was running and 
holding a folding fan labeled ‘political reform’.94 More particularly, Yomiuri's editorials 
appeared to focus on expediting the legislative process by making a claim to the public 
promise made earlier by Prime Minister Hosokowa. The content of these articles 
demonstrated an attempt to shore up public dissent against the slowness of the 
Hosokawa administration in realizing political reform.95
As shown in Figure 7, news articles in both Yomiuri and Asahi appeared to be 
neutral in covering political reform. Yet there were far more pro-reform articles than 
anti-reform articles. Press support for reform was obvious in most news coverage, 
especially when the type and details of a new election system were at the center of 
political debates. Both papers appeared to support the government proposal of the 
mixed system of single-member constituencies (250 seats) and a nationally-based 
proportional representation system (250 seats). Some observers suggested that the 
press gave positive coverage about the introduction of the mixed system due to the fact 
that several executives of these media organizations were members of the 8th Election 
System Council, which came up with a similar proposal in 1990. This Council was
Hayabö Chöji, "Seikansai yuchaku wo kaishö dekimasu kal" (Can the shady relationships 
between the political, the business, and the financial world be broken off?), Asahi Shimbun. 
September 16, 1993, p. 1.
Yomiuri Shimbun. January 21, 1994, p. 2.
Such an attempt was exemplified in articles such as, "Seiji kaikaku no nennai jitsugen wa kyümu 
da" (Realizing political reform by the end of the year is an urgent task), Yomiuri Shimbun, 
October 18, 1993, p. 3; "Kaikaku jitsugen e jisha wa dakyöseyo" (The LDP and the SDPJ 
should compromise in order to realize political reform), Yomiuri Shimbun. October 22, 1993, 
p. 3; and "Dakyo kaikaku wo kecchakusaseyo" (Compromise should occur so the reform will be 
settled), ), Yomiuri Shimbun. January 27, 1994, p. 3.
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Figure 7: Agendas of Political Reform Articles in Yomiuri (11=303"). 
and Asahi (n=358) from April 1993 to March 1994
U / O -
Proreform Anti-reform Neutral
El Y omiuri 47% 2 % 50%
□  Asahi 46% 3% 51%
Figure 8: Priority of reform issue as interpreted in Japanese newspapers from
April 1993 to March 1994
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established during the Kaifu administration, and twelve out of twenty-seven ol its 
members were presidents and directors of major media organizations.96 Noticeably, 
there were very few articles in both papers that opposed the adjusted reform plan that 
resulted from the behind-the-scenes negotiations between Prime Minister Hosokawa, 
and Kono Yohei, the LDP leader. These negotiations eventuated in the selection of a 
mixed system of single-member constituencies (300 seats) and a regionally-based 
proportional representation system (11 blocs, 200 seats). The number of seats were 
reportedly changed to accommodate LDP demands so as to get the bill through the 
House of Councilors.
As noted above, the Japanese press put priority on the direction of electoral 
reform. However, as shown in Figure 8, Yomiuri gave almost equal coverage to 
discussing electoral reform and forging an agenda of public dissent to expedite the 
legislative process, while assigning only twelve per cent of its articles to blaming 
officials or public systems for obstructing the legislative process of the political reform 
bill. Asahi, on the other hand, was more critical of the officials and systems than 
Yomiuri. Yet, when comparing these results with the priority of issues on political 
reform covered in the Thai press, it is clear that the Thai papers were far more intent to 
assign blame to particular politicians or public officials whose comments or conduct 
were regarded as anti-reform. In contrast, the Japanese press seemed to try to give a 
balanced coverage and maintain its objectivity. At the same time, the Japanese press had 
a greater tendency to be a passive agent by transmitting official information uncritically. 
News about political reform became reports of what prominent people say about the 
reform, rather than reports of the reform process itself. The Japanese press tended to 
legitimize their official sources. Neither did it ask why politicians narrowly focused 
their comments on electoral reform, nor set a useful alternative agenda for political 
reform. Important issues were selected and pursued by the press after decisions or 
agreements had been reached in backroom negotiations among key politicians. The main 
agenda it set out during the coverage was to put pressure on the government to fulfill its
96 Kurashige Atsurö, op. cit., p. 68. See also Tanaka Shüsei, "Seiji to medeia" (Politics and 
Media), IIösö Repooto. 164, March 2000, p. 4
promise of completing the task of political reform. As such, the Japanese press did not 
successfully play the role of an agenda-setter, but functioned more in the role of a 
servant of the state.
5.4 News Frames Contested and Other Roles of the Press in Politics
The foregoing discussion suggests that the Thai press is more likely to play the role of
agenda-setter than the Japanese press. In agenda-setting, a linear and reciprocal
interaction between state, media, and the public is common and anticipated. However,
there are often circumstances in which the state, the media, and the public interact more
dynamically in the formation of political discourses. An example of such a situation is
where the government of the day, as a powerful news source that can alter its tactics
and agendas as the intense political situation unfolds, and the media which have
developed a hostile attitude towards the government, compete to exert their influence
over the framing process of political information, and the public opinion and feedback
are constantly exposed and manipulated as media messages by either side. According to
Gitlin, political information is framed by a journalistic process of selecting, interpreting,
and excluding before being conveyed to the public:
Media frames are persistent patterns o f cognition, interpretation, 
and presentation, o f selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which 
symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual.
Frames enable journalists to process large amounts o f information 
quickly and routinely: to recognize it as information, to assign it to 
cognitive categories, and to package it for efficient relay to their audiences.97
These frames also resonate within the professional and political culture of the 
news media. Wolfsfeld asserted that as the political and cultural base of the news media 
varies, media frames thus offer a brief glimpse of the political symbols, myths, and 
stories that are popular at a particular time and place.98 Examples of common news 
frames in Japan and Thailand are press coverage of the rape of a local girl in Okinawa by 
US military officials in 1995 that was located within the frames of the problem of US
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Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking o f the 
New Left (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 7.
Gadi Wolfsfeld, Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle Fast (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 32.
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military base in Okinawa and the re-armament of Japan. The peasants' movements in 
Thailand, on the other hand, were often portrayed by the press as political smear 
campaigns against the government rather than being discussed within the frame of the 
inequality of development between urban and rural sectors.
News frames are thus important because they highlight some aspects of political 
information, make them more meaningful to the public, and lead to specific public 
reactions." News frames, or story themes, are tools in presenting news stories which 
journalists employ to draw readers' and audiences’ attention to certain meanings of news 
stories, while ignoring others. Accordingly, the state contests the meanings of news 
frames in order to maintain public support on specific political issues. The main task of 
journalists is to maintain the autonomy of their news frames by including non­
governmental voices, independent viewpoints, and alternative materials, as news sources 
in political stories.
As mentioned in Chapter Four, the professional culture of Thai and Japanese 
press reports is largely based on strategic power games between political factions or 
groups rather than differences in policy or ideological positions. As a result, newspaper 
headlines of political articles often reflect and demonstrate the shifting alliances of key 
power brokers and keep track of winners and losers. Political events are centered on the 
activities of political leaders, and the political climate reflects how these leaders create 
and manage political events, and sometimes how the public responds to these events. In 
this section, a content analysis of newspaper headlines in Japan and Thailand is 
conducted to look at how the media frame the issue of ‘premiership’, and how related 
political discourses are constructed. The extent to which the state and the media struggle 
to exert influence on the media frame, how the press employs expert or legitimate 
strategies in the framing of political news, and how the public responds to such 
contestation are also addressed. In analyzing the media frames on cmcial events that
99 Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm", Journal of 
Communication. Autumn 1993, 43(4), pp. 51-58.
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involve the Prime Ministers in both countries, the political role of the press in reporting 
these events will also be gauged.
The content analyses in the sections below were conducted on the headlines of 
three Thai newspapers, including Naew Na, Matichon, and Thai Rath, and three 
Japanese newspapers, including Asahi, Yomiuri, and Mainichi. The selected editions 
were the morning issues of the last month of office of recent Prime Ministers in both 
countries. In the Thai case, the morning editions of newspapers during the last month in 
the office of Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (October 1-31, 1997) were selected. 
For the Japanese case, the morning editions of newspapers during the last month in the 
office of Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryütarö (June 12 -July 14, 1998) were selected. 
These two Prime Ministers were chosen for a reason that they had been in power for a 
considerable time (approximately a year or more). In countries like Thailand and Japan 
where the occupant of the Prime Minister position changes on the average of fewer than 
eighteen months, this indicated a certain degree of policy continuity and stability in the 
government.
In both cases, the headlines of articles on either front page or political page were 
recorded and translated (see Appendices 11 and 12). Coding sheets were used to obtain 
details of headlines about the Prime Minister in the news articles (see Appendix 10). 
The article was selected when its content was oriented towards domestic political 
matters. The dominance of the article was measured by considering first whether the 
Prime Minister was featured in the headline. If the Prime Minister was absent from the 
headline, then attention was turned to other main political actors including cabinet 
members, the opposition, and the public. The topic of the headline was categorized 
according to its general meaning, such as the Prime Minister’s failure in administration, 
the Prime Minister's activity, the coalition disarray, opposition to the Prime Minister, 
opposition to the coalition party, or support for the Prime Minister.
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5.4.1 The Thai Press and the Premier: A Typical Guard Dog
The Prime Minister has always been a readily available target of the Thai press since the 
revocation of Decree No. 42 in 1991, which allowed the state unilateral power to close 
down any newspapers that criticized the Prime Minister and his ruling party. 
Moreover, in the 1990s, the premier’s post was no longer at the pinnacle of power as it 
had been during the 1960s-1980s. In fact, Thailand had seven different Prime Ministers 
over this last decade.
Cultural factors that contribute to the public attitudes towards leaders in 
Thailand include the concepts of decha (power), and khunna (moral goodness). It is 
generally believed that a legitimate leader must have a combination of these two 
qualities, though the combination can vary from one leader to another.100 Chavalit 
Yongchaiyudh became Prime Minister after his party, the New Aspiration Party 
(NAP), had won the November 1996 general election. Allegations about the N A P’s 
extensive vote buying originated in foreign journals101 and newspapers, which covered 
the issue extensively. The Thai press held back, waiting to ascertain Chavalit's probable 
fate before it attacked him. This can also be explained by the common phenomenon of a 
‘honeymoon period’ usually given by the press to a new administration. However, a 
flood of critical coverage began to surface within six months. Scandals involving the 
NAP’s deep involvement with ‘money politics’ were publicized. Chavalit’s leadership 
in appointing unpopular ministers and his capability in economic management was 
largely questioned after the Thai Reserve Bank announced the flotation of the baht in 
the beginning of July 1997. Thus, for the Thais and particularly for the urban voters,
Niels Mulder, Inside Thai Society: An Interpretation of Everyday Life (Bangkok: Duang Kamol, 
1992), cited in James Ockey, "Thai Society and Patterns o f Political Leadership", Asian 
Survey. April 1996, 36(4), p. 350.
Michael Vatikiotis reported that about US$ 1 billion was spent on vote buying in the 
November 1996 election. Michael Vatikiotis, "Tilting at Windmills", Far Eastern Economics 
Review. April 3, 1997, p. 18.
293
Figure 9: Main Actors in the Headlines of Articles in Matichon. Thai Rath, 
and Naew Na during October 1-31. 1997
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Figure 10: Topics of Headlines Featured in Matichon. Thai Rath, and 
Naew Na during October 1-31. 1997
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Chavalit had only decha, which suited a traditional Thai leader, but obviously lacked 
khunna - an ingredient essential for a legitimate leader of present-day Thailand. As the 
Thai press was fixated on these leadership qualities, Chavalit became a target of 
constant press criticism. Figure 9 shows that Chavalit and his close cabinet members 
were the main political actors featured in the headlines of the major Thai press.
The attacks in the major Thai newspapers focused on objections to the Prime 
Minister, his unattractive personality, and the failure of his administration. The press 
reports rarely went beyond his personal qualities focusing on allegations that the P M 
had Alzheimer's disease, that the PM's wife was obsessed with astrology, and that his 
party was struggling with internal disarray. The press coverage appeared to ignore 
investigation of the real reasons behind the economic turmoil, or discussion of potential 
policy solutions. As Marger has noted, “rarely do the mass media subject the dominant 
political economy to serious scrutiny and criticism”.102 One of the fundamental 
problems of the Thai economic downturn involved the irresponsibility, mismanagement 
and corruption within the Reserve Bank of Thailand. Nevertheless, the Bank scarcely 
made headlines in the Thai press. Instead, there were headlines using abusive languages 
attacking the Prime Minister such as, "Jiw nak pan din ouk p a i” (Jiw (Chavalit), a 
wastrel, get out!) (see Appendix 11).103
To explain the hostility of the press coverage given to the Chavalit government, 
it is necessary to mention distinctive roles played by advocates in shaping the media 
frame. The government's mismanagement of the economy and frequent change of finance 
ministers attracted a swathe of criticism from both private and public sectors. 
Moreover, they were sceptical about attempts by conservative members of the 
government to block the passage of the new Constitution. All three newspapers 
analyzed here published articles written, or interviews given, by several influential 
individuals in the Thai politics and the economy. If the Thai press did have an impact
102
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Martin N. Marger, “The Mass Media as a Power Institution”, in M. E. Olsen, and M. N. 
Marger (eds.). Power in Modem Societies (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 243. 
“Jiw” is the nickname of Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh.
on public attitudes, then it was most likely to have been in articulating and reinforcing
this public scepticism. As demonstrated below, the persistent antipathy of the public
was highlighted by reporters and columnists as a crucial contextual factor in shaping
their own perceptions of the legitimacy of the Chavalit government. The sentiments the
press expressed, as it argued, were in tune with those of the public:
Matichon: The public antipathy against Chavalit and his government is 
increasing. If General Chavalit listens to public opinion, he will realize 
that the public has suffered badly from the poor economic conditions.104
Thai Rath: The grand movements by businessmen, public intellectuals and 
the middle class since yesterday on the Silom Rd. to drive this goverment 
out signified the overwhelming public antipathy against this government.
In the past we saw students protesting against the military governments, but 
in the new age in which Thailand became a fmancial colony we have witnessed 
protestors wearing suits.105
Naew Na: The public closed the business area and the Prime Minister's office to 
pull Jiw down from the premiership, since he has destroyed the nation for nearly 
a year. The military also watched closely, declaring that it has sided with 
the public.106
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Severe criticisms of Chavalit and his government were consistently made 
throughout the paper ranging from headlines, news items, and commentaries, to editorial 
cartoons. Relationships between those in the press and those in government were 
inevitably strained. Snoh Thienthong, the interior minister, responded to the press 
scrutiny by setting up a media-monitoring center to rebuke the press and issue 
warnings. He also sought to use extralegal measures against directors and columnists of 
these papers (see Chapter Two). His rationale behind the establishment of such a center 
was that newspaper companies were opposed to the government because they suffered 
economically when their overseas debts doubled overnight as a result of the 
government's decision to float the baht. Deputy Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej even
"Thueng waela Chavalit siasala perd thang khon meephimue kobkoo chat" (It's time for 
Chavalit to open a way for a better hand to recoup the nation), Matichon Daily. October 21, 
1997, p. 2.
"Scoop na nueng" (Page one scoop), Thai Rath. October 21, 1997, p. 17.
"Khon Thai ruam soon khoo chat" (The Thai people unites to recoup the nation), Naew Na. 
October 21, 1997, p. 1.
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Figure 11: Percentage of Topics in the Headlines of Articles in Matichon. 
Thai Rath, and Naew Na during October 1-31. 1997
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claimed that the media were the root cause of the country's problem . 107 Although the 
Thai press rejected these claims, Surin Maisrikrod, an ex-journalist and currently a 
lecturer in Thai politics at James Cook University, offered this insight: "it is not 
surprising to see these newspapers feeling angry and turning to attack individuals in the 
government, since they lost lots of money as a consequence of the economic 
downturn" . 108
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Further contestation over media frames by the government was evident in its 
attempt to launch a public relations campaign on state-run radio stations. Manipulation 
of the tmth was clear when PM Chavalit made claims that there were reports from the 
Thai Intelligence Agency that public demonstrations were parts of a ploy initiated by a 
group of people with their own political ambitions, who funded the demonstrations and 
campaigned to drive him out. 109 Although such claims gained a certain degree of media 
attention, the press quickly reported that sixty per cent of the demonstrators at the 
rally on Silom Road had a bachelor’s degree, and were not likely to have been paid for 
attending the rally . 110 Quotes of criticisms made by the foreign press, and various public 
polls concerning the Prime Minister and his cabinet that were conducted by tertiary 
educational institutions were used by the major papers to counteract Chavalit's 
claims. 111 The results of these polls mostly indicated a strong negative public feedback 
on the Prime Minister and his administration.112
There are two interesting aspects of the three newspapers that emerged from the 
analyses of their headlines. Firstly, it is noticeable that the headlines used in Matichon
107
108 
109
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"Samak vents his frustration at freedom of the press", Bangkok Post September 11, 1997 (on­
line edition).
Dr. Surin Maisrikrod, James Cook University. Interview on November 10, 1997.
"Jiw choe buang lung mob 1 por l chor and 2 Khunying Chor" (Jiw disclosed the truth behind 
the rally - backing by one male with initial P., another with initial C., and two ladies with 
initial C.", Matichon Daily. October 22, 1997, pp. 1-2.
"Perd krong sang mob 21 tula" (Reveal the structure o f the October 21 rally), Phuiadkan Daily. 
October 22, 1997, p. 4.
"Thai-thet muen kor.ror.mor. Jiw 4 yee yeu nakwichakan-thurakit phid wang samsak"
(Both Thai and foreigners were dissatisfied with the cabinet reshuffle, Intellectuals and 
businessmen were disappointed again and again), Naew Na. October 26, 1997, p. 1,7.
For example, a survey by Suan Dusit Poll on the attitudes of business proprietors in Bankok 
towards the government showed that more than fifty per cent of respondents wanted the Prime 
Minister to resign.
were strong but tactful. Although the majority was directed at the government, some 
expressed great concern regarding the effects of inflation on the people. The headlines in 
Naew Na, on the other hand, consisted of abusive and derogatory terms. As indicated in 
Figure 11, about forty-five per cent of its headlines directly opposed to the Prime 
Minister. They used derogatory terms to brand the Prime Minister, such as a torarat (a 
traitor), nhak pan din (a wastrel), and khattakorn Jiw (Jiw (Chavalit), the murderer). 
Furthermore, the discussion in its news columns did not corroborate the headlines. Not 
surprisingly, Naew Na was the main target of the government established media 
monitoring center. Opposition to the government seemed to permeate the entire 
structure of Naew Na. It was reported that the publishers of Naew Na newspaper 
appeared to be the main organizers of the major demonstration on Silom Road on 
October 21.113 Thus, it can be argued that the personal relationships between the 
newspaper publishers and the powerful politicians was significant here. Squadron 
Leader Prasong Soonsiri, a director and a columnist of Naew Na, is a close ally of 
General Prem Tinsulanonda, and was a Foreign Minister during Prem's premiership. The 
newspaper also repeatedly sent pro-Prem messages to people in its news columns. For 
example, frequent messages included: "if we don't change the Prime Minister, if  we don't 
change the cabinet, and if we don't have a person like General Prem as the Prime 
Minister, we will be facing bankruptcy like many other countries".114 Prasong's close 
relationship with the major opposition party, the Democrat Party, became clear when 
he was made an adviser on security when the Party replaced Chavalit's New Aspiration 
Party to lead the government in late 1997. A long time animosity between Prasong and 
Snoh, Chavalit’s interior minister, also had a great influence on how Naew Na covered 
Chavalit and his close cabinet members during their last month in office.
Secondly, the concentration of press attacks after the float of the baht and during 
the decline of the government is indicative of how the Thai press in general recognizes 
the significance of power held by certain political figures at a particular point of time. 
The press will not attack certain figures should they have enough power to take revenge.
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Phuiadkan Daily. October 22, 1997, p. 4.
"Khwam hen Naew Na" (Naew Na's opinion), Naew Na. October 20, 1997, p. 1.
Instead, they will wait until the influence and popularity of these dominant figures are
in decline. These characteristics of the Thai press are reflected in comments made by
Boonrak Boonyakhetamala of Thammasat University:
When a man is at the pinnacle of his power, no one will attack him, 
but when he begins to slide from power and is vulnerable, journalists 
go after him like a pack of dogs.115
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Boonrak also suggested another reason why the press severely attacked Chavalit 
and his cabinet members: "it's easier and quicker for the press to frame the story. Rather 
than finding out what has gone wrong in the system, it's somehow more convenient to 
pick an individual in the system and point a finger at him that he is a wrong-doer".116 
This feature o f the Thai press is similar to that described in the 'guard dog' thesis, where 
the media are generally viewed as being loyal to their owners and siding according to the 
owners' political inclination. However, when the welfare of the system is threatened, 
these guard dogs will bark and attack the individuals in power roles rather than the 
power structure.117 These 'guard dog' media will report this challenge on individuals in a 
way that is often regarded as a media attack. Indeed the reporting can portray its 
subjects as renegades or villains, even when they are part of the power structure. 
Indeed, when the Thai economic crisis intensified, the press portrayed Prime Minister 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh as an incapable PM, one with Alzheimer's disease who always 
forgot what he had said and changed his mind, one with a level of intelligence not so 
much different from the comedians performing at cafes and nightclubs, and one who was 
always accompanied with MPs who only wanted to make money and profit from what 
they spent on vote-buying. Chavalit’s reluctant support for the passage of the 
Constitution was underlined by the press as a threat to the country’s democracy. In the 
face of these press criticisms and negative urban opinion expressed through the press, 
Prime Minister Chavalit resigned on November 6, 1997.
An interview with Boonrak Boonyaketamala cited in Jon Vanden Heuvel and Everette Dennis, 
The Unfolding Lotus: East's Asia Changing Media (New York: Freedom Forum Media Studies 
Center, 1996), p. 173.
Thawatchai Jaranai, "Boonrak Boonyakhetamala wikhroe nungsuphim Thai thammai tong 
khayom Jiw" (Boonrak Boonyakhetamala's analysis on why the Thai Press attacked Jiw), 
Matichon Sudsapda. October 21, 1997, pp. 68-9.
George A. Donahue, Phillip J. Tichenor, and Clarice N. Olien, “A Guard Dog Perspective on 
the Role o f the Media”, Journal of Communication. Spring 1995, 45 (2), p. 122.
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5.4.2 The Japanese Press and the Premier: A Reluctant Guard Dog
The distinctive difference between the Thai and Japanese Prime Ministers is the fact 
that the Japanese Prime Ministers do not need to acquire as strong individual images to 
gain public popularity to ascend to the top.118 A crucial reason lies in Japan's system of 
leadership recruitment, wherein factional politics essentially determines the selection of 
the LDP president, who, in turn, becomes a legitimate leader by virtue of his party's 
majority of votes in the Diet. Three conditions of this legitimate leader are being a senior 
leader of one of the five major factions within the LDP, having a strong intra-factional 
support, and being committed to building inter-factional alliances. None of this has 
anything to do with popular appeal.
Consequently, the Japanese Prime Minister is merely a front man who 
articulates a policy consensus, and who is needed for factional power-sharing 
arrangements on which his selection to the top rests. Clearly, he is in a weak position 
vis-a-vis both party factions and the bureaucracy. As such, the prime ministerial style 
in Japan has been branded as "reactive leadership".119 The Japanese press generally 
pays much attention to its 'reactive' premier. Therefore, such attention was not focused 
on his policy initiative, but rather on how he would achieve a consensus of opinions 
from his faction, and how he would avoid conflicts among factions to achieve policy 
resolution. An earlier examination of illustrations of the Japanese Prime Minister in 
editorial cartoons has suggested that the Prime Ministers were often portrayed as weak,
This also reflects the difference of the position of political parties in both countries.
Thai political parties, unlike their Japanese counterpart, tend to confine themselves to 
parliamentary activities, rather than establishing themselves as mass organizations engaging 
public movements and activities. McCargo suggested that this was due to Thai popular 
perceptions which generally distrust political parties of their political motives. See further 
discussion of Thai political parties in Duncan McCargo, “Thailand’s Political Parties: Real, 
Authentic, and Actual”, in K. Hewison (ed.), Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and 
Participation (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 121.
Hayao Kenji, The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy (Pittsburg: University of 
Pittsburg Press, 1993).
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Figure 12; Main Actors in the Headlines of Articles in Asahi. Yomiuri. 
and Mainichi from June 12 to July 14. 1998
Figure 13; Topics of the Headlines Featured in Asahi. Yomiuri. and Mainichi 
from June 12 to July 14. 1998
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confused, and lacking in confidence — a combination of qualities which detracts from 
being a charismatic leader.120
When Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryütarö came into power after the general 
election in 1996, he was faced with a host of pressing issues: administrative reform, 
economic reform, reform of the financial system, and problems of a rapidly ageing 
society. In April 1997, Hashimoto raised the national consumption tax from three to 
five per cent, and repealed a special income and residential tax cut to reduce the fiscal 
deficit. As a result, the recession deepened and unemployment soared. The public’s 
antipathy increased when the vice-minister of health and welfare was arrested on 
suspicion of conspiring with companies that built nursing homes. Soon after, 
mismanagement and corruption within the Ministry of Finance was exposed following 
the collapse of Yamaichi Securities, one of the nation's four biggest securities houses in 
Japan. These scandals obliged the Hashimoto administration to tackle administrative 
reform that had been unpopular among old-guard politicians, bureaucrats and vested 
interest groups, who were in no hurry to challenge the arrangements that had served 
them well. In 1998, Hashimoto announced some measures aimed at promoting economic 
recovery, including tax reductions and reform of the banking system. However, the 
economy reacted negatively to the announcement, as the LDP appeared to be too slow 
in addressing the problem of bad loans burdening financial institutions. It was only 
before the Upper House election in July 1998 that the LDP came up with several 
drastic measures, including the establishment of a bridge-bank, and a permanent tax-cut 
package. However, the press saw the responses as too little too late, and became 
strongly critical of Hashimoto's inept handling of the economy. In the July election, the 
majority of voters decided to vote against the LDP and Hashimoto resigned.
As shown in Figures 12 and 13, fifty per cent of the headlines of the three major 
newspapers in Japan focused on the Prime Minister. Yet, unlike the Thai case, only ten
3 0 2
120 Ofer Feldman, "Political Reality and Editorial Cartoons in Japan: How the National Dailies 
Illustrate the Japanese Prime Minister", Journalism Quarterly. Autumn 1995, 72(3), pp. 571 - 
580.
per cent of the general meanings of the headlines in the major Japanese press were 
directly opposed the Prime Minister. Particularly, there was no single headline from 
Asahi Shimbun that could be categorized as directly attacking the Prime Minister. 
Instead, most headlines seemed to focus on his activities and policies, particularly on 
the economic measures he was considering to pursue (see Appendix 12). Wordings and 
terms used to address the Prime Minister were much more formal and straightforward 
than those used by the Thai press, yet puns were often used. For instance, a headline of 
Asahfs political article on June 12, 1998, the day that the opposition parties submitted 
a no-confidence motion to the Parliament, featured, "ryütö dabi? nobori ryü" (literally 
meaning a dragon’s head with a snake’s tail or a rising dragon, or a tame ending or a 
bright start). The Chinese character ryü used here was the same character as ryü in the 
Prime Minister's name, Ryütarö.121
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In contrast to the Thai press, which appeared to reflect and reinforce the public
criticisms of Chavalit's policies and his mismanagement of the economy, the Japanese
press seemed to have organized public opinion in forming dissent against Prime
Minister Hashimoto and his government. While most headlines were focused on
economic policy direction and complications, editorials in the major press were confined
to attacking the government's slow responses to the economic problems, and urging the
indecisive Hashimoto to take on radical economic policy. The permanent tax reduction
plan initiated by Hashimoto was framed by the major press as merely an election
promise in what was called by a Mainichi columnist a "genzei senkyo" (tax reduction
election).122 Similar criticisms were:
Mainichi: The policy on permanent tax reduction is aimed at 
shoring up the stock market and yen value, and at the same time, 
the Prime Minister focuses on his visit the United States at the 
end of the month. It seems that the Prime Minister has tried to avoid 
discussing any concrete policy during the election. The permanent tax 
reduction policy is merely a political speculation that is based on a 
hasty conclusion that it would ease the people's economic burden, 
and the country's financial problem.123
Asahi Shimbun. June 12, 1998, p. 6.
Mainichi Shimbun. June 7, 1998, p. 2.
Komatsu Hiroshi, "Shushö no kökyü genzeiyönin: Seiji teki omowaku ga sakibashiri" (The 
acceptance of the Premier's permanent tax reduction plan: A mere political speculation), 
Mainichi Shimbun. Junly 2, 1998, p. 2.
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Figure 14: Percentage of Topics in the Headlines of Articles in Yomiuri. 
Mainichi. and Asahi from June 12 to July 14. 1998
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Asahi: At the press conference after meeting with the LDP study group 
on the tax system last week, the Prime Minister suggested that, "this 
is not a special tax reduction, but I intend to introduce a permanent 
tax reform scheme". Katö Hiroichi, the LDP secretary, also said that 
the amount of tax cut will be at least two trillion yen. But how are we 
going to finance this at the time of rapidly ageing society. The government 
did not even say how we are going to support the health and welfare system 
after the tax cut.124
Yomiuri: Prime Minister Hashimoto announced that a permanent tax reduction 
plan for income tax, residential tax will commence next year. The corporate 
tax will also be reduced to the level equal to the international standard. However, 
one can wonder why the Prime Minister suggested such a plan after the election 
campaign has started, and yet denied his suggestion directly afterwards. The Prime 
Minister seemed to continue to change his mind on the subject. But we cannot 
allow him to change his mind again. Rather, we should ensure that he will put 
in place the permanent tax reduction plan, which would assist in the 
economic recovery.125
However, it is noticeable that Yomiuris attacks on Hashimoto and his 
administration in its editorials were generally more subtle that those of Asahi and 
Mainichi. This had parallels with a series of its front-page editorials in June 1998 on 
economic problems and political solutions that did not directly criticize Hashimoto's 
mismanagement of the economy. Rather, these articles made various economic and 
political suggestions to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.126 In comparison with 
Asahi, although Asahis headlines did not directly attack the Prime Minister, its 
editorials and cartoons seemed to address the Prime Minister in a more aggressive 
fashion than usual. For instance, it published an editorial cartoon characterizing 
Hashimoto as a sheep being chased around by two sheep dogs - one with "USA" 
written on it barking "permanent", and another with "Upper House Election" written on 
barking "tax reduction".127
The major press also framed the Upper House Election as an election that 
centered on voters’ judgement of the government's performance on the economy.
"Shushö e no shingi no ba da" (It's the place to judge the Prime Minister), Asahi Shimhun.
July 9, 1998, p. 5.
"Defure kaihi ni ato modori wa dekinai" (Reversing the plan to avoid deflation cannot be done), 
Yomiuri Shimbun. July 9, 1998, p. 3.
See, "Keizai kiki seiji e no teigen" (A suggestion to politics on economic crisis), Yomiuri 
Shimbun. June 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 1998, p. 1.
Asahi Shimbun. July 10, 1998, p. 4.
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AsahVs editorial published ten days before the poll suggested that voters should turn up 
to show their dissatisfaction with Hashimoto's indecision concerning the permanent tax 
cut.128 Mainichfs headline on July 11 suggested that Election Day would be the day 
that both Hashimoto and the LDP would be judged by the public.129 Press 
condemnation of the government's economic policies was also reinforced by the use of a 
public polls undertaken by each newspaper on a nearly monthly basis to measure the 
public support for the government. The Mainichi poll published in September 1997, for 
instance, suggested a seven point drop in support for the cabinet in comparison to the 
previous month, and thirty-three per cent of respondents thought that Hashimoto's 
weakest point was his inept economic policy.130 The Yomiuri poll in June 1998 even 
showed even less support for the cabinet.131 Notably, public opinion polls that were 
featured prominently in Yomiuri, Mainichi, and Asahi, a few days before Upper House 
election all suggested that the public had developed a sense of crisis and insecurity 
towards the LDP, and predicted that the LDP would lose its seats. In this case, the 
press not only underpinned and supported the viewpoints already in circulation, but 
also articulated and organized ones that were consistent with their own viewpoints.
In this case, the newspapers’ viewpoints were based partially on inside 
information, dispersed within the cosy information loop of factional reporters prior to 
the election, that Hashimoto was perceived within the party as a political loner, who 
commanded no particular faction in the party. As such, his leadership was undermined 
by not having strong intra or inter-factional supports. The Takeshita faction, the largest 
faction of the LDP at the time, wanted its leader, Obuchi Keizo, to be the next Prime 
Minister, and had already lobbied for the move.132 Hashimoto also made a lot of 
enemies, especially amongst the old-guard LDP, who far from agreed with the need and 
direction of his reform plans, by designating his entire cabinet as the Government
128 " Warusa kagen wo kurabe tara" (How about comparing the degree of badness), Asahi Shim bun. 
July 2, 1998, p. 5.
129 Mainichi Shimbun. July 11, 1998, p. 1
130 Mainichi Shimbun. September 10, 1997, p. 1.
131 Yomiuri Shimbun. June 17, 1998, p. 3.
132 Interview with Iwamura Tatsurö, Deputy Chairman Editorial Board, Asahi Shimbun on 
November 17, 1998.
Administrative Reform Headquarters, and by putting the heat on ministers, particularly 
those with portfolios such as Construction, Housing, Health and Welfare, and 
Agriculture, who were all known to be wary of reform. Although such information was 
categorized as 'leaked information' and printed in some weekly magazines, it was never 
printed in major newspapers due to the reporters' club sanctions on publishing leaked 
information, and perhaps the strong adherence to the concepts of impartiality and 
nonpartisanship of the press. This open secret of the Prime Minister's weak position 
within his party perhaps encouraged Mainichi and Asahi to target the Prime Minister 
and critically attack him. However, for Yomiuri, despite having figured out that the 
Prime Minister would certainly lose his seat after the election, it reserved strong 
criticism against the Prime Minister and his administration due to its close relationships 
with the LDP.
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Another reason that perhaps underpinned the reluctance of Japanese 
newspapers to directly attack the inability of the administration and ineptness of the 
Prime Minister was their concerns about the deregulation of newspaper industry. The 
industry derives more than half of its income from subscriptions, underpinned by a 
price maintenance system that requires all retailers to sell newspapers at a fixed price 
everywhere in the country. Moreover, these national newspapers also receive special 
tax privileges and the lowest postal charge by the Postal system and the Japanese 
Railway System . 133 The deregulation of these services would have inevitably meant 
more production costs for the newspapers. A threat of radical deregulation thus became 
a powerful weapon in the hands of the government of the day. To protect their control 
on the resale price of their publications and maintain the status quo, newspapers used 
their news pages to campaign against deregulation, most notably during the Hashimoto 
government's move towards administrative reform and deregulation. 134 The role of the 
Japanese press in this case could thus be branded as that o f 'a  reluctant guard dog'.
Katsura Keiichi, Gendai no Shimbun (Newspapers at Present (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho 
1997), pp. 87-88.
Ota Hiroko, "Sharing Governance: Changing Functions of Government, Business, and NPOs", 
in Yamamoto Takashi (ed.), Deciding the Public Good: Governance and Civil Society in Japan 
(Tokyo: Japan Center of International Exchange, 1999), p. 137.
134
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5.5 Comparative Remarks
Despite the decline in newspaper readership in Japan and Thailand during recent years, 
the press still retains an important position as the medium that actively interacts with 
the state and events produced by political actors, as well as reflecting the political 
opinions, ideologies, and values of the public. This was evident in the case study of 
Thai press coverage of political reform, in which the press framed the passage of a new 
Constitution as an agenda for political reform, and successfully articulated and 
reinforced public sentiment for reform. However, news about political conflicts 
revolving around the drafting of the Constitution dominated the entire press coverage. 
News about policy debates was only emphasized in the Thai quality press, which 
limited its target group to the urban readers, and reflected only the opinions of the 
better-educated Thai middle class.
The role of the Japanese press in covering political reform is perhaps more 
conformed than that which characterized the Thai press's coverage of the political 
reform. The heavy reliance of the Japanese press on quotes and comments from the 
official sources suggests that the Japanese state had more control over political 
information than the press. This argument was supported by the results of the content 
analysis, which showed that the majority of coverage on political reform was about 
conflict and compromise between opposite camps of politics. The domination of 
electoral reform coverage over the entire period of political reform packages suggests 
that journalists seemed to spend most of their time reacting to an agenda already set by 
politicians, rather than initiating it. In this context, the Japanese press was much more 
restrained in setting an agenda for reform independent of the government.
The content analyses of the press coverage of the premiers in both countries 
demonstrated how the press interacted with the state and public opinion more 
dynamically. The press struggled with the state by constructing its own discourse of 
political events, and inventing frames that offered guidance on how the stories would be
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told. In the case of the Thai press coverage of Prime Minister Chavalit, the press was 
successful in the battle over media frames by focusing on public dissent against the 
government and the mismanagement of economic policy by the Prime Minister. 
Although the state attempted to promote its political frame to the press and other 
media, the Thai press adhered to its own frame and never hesitated to directly assign the 
blame to the Prime Minister and his close aides. However, the partisanship of the Thai 
press characterized these active roles as those of a mere guard dog. The Japanese press, 
on the other hand, was more reluctant to target the Prime Minister. It only did so after 
ensuring that he was unlikely to be at the pinnacle of power, or to have sufficient 
authority to jeopardize the status-quo.
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CHAPTER SIX
POLITICAL INFORMATION CONTESTS AND THE POLITICAL ROLE OF
TELEVISION NEWS
iTV does not want to see any low-ranking police officers 
becoming a scapegoat. Rather iTV's venture against police 
corruption is aimed at persuading the Police Commander 
and the Minister o f Interior to demonstrate their courage 
and seriousness to punish any officers who involve in 
corruption.
Editors of iTV1
Since commercial stations are regulated by the licensing 
system, they fa ll into the whims o f the MPT. They are 
weak and trembled by any calls from the Communication 
Council to appear before them. In such an instance, the only 
support that commercial stations have in order to contest with 
the authority is the public support. In the case o f  
TV Asahi's problem this time, we achieved an unexpected result.
This was all due to the overwhelming public support.
Tahara Soichiro2
The ownership structure of television broadcasting in Thailand and Japan, as 
well as the licensing systems of television broadcasting services, as discussed in Chapter 
Three, have been the manifestation of coercive and reward strategies which both Thai 
and Japanese states employ to control political information dissemination. However, 
recent changes in the television broadcasting marketplace in both countries -- the results 
of liberalization and increased competition — have given the television medium an ability 
to compete for control over political information by presenting alternative discourses 
and interpretations of political events. The extent of these political information contests 
and the extent of the power relations that were exercised between the television medium, 
the state, and the public, as well as its impact and influence on the political roles of
Statements by the Editorial Board of iTV, broadcast on iTV  evening news on April 24, 1998. 
Extracted from an interview withTahara Soichiro, a TV journalist regularly hosted a current 
affairs program - Sunday Project -, by a Mainichi Reporter in "Kenryoku no hödö kainyü " (The 
Power of Intervention in Reporting), Mainichi Shimbun (evening edition), March 18, 1999, p. 
3.
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television are the core of this chapter. However, this will be limited to the realm of 
television news. Current affairs programs, political discussion programs, and special 
editions of election campaign coverage, though relevant, are beyond the scope of this 
thesis.
In recent years, television has gained a position as the prime source of political 
information for both the Thai and Japanese public. In Japan, despite having the highest 
volume of newspaper circulation in the world, television has become a preferred source 
of political information.3 The rapid increase in television penetration in Thailand has 
brought similar results. In particular, technological and regulatory changes and increased 
competition have increased TV viewership in both countries. In Thailand, a new news 
channel -  Independent Television or iTV  -  has gained a reputation for its investigative 
style of news reporting, and its watchful gaze on the state’s wrongdoings. In Japan, 
evening news bulletins and late night news programs such as News Station and News23 
have pluralised media content, increasingly challenged mainstream political discourses, 
and engaged public opinion. What were the forces which made this contestation 
possible, what was the nature of TV news coverage, and what role has the television 
medium assumed in Japanese and Thai politics? To answer these questions this chapter 
will outline the evolving nature of the television marketplace, the changing dynamics of 
news programs in both countries, and significant news events where the TV media 
strongly contested state interpreted meanings of political situations, and the extent to 
which these challenges determined the shifts in the political role of the TV news media.
6.1 The Marketplace for TV News
According to NHK public opinion surveys in 1985 and 1993, there was a shift to relying on 
television as a major source o f political and social information among the Japanese public.
In 1985, the Japanese people relied more on newspaper (46%) than television (43%) for 
information; whereas in 1990 television (52%) replaced newspaper (37%) as a major source of 
information. See Okamura Reimei, Terebi no asu (The Future of Television). Iwanami Shinsho 
Booklet No. 283 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997), p. 70; a similar survey conducted nationally 
by Yomiuri Shimbun in 1995 also showed that people relied more on news programs on 
television (54%) than newspapers (40%) for information on political parties and current political 
situation. Yomiuri Shimbun. June 21, 1995, p. 3.
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In Thailand, the television penetration rate has rapidly increased over the last ten years. 
Whilst 50.1 % of total households had at least one television in 1989, that figure climbed 
to 94 % of total households in 1997.4 In these households the most watched programs 
on television are news programs, and free-to-air TV news has been the main source of 
political information for the Thai public.5 According to a public opinion poll conducted 
in Bangkok and metropolitan area in 1999, television ranked first as the public source 
for news and information.6 This has also led to the widespread use of television for 
political campaigning in recent elections. The results of the 1996 election, for example, 
indicated a strong correlation between the amount of money spent on television 
advertising by political parties and voting results.7
As television audiences have increased since 1994, the total daily newspaper 
circulation has remained steady. Indeed, the Thai public consumes a relatively low 
amount of print media, as indicated by paper consumption rate. According to a 1999 
UNESCO report, there was only 13.1 tons of paper consumed annually per 1,000 
people in Thailand, whereas people in Singapore and Hong Kong consumed up to 98 
tons per 1,000 people. As Nidhi Aeusrivongse argues, conventional methods of reading 
which interpret and understand the core meanings of written words have never been a 
part of Thai culture.8 Before newspapers were introduced, most Thai materials written 
for mass consumption were either aesthetic poetry or literature, and were written 
mostly for recitation and theatrical performance. The Thai tradition actually emphasized 
auditory and visual modes of communication. Old Thai sayings such as ‘au hoo tuan 
lorn' (thrusting your ears against the wind), and ‘sib pak wa mai thao ta hen’ (one
National Statistical Office, Office of the Prime Minister, Renort o f the Mass Media Survey 
(Radio and Television) 1989 (Bangkok: National Statistical Office, 1989), p. 6; Far East 
Advertising Company, Media Guidebook: Thailand' 97-98 (Bangkok: Far East Advertising 
1997), p. 12.
Far East Advertising Company, Media Guidebook: Thailand' 97-98 p. 19.
See the results o f ABAC poll in "Economic news out-votes politics", The Nation. September 
27, 1999 (on-line edition).
The New Aspiration Party, which was the biggest spender on television advertising in the 1996 
campaign, won the election. The total amount of money spent on TV advertising by political 
parties in the 1996 campaign almost trippled from what was spent in the 1995 election. See 
" Yuthakan chaiseu hasieng" (Media Strategy for Election Campaigning), Prac.hachart Thurakit. 
November 26-29, 1998, p. 3.
Nidhi Aeusrivongse, "Watthanatham kan'an " (Reading Culture), Matichnn SudsnpHn April 
25, 2000, p. 47.
sighting is worth more than ten rumors) reflect such traditions. The public's reliance on 
hearing and seeing as ways of receiving information ensured the success of television - a 
medium which offers both sight and sound.
313
From its advent, television has been an important part of Thai society. 
However, its primary role has been to convey official news and information to the Thai 
public. The evening news bulletins of early broadcasts merely focussed on the Prime 
Minister and his aides.9 Fifty years later, the Thai television news formats remained the 
same, but its content had become more sensationalized. Thus, the government of Anand 
Panyarachun felt the need to emphasize the importance of television in providing 
necessary and impartial news and information in the 1992 plan to liberalize UHF 
channels. This emphasis was clearly reflected by the requirement for one channel to 
allocate seventy per cent of broadcast time to information.
Table 8: Comparison of Percentage of Program Content Broadcast on Six Stations in 
Thailand between 1999 and 1979* ( in brackets)
Channel Information
(%)
Entertainment
(%)
Advertisement
(%)
Broadcasting 
Hour (seconds 
per day)
3 23.10
(14.10)
61.58
(67.48)
15.32
(17.27)
75,285
(46,654)
5 30.93
(22.44)
52.27
(56.44)
11.8
(19.17)
86,400
(33,540)
7 37.26
(19.01)
52.27
(63.64)
10.47
(16.61)
71,400
(30,026)
9 60.84
(42.53)
27.07
(42.78)
12.09
(13.11)
74,314
(36,231)
11 96.71
(N/A)***
3.29
(N/A)
0.0**
(N/A)
60,900
(N/A)
iTV 81.64
(N/A)
10.78
(N/A)
8.18
(N/A)
69,171
(N/A)
* The 1979 data is based on a content analysis of programs broadcast during September 1-7, 1979 
conducted by Boonlert Supphadilok. The 1999 data was based on data gathered in May 1999 by the 
Public Relations Department.
**Only government commercials are allowed on Channel 11, and these are considered "information". 
***N/A = Data not available, since Channel 11 was established in 1987, and iTV in 1996.
Sinith Sitthirak, Kamnerd thorathat thai vhor sor 2493 -  2500 (Tncention o f  Thai Television 
1950-1957) (Bangkok: Kled Thai, 1992), pp. 226-236.
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Source: iTV  Monitoring Group, National Broadcasting Commission, Public Relations Department, 
1999; Boonlert Suphadilok, Sitthi Kanseusan nai Prathet Thai (The Right to Communicate in 
Thailand! (Bangkok: Sathaban Thaikhadisuksa, Thammasat University, 1984), pp. 64-68.
The official permission to broadcast 24 hours, which was given in 1991, had 
already induced existing channels to increase the ratio of information to program 
content. The emergence of an information channel added a new strength to the 
competitiveness in news and information programs among existing TV broadcasters. As 
shown in the above table, the percentage of news and information programs has 
dramatically increased during the twenty-year period. More substantially, the 
liberalization brought changes and competitiveness in style and format of television 
news coverage, which had long been designed and operated within the confines of 
official standards.
Thai television had twice experienced changes in news broadcasting styles. The 
first time was in 1975 when a television guru, Sampasiri Wiriyasiri, introduced a news 
update program at Channel 9 that aired an uncensored non-official news bulletin every 
hour. However, the program was banned soon after its coverage of the brutal killings of 
students by right-wing extremists and the police and military in October 1976. The 
second change in style was when Somkiat Onwimon, who had graduated from the US 
education system with a PhD in communication, joined Channel 9 in 1985. He tried to 
adopt an American broadcasting format that emphasized the news anchor, live 
broadcasts, expert comments, and musical backgrounds. Somkiat extended news time 
from a half an hour to one hour and a half. He broadened coverage beyond state issues 
and introduced criticism and commentary.10 He also refined foreign news segments by 
adding items broadcast via CNN satellites. Soon after these changes Channel 9 ’s 
viewership soared, which prompted the government under the leadership of General 
Prem Tinnasulanondh to suppress the innovations. Prem publicly criticized Somkiat for 
airing a news item that contrasted urban and rural infrastructure spending. A few 
months later, Somkiat disappeared from the station but was soon attending the courses
For relevant materials see Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, “Television and the Emergence o f Civil Society 
in Thailand , in D. French and M. Richards (eds.), Contemporary Television: Eastern 
Perspectives (New Delhi: Sage, 1996), pp. 181-99.
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run by the National Defense College, which instructed businessmen and civilians about 
the importance of the army and national security.11 Somkiat later moved to produce 
news for the Army-owned Channel 7 and Channel 5, and gained a concession to run a 
24-hour traffic radio channel on one of the Army's frequencies.
The style of presentation in Thai news programs had been refined by Somkiat, 
but the content of news and complexity of stories needed further enhancement. 
Although all news producers in the early 1990s learned to draw the line between the 
touchable in the political realm and the untouchable in the royal circle by putting 
political and royal news into separate segments, political news was still mundane and 
shallow. Its content was limited to supporting the status quo. Investigative stories on 
political corruption and scandals were usually follow-ups to press reports. The press 
was actually a major source of news stories for TV news programs until the advent of 
iTV. Independent Television, or iTV, was the first UHF channel, privately operated 
under a concession given by the OPM. After its launch on July 1, 1996, iTV  gained a 
reputation for its innovative reporting and in-depth news analysis. This was largely 
because one of its controlling consortium members was the Nation Multimedia Group.12 
The expertise in newspaper journalism that the Nation Group brought to the TV market 
undercut the traditional style of news reporting, which emphasizes straightforward 
newsreading with a few background pictures. For the first time with iTV, television 
news actually became the source of press reports. The channel did not present news in 
hierarchical order but started with the headline of the day, and often intertwined 
political and social issues whilst highlighting public concerns. Lead stories combined 
straight news details with documentary-style reports, graphics, pictures, sound bytes, 
and sometimes live broadcasts. One of iTV executives, Suphap Kleekhachai, claimed that 
iTV  looked to CNN as a prototype, and presented news in a language that was easy for 
audiences to understand.13 The CNN style of reporting -  including live, exclusive and
11 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand Economy and Politics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), p. 372.
12 In May 2000, Shin Corp. bought forty per cent of iTV shares and became the major share 
holder. The Nation Multimedia Group, on the other hand, left iTV and bound for the new 
news channel on cable TV.
13 "Raikankhao iTV young tong nuai to" (News Programs: More struggle for iTV), Phuiadkan
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investigative news (locally known as khao sod, khao jo, and khao tid) — quickly 
emerged as a tradition for iTVnewsmakers. The station's emulation of the CNN style of 
news reporting certainly met with approval and increased audiences.
Table 9: Rating of TV Audiences of Five Broadcasting Stations in Thailand between 
Mav 1997 and Mav 1998 (excluding iTV)
Station
Time
Ch 3 Ch 5 Ch 7 Ch 9 Ch 11
16.00-18.45 47.0 8.3 31.5 10.2 2.9
18.45-22.30 38.3 12.4 43.2 4.4 1.7
22.30-24.00 34.5 14.8 38.5 9.4 3.8
08.00-16.00
Mon-Fri
34.5 14.8 38.5 9.4 2.8
08.00-16.00
Sat-Sun
26.1 11.1 43.8 16.7 2.3
06.00-24.00
Everyday
36.8 12.1 40.3 8.5 2.3
Source: Prakit & FCB Ltd., Media Dynamics cited in "Pholsamniad rating TV chong 3 bi chong 7 
soodman TV phuakhun young champ" (Survey TV Ratings: Channel 3 is close to Channel 7, which 
remains the top), Prachacart Thurakit. July 23-26, 1998, pp. 17-18.
ITV*s success also influenced market leaders such as Channel 7 and Channel 3. 
Both stations increased their scoop to story ratio, and interspersed news programs 
between prime-time drama series.14 As shown in Table 9, Channel 7 retained its 
position as a market leader of news programs during prime time (18.45-22.30) in 1997 
and 1998. This was largely due to its large coverage area. The success of iTV also 
inspired the Army-run Channel 5 to launch its Global Network Broadcast in 1998, 
which was designed to carry more foreign news items as well as coverage of economic 
and financial matters. During the same year, the state-owned Channel 9 upgraded its
rai sup da , March 3, 1997, pp. 35-36.
"Wigjet si thuang champyok khruangprime time chon chong sam" (Channel 7 overhauls 
its prime time programs to compete with Channel 3), Prachachart Thurakit. April 26, 1998,
p. 21.
14
news programs to include more scoops, live broadcasts, and sports coverage.15 Channel 
11 refocused its programs since mid-1996 to emphasize exclusive news and regional 
coverage.16 According to the Director of Program Production at Channel 11, iTV*s 
success prompted Channel 11 to set up its own news team after having solely relied on 
news provided by the Thai News Agency since its establishment.17 Following the 1997 
economic crisis, an associated downturn in advertising revenue, marketing factors and 
audience reach were also entrenched as key determinants of competitiveness for TV 
news coverage in Thailand.18
317
In Japan, television consumption spread earlier and more rapidly than it did in 
Thailand. From 1953 to 1962, television penetration rose from 0.1 per cent to 45.8 per 
cent of the total population.19 In particular, television became a subject of mass 
consumption in 1964, the year of the Tokyo Olympics, and by that time it had 
outstripped cinemas as the prime source for entertainment.20 Since the television 
penetration rate reached nearly 100 per cent in the early 1980s,21 the Japanese public 
has relied on television not only for entertainment, but also for information. According 
to the NHK national survey on time-use that was conducted every five years from 1970 
to 1995, both Japanese men and women spent increasingly more time watching 
television for information.22 For instance, during 1995 Japanese men spent an average of
"Fai Ion kon TV rath phueng tuen Chong kao Chong sibed prab 'dtalud" (Backbuming State- 
run TV: Channel 9 and Channel 11 just revamped", Prachachart Thurakit. November 2-4, 
1998, pp. 17-8.
"Perd kolayut iTV-Chong sibed ching TV khaosan" (Disclosure o f iTV  and Channel 1 l's 
strategies to lead in television news), Krunethep Thurakit. July 1, 1996, pp. 7-8.
Interview Tuenchai Sintuwanick, Director of Program Production of Channel 11, on July 18 
2000 .
In 1997, gross television advertising expenditure was 24,603 million baht. In 1998, it 
dropped to 21,164 million baht, which was approximately fourteen per cent decline. See Pocket 
Thailand in Figures (Bangkok: Alpha Research, 1999), p. 172.
Shiga Nobuo, Shöwa terebi hösö-shi (id) (The History of Television Broadcasting in the 
Showa Period II (Tokyo: Hayagawa Shobö, 1990), p. 259.
Marilyn Ivy, "Formations of Mass Culture", in A. Gordon (ed.), Postwar Japan as History 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 248-249.
From 1983 and 1993, the penetration rate of colour television in Japan was ranging between 
99.0 to 99.4 per cent. See Iyoda Yasuhiro et al (eds.), Terebishi H andobum i (Television 
Handbook). 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Jiyukokuminsha, 1998), p. 130.
Mitsuya Keiko and Yoshida Rie, "Seigatsu jikan no toki keiretsu henka - 1970 nen ~ 1995 nen 
no kokumin seigatsu jikan chösa no toki keiretsu bunseki" (Change in Time Use: Analysis o f  
NHK National Time Use Surveys from 1970 to 1995), NHK Hnsb Punka Chnsa Kenkmi 
Nenpö. 1997, (42), pp. 190-193.
thirty minutes reading newspapers on weekday, while spending up to three hours and 
fifteen minutes watching television. This time spent watching TV had increased by half 
an hour since 1990.23 This change coincided with the reduction of working hours in 
Japan which commenced in the early 1990s. According to Table 10 below, news 
programs comprised approximately twenty per cent of total program content aired on 
Japanese commercial televisions in the 1990s.
Table 10: Average Daily TV Program Content Broadcast bv Commercial Broadcasters 
in Japan in 1994 and in 1998*
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Types of Program 1994 (Percentage) 1998 (Percentage)
News 20.7 19.6
Education (Coursework) 12.9 12.0
Culture and Education 24.7 25.4
Entertainment 39.4 39.2
Advertising 1.2 2.5
Others 1.1 1.3
Total 100.0 100.0
* The 1994 data is based on data collected between January and March 1994. The 1998 data is based on 
data collected between October 1997 and March 1998.
Source: Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, 1998 White Paper Communications in Japan 
(Tokyo: General Planning and Policy Division, MPT, 1998), p. 69; The National Association of 
Commercial Broadcasters in Japan, Japan NAB Handbook 1994/95 (Tokyo: NAB, 1995), p. 67.
Equally important was the increasingly significant function of television as a 
central device in political campaigns in Japan during the 1990s. The 1996 election 
campaign, in particular, was regarded by all political parties as a 'media-centered 
campaign' in which television advertising played a prominent role.24 Organized media 
campaigning via TV advertising as well as news coverage has become the main strategy 
for success in electoral politics. However, expert analysis and not straight reportage has 
become the foundation of news coverage in this era of'mass-mediated elections'.25
Ibid.
Todd Joseph Miles Holden, "Commercialized Politics: Japan's New Mass Mediated Reality", 
Japanese Studies Bulletin. 1999, 19(1), pp. 33-46.
Ibid., p. 37.25
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In Japan, NHK's sögö terebi has dominated the TV marketplace as a news and 
information provider for the public since its initial broadcast in 1953. It was largely 
developed under the guidance of President Maeda Yoshinori (1964-73) who was 
directly involved in strengthening and expanding the news bureau. Since then, NHK 
news has become a flagship for its organization.26 On the other hand, commercial 
channels, which emerged between the 1950s and 1960s, have focused their resources and 
funding on producing drama series and entertainment programs, and relied largely on 
their affiliated newspapers for news. They reasoned that they would never be able to 
beat NHK in news reporting, because NHK was often granted exclusive coverage of 
governmental functions and meetings. Moreover, NHK has had more staff and better 
equipment for these purposes than the other channels. By 1997, NHK had established 
3,478 relay stations around the country and its staff had reached 12,986 people.27
In 1962 NHK's monopoly of news and information was challenged when TBS 
launched a 7 pm anchor-type news program called "News Koopu". This program 
deviated from the NHK's formal news reading pattern to provide news plus comments 
offered in a language that was easy for general audiences to understand.28 The program 
focused on investigative stories, particularly those concerning social issues. However, 
the famous anchor of the program, Den Hideo, was forced to resign after he criticized 
U.S. policy during the Vietnam War.29 In 1974, NHK marked a turning point in 
television news reporting by launching a 9 pm program that was aimed at late-shift 
working urban viewers. This was an anchor-type news program called "News Center 9", 
or NC9. The program gained high popularity among viewers, largely owing to its 
creative visual and sound presentation, as well as to its famous anchor, Isomura Naoki, 
who became known as Mr. NHK.30 Yet NC9 lost its popularity after Isomura left in
26 For further details on President Maeda Yoshinori and his contribution to the development of 
NHK news, see Ellis S. Krauss, Broadcasting Politics in Japan: NHK and Television News 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 127-30.
Nippon Hösö Kyökai-hen, '98 NHK Nenkan (1998 NHK Radio&Television Yearbook! (Tokyo, 
NHK, 1998), p. 1, 58.
28 Tahara Shigevuki. Terebi no uchigawa de (The inside of Television! (Tokyo: Söshisha, 1995), 
pp. 77- 78.
Shiga Nobuo, Shöwa terebi hösö-shi (ge) (The History of Television Broadcasting in the 
Shöwa Period III (Tokyo: Hayagawa Shobö, 1996), pp. 133-64.
30 Tahara Shigeyuki, op. cit., p. 61.
1977. NHK withdrew the program in 1988, and redirected its efforts towards the news 
at 7 pm, which has maintained its audience rating in the top five until today (see Table 
4). However, NHK News 7 strictly adheres to the rigid formats of factual reporting and 
relies heavily on governmental sources.31 This new program reflects NHK policy, which 
closely adheres to the political impartiality required by the Broadcast law. As such, no 
critical comments are allowed from newscasters. This situation has opened the way for 
the direct and indirect interference of authorities, and has reinforced a policy of self­
censorship in news production at NHK. Likewise, as discussed in Chapter Three, any 
attempts from the commercial stations to screen news programs that offered views 
contrary to those of governments, or even provocative comments, have often been met 
with reprimands from the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT).
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Table 11: Japan's Top Ten News Programs for November 16-22. 1998 bv Audience 
Ratings
P r o g r a m s C h a n n e ls D a te T im e R a t in g s
News 845 NHK 17-11-98 8.45-9.00 pm 22.0
News 7 NHK 22-11-98 7.00-7.20 pm 20.0
Weather 
Forecast News
NHK 21-11-98 6.45-7.00 pm 18.4
News NHK 20-11-98 4.53-5.23 pm 16.9
Shutoken
Network
NHK 20-11-98 6.02-7.00 pm 16.0
Weather 
Forecast news
NHK 22-11-98 8.45-9.00 pm 15.2
News Station TV Asahi 16-11-98 10.00-11.20
pm
14.9
News Plus 1 NTV 18-11-98 5.55-7.00 pm 14.4
News 9 NHK 18-11-98 9.00-9.30 pm 14.4
News no mori TBS 21-11-98 6.30-6.55 pm 13.0
Source: Video Research Co., Ltd., 1998, 47, November 16-22, 1998; 
http ://www. videor .co. j p/index. html
A comparative study of the uses of news sources between NHK and four commercial networks in 
1995 found that NHK's sources were usually government agencies, political parties, and 
organizations related to governments. Although, commercial stations also largely relied on their 
governmental sources. They also used non-routine channels including public and grassroots 
organizations more frequently than NHK. See E. Gwangho, "Nihon no TV nyusu ni okeru nyusu 
sousu no bunpu: NHK to minpo no hikaku wo chüshin toshite" (TV News Sources and 
Channels in Japan: A Comparative Analysis o f NHK and Commercial Broadcasters), Masu 
Komunikeshon Kenkvu. July 1996, (49), pp. 82-95.
The marketplace for television news in Japan became increasingly competitive 
after the emergence of a prime-time news program called ‘News Station’ on TV Asahi. 
This late night program was primarily aimed at capturing the middle-aged audiences who 
had distanced themselves from television.32 Launched in October 1985, the program still 
airs at 10 pm and lasts about 80 minutes. The style of this unusually long presentation 
is a mixture of factual reports, interpretation of news stories by a team of news anchors 
led by Kume Hiroshi, and comments from experts who are usually from the editorial 
board of the Asahi Newspaper. Kume Hiroshi's non-conventional and forthright 
opinions, blunt questions, and unhesitating reactions to news stories, quickly gained a 
wide audience.33 Kume often interviewed politicians live to gauge real reactions to his 
un-scripted questions. Kume offered the audience 'the true meanings' (honne) of politics, 
which were rarely discussed explicitly in the mainstream press. Kume's live interviews 
bypassed the system of reporters' clubs, which had dominated the news-gathering 
system and filtered the outflow of political information for more than a century. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, interviews of politicians at these clubs are undertaken in 
form of the kondan (chatting), in which most of the conversations are stated ‘off-the- 
record’. However, the fact that interviews with politicians are usually conducted live 
prevents them from intervening in the editing process and airing schedule.
Moreover, the co-operation between TV Asahi and CNN in news coverage and 
production assistance in the 1987 also gave News Station a greater comparative 
advantage in terms of technology and expertise.34 The foresight of TV Asahi's 
management in forging links with an international news network was in direct contrast 
to the traditional views held by NHK senior staff, who saw CNN as a 'cultural 
invasion'. In the view ofKanagawa Tomiyuki, director of international development for
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Tahara Shigeyuki, op. cit., p. 77.
Sherman, for example, suggested that Kume Hiroshi is one o f the most-watched 
news anchors in the world. See Spencer A. Sherman, "Hiroshi who?", Columbia 
Journalism Review. July/August 1995 (on-line edition).
Okamura Reimei, "Terebi no asu (The Future ofTelevisionC Iwanami Shinsho Booklet No.283 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997), pp. 62.
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NHK, for instance, "CNN is edited by Americans and their views are forced on us. 
Asian editors should produce and edit Asian news".35
The success of News Station in gaining high ratings of an average of seventeen 
per cent since 198 536 prompted other stations to launch anchor-type news programs 
during prime time (7-11 pm) — a period traditionally reserved for entertainment alone. 
However, these programs were short-lived. For instance, when their 10 pm news 
program failed to gain high rating, TBS decided to move out of primetime to 11 pm slot. 
The station hired Chikushi Tetsuya, a former Asahi newspaper editor and host of News 
Desk on TV Asahi to launch its News 23 program. This program has been broadcast for 
more than eleven years now, largely due to Chikushi's liberal viewpoints and vast 
political knowledge, and has captured a more mature audience than that of News Station.
Other programs that emulated News Station but aired at 11 pm included ‘kyö no 
dekigoto' (Today's events) onNTV (1988), ‘Dateline’ (1988), ‘News Com’ (1993), and 
‘News Japan’ (1994-) on Fuji TV.37 These programs rapidly fostered a new reporting 
style known as ‘waido nyuusu’ (wide news), which emphasized a variety of long 
documentary-style news items, plus anchors’ interpretative and personal comments. 
Not only the national news networks switched to this new style of news reporting, a 
number of local stations also adopted this style of ‘wide news’ reports in their local 
coverage.38 The success of ‘wide news’ has challenged the domination of the factual 
news reading style of NHK, which has not particularly been successful in the late night 
time slot.39 By the mid-1990s, NHK had not launched a news program in direct 
competition with News Station, but had filled the gap in foreign news by launching 
‘News 9 \  which carried mainly foreign news stories at 9 pm. However, in March 2000,
M. Scott, "News from Nowhere", Far Eastern Economic Review. November 23, 1991, p. 34; 
cited in John Aboud, "Japan as a TV Culture", Japanese Studies Bulletin. September 1992, 
12(2), p. 37.
36 Tahara Shigeyuki, op. cit., p. 80.
37 Okamura Reimei, op. cit., pp. 57-60.
lyota Yasuhiro, "TV Nettowaaku to chihö seiji" (The Networkization of TV and the reporting of 
local politics), Masu Komvunikeeshon KenkvCi. July 1996, (49), pp. 25-35.
3i For further discussion see Ellis Krauss, "Changing Television News in Japan", The Journal of
Asian Studies. 1998, 57(3), pp. 663-692.
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NHK launched ‘News 10', which directly competed with News Station. The use of soft 
musical backgrounds and a panel of news anchors similar to that of News Station is 
intended to soften the stringent image of NHK. However, this softening strategy has 
apparently been in stark contrast to the composed, and rather bland news anchors, who 
rarely comment and adhere strictly to the NHK's straightforward newsreading format. 
Not surprisingly, News 10's ratings during its first two months of broadcast were far 
outstripped by those of News Station .40
The popularity of these late night programs has also increased competitiveness 
among the earlier evening news programs on commercial networks. As shown in Table 
4, NHK still dominates the ratings in these timeslots. Indeed, competition for high 
audience ratings and hence high commercial revenue is very intense among commercial 
networks.41 In the case of the evening news bulletin, the broadcasting hour has been 
extended and more human-interest stories have been added to the programs. Hard news 
topics such as politics, economics and international relations are only mentioned briefly 
as the topics are too serious for viewers, most of whom are pensioners, housewives, and 
children. Such heavy topics are usually dealt with in the late night news programs, 
which are designed to cater for urban young and working audiences.
Major domestic crises, such as the Great Hanshin earthquake and the sarin gas 
attack in Tokyo subway in 1995, and the numerous cases of airplane and bus hijacks in 
the late 1990s prompted competitiveness in news and "wide show" programs42 and
The monthly average rating for News 10 was 8.5 per cent, whereas News Station's monthly 
rating stood at around 11-15 per cent. See Maruyama Noboru, "Nyuusu Suteeshon ni kampai de 
mietekita, NHK ryü seiji hödö no akumi kansö [nyuusu 10] no nikagetsu wo otte" (The defeat of 
the NHK's style of tasteless and dry political reporting to News Station was evident in the 
examination of two months of its broadcast), Hösö Repooto. July 2000, (165), pp. 10-14.
There are two major companies that measure ratings o f television audience viewership in Japan, 
and provide information commercially: the Japanese-owned Video Research Co., Ltd., and the 
American-owned A.C. Nelson Co., Ltd. All four networks - NNN, ANN, FNN, and JNN - have 
a stake in Video Research Co., Ltd, and thus rating results are supplied on a weekly basis. 
However, some networks use both companies, as there has been criticism against small 
sampling groups used and unreliable survey methods conducted by Video Research Co., Ltd. 
However, audience ratings are the key determining factor of the success and failure of TV 
programs in Japan despite the dubious nature o f the way in which the results are collected. 
Okamura Reimei, op. cit., pp. 96-100.
Wide shows can be categorized as current affairs programs. However, the topics covered in the 
programs are considered "wide", as they range from crime news, political news, entertainment 
news, sports news, to news about the Imperial Family, and particularly emphasize scandals.
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created a boom in live broadcasting. This boom was also marked by two separate 
incidents of TV helicopter crashes.43 Recording of these live broadcasts are regularly 
recycled in the station through news and wide show programs in various formats, from 
specials to short announcements to news segments. Competitiveness also increased 
with the development of information technologies that has drawn heavily investment 
from both public and private sectors as a part of the informatization (jöhöka) 
industrialized schemes.44 These schemes started to bear fruit in the mid-1990s when 
satellite television, cable television, and multi-channel broadcasting began to take market 
share from the existing terrestrial broadcasters. For instance, Rupert Murdoch's News 
Corporation commenced the satellite broadcasting of a 24-hour news channel called 
‘JNN News Bird’ in 1998.45 As a result of such incursions, news programs have fiercely 
competed for ratings. They have become increasingly segmented and highly competitive. 
In most cases, special reports, interviews and live broadcasts have been unnecessarily 
added to the programs. As revealed by Adachi Hisao, a news producer at NTV, the key 
success of Japanese news programs consists of ‘genba’ (site) and ‘tojisha’ (concerned 
people).46
The technology of communication (CS) and broadcasting (BS) satellites has also 
facilitated the instant transmission of live broadcasts. It has heightened competitiveness, 
and ushered in a qualitatively new stage of newsgathering and news reporting in Japan. 
The launch of communication satellite technology in Japan in the 1990s has facilitated 
the use of SNG (satellite newsgathering) to cross live from anywhere in the world. This
Presentation style of wide shows is highly sensationalised, often blurring the line between 
reportage and entertainment. They usually occupy the day-time slot, as their main 
audience viewers are housewives. For further reading, see Tahara Söichirö, "Terebi shusai ni 
manuaru wa nai" (There is no manual in television news-gathering), Buneei Shuniü. June 
1996, pp. 128-136.
In April 1997, helicopters of Television Shunshu Broadcasting and Nagano Broadcasting 
Systems crashed, killing journalists and cameramen on board. Similar incidents also happened 
in October 1994 when helicopters of Asahi and Mainichi crashed in Osaka. Murakami 
Shikemi, "General Trend of the Japanese Press in 1996-1997", The Japanese Press' 97 
(Tokyo: NSK, 1997), p. 14.
For further discussion see Ito Yoichi, “Japan”, in G. Wang (ed.), Treading Different Path: 
Informatization in Asian Nations (Norwood, NJ: Albex, 1995), pp. 68-98.
Asian Mass Communication Bulletin. January-February 1998, 28(1), p. 9.
Interview with Adachi Hisao, Editor, News Program, Nippon Television Network Corporation 
on October 29, 1998.
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satellite technology has accommodated a program featuring the live broadcast of daily 
parliamentary debates and deliberations in Japan, known as kokkai terebi. This program 
was televised on Perfect TV via a communication satellite (CS) to subscribers around the 
country in January 1998.47 Although live broadcasts of parliamentary debate had been 
first televised since 1990 on cable television, these broadcasts had been limited to 
featuring parliamentary deliberations on important legislation and budgetary issues, and 
had only been able to yield a small audience.48
6.2 Pluralism in TV News
The transformation of news reporting in Thailand and the increased competitiveness 
amongst Japanese news programs has markedly increased the level of pluralism in 
domestic reporting, or in other words, the differences in news selection and presentation 
among television channels. The high degree of pluralism in TV news is evident in the 
following content analyses of television news stories. Twelve evening bulletins that 
were aired during the main evening broadcast on six channels in Thailand on May 13-14, 
1998, and ten bulletins broadcast on NHK and four commercial networks in Japan on 
November 25-26, 1998 were taped and analyzed. The analysis of Japanese news is 
longer than the Thai news as the former was inclusive of the comparison between two 
popular late night news programs and the NHK's ‘News T . The absence of comparable 
late night news program in Thailand prevented similar analysis.49 Nonetheless, the 
overall content analysis was aimed at categorizing the types of stories covered by each 
station to map out the news policy of each station, and to gain some indication of 
convergence, diversity, and the interpretation of meanings invested in certain events (see 
Appendices 11 to 14). According to Gurevitch et al., the comparison of convergence and 
diversity of news stories offers:
As noted in Chapter Three, cable television had a limited number of subscriptions when it was 
introduced in the late 1980s. Moreover, as according to Kurashige, audiences of these programs 
were limited to the Diet members, relevant bureaucrats, and reporters, who taped and watched 
the programs later for their own use. See Kurashige Atsuro, "Kokkai terebi ga hödö wo 
kaeru!?" (Will the live broadcast from the Parliament change the way the news is reported?), 
So go Jaanarizumu. Kenkvu. 1996, (163), pp. 30-34.
Ibid., p. 32.
Although some TV channels in Thailand had late night news programs, they were truncated 
versions of early evening news programs.
a very useful opportunity to compare the meaning in the 
stories of the same events, and thus to examine comparatively 
whether and how such diverse meanings are constructed.50
Evening news bulletins broadcast on six channels in Thailand on May 13-14, 
1998 lasted between one and two hours. The news hour was relatively long when 
compared to evening news bulletin in other countries such as Australia, which generally 
lasted about half an hour, and the U.S., which lasted about twenty-two minutes. This 
peculiarity was due to two reasons. Firstly, evening news hours broadcasts in Thailand 
were modelled after the CNN's concept of 'news magazine' by including various 
documentary-like features. As shown in Figure 15, these documentary features are 
categorized into a life style section which accounts for around ten to fifteen per cent of 
the total news hours, and generally includes stories on tourism, agriculture, public 
services, infrastructure, and historical ceremonies and artifacts. Moreover, the news 
bulletins observed on commercial channels, with the exception of iTV, were aired 
between two drama series. As a result, some leading news items in both the before­
drama and after-drama bulletins overlapped. The before-drama news bulletins were 
broadcast between 5.30 and 6.30 pm., primarily to cater for housewives and students 
who would be home earlier than blue and white-collar workers. The latter group usually 
arrives home in time for the main bulletin at 7 pm. The anchors of these bulletins were 
both males and females, although female anchors seemed to appear more frequently than 
their male counterparts.
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Michael Gurevitch et al., "The Global Newsroom: Convergences and Diversities in the 
Globalization o f Television News" in P. Dahlgren and C. Sparks (eds.), Communication and 
Citizenship; Journalism and the Public Sphere in the New Media Age (London: Routledge 
1991), pp. 204-5.
Figure 15: Type and Percentage of Evening News Content Broadcast 
on Six Stations in Thailand on Mav 13 - 14. 1998
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News items were divided into 'hard news' and 'soft news'. This categorization of 
news was proposed by Tuchman in 1978, who suggested that journalists differentiate 
news when they approach and write stories by using 'time' as the main criterion.51 'Hard 
news' includes stories that need to be factually accurate and speedily published; whereas 
'soft news' stories are less urgent with less emphasis on facts. However, organizational 
application of this typification, particularly in assigning works to individual journalists, 
has tended to depend on the estimation of time and efforts that journalists must invest 
to produce news stories. As such, 'hard news' stories are defined as complicated stories 
in which journalists must put a greater effort in pursuing them than in dealing with 'soft' 
news stories. By using the latter definition, 'hard news', as defined here, included 
politics, economics, and foreign coverage of events, and 'soft news' focused on crime, 
social problems, the environment, and society.
Figure 16: Style and Type of News Content on Thai TV Channels
HARD NEWS SOFT NEWS
INVEST!
GATIVE ITV, CH 11 CH 3
STRAIGHT
CH 5, CH 9 CH 7
Yet the distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' news was not absolute in the Thai 
case, because the presentation of investigative stories often blended political and social 
issues. All channels tended to carry similar news items, although they provided different 
lead stories. Still, the collected data showed that iTV, Channel 5, Channel 9 and Channel
51 Gay Tuchman, Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality (New York- Free Press 
1978).
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11 carried more hard news stories, whereas Channel 3 and Channel 7 concentrated on 
crime, and social and life-style issues. The data showed a clear demarcation between 
'investigative' news stories and 'straight' news stories. iTV  and Channel 11, in particular, 
carried a number of investigative political and economic stories. Channel 5, on the other 
hand, featured mostly straightforward and informative political and foreign news, 
whereas Channel 9 carried more economic news, such as stories related to the economic 
crisis. Channel 11 devoted half an hour at the beginning of the program to live regional 
news from its eight network stations around the country. Channel 7 also crossed live 
from its regional centers, although most of the stories aired were related to crime and 
traffic accidents. The high diversity in news stories on different channels signals a 
considerable degree of nonconformity in news values and news policies among different 
channels (see Appendices 13 and 14).
In comparison with iTV, political news content on other channels seemed to 
center on official stories and sources. iTV  tended to feature political stories, particularly 
those about protests, which were not reported by other channels. While presenting 
similar stories on social issues to those shown on other channels, iTV  provided more 
detailed analysis. For example, when reporting on the transfer of seven police 
superintendents for breaches of conduct, iTV named all the officers and their charges, 
but other channels did not. Such a brave venture can be explained by organizational 
factors, and a reaction to the traditional 'gatekeeper' role of journalists. In 1998, most 
iTV  journalists and producers were former members of the press. The Thai press is a 
medium that, until 1992, has always been a target of closure by the police because of its 
negative portrayal of authoritarian governments. Thus, the model of ‘newspaper 
journalism’ adopted by iT V s producers might have compelled the station to release 
names rather than withholding them in the role of ‘gatekeeper’. On the other hand, the 
fact that other stations are owned or run by the state might have compelled them to 
voluntarily impose self-censorship when reporting such a scandalous issue.
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Opinionated news on Thai TV news channels was rare, but not totally absent. 
Thai journalists generally upheld the journalistic principle taught in the early years of 
journalism school that news is always factual. No simplification and elaboration of 
journalists' opinion or emotion can be incorporated into news reportage. Therefore, a 
distinct line is drawn between news and comment. This condition is best described by 
the distinction between editorials and news in the press. Like the press, iTV  allocated 
five minutes at the end of the domestic news to a ‘wikroe khao', or ‘analyzing news’ 
section that was presented by an editor of the Nation newspaper. The channel also 
added an half an hour interview program (similar to the 7.30 Report on the Australian 
ABC) to its evening news bulletin. This program was called ‘iTV talk', which aired 
interviews with politicians, academics, police, or members of public who were involved 
in the daily issues.
Next, evening news bulletins broadcast on NHK and four commercial networks 
in Japan on November 25-26, 1998 were analyzed (see Appendices 15 and 16). As 
shown in Figure 3, these news bulletins included the NHK ‘News 7’, the NTV ‘News 
Plus V , the TBS ‘News no mori', the Fuji TV 'Super News', and the TV Asahi ‘Super J  
Channel'. Evening news broadcast on Tokyo TV was excluded because it does not have 
national coverage. NTV, TBS, and Fuji TV broadcast their bulletins at 5.55 pm, whereas 
NHK broadcast its evening bulletin at 7 pm. TV Asahi had the highest number of news 
stories because it ran a two-hour bulletin, which started at 5 pm. As illustrated in Figure 
3, a large proportion of news stories on commercial networks in Japan were personal 
and human-interest stories. These stories belong to the ‘life style’ category. The content 
analyses (see Appendices 15 and 16) show that both NHK and commercial networks 
tended to carry similar lead stories. However, NHK featured the highest number of 
foreign news stories (as the dates of collection happened to coincide with the visit of 
China's President Jiang Zemin), and the commercial networks carried more stories about 
social issues. The lead political news in Japan on November 25-26 1998, as covered by 
most channels except Fuji TV, was the alignment of a new coalition
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Figur? 17 ; Type and Percentage of Evening News Content Broadcast on Five 
Networks in Japan on November 25 - 26. 1998
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between the LDP and the Liberal Party (Jiyütö), and subsequent protests from some 
factions within the LDP. As the alignment decision was announced a week earlier, the 
stories presented in the collected data featured the subsequent meetings between the 
law-makers of both parties. However, the related news scripts were short, and the 
visuals covered only the formal introduction between members of the two parties.
Except on NHK, the number of male and female anchors presenting these 
evening news bulletins was approximately equal. Yet male anchors seemed to dominate 
the reporting of hard news and weather forecasts; conversely, female anchors tended to 
deliver human-interest stories.52 This role difference heightened in the 'on-location' 
stories of political reporters of the commercial channels. Moreover, in contrast to NHK 
‘News 7’, which was presented by a solo female news anchor, commercial channels 
preferred to use as many anchors as possible. NTV's News Plus 1, for example, used six 
anchors to present different types of news. The presence of a panel of news anchors on 
commercial networks, as mentioned by Miller, is relevant to the Japanese concept of 
visual balance.53 In Japanese variety and talk shows, for example, panels of male and 
female hosts are preferred, and a solo host is rarely used. In addition, TV Asahi's 
‘Super J  Channel’ also included a commentator, an editor from Asahi Shimbun, who 
commented on social issues. The selection of this editor, who came from the social 
section (shakai-bu), sharply contradicted to that of News Station, the popular late night 
news program on the same channel: the latter program included an editor from the 
political section (seiji-bu), or from the editorial board, who commented on political 
stories. Although broadcast on the same channel, it was clear that these two programs 
had markedly different target audiences.
In comparison to the collected data from Thai evening news bulletins, there was 
more diversity in Japanese television news. As shown in the Figure 18 below, NHK and 
TV Asahi emphasized hard stories and covered more politics, foreign, and economics
This division between male/female anchoring in Japan was also consistent with earlier findings. 
See Jay K. Miller, "Broadcast News in Japan: NHK and NTV", Keio Communication RovipW 
1994, (16), pp. 77-103.
Ibid., p. 92.
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news. In contrast, NTV, Fuji TV, and TBS offered more news stories on crime, social 
issues, and society. NTV spent more time than other channels in investigating social 
issues: a murder case in Wakayama that involved food poisoning and an insurance 
swindle dominated coverage. However, the story that included long interviews with 
victims and murder suspects was presented in such as way that could be described as 
‘sensationalist’. As for hard news, stories screened on TV Asahi were generally better 
analyzed and more investigative than the same stories broadcast on NHK.
Figure 18: Style and Type of News Content on Japanese TV Networks
HARD NEW S SO FT N EW S
INVESTI
GATIVE TV ASAHI NTV
STRAIGHT
NHK TBS, FUJI TV
Further examination of coverage of the same events by different stations 
supports the characterization of these news networks. For example, the coverage of 
Christmas lights in Paris by Fuji TV and Asahi TV was markedly different. While Fuji 
TV only screened pictures of Christmas lights in the streets of Paris, TV Asahi 
mentioned the lighting up of streets in Paris, and referred back to the Christmas lighting 
festival in the Omote Sando area of Tokyo, which has drawn increasingly larger crowds 
in recent years and has caused disquiet amongst local residents. In this story, TV Asahi 
directly applied the concept of site and concerned people (genba and töjisha) by 
sending a reporter to the site to interview residents and shop owners, as well as local 
public officers in charge of the festival. The discrepancies in news policies between TV 
Asahi and other channels are a result of the channel's new position as a News Station
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(hödö no terebi asahi), and not an entertainment station, since the success of launching 
News Station in 1985.
In particular, the discrepancies in news policies and approaches between TV 
Asahi and NHK were evident when comparing TV Asahi's popular late night news 
program, News Station, and NHK News 7. According to Krauss's study of comparative 
coverage of these programs broadcast in 1996, there were marked differences in news 
policies between both programs.54 For instance, whilst News 7 tended to carry more 
news items on government and advisory councils attached to the bureaucracy, News 
Station placed emphasis on local government and the Cabinet. However, as Krauss 
concluded, the major difference between the two programs was not so much in the 
subjects covered, but in the news approaches. Specifically, news anchors on News 
Station gave their comments on news items far more often than their counterparts on 
News 7.55 Clearly, opinionated journalism is a dominant value at News Station, whereas 
objective journalism is strongly upheld at News 7. My own examination of the 
convergence and diversity of news content between News 7 and News Station and 
between News 7 and News 23, which were broadcast on the same day, offers a clearer 
understanding of the different type of news approaches employed, and the extent to 
which these programs framed the same news differently.
As demonstrated in Table 12 below, news items that were covered by News 7 
but not covered by News Station were those related to NHK, an advisory body, and 
human-interest stories. However, News Station and News 7 considered the news about a 
new coalition being formed between the LDP and the Liberal Party as their headline of 
the day, whilst treating President Clinton's visit as a minor story. In covering the major 
story on the coalition, both programs gave long background stories. Although the 
selection of, and value placed upon, what news came first appeared to be the same on 
both programs, there were some differences. NHK's coverage was quite descriptive and
54 Ellis S. Krauss, "Changing Television News in Japan", The Journal of Asian Studies August
1998, 57(3), pp. 663-692.
55 Ibid., p. 673.
focused on the chronological development of the new coalition. However, the same 
coverage on News Station highlighted the serious conflict between the LDP Chief 
Cabinet Secretary, Nonaka Hiromu, and Ozawa Ichiro, who formerly a leading LDP 
member but now headed the Liberal Party. Records of earlier press conferences given by 
Nonaka attacking Ozawa were shown repeatedly, and added to by Kume's remarks of 
his surprise that Nonaka could shake off his anger towards Ozawa very quickly to 
embark upon this new coalition. Moreover, TV Asahi's reporter, who crossed live from 
the Nagata kurabu, also reported the anti-coalition faction, which was forming within 
the LDP. Other leading stories that were covered by News Station were also directed at 
the opposition and protesting groups. Clearly, political news on News 7 was selected 
within the confines of official activities and development within the government. In 
contrast, the presentation of political news on News Station contested NHK's version of 
political reality by covering the non-governmental area of politics and various political 
groups, thus representing a different political reality and institutional order of Japanese 
politics.
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Table 12: News Content Broadcast on NHK News 7 and TV Asahi's News Station on 
November 19. 1998
(underline: stories unique to the 
program)___________________
NHK Time TV Asahi Time
News 7 (7:00-7:53 pml (m: s) News Station ( 10:00-11:15 prrfl (m: s)
1. P o lic y  planners from  the LD P and the 
L iberal Party m et, ou tlin ing  p o lic ie s  for
1 8 :3 9 1. O buchi and O zaw a sign ed  an agreem ent to  
form  a coa lition  governm ent
1 0 :1 0
the n ew  c o a litio n  governm ent
2 . T he L ong Term  Credit Bank o f  Japan and its 
su b s id ia r ie s
4 :1 7 2. Kan N aoto 's resp o n ses to stories about his 
alleged  affpjfs
1 :0 0
3 . B ribery charges against N akajim a, an LDP  
M P
3 :0 0 3. C linton's v is it  to Japan 1 :2 5
4 . W akayam a murder m ystery and insurance  
s w in d le
1 :3 6 4. D irector o f  S e lf-D efen se  Force A g en cy  
a p o lo g ized  for h is  agen cy's h id in g  
e v id en ce  im p lica tin g  corruption
4 :3 8
5 . C lin ton 's v is it  to Japan 5 :0 0 5. B ribery charges against N akajim a, an LD P  
M P
6. K obe's n ew  international airport project 
and nuhlic referenda
1:01
6 . D irector o f  S e lf-D efen se  Force A gen cy  
a p o lo g ize d  for h is agency's h id ing
1 :3 0 8 :2 5
e v id e n c e  im p lica tin g  corruption
7 . H eavv  sn ow fa ll in N orthern Japan 1 :4 2 7. L ife  stvle: C an oeing 1 4 0 9
8. D ated  u tensils m ade o f  copper w as found  
at a d ie e in e  sjte in Kypshp
1 :3 0 8. W akayam a murder m ystery and insurance  
s w in d le
1 :0 4
9 . N e w  m em ber o f  Japan's Art C ouncil 
10. N H K  organized  a sym p osium  on  N H K  and
0 :3 4
1 :2 6
9. Launch o f  stickers s ig n ify in g  orean  donor  
status attached to driver's lic e n se s
0 :1 7
th e educational role o f  broadcasting
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Table 13: News Content Broadcast on NHK News 7 and TBS's News 23 on November 
11.1998
(underline: stories unique to the 
program)__________________
NHK Tim e TBS Tim e
News 7 67:00 - 7:53 prrri (m : s) News 23 (11:00- 11:55 prri) (m : s)
1. P o lic y  p la n n e rs  fro m  th e  L D P  an d  the 1 :2 0 1. T h re e  b ig  d e p a r tm e n t s to re s  are  ru n n in g 0 :5 3
L ib e ra l P a rty  m et, o u tlin in g  p o lic ie s  fo r 5 %  d isc o u n t c a m p a ig n s , c a llin g  fo r
th e  n e w  c o a li tio n  g o v e rn m e n t g o v e rn m e n t re d u c tio n  o f  c o n su m p tio n  tax
2 . F o rm e r  p a r ty  se c re ta ry  o f  th e  L D P , K ato 4 :0 1 2. P o licy  p la n n e rs  f ro m  th e  L D P  a n d  th e 4 :5 3
K o ic h i,  o p p o se d  to  th e  n e w  c o a litio n L ib e ra l P a rty  m e t, o u tlin in g  p o lic ie s  fo r
th e  n e w  c o a li tio n  g o v e rn m e n t
3. C h ie f  C a b in e t S ec re tary . N o n a k a  H iro m u . 1 :0 3 3. W a k a y a m a  m u rd e r  m y s te ry  an d  in su ra n ce 1 :1 8
a n n o u n c e d  a  d a te  fo r  sn e c ia l D ie t se ss io n s w in d le
4 ,O b u c h i  le ft H an ed a  fo r  M o sco w 1 :2 4 4 . O sa k a  g o v e rn m e n t a n n o u n c e d  its  f irs t 1 :2 1
b u d g e t d e f ic it
5. L iv e  f ro m  M o sco w 2 :5 6 5. C h a n g e s  in  lo ca l a d m in is tra tio n 1 2 :5 9
6. M H W  c o n s id e re d  to  re - lis t  tv p es  o f 2 :3 8 6. N o  c h a n g e s  in h u m an  r ig h ts  a n d  so c ia l 4 :5 7
a p p ro v e d  m ed ic in e  u sed  in  em e rg en c y  ro o m n ro b le m s
7. W a s te  d u m p in g  p ro b le m  in  F u k u sh im a 3 :3 2 7 . C h ik u sh i 's  d e b a te  "C o n tin u a tio n  o f 1 :5 2
w a s te fu l  sp e n d in g "
8. A  grouD o f  C h in ese  p e o p le  cam e  to search 1 :5 3 8. S tu d e n t's  d e m o n s tra t io n  in  In d o n e s ia 0 :3 5
fo r  th e ir  p a re n ts  in  O sak a
9. B rib e rv  c h a rg e s  a g a in s t a fo rm er u n iv ers ity 1 :3 4 9. O b u c h i le f t  H a n ed a  fo r  M o sco w 0 :2 0
D rofesso r an d  a m ed ic a l co m n an v
10 . A P E C 's  m e e tin g  in  K u a la  L u m m ir w ill 1 :1 3 10. T e r re s tr ia l  D ig ita l B ro a d c a s tin g 1 :1 8
s ta rt  o n  N o v g jp b g r 14
11 . N e w  p lan  to re fo rm  s u o e ra n n u a t io n 1 :11
t h e m e s
12 . O s a k a  g o v e rn m e n t a n n o u n c e d  its  firs t 2 :3 0
b u d g e t d e f ic it
13 . F a lls  o f  sh o o tin g  s ta rs  o v e r Jan an 's  skv 4 :0 9
n eM  wggjc
14. P o lic v  c o n c e rn in g  a n n o u n c e m e n t o f 4 :4 6
e a r th q u a k e  p re d ic tio n
15 . F a rm e rs  w e re  a sk e d  to p ro d u c e  m ore 1 :51
v e g e ta b le s  to  m atch  w ith  th e  d em an d
16 . N a g a n o  O lv n m ic s  C o m m itte e  w as su ed  bv 0 :4 8
a m an  w h o  m isse d  th e  gam e b ecau se  o f  bus
d s ia y
17 . U N 's  w ith d ra w a l fro m  Iraq 0 :2 6
18 . W o rld  m e e tin g  o n  G re e n  G as E m iss io n  in 2 :3 9
B u e n o s  A ire s
19 . JC P  d e m a n d e d  th e  g o v e rn m e n t to  red u ce 0 :3 0
c o n su m p tio n  tax
2 0 . M in is te r  o f  M P T  m et w ith  th e  n ew lv 1 :0 2
aD D ointed  h e a d  o f  In te rn a tio n a l
T e le c o m m u n ig f itio n  un it
2 1 . In c re a se  in  a  n u m b e r  o f  n e w  m an s io n  b u ilt 0 :3 4
in  th e  c itv  o f  T p k y o
2 2 . T h re e  b ig  d e p a r tm e n t s to re s  a re  ru n n in g 0 :3 1
5 %  d isc o u n t c a m p a ig n s , c a llin g  fo r
g o v e rn m e n t re d u c tio n  o f  c o n su m p tio n  tax
The analysis of diversity and convergence in program content broadcast on 
NHK's News 7 and TBS' News 23 also yielded similar results. The selection of and order
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placed upon news items on both programs appeared to be the same. However, News 7 
clearly carried more news on the government, and its bureaucracies, while News 23 
featured news stories on local administration and social problems. The most apparent 
difference in the news approaches was that News 7 carried more items in a shorter time 
than News 23, which spent more time reporting each item. News 7 carried more foreign 
items than News 23, but some news stories on News 7 were read without film 
background. More interviews and sound bytes were added to the domestic stories on 
News 23 than News 7. On News 23, Chikushi Tetsuya, the leading news anchor, gave a 
two-minute commentary as well as strong criticism on an important issue of the day in a 
section called tajisöron (eventful debate), which was evidently popular with viewers. 
The topic presented in tajisöron was often of a controversial nature and subsequently 
taken as an editorial topic by newspaper or television journalists. For instance, a scoop 
on changes in local administration broadcast on November 11 1998 explored the way in 
which some local administrations initiated their own cost-cutting and reduced the scope 
of public projects. The story was presented as a policy alternative that the public 
preferred to the heavy spending of the central government. The fact that this topic on 
'changes in local administration' was taken as a lead story on TV Asahi’s Sunday 
Project, was ample evidence that the program has successfully set a news agenda.56
There are marked commonalities in the way in which the Japanese TV news and 
the Thai TV news cover politics. Political news is mainly about political information, 
such as stories about how political alliances are being formed or broken. Interview 
subjects in the political stories, such as party and factional leaders, are the main 
interlocutors of TV news. As such, political news has become a stage where politicians 
can send messages to gauge reactions from enemies and allies, and where politics is 
played out. Coverage of policy information is scarce, and is often limited to the 
deliberations surrounding legislation, rather than debates or discussions of policy issues.
56 This program was broadcast on October 18, 1998.
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Table 14: Similarities and Differences in News Presentation in Thailand and Japan
Similarities Differences
Thailand Japan
News content Emphasis on political 
infonnation rather than 
policy information
Diverse news for mass 
audiences
Selective news for 
segmented audiences
More coverage on 
foreign news
Less coverage on 
foreign news
News style Anchor - type news Informative news Interpretative news
CNN - style journalism 
(Live broadcast and 
interview)
Separation between 
news and comments
Opinionated news 
and sensationalized 
stories
Some characteristics of visual presentation in Thai and Japanese TV news were 
also different. Japanese political news often used visuals featuring staged events such as 
press conferences, and meetings between politicians. In contrast, Thai political news 
mostly captured relevant politicians or officials giving interviews in front of their 
offices, or sometimes in motion. All Japanese channels regularly used news titles, or a 
three or four worded summary of the topic being discussed, which were often absent in 
Thai TV news. However, both Japan's commercial and NHK news programs only 
included a few selected pieces of foreign news, mostly from England, France, and the 
U.S., whereas the Thai news programs had much wider and longer coverage of foreign 
news. With regards to opinionated journalism, iTV news in Thailand and evening and 
late night news programs in Japan offered commentaries by members of their associated 
press. However, Japanese news producers appeared to have different journalistic values 
from their counterparts in Thailand and other countries. In Japan, news anchors were 
also encouraged to offer their own comments. They were implicitly used as 'proxies' to 
create what Andrew Painter called a 'televisual quasi-intimacy' with the audiences.57 By 
using personally attractive presenters and relaxed formats, popular daytime talkshow 
programs in Japan are claimed to have established this 'quasi-intimacy' with the 
audiences. As for the news programs, casual comments and opinion by anchors
57 Andrew Painter, "Japanese Daytime Television, Popular Culture, and Ideology", 
Journal of Japanese Studies. Summer 1993, 19(2), pp. 295-325.
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encourage audiences to establish a familiar and intimate relationship with the news 
programs. Unanimity and playful spontaneity such as the props and gags often used by 
Kume Hiroshi are, for example, useful tools to establish quasi-intimacy with audience. 
Within this comfortable atmosphere, anchors like Kume react with news stories and the 
comments by experts on behalf of the audiences at home. The success of this kind of 
program is seen in its capacity to influence the public, and in gaining access to influential 
leaders of political parties during elections and times of crisis.
6.3 News Frame, Contesting Discourse, and Expert/Legitimate Relations
The marketplace competitiveness of television news in Thailand and Japan, in tandem 
with the pluralism in TV journalism established by iTV and Japanese late night news 
programs, have enlarged the platform from which the TV medium can contest state 
discourse. This development has also motivated TV journalists and news producers to 
put the best of their abilities into gaining access to, interpreting, and disseminating 
political information. In doing so, TV journalists have attempted to construct 'news 
frames', or story themes which attract audiences’ attention, that are different from those 
of their competitors, and to a certain extent different from those of the state.
The fundamental question of how well the Thai and Japanese journalists can 
perform these tasks has been answered in Chapter Four. Indeed, the ability of both Thai 
and Japanese journalists to contest state control of information is severely constrained. 
The ownership factor, the close relationship with sources, the lack of information, and 
certain normative practices of the journalistic profession can force the TV journalists in 
both countries to employ a legitimating strategy of relying entirely on official sources, 
and accepting the way in which the state has framed political information. The following 
comparative case studies are aimed, Firstly, at clarifying aspects of political news in 
which Thai and Japanese television journalists tended to interpret political information 
and extend the boundaries of official discourses; and secondly, identifying aspects of 
political news in which the legitimating state versions of a political situation became 
imperative.
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6.3.1 fTKNews: Investigative News
The following analysis of political news compares evening news bulletins broadcast on 
Channel 7, which covered almost 100% of Thailand and had the highest ratings among 
the six stations from 1997 to 1998 (see Table 9), with those broadcast on iTV. Analyzed 
were video tapes of news broadcast on iTVs evening news program between 7.00 pm 
and 8.30 pm, and on Channel 7 news between 6.00 pm and 6.30 pm and 7.30 pm to 
8.30 pm from December 14 to 31, 1998. As shown in Figure 19, stories broadcast on 
iTV  and Channel 7 are categorized into eight types: politics, foreign, economics and 
finance, social issues, society, sports, weather forecast, and commercials.58
In comparison to Channel 7 s  evening news bulletins, iTV  contained more 
coverage of politics. Channel 7 emphasized news stories on social issues, and society, 
covering special royal activities, including overseas trips. As shown in the following 
table, political stories reported on both channels were categorized into five types: 
investigation including investigative stories which were generally longer than two 
minutes, and involved complicated issues; the politics of inter and intra-party stmggle, 
and the organizational disarray within the coalition; celebrity issues including campaign 
activity, and attacks on, or ridicule of, public figures; the airing of opposition party 
claims and attempts to set a political agenda, as well as public protest; and news on the 
passage of important legislation. As demonstrated in Table 15 below, news about 
important legislation and policy was rarely featured by both channels. Moreover, these 
stories were often limited to questions of what and when, but not how? This raised
‘Politics’ stories concern government, Cabinet, bureaucracy, policy, and protests. ‘Foreign’ 
stories cover foreign relations, and news about other countries. ‘Economics and finance’ stories 
include issues on trade, economic policy, industries, and financial markets. ‘Social issues’ are 
stories about crime, corruption, poverty, human rights, environment, and the courts. ‘Society’ 
stories include reports on the royal family, national and religious ceremonies, entertainment 
news, and human-interest stories. The remaining includes sport news, weather forecast, and 
commercials.
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the key issues of journalistic competence in gaining access to and interpreting 
information, and the availability of that information. The lack of 'specialized' knowledge 
among Thai journalists, as discussed in Chapter Four, has a bearing on this area. 
Although the lack of information may also play an equal part in determining the 
coverage on government policies and legislation, more information has been made 
available in Thailand as a result of the Official Information Act of 1997.59 However, the 
Act has not greatly affected journalistic competence or the willingness to gain access to 
political information.
Table 15: Type and Percentage of Political Stories in Evening News Programs Broadcast 
on iTV and Channel 7 from 14 to 31 December 1998
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Political Stories iIY (% ) Channel 7 (%)
1) Investigation 45 24
2) Struggle 13 17
3) Celebrity/Campaign 13 37
4) Crusade/Protest 22 16
5) Passage of law 6 5
During the three-week broadcast period, political news coverage on Channel 7 
was mostly framed on the basis of politicians' activities, their personal images, their 
constituencies, and their campaigns. For instance, Channel 7 carried a scoop on 
December 30, 1998, which detailed the nicknames that the Government House reporters 
gave to the ruling party ~  a yearly tradition at Government House. Channel 7 also had 
less live coverage, and crossed live from location less often than iTV. News stories on 
Channel 7 were shorter than those of iTV. Not many news stories on Channel 7 carried 
soundbites, and most were read out by the news anchors. iTV, on the other hand, added 
two new features to its evening bulletin. A documentary section called 'A New Chapter 
of Thai Politics' (Choam na kanmuang mai), which featured the changes in Thai politics
59 This legislation will be discussed further in Chapter Seven.
that resulted from the constitutional reform of 1997, was added once a week to its 
regular bulletin. Moreover, news analysis presented by Prachak Mawongsa, an iTV 
political editor, was broadcast once a week in a section called, TMews from the Political 
Desk’ (Chak toa khao kantnuang). According to Prachak's assistant, iTV has committed 
itself to providing political information, comment and analysis at a new level for 
television stations in Thailand.60 In covering policies and political currents, iTV has 
demonstrated its journalistic expertise by including more background information and 
commentaries in the story, by interviewing non-official sources, and by offering a more 
active and less reportorial style of journalism.
However, in covering scandals, iTV tended to reproduce official discourses rather 
than maintaining the distance that might have allowed it to be more critical of the stories 
covered. During the period of study, the most covered political story was the revelation 
of links between the Minister of Interior and three luxurious villas built in the 
conservation area around Sri Nakkarin Dam in Kanchanaburi. iTV spent more time 
investigating the issue than Channel 7, and included coverage dedicated to a five-minute 
editorial section called Wikhroe khao' (Analyze news). However, the nature of both the 
iTV and Channel 7 coverage of the story was confined to the debate between the 
government and the opposition that started the allegations. Although raised by the 
opposition party, government officials were the main sources for this story once it 
became an urgent issue. Consequently, news content was framed and confined to 
questions of whether the houses were or were not built in the conservation area, and 
who should be in charge of making a clear ruling — the Land Office, or the Office of 
Forestry. Most coverage featured interviews with the Minister of Interior, his wife who 
was seen visiting one of the villas, and the officers in charge of the Land Office and the 
Office of Forestry in Bangkok. The question of how a local official who has a close 
relationship with the Minister could secure a large piece of land that had originally been 
allocated to local peasants was overlooked and under-emphasized. Within such a news 
frame, politicians and bureaucrats of the central government became dominant news
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60 Interview with Anchaleepom Kusum, Assistant to Political Editor, iTV, on May 9, 1998.
sources, and alternative sources of information essential to the story, such as local 
officers and peasants living in the area became rare. As Tuchman has argued, the heavy 
reliance on centralized bureaucratic sources helps to present "a politically-legitimated 
reality".61 By adhering to the beat system and relying on government sources, iTV 
legitimized the official views of the scandal, and constructed a news frame wherein state 
officials dominated the news text.
6.3.2 Late night news programs in Japan and the 2000 Election
In Terebi hödö ron (Discussion on Television News), Tamiya Takeshi presented the 
results of several surveys conducted between 1993 and 1995 on patterns of news 
watching and its criteria among university students. O f 1,372 respondents, the most 
important criteria in deciding which news program to watch was the news anchor (better 
known as nyuusu kyasutaa in Japan), and his or her comments made about the news 
stories.62 The most-watched news program was News Station, and the second most- 
watched news program was News 23. Hence, the most popular news anchors were 
Kume Hiroshi of News Station and Chikushi Tetsuya of News 23.63 According to the 
survey results, the students liked watching News Station because firstly, of Kume 
Hiroshi; secondly, because the news interpretation which was easy to understand; 
thirdly, because of interesting comments; fourthly, because of investigative stories; and 
lastly, because of the airing time. As for News 23, the program was frequently watched 
by students because firstly, of Chikushi Tetsuya; secondly, because of good comments; 
thirdly, because of Chikushi's debates in the section called tajisoron; fourthly, because 
of the intention to compare it with News Station', and lastly, because of the airing time.64
Clearly, the success of both programs was largely due to the ability of the 
anchors to deliver political stories to the public. By using simple language, visual aids,
Gaye Tuchman, "Myth and the Conscious Industry: A New Look at the Effects o f the Mass 
Media", in E. Katz and T. Szecskö (eds.), Mass Media and Social Change (London: Sage,
1981), pp. 88-89.
Tamiya Takeshi, Terebi hödö ron (Discussion on Television Newsl (Tokyo: Meishi shoten, 
1997), pp. 196-235.
Ibid., p. 197.
Ibid., pp. 222-227.
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examples, live interviews, and commentaries, they extracted 'true meanings' (honne) out 
of ambiguous, 'stated principles' (tatemae) of politics.65 In so doing, they framed the 
meanings of the text with issues that they thought were most 'relevant' to their 
audiences, and hence subjected the audiences to their views of political reality. The 
following analysis of political news stories reported on News Station and News 23 on 
the eve of the 2000 Lower House election will discuss the extent to which these two 
programs framed political news, and the aspects of political news in which the anchors 
tended to legitimate state political discourse. Thirty-six bulletins of News Station and 
News 23 were analyzed, all of which were broadcast from June 2, the day that the 
parliamentary was dissolved, to June 26, the day after the election.
As demonstrated in Figure 20, stories broadcast on News Station and News 23 
were categorized into eight types.66 Whilst News Station clearly had more coverage of 
political and foreign news than News 23, it had less coverage of social issues. News 
Station's emphasis on political reports and Kume's ability to comment quickly and 
authoritatively was clearly demonstrated in the program's first edition of election 
coverage. A qualitative analysis of this edition will give a clear picture of how Kume's 
comments could have established a political discourse.
According to Ito, 'extracting information' plays an important function in Japanese personal 
communication which tended to avoid using direct expression, or personal confrontation. See 
Ito Yöichi, "The Future of Communication Research: The Japanese Perspective", Journal of 
Communication. Autumn 1993, 43(4), p. 70.
As already mentioned, these types include ‘politics’, ‘foreign’, ‘economic and finance’, ‘social 
issues’, ‘society’, ‘sports’, ‘weather forecast’, and ‘commercials’.
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On June 2, 2000 Kume conducted a thirty-minute live interview with then LDP 
secretary Nonaka Hiromu, and the leader of Democratic Party Hatoyama Yukio. After 
the interview, Kume offered his view: "in contrast to NHK ‘News T  today that told 
you that there were seven parties, or seven alternatives in this election. I would like to 
give you instead two alternatives and three possibilities for this election". He then 
introduced two dolls with faces bearing the likeness of leaders of the LDP and the 
Democratic Party. The first doll was placed on building blocks bearing the names of the 
LDP-led (ji-ko-ho) coalition,67 and the second doll was put on the next set of building 
blocks which bore the names of the Democratic Party, the Liberal Party and the Social 
Democratic Party of Japan. Kume paused and said that "this is not all". He then pulled 
out another building block painted red with the name ‘Nihon Kyösantö’ (Japan's 
Communist Party) written on it. While adding this red piece to the second set of 
building blocks, he declared that if the voters chose the Democratic Party-led coalition, 
they had to inevitably have the Communist Party in the coalition. Another doll — which 
was later introduced as the third possibility should neither the LDP nor the Democratic 
Party win the majority of seats — wore a paper mask bearing a question mark. The doll 
was put on another set of LDP-led coalition building blocks, as Kume asked a political 
commentator from Asahi Shimbun about the likelihood of this alternative, and who 
might be the man behind the mask. The suspension of the identity of the man behind the 
mask was revealed by the commentator as Mori Yoshiro, the LDP leader.
Within fifty minutes of the first edition of election coverage, Kume entertained 
and informed the public about the upcoming election by framing the election as nothing 
but a horse race between the LDP and the Democratic Party. Emphasis was placed on 
potential winners and losers, and the number of seats expected to go to each party. The 
news frame that was being drawn by Kume dominated the entire political discourse. 
Subsequent editions of campaign coverage were directed towards the competitiveness of 
the campaigning between both parties. Content was preoccupied with poll results, 
rather than policies. Coverage of smaller parties such as the Liberal Party, and the
347
67 V f stands for lJiminto\ or the Liberal Democratic Party. ‘K6’ stands for ‘Komeito’, or the 
Clean Government Party, whereas ‘/io’ stands for lhoshuto\ or the New Conservative Party.
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Japan's Communist Party, was scarce in virtually all editions of election coverage. 
Although earlier studies of electoral campaigning in Japan have emphasized the limited 
effects of Japanese media on voting decision,68 and evidence to prove any direct link 
between Kume's comments and how the audiences vote is unavailable, the results of the 
2000 election were indeed reminiscent of the third possibility that Kume had suggested. 
Despite losing seats, the LDP formed a coalition with the help of votes from Komeitö, 
and Mori continued to be the Prime Minister.
Not only could these late night news programs determine political discourse, 
they also had the capacity to inform the electorate. News 23, for instance, elevated and 
ridiculed Prime Minister Mori's remarks that "people who have not decided to whom 
they'll give their vote may sleep in on the election day". Later that night, Chikushi put 
up a sign reading ''Okiro yo Baby', or ‘let's get up (and vote)’, as a challenge to Mori's 
remarks. He severely criticized Mori, condemned the LDP for not debunking their 
leader's ideas, and commented that "there may be a number of LDP politicians whose 
thoughts are similar to Mori".69 Although there is no evidence of a direct correlation 
between the impact of News 23"s coverage of Mori's remarks and the LDP's loss of seats 
in the election, pre-election poll results that were released after the coverage indicated a 
sharp drop in support for the Mori administration, as well as for the LDP.70
In understanding how journalists frame election issues, Patterson uses the 
psychological term 'schema' to refer to frameworks that journalists and the public 
audience employ to understand the political world.71 Schemas are cognitive structures 
that help individual make sense and simplify the complexity of information to which 
they are exposed. Patterson argues that journalists prefer to employ what he calls 'a
68 For example, Akuto Hiroshi has suggested that the Japanese media has a limited effect on the 
voting decision of the Japanese public, which depends more largely on personal connections and 
political organization networks. See Akuto Hiroshi, "Media in Electoral Campaigning in Japan 
and the United States" in S. J. Pharr and E. S. Krauss (eds.), Media and Politics in Japan 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), pp. 313-337.
69 News 23, TBS, June 22, 2000.
70 Kobayashi Yoshiaki, "Sösenkyo yukensha no töhyö wo yomu" (Readings of voters' voting 
behavior in the general election), Sekai. August 2000, pp. 42-47.
71 Thomas E. Patterson, Out of Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).
Strategie game schema' when reporting on elections, whereas the public employ 'a 
governing schema' in relation to campaign politics.72 The strategic game schema focuses 
on political aspects of the election such as who is leading in the polls; whereas the 
governing schema focuses on debates of public policy issues and problems. Table 9 and 
10 list emphases on ‘politics’ or ‘policy’ aspects of election coverage featured in a 
special series on election coverage on News Station and News 23. Each coverage was 
about ten to fifteen minutes long. The results suggested that the series on both programs 
tended to employ 'strategic schema' by focusing on the horse-race aspects of the 
campaigns, although attention was also given to candidates' arguments on issues of 
public policy.
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Table 16: Emphases of News Station's Special Series on the Lower House Election 2000
Date Topics Politics Policies
June 7 Second generation politicians X
June 8 Candidates' campaign strategies 
in most competitive districts
X
June 9 Public opinion poll X X
June 12 Changes in the new election system 
and campaign tactics
X
June 13 Earlier voting and voting from overseas X
June 19 Public projects and agricultural politics X
June 20 Stop deregulation on small and medium 
enterprises
X
June 21 Economic and financial reform X
June 22 Social welfare and superannuation X
June 23 Political debates (Live) X X
72 Ibid.
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Table 17: Emphases of News 23's Special Series on the Lower House Election 2000
Date Topics Politics Policies
June 13 Voters X
June 14 Election issues X X
June 15 Köenkai (political support groups) X
June 19 Rivalries between Hatoyama's brothers X
June 20 Co-operation and conflicts between the 
LDP and the New Komeito Party in 
their campaign strategies
X
June 21 Second generation politicians X
June 22 Wake up! or Sleep in! on election day X
June 23 Political Debates (Live) X X
As seen in the above tables, both News Station and News 23 focused more on the 
political aspects of the election by featuring stories on party strategies and the personal 
traits and ambitions of politicians than differences in policy platforms among the 
parties. As a result, politicians became dominant news sources in these stories. 
However, when it came to reporting policy issues, both programs presented 
investigative reports gathered from the concerned public and labor groups, and 
bureaucrats. Yet most reports carried a negative connotation about the LDP's poor 
performance in solving the economic problems, and mass spending on public projects. 
On the eve of Election Day, both programs invited representatives from all parties to 
participate in the live broadcast of policy debates. In that broadcast, differences among 
party policies were made clearer, as party representatives were given equal time to talk 
about their major policy issues. Interestingly, all party leaders, except that of the LDP, 
participated in the live debate at News Station. The fact that the LDP chose to send its 
major power broker Nonaka Hiromu, rather than its gaffe-prone leader Mori Yoshiro 
indicates that these politicians realized how much impact TV news programs had on the 
public opinion. In this sense, it also points to an urgent need for a new breed of 
politicians in Japan, one that is more telegenic, younger, and more tactful in handling ad 
hoc questions than its predecessors. As Altman has observed, "the triangular
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relationship between television, politics, and election that characterizes American 
politics was beginning to emerge in Japan".73
6.4 TV News and Changes in Its Political Roles
It should now be clear that the style of broadcast journalism elicited by iTVs evening 
bulletin in Thailand and late night news programs in Japan has constituted a new way of 
communicating politics. This new style has broken away from the traditional 
newsreading format by adding live broadcasts, interviews, and commentaries; and these 
additions have had a profound impact on politics. Yet, how has this impact been 
manifested? Let us now employ the Political Information Contest Model, and consider 
the extent to which the media and the state have vied for control of political information, 
as well as the extent to which the roles of Thai and Japanese television news has 
presumed in politics.
6.4.1 iTV
The foregoing analysis suggests that iTV has positioned itself as an investigative news 
channel that undercuts the more traditional style of political news presentation in 
Thailand. Yet to what extent has its investigative reporting had an impact on politics, as 
well as the public at large? A case study of iTVs scoop on traffic police corruption, 
which rocked the entire police department, will elaborate this point.
TV watchers who tuned in to iTV  shortly after 7.00 pm on the night of 21 April 
1998 saw images that they would never have imagined appearing on Thai national 
television. Real-time footage from a hidden camera showed overloaded express-way 
motorists being stopped and asked to pay for their passsage by traffic policemen. 
Subsequent footage captured other drivers throwing banknotes on to the tarmac, and the 
traffic policemen later picking them up. The images themselves were rather unsteady, 
and carried the connotation that the police's actions were dubious. iTV reporters added
Kristin Kyoko Altman, "Television and Political Turmoil: Japan's Summer in 1993", in S.J. 
Pharr and E. S. Krauss (eds.), Media and Politics in Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1996), p. 177.
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flavor to the story by interviewing angry motorists in the area. The evening news ran a 
headline, "suai thang duan" or "Expressway police's levy", on the right hand comer of 
the screen. A female anchor summarized the story by asking whether this was an 
individual act, or a part of a major corruption scandal within the traffic police force.74 
The next day, several national newspapers featured iTVs coverage on the front-page. 
Two days after the story broke, five traffic policemen arrived at iTVs head office with 
more than fifty signatures to plead with iTV  that this was not an individual act but that 
they were ordered to do it by their seniors, who played important roles in a major graft 
ring within the traffic police force.75
On the night of 24 April 1998, iTV  ran a scripted two-minute editorial that called 
for a transparent investigation from the Police Department and the Minister in charge.76 
A week later, two polls were conducted in Bangkok on how the public reacted to the 
problem of police corruption. The public's anger reflected in these polls was so intense 
that some members of the opposition parties demanded an immediate response from the 
government. A leader of one right-wing party even made the far-fetched claim that iTV 
colluded with the Democrat Party to create stories that would reflect well upon them 
should the problems in the police department be quickly solved. Such conspiracy 
theories unexpectedly magnified the agenda to the extent that a parliamentary advisory 
committee even considered bringing the issue into parliamentary session.77
Ten days after the story broke, six high-ranking officers were dismissed and 
charged for their actions. This was the quickest internal investigation in the history of 
national police force. The Police Department also underwent an extensive reform and 
was reconfigured as the National Police Office later in the year. Nevertheless, iTV  did 
not stop there, but continued the pursuit of justice and found that other levies were 
being collected, such as those illegally imposed on black smoke from exhaust pipes (suai
74 iTV Evening News, 21 April 1998; see also "Talk kab iTV: Buang lhang choe khao pua pen 
suai kwan dam" (Talk with iTV. Investigative story on black smoke levy' ", Prachachart 
Thurakit. May 4-6, 1998, pp. 35-6.
75 iTV Evening News, April 23, 1998.
76 iTV Evening News, April 24, 1998.
77 iTV Evening News, April 25, 1998 - May 4, 1998.
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kwan dam), from trucks using the national highway (suai thang Ihuang), and from 
motorcycle taxis (suai motersai).78 Most of these stories were guided by public 
concern, and the role of iTV  was evidence that television news in Thailand had moved 
beyond its traditional role as a conduit of information, to become a watchdog that 
guarded against any wrongdoing, and an agenda-setter in politics. iTVs campaign to 
attack police corruption was not an isolated event. During a local election in February 
1999, iTV  also captured footage of a group of unauthorized men stuffing ballot boxes 
with marked papers. iTVs broadcast of this footage led to the cancellation of election 
results, and a new election.79
The coverage of police corruption and electoral fraud contained powerful images 
that appeared to be both spontaneous and credible, which almost every viewer in 
Thailand could easily associate with his or her own experience. Indeed, successful 
television news programs usually draw viewers into the text and establish a position for 
them to occupy.80 The images of police collecting banknotes from the tarmac, and a 
group of men stuffing ballot boxes were repeatedly used to relate to viewers the notion 
of ‘the public as victim’. These images provided iTV  journalists with an opportunity to 
introduce the question of the state's commitment to reform.
iTV  has certainly demonstrated an ability to construct narratives that challenge 
official definitions of rightful conduct of police and politicians, and that push for change. 
The overwhelming public response, as reflected in the above-mentioned poll, confirmed 
a positive public attitude towards iTV. It was in this condition, wherein the medium 
could act as an expert that watched out for the state's wrongdoings and received positive 
reference from the public, that it could function as a watchdog in Thai politics. 
However, as argued in Chapter One, the political role of media is fluid  and changeable 
depending on relationships that the media formed with other political actors. According 
to the following case study, commercial constraints have forced iTV  to shift its course to
78
79
80
iTV Evening News, May 5, 1998 - May 14, 1998.
"TV Channel denies links to election fraud", The Nation. February 6, 1999 (on-line edition). 
Ian Ward, Politics of the Media (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1995), p. 77.
functioning as a guard dog, guarding its own interests, and sometimes legitimizing official 
discourse.
By 1998, iTV  had been broadcasting for two years and constantly gaining 
viewers from other channels, but had failed to make its first royalty payment.81 The 
station claimed that this failure related to the loss of revenue caused by delays in the 
installation of transmitters at provincial network stations owned by the Public Relations 
Department (PRD). The mid-1997 economic crisis and the subsequent devaluation of 
the baht worsened the situation and made necessary iTVs requests for a deferral of the 
Bt 300 million payment.82
This failure led to numerous attacks by the largest daily newspaper, Thai Rath, 
which was part of another consortium that had failed in its bid for a UHF television 
licence. The daily launched a massive campaign to discredit iTV  by running damaging 
headlines and abusive editorial comments.83 Allegations were laid that /7T had acted as a 
government mouthpiece in exchange for a deal which deferred the payment, and that it 
subsequently colluded with Minister in charge of the OPM, Khunying Supatra M asdit 
(1997-2001), to waive the concession payments.84 In response, iTV  broadcast news and 
editorial programs to rebut the Thai Rath claims, accusing the daily of having a hidden 
agenda, as well as attacking its record of journalistic impropriety. This war of words 
lasted about a month, until the mass-circulated daily finally vowed to prevent iTV  from 
"using journalism as a pretext for breaking a contract to pay a concession fee to the state 
coffers".85
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"iTV Roong Kanan Niyom Poong 'ndub-sam" {iTVbecame the third in ratings), Than Wikroe. 
March 31, 1997, p. 18.
''Cabinet May Ponder iTV Plea Today", Bangkok Post. June 30, 1998 (on-line edition).
The first round occurred at the beginning of 1998, when iTV for the first time sought cabinet 
approval for a deferral o f royalty payments. See, for example, Thai Rath. January 4, 1998, 
p. 1, 13; January 8, 1998, p .l, 3, 11, 17; and January 9, 1998, p. 1, 10, 19.
" Thai Rath Says iTV Attacks are in the Public Interest", Bangkok Post. June 10 1998 (on-line 
edition); Ruch Komolbut, "Thai Rath - iTV"", Matichon , June 24, 1998, p. 3.
"Thai Rath - iTFFray Enters Round Two", The Nation. June 10, 1998 (on-line edition).
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Interestingly, most media coverage of this controversy portrayed the story as an 
internecine fight, and there was no attempt to unravel the truth. This reflects the 
tendency of Thai journalists to focus on conflicts rather than on the investigating and 
processing of information. The iTV  and Thai Rath saga highlighted the influence of 
commercial factors and the competition between media on the role of television in Thai 
politics. Both factors forced iTV  to act as ‘a guard dog’, in a condition wherein the state 
had rewarded it by allowing the payment deferral, and iTV legitimized the state's 
discourse on this issue by denying the allegation. In this instance, iTV  received neither 
positive nor negative reactions from the public, who were distanced from the issue.
Indeed, the controversy between Thai Rath and iTV  was ample evidence that the 
reward relations between the Thai state and iTV  formed had shifted the course of iTV s 
political role from being ‘a watchdog’ -- watching for abuses of power, facilitating 
political participation and demands, and providing a channel for the voiceless in the 
society — to being ‘a guard dog’, which legitimizes certain official discourses for the sake 
of guarding its own interests and interests of those with whom it has patron-client 
relations. Significantly, concerns among television entrepreneurs about protecting their 
commercial interests became much greater after the 1997 economic crisis, which led to a 
sharp decline in advertising revenue. One iTV  news producer admitted that this 
constraint now has serious repercussions in news selection, as negative coverage of 
major sponsors was carefully avoided.86 iTVs news slot was shortened and commentary 
section such as 'Wikhroe khao' was revoked to give way to the longer broadcast of 
sponsors' activities and beauty contests.87
The takeover of iTV by a political party leader, Thaksin Shinawatra who became 
a Prime Minister in February 2001, has introduced ideological divisions within the 
station. Tephachai Yong, the news director who was famous for his investigative stories 
on 'suai' (levy), threatened to resign, and was later transferred to an inactive post.
86 Interview with Anchaleepom Kusum, Assistant to Political Editor and News Anchor, iTV, Siam
Infotainment Co., Ltd on May 9, 1998.
87 "Beastly row over Miss Thailand pageant", The Nation. May 11, 2000 (on-line edition).
Suthichai Yoon, a veteran press journalist and one of the founders of iTV, could not bear 
the thought of serving a politician. He left iTV  together with most of his team from the 
Nation Multimedia group, and began a new news channel on a cable TV network.88 In 
June 2000, he led his old teammates such as Sorayuth Suthasanachinda, who was a 
regular commentator in the section called ‘ Wikroe Khao’ to set up a 24-hour news 
channel known as ‘UBC 8 Nation News Channel’.89 As for iTV, frequent changes in 
management team and news policies since the departure of Nation Multimedia Group 
and the takeover by Thaksin,90 have indicated that it is unlikely that the watchdog role 
of iTV will be maintained in the near future. Numerous reports of direct interference in 
political content during the 2001 election campaign were made, and journalists who were 
not comply with the management orders were immediately fired.91 As Thaksin and his 
party won a majority of seats in 2001, critics viewed that iTV  has inevitably shifted to 
presume a role of a 'servant of the state' — being dictated and controlled by those 
running the government.92
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6.4.2 News Station
The political role of News Station in the earlier studies has been described as that of ‘a 
watchdog’ that watches out for the state's wrongdoings and protects public interests in 
Japan. Altman, for instance, suggests that during the 1993 election campaign, News 
Station broke "taboos, challenging the establishment and exposing the rotten-roots of
Membership of UBC, the only national cable TV operator in Thailand, reached 330,000 in mid 
2000, which is only about 0.05% of the total population. “Khodsana penpit seukranam 
‘Suthichai Yoon ’ rab nong National hoad” (Media’s unwelcome reception to National News), 
Matichon Sudsapda, June 12, 2000, pp. 70-71; “UBC Set to Storm Provincial Market”, The 
Nation. April 8, 2000 (on-line edition).
Nation News Channel attempts to directly emulate CNN, and carry top news in both Thai and 
English languages. See "Nation set for new slot on UBC", The Nation. March 20, 2000 (on­
line edition).
Nondhanada Intarakomalyasut, "Exec forced to table on layoff news, Redundancies not entirely 
ruled out", The Nation. November 28, 2000 (on-line edition); "Manager reassigned as iTV feud 
worsens", The Nation. December 29, 2000 (on-line edition); "iTV switch infuriates board 
head", The Nation. January 1, 2001 (on-line edition).
There were reportedly incidents in which iTVs political reporters were told to tone down 
negative coverage of Thaksin and the Thai-Rak-Thai Party during the election campaign. "iTV 
crew decries 'interference'", The Nation. Jamuary 4, 2001 (on-line edition); "A legacy of '92 is 
now shackled to one man's ambition", The Nation. January 4, 2001 (on-line edition); uiTV 
crew told to lodge petition”, Bangkok Post. January 16, 2001 (on-line edition).
Julian Gearing, “Taming the Media: Allegation of Political Interference Cast A Cloud Over 
Thaksin’s Incoming Administration”, Asiaweek. 27(6), February 16, 2001 (on-line edition).
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one-party rules".93 However, it has also been argued that News Station is not a 
watchdog, but rather an agenda-setter as it lacks fairness and, often, accuracy. This 
argument was supported in a study of News Station's coverage on political reform issues 
both before and after the 1993 election. In his analysis, Yokota found that the program 
played a crucial role in prioritizing refonn subjects. The whole issue of political reform 
was incrementally reduced to a mere subject of electoral reform that the Hosokawa 
administration was set to accomplish in 1994. News Station's main task, as he 
concluded, was that of an agenda setter, selecting and priming issues that it thought were 
most important.94
The following case study of News Station's coverage on dioxin provides similar 
results. An edition of News Station broadcast on February 1, 1999 featured a report on 
the unusually high level of dioxin chemicals on ‘leaf vegetables’ in Tokorozawa City of 
the Saitama prefecture.95 The director of a local environmental agency, interviewed by 
Kume, stated that such vegetables included spinach. As spinach is the most produced 
"leaf vegetable" in that area, Kume's reports alone resulted in a huge drop in the price of 
spinach. This drop caused a huge loss to local farmers, who are regarded as the 
stronghold of the conservative LDP’s constituency. The Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications rapidly ordered an investigation into the case, which revealed that 
Kume mistakenly cited the 1997 survey results of a local environmental agency that 
only found a high level of dioxin on tea leaves in the area. The issue was highly 
politicized by the LDP, to the extent that the President of TV Asahi had to make a trip 
to the Diet to explain the circumstances. Kume, who had consistently represented 
himself as a transparent, open, and reciprocal proxy who spoke on behalf of the 
Japanese society, made an on-air apology, albeit his denying that he had made false
Kristin Kyoko Altman, op. cit., p. 183.
Yokota Hajime, Terebi to seiii (Television and Politics! (Tokyo: Suzusawa shoten, 1996).
"Tokorozawa daiokishin mondai saiko nödo wa [sencha]-Satitama-ken" (Tokorozawa's diaoxin 
problems, High level daioxin found in green tea — Saitama Prefecture", Mainichi Shimbun. 
February 19, 1999, p. 23; "Yasai daiokishin hödö tere asa... " (TV Asahi's Reports on daioxin 
in vegetables), Yomiuri Shimbun. morning edition, February 19, 1999, p. 35; "Tere asa, 
Daiokishin södö chosa zusan datta...", (TV Asahi's daioxin trouble - Inaccurate report of 
investigation's results!. Yomiuri Shimbun. evening edition, February 19, 1999, p. 23.
reports, and simply claiming that he did not receive the detailed results of the dioxin 
level conducted by the Environmental Agency.96
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However, the controversy over whether News Station made a false report had 
itself ushered into the spotlight the problems of high levels of dioxin chemicals in the air, 
water, and soil. Grassroot concerns about the environment had generally not received 
much attention in either the national press, or on television until recently. For instance, 
the safety levels of dioxin intake, which were established by various environmental 
agencies and featured numerous discrepancies, had never been questioned by the media 
until Kume's mis-reporting.97 The subpoena of the President of TV Asahi further 
attracted a divided media's attention. The conservative press, weekly magazines, and 
wide show programs on commercial stations in association with the conservative 
establishment, such as NTV  and Fuji TV, demanded that the MPT find TV Asahi in 
violation of the Broadcast law.98 The liberal press, on the other hand, condemned the 
subpoena. A commentary in the Manichi Shimbun, for instance, claimed that the dioxin 
problem was elevated to a national issue because the controversial nature and popularity 
of TV Asahi's News Station dismayed the authority. The newspaper went on to claim 
that if  this case had involved other TV programs, then the dioxin problems would have 
attracted less political attention .99 Positive public reference given to the program via 
correspondence, most of which focused on the actual problem of dioxin, also helped 
magnify the issue, and became an invisible force counterbalancing any attempts from the 
government to harshly attack the program. As Tahara Soichiro observed, TV Asahi 
could overcome the problem this time because of the "overwhelming public support" . 100
Sögö jaanarizumu kenkyüjo, "[Daiokishin hödö] no hödö to södö to" (The troubles and reports 
of the Daioxin's reporting). Sözö jaanarizumu kenkvü. 1999, 168, pp. 18-28. See also Hattori 
Takaaki, "Tokorozawa daiokishin hödö to hödö no jiyü" (The report o f Tokorozawa's problems 
of daioxin and the freedom of reporting!. Hösö Repooto. May 1999, (158), pp. 20-23.
Kuroda Kiyoshi, "Tokorozawa no daiokishin hödö wo kangaeru" (Have a think about a report 
on Tokorozawa's daioxin), Akahata Shimhun March 7, 1999, p. 3.
Takehisa Nanyuki, "Takechan no widoshoo kösa: Daiokishin hödö to suchi majikku" (Take's 
Lecture on Wideshow: The Reports on Daioxin and the Magic o f Figure), Sankei Shimhun. 
evening edition, February 13, 1999, p. 7.
Ogino Shözö, "Broadcast: Suteeshon dakara" (Broadcast: Because it's News Station),
Mainichi Shimbun. evening edition, February 23, 1999, p. 5.
"Kenryoku no hödö kainyü" (The Power of Intervention in Reporting), Mainichi Shimhun 
(evening edition), March 18, 1999, p. 3.
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Within twenty-two days of the News Station broadcast, the first ministerial-level 
conference on dioxin policy was held, the standard set for tolerable daily intake was 
revised, and a basic policy to tackling dioxin problems was also formulated. 101 This 
evidence demonstrates that the television medium in Japan has helped set, and magnify 
a political agenda, as well as accelerating the government's responses to that agenda. In 
this case, the role of the TV medium as an agenda-setter is clearly manifest. However, 
the case also reflects the norm that accuracy and accountability in Japanese television 
news has often been sidelined by the emphasis of opinionated journalism.
There are arguably several reasons why News Station has rarefy moved to
perform a watchdog role. Unlike iTV, which had sought to contest state s discourses
with undeniable visual evidence, it did not want to seek confrontations. News Station,
like other Japanese news programs, is comfortable with the status quo and high ratings,
and unwilling to take extreme risks to achieve change. As the program has constantly
been attacked and pressured by the state, the President of TV Asahi, the news
producer, and Kume himself know all too well what these risks entail. The recurrent act
of "tere asa basshingu" (TV Asahi bashing), such as the summoning of the station's
President, or the state pressure exerted on advertisers to stop sponsoring the station's
programs, has been commonplace. TV Asahi, as well as other TV stations in Japan,
largely relies for commercial viability on Japan's biggest advertising agency, Dentsu,
which has a close relationship with the LDP. 102 As Watanabe puts it:
Large advertising agencies, such as Dentsu Incorporated and Hakuhödö 
Incorporated, also play a significant role in maintaining the collusive ties 
that link the media to business and politics...together they attempt to 
manipulate public opinion and maintain status-quo.103
"Minister urges quick review of safe, daily dioxin intake", The Japan Times. February 24, 1999 
(on-line edition).
For instance, Dentsu ran an advertising campaign for the LDP during the 1996 election, as well 
as the 2000 election. In 1997, Dentsu won a bid to buy a large piece of government site in 
Tokyo to build its headquarter. See details in Dentsu Inc., Japan 1998 Marketing and 
Advertising Yearbook (Tokyo: Dentsu Inc., 1998), p. 134.
Watanabe Takesato, "The Soka Gakkai and the Japanese Media", Paper presented at the 
Japanese Studies Association of Canada Conference, Montreal, October 1999, p. 19; See also 
see Watanabe Takesato, "Gendai no kataribe Kume Hiroshi ga ukeru wake" (The story-teller of 
the present day: The reasons why Kume Hiroshi assumed this role), Ushio. 1993, 12, pp. 110- 
119.
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This collusive relationship between the state and the advertising elite became 
pronounced when they joined force to attack News Station in 1992. After Kume had 
severely criticized the Diet's passing of the Peace Keeping Operation (PKO) Bill, which 
allowed the dispatch of Japan's defence force to Cambodia, the Minister of MITI and 
these major advertising agencies exerted their pressure on car companies to withdraw 
from sponsoring the program.104 Such tactics have intensified since the alleged influence 
of News Station on LDP's defeat, and the establishment of the so-called "Kume-Tahara 
made coalition" (Kume-Tahara renritsu seiken) in 1993.105 Hence, the scope of news 
frames in which politics per se could be questioned and the symbolic display of politics 
could be fleshed out in this late night news program has been narrowed.106
6.5 Comparative Remarks
In a famous book entitled "Making the News", Golding and Elliott offered suggestions 
that were aimed at improving television news. The first was to lengthen news bulletins: 
"by extending the news even further, perhaps to an hour, most of the limitations to 
broadcast news will disappear". They also urged producers to provide more background 
information and to use a more active and less reportorial style of journalism.107 Indeed, 
their call to improve news by combining facts and analyses has been implemented by 
both iTV  and Japanese evening and late night news programs. These news programs 
have extended their news hours, and increased the amount of live interviews, soundbites, 
documentary-like sections, and commentaries. However, there is a stark contrast in the 
way between the two countries in the way that news analyses and commentaries are 
presented. While Thai news programs air news commentaries at the end of the programs
Tahara Shigeyuki, op. cit., p. 87.
Tase Yasuhiro, a former journalist for Nihon Keizai Shimbun", contributed the fall o f LDP in 
1993 to two television programs, Sunday Project and News Station, which are hosted by 
Tahara Söichirö and Kume Hiroshi respectively. He branded the Hosokawa Coaltion 
government as "Kume-Tahara renritsu seiken", or "Kume-Tahara made coalition". Further 
discussion see Duncan McCargo, "The Political Role of the Japanese Media", The Pacific 
Review. 1996, 9(2), pp. 251-64; Kristin Kyoko Altman, "Television and Political Turmoil: 
Japan's Summer in 1993", in S. J. Pharr and E. S. Krauss (eds.), Media and Politics in Japan 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), pp. 165-86; Yokota Hajime, Terebe to seiii 
(Television and Politics) (Tokyo: Suzusawa Shoten, 1996), pp. 116-60.
For further discussion see Watanabe Takesato, "Gendai no kataribe Kume Hiroshi ga ukeru 
wake" (The story-teller of the present day: The reasons why Kume Hiroshi assumed this role), 
lJ ship. 1993, 12, pp. 110-119.
Peter Golding and Philip Elliott, Making the News (London: Longman, 1979), p. 212.107
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to avoid intermingling facts and comments, Japanese news programs tend to deliver both 
as 'news'.
This transformation of the TV news marketplace, brought about by iTV  in 
Thailand and late night news programs in Japan, has arguably created an arena for 
enlarging the 'public sphere' and promoting participatory democracy. The incremental, 
as well as substantial, changes found in other television channels have indicated a move 
in the same direction. Television in Thailand and Japan has been recognized as a reliable 
and preferred source of political information, and the public have thus developed a 
'positive referent' power relation with this medium. Yet, whether television can sustain 
or further enhance the quality of its news programs depends on the improvement of 
journalistic expertise in delivering the accurate information and creating the attractive 
presentation styles, and to a large degree on sponsorship and patterns of ownership. 
This is clearly evident in the case of iTV, its watchdog role was only ephemeral due to 
the change of ownership.
However, the pluralism in both the Thai and Japanese television news programs, 
which was elicited by the competitiveness amongst different channels led to the 
establishment of a different political discourse. Both iTV  news programs in Thailand and 
the late night news programs in Japan departed from the mainstream media discourses 
provided by state-centered television. The case studies of iTV  and News Station 
demonstrated that these contests over interpreting political information and constructing 
political discourse led to changes in the political function of the television medium. In 
the Thai case, the competitiveness and newspaper-style journalism that iTV  brought to 
broadcast journalism has shifted the political role of television news, from that of a 
‘servant of the state’, to that of a ‘watchdog’ against the state's wrongdoings, as well as 
a ‘guard dog’ protecting its own interests and legitimizing the discourse of its patrons. 
In the case of Japanese television news, political information contests instigated by the 
state, in the forms of pressure on sponsors and direct coercion, prevented News Station 
from directly confronting the state by exposing the state's wrongdoings in a real
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‘watchdog’ sense. Rather, they have influenced the program to perform as an agenda- 
setter — setting and shaping alternative political discourse.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION
The power to create and distribute meaning still resides with 
centers o f material and political power, both within the state 
and amongst the higher reaches o f  corporate and financial 
authority. But this power is exercised dynamically. It is 
fought over, challenged and abused, both within and without. 1
Previous chapters in this thesis have discussed various arrays of contesting 
relationships and power relations between the state and the media in Japan and 
Thailand. In this final chapter, direct competition between the public and the state in 
both countries over control of political information is examined. The Political 
Information Contest model proposed in the first chapter is revisited, and the 
relationships between the state, the media, and the public in both countries are re­
addressed and summarized.
7.1 Information Rights, the Informed Public, and Media Reference
There are four types of rights that constitute full citizenship .2 Firstly, there are civil 
rights, including rights in relation to freedom of action within civil society, and freedom 
from undue coercion by the state. Secondly, there are political rights. These include the 
right to participate in the formation and application of the laws. Thirdly, there are social 
and economic rights. These are, for instance, workers’ rights, employees’ rights, and 
consumers’ rights. Finally, there are cultural and information rights. Cultural rights refer 
to the right to have one’s experiences, beliefs, and aspirations represented in the main 
forum of public culture. Information rights, on the other hand, include two sub-sets of 
rights: the right to access and the right to know. The former involves a public provision 
of the full range of information that people need to make considered judgments and
Peter Golding and David Deacon, Taxation and Representation: The Media. Political 
Communication and the Poll Tax (Kent, UK: Whitstable, 1994), p. 203.
Graham Murdock, “Corporate Dynamics and Broadcasting Futures”, in H. Mackay and T. 
O'Sullivan (eds.), The Media Reader: Continuity and Transformation (London: Sage, 1999), 
pp. 29-30.
2
political choices, and to pursue their rights in other areas effectively. The latter refers to 
the process by which such infonnation can be converted into knowledge that can form 
the basis for strategies of action. This process is built upon each individual’s level of 
education and media exposure. Indeed, the media play a key role in the process of 
creating public understanding of every possible aspect of infonnation, and building 
conceptual frames through which it can be interpreted and evaluated. As such, the media 
help engender public participation and involvement in the political process, and create 
an informed public.
This concept also coincides with the ‘revised form of the public sphere’, as 
proposed by James Curran, which is a structural organization of media that is intended 
to facilitate the provision, availability, and circulation of relevant information affecting 
the public good.3 As reviewed in previous chapters, the creation of such a public sphere 
in countries like Japan and Thailand is constrained by state censorship, state ownership, 
and oligopoly control of the media, and the limitations imposed by normative 
journalistic practices, which often restrict the flow and quality of information supplied 
to the public. Therefore, a question that should be raised here is whether the public in 
both countries can successfully gain direct access to information and interpret it without 
passing through the filtering processes provided by the media. Timothy Cook once 
noted that this well-informed and politically involved public can be achieved without 
involving the media:
If representative democracy is to work well, there must be more participation 
not merely by news organizations on behalf o f the people but by the people 
themselves in shaping the options and decisions o f the government. Bringing 
in the public back into politics, o f course, entails many possible steps not 
connected with either Congress or the media.4
Nonetheless, behind this attempt to bring the public back into politics lies a 
problematic concept of the ‘public sphere’, which is premised on the notion that all 
information be made available. This notion is indeed a cause for concern when
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James Curran, “Rethinking the Media as Public Sphere”, in P. Dahlgren and C. Sparks (eds.). 
Communication and Citizenship: Journalism and Public Sphere in the New Media Age 
(London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 27-57.
Timothy E. Cook, Making Laws and Making News Media Strategies in the U S. H ouse o f  
Representatives (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989), p. 177.
4
considering the Thai and Japanese situations, where not only political information but 
also a large volume of information that directly concerns public’s lives is often not made 
available.
365
One root cause of such problems has been the absence of the legitimate notion of
information rights in both countries until very recently. In Thailand, the local
interpretation of rights has long been narrowly limited to the authority and privilege of
the ruling class. Right or sitthi, was traditionally viewed as privilege associated with the
position and duty of the elite and the ruler. According to Thanet,
Sitthi (authority, right), an old word in wide use since the dawn o f Thai 
written history in the fourteenth century was associated with the privilege 
and power of the king to rule over his subjects, deriving from his claim to 
protect and preserve order for the common good. In Sukhothai incriptions 
(700th Century), sitthi means ‘authority and success’. As the right to rule 
over the subjects, and the successful execution of the state, sitthi is thus 
an attribute of mlers rather than commoners.5
The traditional concept of sitthi was also interpreted within the realm of Buddhism 
beliefs of past deeds, and impermanence, which encouraged people to depend upon 
those with authorities and fortune, or phu mi amnaj wasana, to make decisions about 
their lives.6 Saneh Charmrik has even suggested that as Buddhism denies the significance 
of the ‘se lf, freedom and rights can be defined as nothing much more than the freedom 
and right to crave for things transient and illusory.7
During the Ayudhya period (1350-1767), sitthi was extended to include the right 
of commoners, as well as slaves. However, as recorded in the Three Seals Law, these 
rights were largely concerned with the power of people in higher positions in dealing 
with their subjects. It was not until the Bangkok period (1782 until present) that the
Thanet Aphomsuvan, “Slavery and Modernity: Freedom in the Making of Modem Siam”, in D. 
Kelly and A. Reid (eds.), Asian Freedoms: The Idea of Freedom in Hast and Southeast Asia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 163.
Thanet Aphomsuvan, “Sitthi khon Thai nai rath Thai” (Rights in the Thai States), in Chaiwat 
Sathaanandha (ed.), Chintanakan su pi 2000: Nawakham chue.nv krahuanthasana dan Thni 
Suksa (Imagination towards 2000: Innovative Paradigms of Thai Smdies^ (Bangkok: 
Samnakgyan kongthun sanubsanun kan wichai, 1996), pp. 219-224.
Saneh Chamrik, Sitthi manusavachon: Kenkhunkha lae thankhwamkhid fBuddhism and Human
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modem concept of right was established. In 1928, Prince Narathip Praphanpong 
classified rights into four types: the right of the freeman, the right of citizenry, the right 
to be informed, and the right to rule.8 However, these rights were inherent within the 
supposed duties and obligations of the common people to the King, and their 
hierarchical relations. It was ironic that the 1932 revolutionary party ended the absolute 
monarchy and introduced popular democracy, but continued to assert elite domination 
and protect the status quo in all political discourse. Girling has argued that while the 
institution of patronage remained in place, the patrons themselves changed from the 
royals and aristrocracy to a professional civil service, who became the foremost of 
politics and administration.9 As such, hierarchical relationships remained fundamental to 
Thai social life.
A good illustration of the elite’s attempt to protect its status quo was the 
official definition of the word sitthi issued by the Royal Institute from the 1940s to the 
1970s. It was defined as “khwam sam ref (success), and “amnaj an chob tham' 
(legitimate power). Only in 1980s was sitthi redefined to suit a more politically 
liberalized environment by including “power to perform legally accepted things 
freely”.10 The first Constitution of Thailand promulgated by the Revolutionary Party 
guaranteed the right to communicate, but the right to publish was only guaranteed in the 
subsequent constitution, as well as in the following thirteen constitutions.11 However,
Rights: Value and Concepts! (Bangkok: Kobfai Publishing Project, 2000), p. 70.
Thanet Aphomsuvan, “Sitthi khon Thai nai rath Thai” (Rights in the Thai States), p. 199.
See Introduction in John S. Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1981).
Thanet Aphomsuvan, “Slavery and Modernity: Freedom in the Making o f Modem Siam”, p. 
164.
Bunlert Suphadilok, Sitthi kan suesan nai prathet thai (The right to communicate in 
Thailand! (Bangkok: Thammasat University, 1984), pp. 13-31; See also Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, 
Rabob witthayu lae thorathat thai: krongsang thang setthakit kanmuang lae polkrathob tor 
sitthi seriphap (Thai Radio and Television Systems: The Political and Economic Structure and 
Its Effects on Rights and Freedoms) (Bangkok: Chulalongkom University Press, 1999), pp. 
300-336.
the people’s right to know, or the right to be infonned, (sitthi nai kan rubroo) was 
always considered a privilege, not a given right. In the recent past, only the well- 
connected groups such as politicians, and powerful businessmen could gain access to 
sensitive official information. For instance, personal information obtained through 
connections and illegal means was used by fellow politicians to discredit and slander 
their rivals. Advanced economic information and decisions, such as the flotation o f the 
baht in 1997, benefited close groups of the political elite and their cronies. The right to 
know and the right of the general public to gain access to information have only been 
formalized recently in the sixteenth Constitution, promulgated in 1997, which 
guaranteed a wide range of rights, freedom, and participation o f public individuals, 
collective entities, and the community. Articles 58, 59, and 60 guarantee information 
rights o f the public, including the right of individual to access government information, 
as well as the right to be informed, and to participate in the official deliberation of 
administrative decisions.12
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These information rights were reinforced by the promulgation o f the Official 
Information Act o f 199713, which was aimed at promoting the public’s right to access
Article 58: A person shall have the right to get access to public information 
in possession of a State agency, State enterprise or local government organization, 
unless the disclosure of such information shall affect the security of the State, 
public safety, or interests of other person which shall be protected as provided by law.
Article 59: A person shall have the right to receive information, explanation 
and reason from a State agency, State enterprise or local government organization 
before permission is given for the operation of any project or activity which may 
affect the quality of the environment, health, and sanitary conditions, the quality 
of life or any other material interest concerning him or her or a local community 
and shall have the right to express his or her opinions on such matters in 
accordance with the public hearing procedure, as provided by the law.
Article 60: A person shall have the right to participate in the decision-making 
process of State officials in the performance of administrative functions, which 
affect his or her rights and liberties, as provided by the law.
See “Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 (1997)”, Government Gazette. 114 
(55a), October 11, 1997.
This Act was initiated by the Anand Panyarachun’s administration. After the May 1992 
incident, Anand set up a committee to draft the Act. However, due to frequent government
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government infonnation, as well as increasing government transparency. The law 
empowered the individual to have access to government documents, to request copies of 
them, to take advice, to make complaints, and to make appeals against personal 
information that he or she may feel inaccurate. In principle, this legislation seemed to be 
highly beneficial to the public. However, there have been a number of drawbacks and 
loopholes associated with the legislation and the administration of governmental offices 
responsible, thus discouraging the public from requesting information.
Since the dawn of Thai democracy, there has been a tradition of secrecy in the 
Thai government, which is keen to protect its interests, and clings to any information 
that is inconvenient to release. This culture of secrecy is not matched or balanced by 
any Freedom of Information Act. A denial of public access to information that is 
deemed harmful to the monarchical reputation, national security, foreign relations, or the 
national economy is clearly stated in Articles 14 and 15 of the Official Information Act. 
Indeed, the term ‘national security’ has been officially used to conceal information on a 
vast array of subjects, which often extends to many areas of policy-making, and cabinet 
meetings.14 Moreover, public access to information can also be denied, when such 
information is classified as top secret, secret, or confidential in accordance with the 
National Security Act B.E. 2517. Such confidential documents are kept from public 
between five to twenty-five years. According to Article 26 of this Act, top secret 
information can also be destroyed if the officials in charge deem it necessary.15
changes and disagreements over the details o f the draft, it took four governments over five years 
to pass the law. See, for example, Chanchai Sawangsak, Prarachchabanvat khormul khaosan 
khong ratchakan por.sor. 2540 (The Official Information Act B.E, 25401 (Bangkok:
Winyuchon, 1997), pp. 29-39.
14 According to the cabinet resolutions on May 19, 2000, details and documents presented or
deliberated in cabinet meetings are considered official secrets, and only the Prime Minister has 
the authority to decide whether to allow disclosure of such information. See Boonlert Changyai, 
“Mali p id  hu p id  ta prachachon" (The motion that shut people’s ears and eyes), Made ho n 
Sudsapdda. May 25, 2000, p. 19.
Wichai Uthai, “Raksa khwam lub" (Keeping the secret), Madchon Sudsapda. May 14, 2001, p.15
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The culture of secrecy is well entrenched in the Thai bureaucracy. In 1999, only 
297 of 8,279 state agencies, or about 3.45 per cent, published information about their 
structure and management, the scope of their authority, their rules, regulations, and their 
staff members in the Royal Gazette. Only twenty-two of seventy-six provinces in 
Thailand had public information service centers.16 During the first year of the 
implementation of the Official Information Act, a number of public requests to access 
information were denied by bureaucrats, who cited the confidential nature of documents, 
and concerns for national security as the reasons. These people, whose requests had 
been denied, filed complaints to the Official Information Board (OIB), which is 
responsible for considering appeals from the public whose access have been denied. The 
first landmark case was that of Sumalee Limpa-ovart, a prosecutor, whose daughter 
failed in the entrance examination to one of the prestigious primary schools where a 
number of students were known to be admitted through favoritism and connections. 
With the belief that her daughter had done well in the examination, she requested to see 
the examination papers of all examinees. The school administration, which is run by 
Kasetsart University, a public university, instantly denied her request, and adamantly 
refused to comply with the orders from the OIB to disclose all of the examination 
papers citing privacy as the reason. Sumalee took her case to the civil court and finally 
won the lawsuit seven months after her initial request. Yet, the school avoided a full 
disclosure, only providing answer sheets without identifying the students, or their 
rankings.17 Other publicized cases similarly involved the middle-class public whose 
requests for government information had been denied or obstructed by bureaucratic red
18.
16 Mongkol Bangprapa, “The Official Information Act: What is it you want to know?”, Bangkok 
Post. August 4, 1999 (on-line edition).
17 “Sumalee ngat raththammanoon lom rabob dek phak” (Sumalee resorted to the Constitution to 
eliminate the system of favoritism), Prachachart Thumkit. March 29-31, 1999, p. 2; “Sathit 
Kaset Never Ending Story”. Prachachart Thurnk.it. April 12-14, 1999, p. 2.
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tape.18 These cases received widespread publicity from the national media, particularly 
newspapers, because they signified the struggle of the middle-class against the old 
system of politics characterized by non-transparency, secrecy, and corruption. They 
also reiterated the prevailing notion in Thailand that bureaucratic resistance could 
override the law. In this situation, the Thai government was caught in a dual desire to 
give and withhold information. On the one hand, it had sought to present itself as more 
transparent and accessible by enacting the law. On the other hand, it succumbed to 
constant bureaucratic pressure and resistance, and thus became unwilling to share 
information with the public. Evidence of this dilemma was the appointment of a liberal- 
minded prosecutor as Director to the OIB, when it was first established, to mark a great 
leap of the Thai government in promoting transparency and accountability. However, 
the director was sacked immediately after he had authorized the release of government 
documents concerning cases in which official corruption was suspected. His position 
was soon filled by a bureaucrat.19
Journalists and representatives of civic groups, who have been seekers of access 
to official information, also felt that the law failed to prevent state agencies from 
withholding information. Yet, by early 2000 less than thirty per cent of petitions to gain 
access to official information were filed by journalists.20 It was not only that most 
journalists were not familiar with the petition process, but also it was due to the way 
Thai journalists usually gather information. As a newspaper editor observed,
18 See the discussion of other cases in Supara Janchitfah, “Teething Problems”, Bangkok Post. 
December 20, 1998 (on-line edition); “Chai sitthi khor khomoon thabuang laew ko kwad khaya 
khao tai phrom" (Use the right to gain access to the Department o f University Affairs and then 
sweep the trash under the carpet), Prachachart Thurakit. April 11, 1999, p. 3; “Father files for 
results disclosure”, The Nation. June 9, 1999 (on-line edition).
19 “Who will inform the people?”, The Nation. August 17, 1999 (on-line edition).
20 Most o f these journalists worked for business papers, such as Prachachart Thurakit. See
“Khormoon yu thi nai raw cha tarn pai do" (We will look up the information wherever it is), 
Prachachart Thurakit. January 14-17, 1999, p. 3. “Editorial: It’s time for the OIC to prove its 
mettle”, The Nation. January 5, 2000 (on-line edition).
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To get information through the new law is a new experience. In Thailand, 
there is a bad habit of getting information through back door and through 
personal connections. Journalists, businessmen, and politicians have often 
used their relations with officials to allow them to see information other 
people cannot see.21
Nevertheless, it should be noted that this journalist’s preference for getting official
information from private channels rather than searching for one is not uniquely limited
to Thai journalists. As Hugo Young wrote, the practice is rather universal:
The media are deplorably bad at using cornucopia of official information which 
is already available.. .Newspapers and television often neglect, or never bother to 
fmd out about, the tedious details often tediously available in unglamorous 
government publications.22
In short, the information rights of the Thai public, which include both the right 
to access and the right to know, are guaranteed only in principle. The Thai public 
maintains their heavy reliance on the media as their main channel of reference for 
political information. Therefore, the better that the Thai media systems are able to 
contest over control political information with the state, the more likely that the public 
will become better informed, and develop a more sophisticated understanding of the 
political world and engage in it.
In the case of Japan, the concept of rights (kenri) has existed since the 
Tokugawa period (1603-1868). The notion of rights was defined as a privilege, and 
associated with the duties and positions of individuals in accordance with their class 
under the feudal system. For instance, during the Tokugawa period peasants had been 
conscious of the “right to subsistence”, and had been positioned as ‘supplicants’ who 
could petition the government when subsistence was threatened. When their petitions
Kavi Chongkitthavora, “Free Flow: Information Act finally passes the test”, The Nation. 
February 11, 1999 (on-line edition).
Hugo Young, “Devious paths from the secrets maze”, Guardian. May 14, 1992, p. 18, cited in 
Ralph Negrine, The Communication of Politics (London: Sage, 1996), p. 13.
22
were unsuccessful, they asserted their political rights by engaging in riots and 
uprisings.23
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The feudal class system was abolished in the first few years of the Meiji
Restoration. The concept of the people’s rights (minken) started to take root among the
common people after the enactment of the Education Code, which was aimed at
eradicating illiteracy, and the flourishing of newspapers that contained critical writings
by progressive intellectuals whose conception of ‘natural rights’ was influenced by
Western writers such as Mill, Locke, Rousseau, and Spencer. For instance, an editorial
published in Kochi Shimbun on October 7, 1881 wrote:
In the words of Rousseau, society is built upon a social contract. This is 
not completely according to historical data, and therefore, we cannot easily 
agree with him. However, we firmly believe that society should not exist 
without social contract. Thus, we are convinced that sovereignty must reside 
in the people, without the people the state cannot exist. If there is the people, 
even with out a king, society can exist.24
The concept of people’s rights at the time was derived from the combination of the 
Western doctrine of natural rights and the Confucian ideology of ‘dynastic change’ 
which posited that “incompetent emperors should abdicate or be replaced, and that 
absolutism of the sovereign was not the natural will of heaven”.25 This led to the 
development of the concept of “joint rule by the sovereign and people”. This concept 
became so widespread that it provided a pretext for the Freedom and People’s Rights 
Movements (jiyü minken undo) all over the country in 1881, which resulted in the 
promulgation of the Meiji Constitution that recognized freedom of speech, press, 
communication, assembly, and education in 1889. Nevertheless, freedom and the rights 
of citizens under this constitution were restricted by the provision “under the limits of
Vera Mackie, “Freedom and Family: Gendering Meiji Political Thought”, in D.
Kelly and A. Reid (eds.), Asian Freedoms: The Idea of Freedom in East and Southeast Asia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 122.
Cited in Joseph Pittau, Political Thought in Early Meiii Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1967), p. 106.
Irokawa Daikichi, “Freedom and the Concept of People’s Rights”, Janan Quarterly April-June
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law”. During the rise of militarism during the early Showa era, the legitimacy of this 
liberal concept was further challenged by the dominance of ultra-nationalist state-backed 
Confucian ideas, which emphasized hierarchy and obedience towards the emperor rather 
than individual rights. At the time, the Japanese state forged “an emperor-system 
ideology”, which included inculcating patriotism, loyalty to the emperor, and the virtues 
of diligence and thrift. It successfully did so by disseminating such ideas through 
numerous centralized sets of institutions, such as the national school system, the 
military, the network of State Shinto shrines, and various hierarchically organized 
associations.26
With regards to the concept of the right to know {shim kenri), a traditional belief 
existed since the Tokugawa period that “knowledge of the facts of government belonged 
to those holding bureaucratic office, and since the majority of samurai and all 
commoners were normally out of office, there were no grounds for considering diffusion 
of, or access to, official information” .27 Freedom of expression was restricted, and one 
could only express his opinion about political, economic, and social issues upon a 
privilege given from a superior.28 This custom was in line with a prevalent belief in that 
period - tami wa yorashimu beshi shirashimu bekarazu (people must not be informed, 
but made dependent on the government's authority). This belief was based on the 
traditional relationship between tami (common people), and okami (people above), 
which carries on today. The hierarchical relationship between okami and tami 
emphasizes the traditional perception of information as a ‘privilege’, and seems to have 
obstructed the adoption of the concept of information rights among the Japanese
1967, 14(2), p. 181.
For further discussion see Sheldon Garon, Molding Jananese Minds: The State in Fvervdav Life
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
Albert A. Altman, “The Press”, in M.B. Jansen and G. Rozman (eds.), Janan in Transition-
From Tokugawa to Meiii (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 231.
28 Ibid., p. 232.
people. In present-day Japan, this relationship continues to reinforce people’s 
tendencies to rely on the authority, or the okami, to make decisions on issues and 
handle information that affect their lives:
Due to a long history of feudalism, the Japanese, especially in rural 
constituencies, tend to leave decisions on difficult matters to okami 
(people above us) and are not affected by the mass media's editorials 
as far as those difficult matters are concerned.29
Chapter Three of the current Japanese Constitution, which was promulgated in 
1946 under the American influence, guarantees a wide range of fundamental rights, 
including civil rights, political rights, social and economic rights, religious and cultural 
rights, and the right to communicate (Article 21).30 However, as McCormack argues, 
these basic rights “in practice have been seen as abstractions subordinate to a surviving, 
pre-modem notion of Japaneseness”.31 Noticeably, the Constitution still begins with a 
series of clauses about the emperor, and this indirectly emphasizes the associated feudal 
notion of loyalty and obligations, which is often defined as essentially Japanese. More 
significantly, information rights, including the right to access and the right to know, are 
disregarded in the Constitution. Thus, in the postwar Japan, “information” is still 
considered the “property” of the authorities, and those who want to access it must be 
given the “privilege” to do so.
Only in the recent years have the Japanese people embraced the concept of 
information rights. According to an NHK national survey in 1997, sixty-six per cent of 
1,197 respondents suggested that they knew they had the right to know about 
government information.32 This rise was largely brought about by an unprecedented
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number of citizen movements at the local level in the 1980s and 1990s, which opposed 
state policies and projects that lacked consultation with communities, and demanded 
access to information about local government funding and expenses. The adoption of the 
concept by these citizen groups has resulted in the enactment of local ordinances on 
information disclosure in major metropolitan areas, including Tokyo, Osaka, and 
Kanagawa since the mid-1980s.33 These citizen groups, particularly the citizen 
ombudsmen, who are a loosely network of private attorneys and supporters, have 
become the most prominent information requesters in Japan. Since 1994, this group has 
utilized Japan’s local disclosure ordinances to audit the accounts of local government, 
which has resulted in spending cuts and sharp reductions in lavish treatment between 
local and state officials.34 By 1998, all prefectures had implemented their own 
information legislation. In 1999, some of these local ordinances were revised to insert a 
clause, which specially guaranteed the ‘right to know’.35
The central government is lagging behind local governments in this regard. The 
National Public Information Disclosure Act (Jöhö kökai ho) was just passed by the 
Diet in May 1999, and came into effect in April 2001, despite the fact that similar bills 
had been drafted since 1980. The Japanese law appears to stipulate a similar procedure 
for information requests to that of the Thai Official Information Act. The Thai public 
must file complaints to the OIB when their requests for information have been rejected, 
and have to engage in lawsuits should subsequent complaints be in vain. The Japanese 
public can either file lawsuits against the government or lodge complaints against the
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Disclosure Screening Commission attached to the Cabinet Office should their initial 
requests for information be rejected. Yet there are some problems associated with the 
Japanese law that remain unresolved. For example, the "right to know" is not mentioned 
in the legislation, with the LDP arguing that the Constitution does not clearly provide 
such a guarantee.36 The law prohibits requests for information concerning defense, 
diplomacy, police records that can interfere with current investigation, information that, 
if disclosed, will impinge on frank discussions among government officials, and 
information on certain individuals. The law only allows the public to file lawsuits 
against the central government from a small number of district courts, including those in 
Sapporo, Sendai, Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, Takamatsu, and Fukuoka, thus 
discouraging people who live in other areas to engage in lawsuits.37
There have been a number of cases in which public requests for information have 
been rejected by local officials, and subsequently ended in local courts. Although the 
courts ruled in favor of the public, the requested documents were often partially 
disclosed, with many sentences considered sensitive, or “official secrets”, blackened out 
by the authority .38 Some government agencies denied that the sensitive information 
requested existed, whereas some refused requests to access information about 
entertaining expenses, claiming that releasing such information could unduly harm the 
workings o f government or invade the privacy of individual officials. These refusals 
reflect the prevalent notion upheld by Japanese bureaucrats that information is the 
government’s property, and should not be made public .39
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Nevertheless, the Japanese public seems to be more enthusiastic about the 
Information Disclosure Law than their Thai counterparts. In Japan, there were more 
than 1,500 requests to the central ministries and government agencies within two days 
after the National Public Information Disclosure Act was enacted.40 In Thailand, only 
156 complaints against government withholding information were filed with the OIB 
within two years of its operations.41 However, most requests to access government 
information in Japan were made by nonprofit organizations and citizen groups, whereas 
similar requests in Thailand were mostly made by the public, though dominated by a 
group of the middle-class.42. Indeed, it is a much more daunting task for a Japanese 
citizen to engage in a lawsuit against the government, as litigation in Japan is a time 
consuming and very expensive exercise. In this case, both the Thai and Japanese laws 
contrast sharply with the American Freedom of Information Act, which provides for 
government payment of attorneys’ fees should requesters win the litigation.43 
Moreover, in contrast to the Thai law, which imposes a small penalty on officials who 
fail to comply with the OIB decisions ordering disclosure (Article 40), though this 
penalty is highly unlikely to be imposed in reality, the Japanese law does not impose a 
penalty for the failure to follow terms of the ordinance, nor does it punish officials who 
fail to comply with court decisions.
Another type of channel that has recently opened direct communication between 
the public and the state and widened public access to official information is the Internet. 
The use of Internet technology to produce an informed and politically active citizenship 
has been described by Wheeler as “electronic democracy”. According to Wheeler, 
knowledge is now widely available through networks, which removes the difficulty of
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accessing information, and this phenomena guarantees success for both direct and 
communitarian forms of democracy.44
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According to Pitch Pongsawat, the Internet in Thailand first began in 1995, and 
by 2000 it was ranked fourth amongst the most consumed media after television, radio, 
and print respectively. 45 Internet Message Boards and chat rooms have become a new 
political space where the public are provided with the opportunity to directly interact 
with politicians. Popular political websites include www.PoliticsThailand.com. and 
political party websites, which provide biographies, policies, activities, speeches, 
committee-hearing, summaries and pictures of political activities.46 Moreover, the 
websites of various independent commissions established in accordance with the intent 
of 1997 Constitution, such as the National Counter Corruption Commission and the 
Election Commission, are frequently visited by Internet users in Thailand. However, the 
reach of the Internet in Thailand is still extremely limited. In 1996, only about 1 million 
personal computers were in use, and 10 per cent of these computers were connected to 
the Internet.47 The system is also plagued by limited telephone lines. According to the 
1999 UNESCO Report, there was only an average of seven telephone lines per 100 
inhabitants in Thailand, and there were only sixteen registered ISPs.48
The growth of Internet technology is far more advanced in Japan than in 
Thailand. According to an MPT report, the number of Internet users in Japan reached
Mark Wheeler, Politics and the Mass Media (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 217.
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379
around 27 million in 1999.49 Japan had an average of 48.9 telephone lines per 100 
inhabitants, and the number of registered ISPs was as many as 2,600 in 1999.50 This 
was largely a result of a government policy which has been oriented to expand 
information infrastructure to promote an ‘information society’ (Jöhö shakai). Internet 
access to political websites and web campaigning during elections in Japan has been a 
new political phenomenon. It was claimed that during the first two months of Mori 
Yoshirö’s premiership, the website of the Prime Minister’s office (www.kantei.co.jp ) 
received 18 million hits from Internet users who wanted to browse official explanations 
for the Prime Minister’s infamous gaffes.51 Nevertheless, most Internet users in Japan 
are in the younger age group (between 20 to 30).52 This group of users is particularly 
fond of using web posters to express their political views. Professor Kawakami 
Kazushisa of Meiji Gakuin University observed this trend and suggested that the 
Internet has widened the political space in Japan to include the younger age group 
whose interests in politics have been declining and most of whom have no party 
affiliation. In his words, the Internet “has energized political discussion because it 
allows people to exchange uncensored views”.53 Yet, it remains to be seen whether the 
older age group of Japanese citizens, which generally have a strong affiliation with a 
political party and whose voting turnouts are often high, will find the Internet useful to 
access political information and communicate with their affiliated parties.
It is obvious that direct channels for the Thai and Japanese public to gain access 
to political information are, to a certain degree, still obstructed by two factors: the
49 Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Heise.il2 nenhan Tsüshin Hakushn 
(Communications White Paper 20001 (Tokyo: Gyösei, 2000), p. 10.
50 UNESCO, op. cit., p. 219.
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impracticality and loopholes associated with the law regarding information disclosure, 
and the minimal adoption and limited usage of Internet technology among particular 
groups. What is also clear is that it is unlikely that the public will use the information 
disclosure law and Internet technology to wholly supplant the provision of political 
information by the media. The mainstream mass media of press and television, with 
their journalistic intermediaries and filtering processes, will remain important actors in 
the political communication processes between the state and the public in both 
countries. However, as more information becomes available through the implementation 
of the information disclosure law and the growth and accessibility of the Internet, the 
Japanese and Thai media should take a proactive role in gaining access to, and 
distributing government information to the public, by making better use of the law and 
the technology themselves. Should more information become available as a result of the 
media’s investigation, the public will develop a type of ‘positive referent’ power 
relation with the media. Consequently, the media can motivate the public to become 
more informed and involved, and this comes closer to creating a ‘revised form of the 
public sphere’.
7.2 The Political Information Contest Model Revisited
The purpose of this study has been to explore new perspectives to understanding the 
relationship between the state, the media, and the public, and to develop basic guidelines 
for comprehending how the political role of the media varies over time and circumstance. 
In the first chapter, the Political Information Contest model was proposed as an 
alternative perspective that can lead to better explanations and understanding of the 
media’s role in politics. The model rests on the premise that the interactions between 
the state, the media, and the public involve the exercise of power relations. This model 
incorporates five types of power relations, which are exercised by the state, the media,
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and the public, in a political communication process with an aim to gain or maintain 
control over political information. These power relations are coercive, reward, expert, 
legitimate, and referent. Four major arguments underpin the Political Information 
Contest model.
The first argument was that the state is likely to exercise a coercive or reward 
type of power relation with the media. The analysis of the history and current practices 
of press censorship in Thailand and Japan in Chapter Two suggested that the state in 
both countries has always tried to regulate the flow of political information in the press 
by means of legal and extralegal controls. Whilst the Thai state has preferred to use 
stringent press regulations to maintain its control of political information by censorship, 
jailing or suing editors and journalists for defamation, the Japanese state has tended to 
impose reward strategies through a number of subtle extralegal mechanisms, especially 
through the system of the kisha kurabu. Both coercive and reward strategies have 
proved to be effective instruments to increase the ability of the Thai and the Japanese 
states to maintain their control of, and to suppress, alternative political discourse in the 
press. It is also clear in this chapter that when the state implemented its coercive or 
reward strategies, the press subsequently changed its role. For instance, when the 
military government took control in Thailand during the 1950s and 1960s and enacted 
stringent press laws, the Thai press shifted its role from a watchdog to the more 
partisan role of a guard dog, protecting its commercial interests as well as clinging on to 
their political connections. In the case of Japan, when the military dominated the 
government during the early Showa years and introduced a number of laws and 
administrative techniques to deal with the press, which had been very competitive and 
politically active, succumbed to these regulations and orders, and became subservient to 
the state. These transitions also indicate that when the state is in control of the political
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environment, it has more ability to gain control over political information. 
Consequently, the media are less likely to triumph over the state in their efforts to gain 
more control over political infonnation.
The examination of Thai and Japanese television broadcasting regulations in 
Chapter Three also demonstrated the dynamics of coercive and reward strategies that 
the state in both countries has applied to gain and maintain its level of control over 
political information. In Thailand, the first broadcasting law limited legal ownership of 
broadcasting stations to state agencies. Reward instruments were also employed for 
license administration and the control of broadcasting content. The combination of these 
approaches fostered the domination of a small well-connected broadcasting elite and 
restricted market entry. In Japan, where the reward strategies were more prevalent, the 
MPT preference for the unification adjustment (ipponka chösei) when granting a 
broadcasting license contributed to overt MPT control over broadcasting stations and 
programming content. The MPT also employed reward tactics to establish collusive 
relationships with NHK executives and those of the commercial networks, and vice 
versa. These relationships promoted self-censorship and enabled the MPT to impose its 
control on programming content whenever it saw fit. This was exemplified by the 
commercial broadcasters’ submissions to political demands for the sake o f renewing 
their licenses.
The second argument was that the media tend to have both expert and legitimate 
relations with the state. With the level of expertise that enables journalists to triumph in 
a political information contest over the state, they should have a good knowledge and 
understanding of their profession, be able to resist influence from their organizations and 
their sources, and deliver good service with high ethical standards. The analysis in
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Chapter Four examined these qualities of the Thai and Japanese journalists, specifically 
in relation to knowledge, organization, autonomy, a degree of social responsibility, and 
ethical codes.
Journalistic practices in both countries have been constrained by a number of 
systematic and ethical problems. These constraints limited the opportunities for 
journalists, the representatives of the media, to triumph over the state in gaining access 
to political information, and accurately interpreting and disseminating that information. 
Moreover, normative practices adopted when reporting about the Royal or the Imperial 
families, and some elements in political culture, could influence journalists to adopt 
legitimate relations with their sources and relegate themselves to the role of 
“messengers”, passively conveying official messages to the public. For instance, the 
journalists’ culture of maintaining good relationship or ‘shinrai kankeV with sources, 
and the gratitude of young Thai journalists towards their sources, or feeling of krieng 
chai (feeling in awe), proved to be elements of political culture that impeded the 
journalists from performing their tasks successfully. Although there are similarities in 
the normative practices and elements of political culture between these two countries, 
conspicuous discrepancies exist between these countries. These are, for instance, when a 
Japanese reporter pursues an independent research, or covers a leaked story, sanctions 
from the source are imposed to the whole team of journalists from the same 
organization. In Thailand, on the contrary, the system of group sanctions is absent, and 
Thai journalists enjoy a high degree of autonomy in their pursuits of news stories. The 
extent to which these cultural factors work differently in Thailand and Japan has been 
observed by Kirsch:
In Japan where an actor chose not to identify himself with these particular 
roles or activities, sanctions were mobilized to either encourage or enforce 
his nonconformity. In Thailand when an actor chose not to identify himself 
with his particular roles and collectivities, no sanctions were mobilized.
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Hence, in Thailand this could not be seen as “deviance” as it could in Japan.54
Accordingly, the journalistic nonnative practices and elements of political culture should 
be regarded as independent parameters that create different degrees of change in the 
political role of the media.
Another independent parameter that should be noted is the globalization of 
media, which has partially forced the MPT to pursue broadcasting reform and introduce 
broadcasting policies that are more responsive to pressures brought about by intense 
competition in the global market. This has allowed the commercial networks in Japan to 
expand, as well as allowing foreign broadcasters to enter the previously well-protected 
market. This has also increased the volume of news and current affairs programs on 
cable and satellite networks, thus providing people with more access to information. 
Moreover, multi-channel broadcasting will make it increasingly difficult for the MPT to 
censor debates and critical reports on news programs. The proliferation of global media, 
such as CNN, has also led to the adoption of new style of broadcast journalism in Japan 
and Thailand. In Japan, high-quality television coverage of political debates became 
increasingly available. This has resulted in a change in the political scene, as politicians 
have become more aware of the potency of the medium as a means of conveying their 
ideas and selling their personalities to voters. In Thailand, the traditional style of 
straightforward reporting with few background pictures became obsolete and was 
replaced by documentary-style reports, with more pictures, soundbites, and live 
broadcasts. As television news increasingly conveys political materials in an interesting 
and digestible manner, it has raised the profile of the public understanding of politics.
54 A. Thomas Kirsch, “Loose Structure: Theory or Description”, in H. D. Evers (ed.), Loose 
Structured Social Systems: Thailand in Comparative Perspective (New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Southeast Asian Studies Cultural Report Series, 1969), p. 56.
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The third argument, which was discussed in the first section of this chapter, was 
that the public can adopt either positive or negative referent type of power relations 
with the media. This depends largely on the level of direct public access to political 
information and the perceived accuracy of the political information that the media 
disseminate. As discussed earlier, direct public access to political information in 
Thailand and Japan has improved over recent years due to the implementation of the 
law regarding information disclosure, and the growth and accessibility of the Internet. 
However, the loopholes associated with the law, perennial problems of communication 
infrastructure, and limited user groups in these countries continue to obstruct the direct 
flow of information between the state and the public. As a consequence, the public in 
Thailand and Japan are likely to continue relying on the mainstream media as their main 
channel for political reference for a considerable time to come. However, should the 
public in these countries find the information distributed by the media inaccurate and 
unreliable, or purely state-orchestrated information, they are likely to adopt negative 
referent type of power relations with the media. As a consequence, they may either lose 
interests in politics, or try to gain more control of political information by making better 
use o f the information disclosure law and the Internet to create their own personal 
networks of information. This depends largely on the public’s motivation, capability, 
and opportunity to gain access to information.55
The final argument was that the media’s role in politics is fluid  and changeable 
depending on the types of power relations are operating at a given time. This argument 
also entailed that the media’s role can shift from the positive end of the spectrum, the 
watchdog role, to the negative end of the spectrum, the role of a servant of the state, and
Previous research has shown that public became politically informed if  they have motivation, 
capability, and opportunity to learn. See, for example, Michael X. Delli, Scott Keeter, and J. 
David Kennamer, “Effects of the News Media Environment and Citizen Knowledge of State 
Politics and Government”, Journalism Quarterly. Summer 1994, 71(2), pp. 443-456.
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to those in between. The content analysis of press coverage of political reform in 
Thailand suggests that the Thai press can function as an agenda-setter. The reliance of 
the Thai press on outside sources, such as academics and public intellectuals, has 
provided the public with a wide range of information on political reform, and has 
promoted public debates. The public has also become dependent on the press for 
information by regarding the press as their positive reference. As a result, the press 
agenda on political reform has been turned into a public agenda. Despite blatant 
attempts made by the conservative government to divert the agenda, the press and the 
public united and successfully forced the government to realize political reform by 
passing the 1997 Constitution. The content analysis of the Japanese press coverage of 
the same topic indicated that the Japanese press can also play a role of an agenda-setter, 
but to a lesser degree than the Thai press. The Japanese press’s reliance on the official 
sources has opened the way for state officials to forge their own agenda. The lack of 
alternative sources in press coverage has limited the press’s emphasis to political 
conflicts rather than reform issues and their repercussions. Furthermore, the shift in the 
role of the press to a guard dog role in both countries has been evident in the content 
analyses of press coverage of the respective Prime Ministers. Due to its concern about 
the reward relations it had with the LDP administration, especially through the privilege 
of low postage charges, and the fixed price system, the Japanese press appeared to be 
hesitant to attack the Prime Minister. On the contrary, the Thai press, which built 
strong positive support from the public by successfully articulating and reinforcing 
public dissent, used public apathy to win the battle against the state’s contest to 
impose its own news frame and influence political discourse.
The content analysis of television news coverage in Chapter Six revealed similar 
results. The new style of TV journalism and high level of expertise that both iTV and
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News Station introduced to broadcast journalism shifted the political role of television 
that had once functioned as a servant of the state, to perform a more proactive role as a 
watchdog, or an agenda-setter. However, the recent change in the power relations 
between iTV  and the Thai state from a coercive to a reward type through the change of 
ownership, from being owned by a group of shareholders to being solely owned by a 
media tycoon who currently occupies the Premier’s post, is likely to relegate the role of 
iTV  to a mere servant of the state. As for News Station, it was evident that direct 
coercion from the state and pressure from sponsorship could at times influence the 
program to change its political course. Yet, due to enormous public support to the 
program and the program’s ability to gain access to political information by bypassing 
the system of the kisha kurabu, News Station is likely to shift its political role to a 
watchdog function in the foreseeable future.
Although the discussion in the preceding chapters did not address all occurrences 
of political information contests between the state, the media, and the public in both 
countries, it did explain how and in what manner that the contestation took place. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that political information contests occur more often in an 
arena of political pluralism, such as in Thailand where the alternation of parties in 
power is common, than in the political arena of Japan whose political system has long 
been dominated by one-party rule. The forms and degree of contestation also depends 
largely on the political culture in which it operates. Too few or too many contestations 
highlight differences in political culture -  the former signifying a political system where 
its actors prefer to maintain the status quo and seek consensus-building, whereas the 
latter is in a constant state of flux. Thus, the political role of the Thai media has varied 
more than that of the Japanese because the Thai political environment has been very 
fluid, in which change in the form and degree of power relations among the state, the
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media, and the public occurred frequently. This means that political information 
contests require a context or environment that nurtures or engenders them, and a 
political culture including the beliefs, values, and attitudes that is supportive, which 
essentially means a modem democracy with participatory politics. Therefore, political 
information contests are arguably essential elements of democracy. The absence of 
political information contestation marks the failure of democracy in a society, resulting 
in stagnation, decay, or the emergence of dictatorial or authoritarian regimes that will 
impose complete controls on the media and on direct public access to official 
information. This will inevitably lead to the demise of the public and participatory 
politics.
7.3 The State, the Media, and the Public in Japan and Thailand
In their study of Taxation and Representation, Golding and Deacon concluded that
while the state and the elite continue to maintain their power to create and distribute
meaning, this will always be challenged and fought over by other actors in the political
communication system, especially by the media and the public .56 This argument implies
that the relationship between the public and the state can no longer be described in
simple terms, and that it becomes contested and multi-directional. The media’s role also
becomes more crucial in highlighting issues and concerns and putting pressure on the
state and its agencies. As such, the media take on a significant role to unearth secret
information, to articulate, to organize, to voice the opinion of the public, and to keep the
state responsive to such opinion. Nonetheless, it should also be noted that not all of
these political functions of the media are detectable, as C. Wright Mills once wrote:
No one really knows all the functions of the mass media, 
for their entirety, these functions are probably so pervasive 
and so subtle that they cannot be caught by the means
56 See footnote 1.
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of social research now available.57
Nevertheless, an important question regarding the function of the media, which 
was posed in Chapter One, as to whether the Japanese and the Thai mass media have 
been considered driving forces promoting reform and transformation of politics, or 
whether they have simply been bastions of conservatism serving existing interests, can 
be answered. The evidence presented in this study seems to demonstrate that different 
media in each country play a different role. Whilst the Thai press tends to take an 
adversarial role, and has been a main advocator for political reform, television news 
coverage is more biased towards conservatism and is likely to serve the political and 
broadcasting elite’s interests. This is largely due to the pattern of ownership of 
television stations, with most under state control, or the control of the political elite as 
is the case with iT V . The Japanese press, on the other hand, is too restrained by the 
system of the kisha kurabu, which generates news conformity, and by its reliance on 
the official sources for political information to offer readers alternative political 
discourse. Television news programs in Japan, by contrast, are far more active than the 
press in challenging mainstream political discourse and sharing with their audiences 
various new political perspectives. This has been largely due to the increased 
competitiveness in the television industry and its less reliance on the kisha kurabu for 
information. However, this radical role is scarcely performed by the public broadcaster, 
NHK.
Nevertheless, it is clear that both the Thai and the Japanese media have actively 
played a more important part in disseminating political information to the public, 
conveying public responses to the state, as well as keeping both the state and the public 
responsive to political issues by organizing and mobilizing public opinion, and by
57 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 311.
becoming the catalyst for public debate. These politically active media have significantly
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contributed to the strengthening of democracy and participatory politics in both 
countries. Denis McQuail observed this contribution of the media and noted that the 
more political information is available, and really accessible by people, the more chances 
there are for the public to make “relevant choices or to recognize, and connect with, 
some strand of political belief’.58 In Japan, as suggested by Flanagan, media exposure 
has helped improve the quality of mass political participation over the postwar period. 
Both print and broadcast media in Japan have “helped create a more knowledgeable 
electorate, one that is better equipped to translate its political preferences into voting 
choices”.59 In Thailand, the press coverage of May 1992 that motivated thousands of 
protestors to take to the street,60 and the promotion of the ‘green campaign’ by the 
press that helped to hasten political reform testified that the Thai press has been 
capable of promoting democracy and increasing public participation in politics. More 
recently, Thai newspapers, and radio and television programs have been geared towards 
promoting a concept of civil society by representing themselves as a forum for public 
debate providing direct participation in political issues.61 The following table 
summarizes distinctive similarities and differences in the elements of political 
communication systems, particularly those regarding the state, the media, and the 
public, in Thailand and Japan.
Denis McQuail, “Diversity in Political Communication: Its Sources, Forms, and Future”, in P. 
Golding, G. Murdock, and P. Schlesinger (eds.), Communicating Politics: Mass 
Communications and Political Process (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986), p. 137.
Scott C. Flanagan, “Media Exposure and the Quality o f Political Participation in Japan”, in S. 
Pharr and E. S. Kruass (eds.), Media and Politics in Japan (Honolulu: University o f Hawaii 
Press, 1996), p. 278.
Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, “The Development of a Participatory Democracy: Raison D ’Etre for 
Media Reform in Thailand”, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science. 1994 (22), pp. 101-14. 
Chawarong Limpatthamapanee, “Bothbath seumolchon kab kanphatthana khwampen 
prachasungkhom” (The role of the mass media in the development o f civil society), Lok khong 
sen lem 2 (The Media’s World Vol. 2) (Bangkok: Chulalongkom University Press, 1998) pp 
168-189.
Table 18: Similarities and Differences of the Elements of Political Communication
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Systems in Thailand and Japan
The State
Distribution of Power
Ruling Party 
Political Party
Political System 
Contest with the media
Bureaucrats retain 
considerable power in 
policy-making.
Governed by a coalition 
at present.
Consists of small 
groups or factions
umerenm
Thailand
Participatory
Democracy
The state attempts to 
control political 
discourse.
‘Liberal Corporatism’, 
a system dominated by 
capitalists and the 
middle class
Frequent changes of 
parties in power
Alliance between 
groups, and parties 
shifts frequently.
Constant changes of 
government mostly 
induced by public 
rejection.
Frequent
Japan j
‘Patterned Pluralism’, a 
system whereby various 
groups can channel their 
interests in policy­
making.
One party ruled for over 
38 years.
Shifts in alliance or a 
breakaway from a party 
is less frequent.
Changes of government 
are usually caused by 
internal party struggle.
Occasional, as most 
media prefer to preserve 
their status quo.
The Public
Education and Media 
Reference
Direct Access to 
Information
Heavy reliance on 
media for political 
information
Direct channels to gain 
access include the use of 
the law concerning 
information disclosure 
and the Internet 
technology.
Less advanced 
education system 
helped sustain visual 
culture (television), 
rather than reading 
culture (newspaper).
The culture of secrecy is 
still well entrenched in 
the Thai state. Internet 
usage is also in its 
rudimentary stage.
A mass literate public 
with the highest 
newspaper consumption 
per capita in the world.
Loopholes in the 
Information Disclosure 
Act discourage the 
public to use the law. 
Internet users are not 
good representatives of 
the whole electorate.
The Press
Censorship
Ownership Structure
Press Coverage of 
Politics
Partisanship
The combination of 
legal and extralegal 
control mechanisms
Private ownership
Emphasis is placed on 
reporting of politics, 
rather than policies.
Press partisanship 
affects news coverage 
and editorial biases.
Emphasis has been 
placed on the use of 
legal means.
A few highly-circulated 
papers are owned by 
families, while most are 
public companies.
Long news stories with 
a sharp division 
between facts and 
comment
Partisanship is 
frequently inevitable 
due to the acquisition of 
newspaper ownership.
The prevalence of subtle 
extralegal means, such 
as the system of 
reporter’s club
Most are still owned by 
families who created the 
papers, and company 
employees.
Conformity in news 
stories, but difference in 
editorial lines is 
detectable.
Some papers forged 
relationships with the 
ruling LDP through 
personal connections.
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T elev is ion
O w n e rsh ip  S tru c tu re L im ite d  o w n e rsh ip , an d  
n e w  en try  res tr ic ted
S ta te  o w n e rsh ip . P riv a te  o w n e rsh ip , w ith  
a  s tro n g  p u b lic  
b ro ad caste r.
L ic e n s in g  S y s te m D e s ig n e d  to  g iv e  to  
th o se  w ith  co n n e c tio n s  
w ith  th e  s ta te .
‘P r iv i le g e d
c o n c e s s io n s ’ w a s  g iv e n  
b a s e d  o n  th e  lo g ic  o f  
th e  p a tro n -c l ie n t 
s y s te m .
A  p ro c e ss  o f
‘u n if ic a t io n  a d ju s tm e n t’ i  
w a s  im p o s e d  to  
a c c o m m o d a te  th e  ‘fa ir  
sh a re  n o r m ’.
;  P u b lic  S e rv ic e  
i  B ro a d c a s tin g
S e lf-c en so rsh ip  is  an  
im p o r ta n t p a r t o f  the  
o rg a n iz a tio n a l cu ltu re .
T o ta lly  d e p e n d e n t on  
s ta te  fu n d in g .
S e m i-g o v e rn m e n ta l 
o rg a n iz a tio n  w h o se  
a n n u a l b u d g e t n e e d s  a n  
a p p ro v a l f ro m  th e  D iet.
j R e la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  
|  P o lit ic a l  a n d  
i B ro a d c a s tin g  E lite
C lo se  re la tio n sh ip  h as  
b e e n  b u ilt  th ro u g h  b o th  
fo rm a l an d  in fo rm al 
ch an n e ls .
T h e  re la t io n s h ip  is n o w  
m o re  c o n c e rn e d  w ith  
c o in c id in g  e c o n o m ic  
in te re s ts  r a th e r  th a n  th e  
tr a d itio n a l m o ra l 
o r ie n ta tio n .
T h e  re la t io n s h ip  is  
fo rg ed  an d  
in s t i tu tio n a liz e d  
th ro u g h  v a r io u s  
lic e n s in g  a n d  
c o n s u ltin g  p ro c e d u re s .
!  C o n tro l o f  
P ro g ra m m in g  C o n te n t
P o li t ic a l  N e w s  
C o v e ra g e
D ire c t a n d  in d ire c t 
in te rfe ren ce  o f  po litica l 
co n ten t
E m p h a s is  o n  p o lit ic s  
ra th e r  th a n  p o lic ie s
A s  a l l  c h a n n e ls  a re  s ta te  
o w n ed , s ta te  in te rfe re n ce  
in  a d m in is t ra t io n  a n d  
c o n te n t is  p re v a le n t.
In fo rm a tiv e  n e w s
P re ssu re  to  ch a n g e  
p o lit ic a l  c o n te n t w a s  
e x e r te d  b y  th e  M P T  
a n d  th e  L D P  o n  N H K  
a n d  c o m m e rc ia l 
n e tw o rk s . 
In te rp re ta tiv e  a n d  
o p in io n a te d  n e w s
J o u rn a lis ts
E d u c a tio n Jo u rn a lism  c u rr ic u la r  is 
d ire c te d  to  su it 
in d u s tr ia l n e e d s  ra th e r  
th a n  p ro d u c in g  q u a lity  
jo u rn a l is ts .
U .S . a p p ro a c h  to  
jo u r n a l is m  w ith  
e m p h a s is  o n  te c h n ic a l 
k n o w le d g e
E m p h a s is  is  p la c e d  o n  
te a c h in g  o f  
c o m m u n ic a tio n  a n d  
so c ia l  th e o rie s .
P ro fe ss io n a l Id eo lo g y E m p h a s is  is  o n  th e  
n o tio n s  o f  ‘o b je c t iv i ty ’ 
a n d  ‘im p a r t ia l i ty ’
C o n n e c tio n s  b e tw e e n  
th e  p re s s  a n d  p o lit ic a l  
p a r tie s  h a v e  y ie ld e d  
little  a p p re c ia tio n  o f  
th e se  c o n c e p ts  in  
p rac tice .
I T h e se  c o n c e p ts  h av e  
in f lu e n c e d  th e  p re ss  to  
i  re fra in  f ro m  ad v ersaria l 
j re p o r tin g .
C a re e r  R o u te Jo u rn a lism  c a n  b e  a  
b r id g e  to  a  p o lit ic a l 
career.
J o u rn a lis ts  c h a n g e  jo b s  
fa ir ly  o ften .
T h e  p rev a len c e  o f  a  life- 
:  tim e  e m p lo y m e n t 
| s y s te m
A u to n o m y | S y s te m  o f  s e n io r ity  is 
em p h asized .
B e a t jo u r n a l is ts  h a v e  a  
ce rta in  d eg re e  o f  
a u to n o m y  to  p u rsu e  
th e ir  o w n  s to rie s .
B e a t jo u rn a l is ts  a re  le ss  
a b le  to  in it ia te  th e ir  
o w n  n e w s  an g le .
R e la t io n s h ip  w ith  
j  so u rce
C lo se  re la tio n sh ip  w ith  
th e  so u rce , a n d  
I so m e tim e s  b e in g  u se d  
as  in fo rm an ts
Y o u n g  jo u rn a l is ts  fee l 
g ra te fu l to  th e ir  so u rce . 
S a n c tio n s , i f  o cc u r , a re  
p la c e d  o n  in d iv id u a ls  
;  n o t g ro u p s  b as is .
Jo u rn a lis ts  a re  e a s ily  
m a n ip u la te d  a n d  th e  
w h o le  te a m  o f  
i  jo u r n a l is ts  c a n  b e  
| s a n c tio n e d .
N e w s g a th e r in g  S y s tem I P a c k  jo u rn a l is m Jo u rn a lis ts  a re  a s s ig n e d  
to  c o v e r  im p o r ta n t 
b e a ts , a n d  th e  
1 O p p o s itio n .
i  J o u rn a lis ts  a re  
;  s tru c tu re d  to  c e n te r  
a ro u n d  m a jo r  fac tio n s .
I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
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C o v e r a g e  o f  R o y a l S e lf -c e n so r sh ip  is L e g a l s e n te n c e  is I f  an  ‘ im p r o p e r ’
fa m ily  an d  Im p eria l 
fa m ily
im p o se d im p o se d  o n  le s e -  
m a je ste  c h a rg es .
c o v e r a g e  p u b lish e d ,  
sa n c t io n  i s  im p o s e d  b y  
th e  Im p er ia l H o u s e h o ld  
A g e n c y , an d  attack  fr o m  
th e  r ig h t w in g  g r o u p  is  : 
p o s s ib le .
E th ic a l S tan d ard E sta b lish m en t o f  s e lf-  
i  g o v e r n in g  b o d ie s
Jo u rn a lists  r e c e iv e d  
b r ib es  fr o m  p o lit ic ia n s .
J o u rn a lists  r e c e iv e d  
la v is h  en te r ta in m e n t
i fr o m  th e  so u rce .
7.4 Final Remarks
The political information contest model proposed in this study offers a new way to 
assess the political communication systems within democratic societies. This model was 
adopted in a pursuit of a comparative analysis of the Thai and Japanese mass media. By 
focusing on the interactions and power relations between the three important actors of a 
political communication system — the state, the public, and the media —, media 
regulations, the structure of ownership of media, journalistic practices, media coverage 
of politics, and public’s direct access to political information in Japan and Thailand 
were examined, compared, and contrasted. Contests and struggles over control of 
political information among these actors were evident at almost all levels. Based on the 
results of this study, it is arguable that the political role of media is fluid  and 
changeable, and the media change their political role according to the type of power 
relations between the state, the media, and the public are operating in their quest for 
control over political information at the time.
The Thai and Japanese cases presented here are not unique, as similar contests 
between the state, the media, and the public over the control of political information can 
be found in other democratic societies, though the degrees and forms of the contests and 
struggle can be varied. This difference largely depends upon the dependent variables, 
that is, the ability of each of these actors to gain control over political information, and 
the independent variables, such as elements of political culture and the effects of media 
globalization on those societies.
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Implicitly, political information contests are essential for a democratic society, 
where the public are expected to participate in politics. Without contestation from the 
reliable and objective media and the public, politically diverse information necessary for 
the public to exercise their political choices will not be made available. Although 
political information contests do not in themselves guarantee a healthy democracy with 
the politically active media, their existence in the societies represents an important step 
in that direction.
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Appendix 1: Decision - Making Process on Licensing Television and Radio 
Broadcasting Channel in Thailand (until the implementation of Article 40)
Station
Public Office
NBEB/NBC NRFMB
OSPM
T~
Economic
Ministries
~T
Cabinet’s
Meeting
Public
- Budget 
Bureau
- National 
Security 
Council
- NESDB
- Other Agencies
Before Approval
--------- >  After Approval
NBEB: National Broadcasting Executive Board
NBC: National Broadcasting Commission
NRFMB: National Radio Frequency Management Board 
OSPM: Office of the Secretary to the Prime Minister
NESDB: National Economic and Social Development Board
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Appendix 2: NHK’s Receiving Fees (as of 1998)
Type of 
Receiver
Method of Payment Amount (Yen) 6 Months in 
Advance
12 Months 
in Advance
NHK1&NHK2
Collecting from 
Home
Electronic Transfer
1,395
1,345
7,950
7,650
15,490
14,910
Color TV
B&W TV Collecting from 
Home
Electronic Transfer
905
855
5,190
4,890
10,130
9,550
Satellite 
Channels 
Color TV Collecting from 
Home
Electronic Transfer
2,340
2,290
13,390
13,090
26,100
25,520
B&W TV Collecting from 
Home
Electronic Transfer
1,850
1,800
10,630
10,330
20,740
20,160
Source: Nippon Hösö Kyokai Ron, NHK Nenkan ’98 fNHK Radio & Television Yearbook
’98) (Tokyo: Nippon Hösö Kyokai, 1998), p. 85.
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Appendix 3: Major Controls over NHK by the Diet and the Government
Organization and Controls
Item MPT Cabinet Diet
Finance
Minister Board o f Audit Relevant provisions
Personnel
affairs
Members of the 
loard o f Governors
Appointment and 
dismissal by Prime 
Minister
With the consent of 
>oth Houses
Art. 16, 19, 20 o f the Broadcast Act
establishment of 
broadcasting stations
ricense
ireliminary
icense*
Art. 4, 8, 12 o f the Radio Act
Supervision of 
-roadcasting stations
Supervision 
Revocation o f 
icense)*
Chapter 6 of the Radio Act
Broadcasting
facilities
Abolition, and 
suspension o f  
operation, o f  
broadcasting 
stations
Approval* or 
notification
A rt 43 o f the Broadcast Act
Transfer of
broadcasting
facilities
Approval*
With the consent of 
both Houses Art. 47 o f the Broadcast Act
Budget o f revenues 
and expenditures 
Business program
Funds program
Comments — _ >  V i a ---------- —> Approval Art. 37 o f the Broadcast Act
Financial
affairs
Provisionary budget 
(limited to three 
months)
Approval*----- — - >  Report Art. 37-2 of the Broadcast Act
Issue of bonds
(V ia)-------------- —
Art. 42 o f the Broadcast Act
Art. 13 o f the Enforcement Regulations
of the Broadcast Act
Inventory Financial 
statements 
(accompanied by 
written explanation)
} Presentation - -> Presentation - -> Presentation Audit Art. 40 o f the Broadcast Act
Accounts Audit Art. 41 o f the Broadcast Act
Receiver's fee
Monthly receiver's 
fee
Determined by the 
approval of the 
budget o f revenues 
and expenditures
Art. 37-4 of the Broadcast Act
Provisions of 
receiving contract
Approval* Art. 32-3 of the Broadcast Act
Standard for 
exemption from 
receiver's fee
Approval* A rt 32-2 of the Broadcast Act
Business
Repair of receiving 
equipments
Designation of 
service station Art. 9-7 o f the Broadcast Act
Business necessary 
especially for 
advancement of 
broadcasting and its 
reception, except the 
ones listed in the 
Broadcast Act
Approval* Art. 9-2 o f  the Broadcast Act
Overseas
broadcasting Order*
State pays 
expenses needed 
for transmissions
Art. 33 and 35-2 of the Broadcast Act
Study on 
broadcasting Order*
conducted by order 
(within the budget) Art. 34 and 3 5-2 o f the Broadcast Act
Modification of 
articles of 
incorporation
Approval* Art. 11 -2 of the Broadcast Act
Business report
Comments
_ >  V ia --------- - >  Report
Art. 38 o f the Broadcast Act
Presentation of data
Request for 
presentation o f 
data
Art. 49-2 of the Broadcast Act 
Art. 4 of the Enforcement Regulations 
o f the Broadcast Act
Asterisk shows the items which the Minister of MPT must refer to the Radio Regulatory Couocil and respect its resolution when the Minister expects to deal with
such items or to attach his comments thereon, unless the Council considers it unnecessary to do so. (Art. 48 of the Broadcast Act, Art. 99-11 o f the Radio Act.)
Source: Adapted from Nakajima Iwao, "The Broadcasting Industry in Japan:
Its Historical, Legal, and Economic, Aspects", in H. Eguchi and H. Ichinohe(eds.),
International Studies of Broadcasting (Tokyo: NHK Radio & TV. Cultural Research Institute, 1971), p. 43.
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Appendix 7: News Flow within Asahi Newspaper
Editor-in-Chief
I
Editorial Board
Other Publishing 
Centres
Radio &
Broadcasting Centres
Telegraphic Section
Communications &
Coordination
Centres
News Sources
Press Clubs 
Overseas Section 
News Agencies 
Air Bureau 
Material Section
News Sections *
Political
Economics
Foreign
Social
Sports
Cultural
Women
Science
Feature news
City
Regional
Photo
ProofreadingLayout Printing
* Each news section has one cheif editor (pßüc) , four or five sub-editors or the so-
called desuku, and a group of reporters. Only Asahi’s office in Tokyo has a political section. There 
are approximately fifty reporters there.
Appendix 8
List of Selected Editions of Newspapers
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Editions of Selected Thai Newspapers (Matichon and Thai Rath)
Months (November 1996 - October 1997) Editions (Morning issues)
November November 3 - 9 ,  1996
December December 8 -14 ,  1996
January January 19 -25,  1997
February February 23 - March 1, 1997
March March 2 - 8 ,  1997
April April 13 -29,  1997
M ay May 18 -24,  1997
June June 22 -28,  1997
July July 6 -  12, 1997
August August 10 - 16, 1997
September September 21 - 27, 1997
October October 26 - November 1, 1997
Editions of Selected Japanese Newspapers (Asahi and Yomiuri)
Months (April 1993 - March 1994) Editions (Morning issues)
April April 4 -  10, 1993
M ay May 9 - 15, 1993
June June 20- 26, 1993
July July 25 - 31, 1993
August August 1 - 7 ,  1993
September September 12 - 18, 1993
October October 17 -23,  1993
November November 21 -27,  1993
December December 5 - 11 ,  1993
January January 9 - 1 5 ,  1994
February February 20 - 26, 1994
March March 27 - April 2, 1994
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Appendix 9: Coding Sheet for Articles on Political Reform
No.
1) Article comes from which paper?______________________________________
2) Publication Date_____________________________________________________
3) Article Page Number________________________________________________
4) Size of the article
a) very brief (0-1/8 page)
b) brief (1/8 - 1/4 page)
c) medium (1/4-1/2 page)
d) long (1/2-1 page)
e) very long (more than one page)
5) Type of the article
a) news report b) commentary
6) Does article include picture?
a) No go to 7 b)Yes
7) Who/ What is in the picture?
a) politician b) bureaucrat
c) NGO member d) academics or public intellectuals
e) legislation or constitution f) charts or graphs
g) public h) voting boot
8) Is there a direct quote within the article from government official?
a) No (go to 9) b)Yes
9) Is the name of the official cited?
a) No b)Yes
10) What is the topic of headline about?
a) Issue in the reform
b) Key decision-maker in the reform
c) Opposition in the reform
d) Timing of the reform
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11) Is the reform about?
a) election reform
b) anti-corruption measures
c) administrative reform
d) judicial reform/legal reform
e) educational reform
f) human rights reform
g) constitutional reform
12) What is the agenda of the article?
a) pro-refonn
b) anti-reform
c) neutral
13) Is there a reaction from the opposition in the article?
a) No b)Yes
14) What issue is given priority in the article?
a) getting t the right direction to reform (stimulating debate on the issue)
b) expediting the legislation process
c) blaming officials or systems that obstruct the process
15) Is the by-line attached?
a) Yes (go to 14) b) No (ends here)
16) Name of Reporter_________________________________________________
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Appendix 10: Coding Sheet for Newspaper Headlines
No.
Coding Sheet
1) Headline comes from which paper?
2) Publication Date_______________
3) What is the headline
4) Who is the main actor in the Headline?
a) Prime Minister
b) His close cabinet members
c) The Opposition
d) The Public
5) The general topic of the headline
a) Prime Minister's failure in administration
b) Prime Minister's personality/activity
c) Party/Coalition disarray
d) Opposition to the Prime Minister
e) Opposition to the coalition party
f) Support the prime Minister
6) Name of Reporter__________________________
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Appendix 11
Headlines of Selected Political Articles Published in Naew Na, Matichon, and 
Thai Rath during October 1- 31,1997
Naew Na
Date Headlines Translation
O ct.l H 5 3 R i h u R m a : : Jiw 's party  splited.
O ct.2 i v u r u ü a ü c f i n ü Sanoh protected Sukhavich.
Oct.3 s b l l H ö d l a r ö Jiw 's afraid to get rid o f his close 
aids (The four "despicable" are 
Sanoh Thienthong, Sukhavich 
Rangsipol, Pol. Capt. C halerm  
Yubamroong and Samak 
Soonthom veth, all o f  w hich except 
Sukhavich are in charge o f the 
M inistry  o f  Interior).
O ct.4 a Q H ä n ä u l u f a  a . s . u . Jiw  turned his tounge not to 
reshuffule the cabinet.
Oct.5 W53RUlUnOUü3ü
w
U ncle's party  (C hatchai's Party) 
threatens to w ithdraw .
O ct.6 ä 3 i m n f n t h m n Jiw  lied repeatedly.
O ct.7 i l ' u \ J 5 u m u i u n Prem  comes back.
Oct. 8 ä a n a a a i a a n Jiw  m ust resign.
O ct.9 n u . a u ö a a i o a n A rm y C h ief expects Jiw  to resign.
Oct. 10 u u ü u n m j i h M ong will m eet Prem.
Oct. 11 a a o d  5 .5 .u .ö ü lH fy  
i h r ü n l a l u u a a i a o n
lÜURüS^U'iaUHüD'lR
G rand celebration for the N ew  
C onstitu tion,
Jiw  disclosed 'not resign', and 
ignored to dem and for a national 
government.
O c t.12 a m s f l d ü a i a a n ,  
l u n a a d 5 u ^ ü  s s u . a u u  
I m i  u a i h i s a u a j n n  
i J i a l u u i R
A m aret early resigned, H is M ajesty 
the K ing told the new  Constitution 
is a success o f  all sectors in the 
nation.
Oct. 13 H ä n i n u n ü 3 R
im nai iJuH3dtJ3u i i4ao
u u r ä 3 i a a a u a ü R 3 u
Change gam e to restore the nation, 
D octor suggested Jiw  to have his 
brain checked.
Oct. 14 u n & 5 n a 5 u u u ä 3 /
§ 3 a 3 a u 3 u ^ i i 6 n a a n
t i w m i d ü ü S a u R u a u
Businessm en ganged up to expel 
Jiw , Jiw 's m ixed spending in vote­
buying and ganging up the poor can 
cost him  an im prisonm ent.
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O c t.15 D35RjnÜ HUUaiU
m ä R ln ä a o c n u & ja i  
anv«55a/ Pr h i j u u u q
HulünaisuüRdau
Jiw  extorted 40,000 million, 
he (Chavalit) farew elled his party 
m em bers, as he’s approaching his 
end/ D isappointed by the dull 
econom ic recovery plan, Jiw  fled 
from  his responsibilty.
O ct 16 5Uflicfumnn5ä3  
da n u m j i h  n au u a iiJ an
A ll condem ned Jiw  - the m urderer/ 
Jiw  w ent to see Pa (Prem ) but 
returned w ith bare hands.
Oct. 17 a n ä a la ä a  unßsnaUa  
 ̂a u ü u uuIh qj a un 5̂ u 
m aaunaaauiin iuau  
3uaofn5
Flared up to D rive Jiw, 
Businessm en close Si-Lom for a big 
dem onstration this M onday, then 
m ove to the PM 's O ffice on 
T uesday.
Oct. 18 33naaaa53R3U3wu/
MW55naü3U5Unü3RM3
n5053uwaüulaä3
Jiw  reduced the petrol price. The 
business arm y called for restoring 
the nation by gathering to oust Jiw.
O c t.19 a35wanawananlaH3  
^ 3 /u im ä ü a u n a u a 3 ü  
333Ü5U R5U.ROJ13Ü
V arious groups w ere eager to drive 
Jiw  out/ C hatichai threatened to 
quit, unless Jiw 's cabinet reshuffle 
excels.
O ct.20 ^3Hunuuuäuaan1ü -
a33MlMUUU3MU3
(Bold l e t t e r s )
Jiw , a w astrel, G et out! - N aew  
Na's V iew.
O ct.21 lci33n5~HUt13UUUfiU 
» n n m ö in s o ,  aum)  
uauaauum ii iuau ,  
n55Ufl553UHUUa 
33^JR1333UJa3R
HuiuaauriiiutJURiu
uaulaun
People all over the nation roared to 
drive Jiw out. They ganged up to 
protest on Silom  St. and w ent to 
the PM 's office, w ith support from  
labour unions.
Jiw  ordered the police to fence his 
office w ith barbed w ire to counter 
the protesters' possible intrusion.
O ct.22 TJaaau5üT35lää3aa  
i a a /  SasfnvnjaiR  
NRIUinrlHRNU5j
i n a /  a a a a n su m j
uwn&vnuiTJuftnauaj
l aau
Blockade around Jiw 's headquarter 
w as prolonged,
Jiw  disow ned Chatpattana, fending 
them  o ff the governm ent/ A  call for 
C havalit to see doctor in fear o f 
A lziem er's disease.
O ct.23 önw annüiä ,  
ä a n a j a a n ,  f h i n n  
waüMMiöu/ untnä  
m in n r iV m u  nau  
ä iöün aun a
Protestors, staying on firm  ground 
to restore the nation, stated their 
ultim atum  - Jiw  m ust go! / 
C hatichai w as startled by the 
breaking off, w ithdrew  
fast.
Oct. 24 53ula i i i ) jR i lad3  n a j
u u u ih a iu u iu ih r m f l
1na1uam5fnHUua
People protested by w earing black 
to drive Jiw  out, People's pow er 
united to oust their leader cam e 
across national boundaries w ith 
supports from  Thai residents in the 
US.
O ct. 25 s ^ i n a i b a a n a i a
H551Ö
J iw  a d m in is tra tio n  sh o w e d  s ig n s  o f  
tre a c h e ry .
O c t. 26 dwu. a a a a w ä a l u a m C h a tp a tta n a  p re p a re d  to  o u s t J iw  in  
th e  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  se ss io n .
O c t. 27 a in lä m a ü iö ä a s 'a a E x p o se : "W eng' e m b ra ce d  'J iw '
O c t. 28 R U 33U 1»n iaU R :  
lu a u u u a  
u a R d i u u t n n  
In a  f t m o a s a . in r r i
A  p la n  to  s e iz e  th e  M in is try  o f  
In te r io r  as a  b a tt le  g ro u n d  to  
r e s u s c ita te  th e  v ic io u s  c y c le  o f  J iw 's  
in d e s tru c tib le  p re m ie rs h ip .
O c t. 29 a n n 5 5 f)a a u u D 3
u n3u i ti~H a a /  U3 ä r 5ii
i h d i a w j / i h i n R t f d
dsrsiuniJsnui
m s u d n a
'K a e w ' le d  J iw 's  p a r ty  m e m b e rs  to 
o u s t h im / C h a v a lit  a d m itte d  h e  h a d  
ru in e d  th e  n a tio n /  C h a tic h a i le f t h is  
p o s t as c h ie f  o f  e c o n o m ic  a d v iso rs .
O c t. 30 n a o a u  c  w .a . w u i h S d 'K w a n g ' d e c la re d  h e  w o u ld  o u s t J iw  
o n  N o v . 5.
O c t. 31 n a d ifu r iin a u a 'ia a u  
a a u i b  i n a u m a m  
m a m J in a r m r id
"K w an g "  w a s  c ru sh e d , a n d  
s u c c u m b e d  to  J iw , C h a tic h a i w a s  
d ism a y e d  a t th e  P r im e  M in is te r 's  
re p r im a n d  o f  h is  c o m m e n ts .
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Headlines on Matichon Newspaper during October 1- 31,1997
Matichon Daily
Date Headlines Translation
O ct 1 f n u . u n n  a a i u l n l a  
i n t e n d »  n b u i h r i i a d  
Tvujan o u a u u a i r i n a
5 u n .
N ew  A spiration  Party splits, 
"South-Isan" faction drove K ietchai 
out, this rebellous faction urged for 
m inisterial positions.
O ct 2 ä d ö i  ö ü i ^ a v n a  a i d s a  
n a u a i n t y i l u  s b a a i J s u  
R3U. u n m a u i f l s u a n a  
HJ
Chatichai reminded: "the m ore we 
wait, the m ore disastrous the 
econom y will becom e", but Jiw  
argued the cabinet reshuffle should 
happen after his return from  Japan.
O ct 3 i a w i r _ a u 3 d _ i a a u _  
a u a 5  c i a a a a  ödlU r Tu
iJsU fi5U. fl30_fU5üff 
tttJLRd
Jiw disclosed his plan o f cabinet 
reshuffle. Sanoh, Sukhavich, 
Chalerm and Sam ak will stay. 
Kwang (K ietchai Chainowarat), and 
Narongchai A kraseranee w ould be 
out.
Oct 4 u s r m f i a u u n n  i d a i h ä  
l ä r u n u l n i a a  t a u i r  
a a u n u  ü n a a l w i J s u
R5M.
Sanoh guaranteed that there w ould 
be no cabinet reshuffle - a stark 
contrast to w hat Jiw  said.
O ct 5 " d s - m f l l n a  l u r n u a  
a o "  qtf r . h . i u d d r m  
m d 5 a n m a a u a a m u f i
"Thailand is in Jiw 's w him s", Oct 15 
is the judgem ent day. There 're only 
few w ays out.
O ct 6 33arlR3rlR5lrvf_iaU3r
u n a a j a a  ä u u a m u  %
3314 lU3U3UHV*35rRUma
Ü 5 r m a
A Chinese astrologer has been busy 
visiting Thai leaders' houses, 
exorcising Jiw 's evil spirit, and 
changing "feng chui" at Sanoh's 
house.
O ct 7 5rH U nU R M 3lf ia_ l l t td  
n r t n  n u l u a / n  ih iT Ja a  
l a i u a j l a m a  d g i n a  
Livid d l  R
Gather all the goodies in Thailand - 
not the 393 individuals in the 
parliam ents. Prem  opened his house 
to clarify his idea o f the 'national 
government'.
Oct 8 ä 3 ü lU 5 U iJ l  Ü5U 511.
livid d l  R
Jiw agreed w ith  Prem  to gear for the 
national government.
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O ct 9 " l a in r "  ai£>53ina 
UHütnÄ a u l v u h u m a j  
r lÜMDJinio
"Sanoh" adopted the idea o f  national 
governm ent, saying he is ready to 
leave for the sake o f the nation.
O ct 10 aa5 .  Hwu " i h u h u a R  
sn  u a i n a n s  
3 i n  a im a 
diw
The constitutional drafters gave a 
full support for G eneral Prem  in 
becom ing a PM  o f the national 
government.
O ct 11 d a a u lu R R a a n  l u m a  
r b  u u .a a .  s s u . I h u
•m
i i 5 r m R l d u a a  5 u r . h u  
u ä R o n s V i a ' ä u r i
The Suprem e A rm y C om m ander 
confirm ed Jiw  has never m entioned 
that he w ould resign/ the new  
constitution has been enacted/ 
M inisters avoided declaring their 
assets.
O ct 12 u u R f m j  a n i u n i 5 ( u  
ÖU33 iR u a j in n a  
u u u a i M a
Crisis forced Jiw  to ungracefully 
quit.
O ct 13 c)d UlBUUORWUUD'l
& ün. /5U 3UimajndiR
qd  R.R.5drRin55U
15 bank officials m et the governor o f 
the Reserve Bank o f  Thailand/ 
C hanged the day to 14th o f  Oct. to 
announce the plan to revive the 
country .
Oct 14 B0URün5 RUlR5^na 
M D m 5 R l U R R R B 0 l a Q 3  
RUnn cja FI55R ÜÜ5Ü 
5 u . u v i a d i R
Jiw  appointed "Korn" to oversee 
the econom y. The Thai Council of 
C om m erce planned to protest by 
carrying the flag. A ll ten parties are 
eager to set a new  national 
government.
O ct 15 samuTviR i h u u u u  
ä R 5 a r in n
H eavy tax charged. Oil price was 
increased by one baht per litre.
Oct 16 t m i n u R i a u i i i  ww 
ivJaw'j i a o %  v h u u a j  
u u I u h b r  s ^ o u n s r n u  
u a a
People w ill be surely dead. Inflation 
rose by 20% . O il price kept rising, 
yet the governm ent said their action 
w ould create m inor recovery.
O ct 17 a i ü  qcjSUR.dlRHRIUl 
53U5U. l i iu Ju au  w i a j  
URfiHn a a ä a d i u  R5U.
Chatichai claimed eleven m inisters 
from  his party  w ere unhappy w hen 
joining this governm ent, and 
dem anded Jiw  to reshuffle the 
cabinet.
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O ct 18 i h t i i a i n  Ü R i ä n u u  
m u u i M U  n a n f i r n i h
n a ü  OTUtJUtJU 3UU3R 
1W05RUIR3R53U
Jiw  - "the com edian", ceased to 
increase oil taxes.
The real com edians w ould laugh at 
this great joke - com m enced by 
yesterday and cancelled by today. 
Perhaps Jiw  has ju s t learnt that 
people are suffering.
O ct 19 u u u l u r i a n  l U R t i u n n  
b W55RR*3U/
u i b u r i u i r  ä a l u i J f u  
n a u R 3
Thanong's resignation from 
Treasurer allowed the six coalition 
parties to talk tonight. Chatchai gave 
Jiw  his ultim atum . I f  Jiw  doesn't 
reshuffle the cabinet, he and his 
party w ill resign.
O ct 20 f a  s u R . f f j  a a  i n h a  
l u ' Ü l ü a u l u  UR tl W55R  
lJ5U R 5 U . 1 h 3 m BU1R
The six coalition party agreed to 
reshuffle 48 cabinet positions w ith 
no conditions. They w ould agree to 
w hatever Jiw  and Chatchai consider 
best.
O ct 21 u a u B R a a u l a ä i
ä a ä a u r n i u B u
D em onstrators sieged Silom  Rd. to 
drive Jiw  out, they then m oved to 
the PM 's office.
O ct 22 1431 m i i i i i u B u l a ’ä3  
^ülR5BUW5aU C]00% 
R 3 U .u a  Ü5ra JH_UUty 
iJ a r m  a u l a  m a n
Jiw  is afraid that the dem onstrators 
w ill bum  the PM 's office to drive 
him  out, so he ordered all the 
national security agents to be on 
alert. The N ew  A spiration Party 
revealed that Prasong Soonsiri and 
M anoon R oopkhachom  are the key 
actors who incited this 
dem onstration.
O ct 23 n 5 5 u n 5 a R u i 3  uaR  
a m  u m a u R 3
Labourers com m enced their hunger 
strike am idst the claim  o f  pretense. 
Chatchai resigned from the cabinet.
O ct 24 Tu ö r  u a  m u a  u a n  
U J R a j_ B R a U B R  la 
i n i a  R s u . l u u l u i a j  
a B J Ü f u i a n i  b b ü b b
K osit Punpiem rath m ade three 
requests for not residing as a 
M inister o f  Finance. U CO M  
captured two seats. The cabinet 
reshuffle has been so m inim al that 
all the "despicable" m inisters are 
kept in positions.
Oct. 25 " m ü  E n a m i n "  " m h o  
□ d a"  i ^ r f T i o a u l n n
"03 t i "  ölrilOÖM5U
t f l M u m u m a u
"Kwang's death w ish", D octor 
W ichai gained because o f his 
frequent debates, "Jiw  4" retained a 
lot o f 'o ld  despicable' m inisters, 
whilst adding m ore o f  new 
despicable ones.
Oct. 26 M3o1h u {J3U u a i a r  (HO 
i a a n  a i a i a a  ö 3 R 5 u . 
n f ln .  15a n u .  a n
Crisis in N ew  A spiration Party, 
Conflicts betw een fam ilies and 
clientels. N ew  cabinet claims to 
focus econom ic recovery and 
passage o f organic laws.
Oct. 27 l a u i r a w d i  u  n .  r in d s -  
i n u l r i n o i n u  n u . a n a o  
l u i a l a  ü n ü a i ä a n n o  
u a  3
Sanoh smiled as his governing 
m inistry finished drafting an election 
m anual even prior to the drafting o f 
election law.
Oct. 28 T n l u a n u a l u  m a r i n i u i  
ü d M . n n n a u n 3  n n u .  
URU U 3 3  U 1)3*3 U W5fl.
Thai Fam ers' Party threatened the 
N ew  A spiration Party to vote down 
six economic legislatives.
Oct. 29 H j a m a n a n  Hu n o  
a h u  a u  w s n .  a n n o u n u  
i i irMU03 a i a w s s M
Breakdow n in the Parliam ent, 
Thirty m illion  baht w as spent to 
vote dow n econom ic legislations, 
Kwang leads to defeat and defect.
Oct. 30 "nno"  m a a a a ö 3
- J  .  w  ’
HUR3U3R a u  H 5 n .
"Kwang" w as angry, sent an 
ultim atum , "vote dow n legislations".
Oct. 31 i m t i a " a n i a 3 ö a _ i i J 5 u  
a n a  i a n d d u n .  
" n n o ' n a a n s R  l a a ä n ä  
a u  U5UM5U.  u o a i n u a
The M edical A sscociation asserted 
W ichai and Prem sak should stop 
using "M D". "Kwang" w as defeated 
as Jiw fought back, arguing frequent 
cabinet reshuffle w ill only m ake 
things worse.
Headline on Thai Rath during Oct. 1-31, 1997
Thai Rath
Date Headlines Translation
Oct. 1 ü n a a n  a n ö 3  ö n i h  
c f au  i h a i n u
Gen. A ud congratulated Gen. Jiw  on 
defeating the Opposition.
Oct. 2 Ü5U n s u .  itou ifnan  
fra " 143" n u  " lMU3r"
Difficulties in reshuffling the 
cabinet,
Conflicts betw een Sanoh and 
Chatichai.
Oct. 3 0)50 ROB 030 16)033 
ü a n ä 3  15oil5i) n su .
Narongchai and Kietichai are sured 
to dump Jiw  and quickly reshuffle 
the cabinet
Oct. 4 R 3 5 i a 3 l M 5 a a n W ho should be dum ped?
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O ct. 5 a o n i n a r i h  la i t fa  a j  
□au
J iw , p le a se  le a v e , th e  e n tre p re n e u rs  
begged.
O c t. 6 a a n n a u  q n i  itavn 
l ä m v h  f lau , n n n u ia ü
A u g . 1 7 th  G ro u p  A tta c k e d , 
C o n f lic ts  in  N e w  A s p ira t io n  P a rty
O c t. 7 Ru u u .  ü u m " i n a "  
n a a l R u a a
P u b lic  s e v a n ts  a t th e  M in is try  o f  
In te r io r  s a id  th e ir  b o s s  s h o u ld  leav e .
O c t. 8 UEJUUUUIJSU R5U. 
R a i iu u a a ia a n R ü  waa 
l u ü n a u u a a n
A  p la n  to  re s h u f f le  th e  c a b in e t  
d is c lo se d , N e w  A s p ira t io n  P a r ty  
su g g ests  i t 'l l  b e  b ack .
O c t. 9 "luRaoiJsu" "N o  re sh u ffle "
O c t. 10 ä a ia a a a c y ü u lR a a u
u a u a i u
J iw  n e g o tia te d  Ja p a n 's  a id s  fo r  30 0  
m illio n  b a h t.
O c t. 11 l ü i a a  "§□" N o  m o re  "J iw "
O c t. 12 i J f u l M f y l ä ö B ig  re sh u ff le  to  d u m p  a ll th e  
"d esp ic ab le "  m in is te rs .
O c t. 13 äaiJsröURau 5 a  c j c  
R . R . I u I r
J iw  c a lled  a n  u rg e n t m ee tin g , as he 
c o u ld  n o t  w a it  u n til  O c t. 15.
O c t. 14 ä a a a n a n i R a a  ü o ü .  
naardau
D e m o c ra t P a r ty  w ill  o n ly  jo in  th e  
co a litio n , i f  J iw  leav es .
O c t. 15 äofld  R ü 5 3 in a i ln
13ÜÖ
litaü
J iw  b o a s te d  to  e s ta b lish  a s tro n g  
c a b in e t w ith  2 6 8  sea ts .
O c t. 16 S o i u i i r n u h  u a a u a  
aauifa
J iw  saw  P re m  in  fea r  o f  C h a tic h a i 's  
ch an g e  o f  m ind .
O c t. 17 "(URRa&55uuaü5a
uaa"
A t th e  g o v e rn m e n t's  m e rc y
O c t. 18 f ia R ä a a u R 5 a n a R u a  
h u  l u a R 5 a / n u i R u
A t la s t, J iw  h a d  to  re d u c e  p e tro l 
p rice  b y  u s in g  fo rm e r e x ile  ra te .
O c t. 19 a R t i u a u l u a a a a n  ua
U U H U V i U
M in is try  o f  F in a n c e  re s ig n e d  d u e  to  
d isc o n te n tm e n t o v e r  o il ex ile .
O c t. 2 0 " aa "RuiaanaRuaaTar  
R5U. tfÖ5
a u u R s a a a a n
"Jiw " g a s p e d  fo r  h is  la s t  b re a th  b y  
re sh u fflin g  th e  cab in e t.
O c t. 21 " R a u a a n a n m a a 1 
Sau
l a ä a  u u u u l u f y a u u
"Jiw  m u st g o " . A  b ig  d e m o  m ee ts  
to d a y  to  d r iv e  h im  ou t.
O c t. 22 äaiR5URaRRJ
ö a u l u t i a i u a u
J iw  s tre s se d  o u t, fe n c e d  u p  in  th e  
P rim e  M in is te r 's  O ff ic e
O ct. 23 " u a u la a a  a iu l iJ n o
RlüaüRaR Ü5UR5U.  
dran "uaaaR" naucfa
D e m o s tra tio n s  to  d r iv e  "J iw "  o u t 
sp re a d e d  to  ru ra l  p ro v in c e s . 
R e sh u ffle  h a lte d  as C h a tc h a i left.
O c t. 24 "Tu O r '' 5Ua.Rcfü 
UUR5
n au  a a j u a m s i u a ü
"K osit"  b e c a m e  n e w  F in a n c e  
M in is te r , w h ils t  " M o n tr i"  le f t  
p o lit ic s .
O c t. 25 RaaR iiaa  öa ü  
diluJa5"aaüLHüu
L a u n c h  o f  th e  fo u rth  c a b in e t u n d e r  
J iw , s till fu ll o f  d e sp ic a b le  m in is te rs .
O ct. 26 m R U R R U l R f l L a y  a ll b e ts .
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Oct. 27 " i b u  anwn
5UR. l inüäaiUR 53U
C onflicts in the N ew  A spiration 
Party, led by Isan  ex-M Ps.
Oct. 28 " ö n m in r "  r m a  wn 
mäURRWU fl5UR5.
"Sanoh" cut lose Chalerm  from the 
Police D epartm ent.
Oct. 29 ö n ö 3  d a u u u n  i n  u i r  
a i a a n
G eneral Jiw  faced crisis as U ncle 
Chatichai left.
Oct. 30 "naa" a i a r a i R  ü a i a u  
m a  a  v i .a. aaiaaia
"Kwang" w ent on ram page, 
threatening Jiw  by draw ing a 
deadline by N ov. 5.
Oct. 31 T flu m W aW u tn iaw in  
"naü"nflffuäa i iaanu
n  W.a .  1114
"Kwang" was accused o f having 
drug-related charges, thus 
succum bed to Jiw. U ncle Chatichai 
confirm ed to leave by Nov. 3.
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Appendix 12
Headlines of Selected Political Articles Published in Yomiuri, Mainichi, and A sahi 
from June 12 to July 14 1998
Yomiuri
Date Headlines Translation
Ju n e  12 gE6 T h e  D e m o c ra tic , L ib e ra l, a n d  J a p a n ’s 
C o m m u n is t  P a r tie s  w ill  s u b m it th e  
n o n -c o n f id e n c e  m o tio n  to d ay .
Ju n e  13 T h e  c a b in e t ’s n o n -c o n f id e n c e  m o tio n  
w a s  v o te d  d o w n .
Ju n e  14 6ÖIC
at.*
P M  H a sh im o to  h a s  b e e n  se rv in g  8 8 6  
d a y s  as a  p re m ie r , b y  fa r  r a n k in g  a t th e  
s ix th  p la c e  a m o n g  p re v io u s  p r im e  
m in is te rs . T h e  P M  w a s  a lso  c o m p a re d  
w ith  th e  fo rm e r  P M  T a n a k a .
Ju n e  15 N /A N /A
Ju n e  16
Ü M lSA 'fo
A  p le d g e  to  m a n a g e  b a d  lo a n s  an d  
fu r th e r  in je c tio n  o f  p u b lic  fu n d s.
Ju n e  17
* *
Y o m iu r i ’s s u rv e y  sh o w s  le s s  th an  
th ir ty  p e r  c e n t s u p p o rt fo r  th e  c a b in e t. 
T h e  p u b lic  a re  in te n s e ly  d is s a t is f ie d  
w ith  th e  s lu g g ish  e c o n o m y .
Ju n e  18 r® j P M  -  Y o u  h a v e  to  sh o w  th e  ‘f a c e ’ o f  
th e  p la n  to  m a n a g e  b a d  lo an s .
Ju n e  19 r̂ aausj fit'fiii. rs 
g
B a d  L o a n  -  to u g h  h o m e w o rk  ( fo r  th e  
g o v e rn m e n t) , A  d ra s tic  p o lic y  to  sh o re  
up  th e  y en .
Ju n e  20 rts/tA-j sitmigfi 
ttälCÄttSg
T h e  ‘R e c e iv in g  B a n k ’ P la n  b e c a m e  
a b o rtiv e . A  c o n c re te  p o lic y  w ill b e  
a n n o u n c e d  a t th e  b e g in n in g  o f  n e x t 
m o n th .
Ju n e  21 T h e  s ta b ili ty  w ith in  th e  p a r ty  is 
im p o r ta n t  fo r  re a c h in g  so lu tio n s  to  
m a n a g e  b a d  lo an s .
Ju n e  22 “ C o m m e n ts  a re  n o  u s e .” D o e s  
H a sh im o to  h a te  in te lle c tu a ls?
Ju n e  23
i 3 H F 1 £ £ S * g f i £ W l c
P M  sh o u ld  h u r ry  in  se ttin g  u p  an  
e c o n o m ic  a d v is o ry  b o d y , a n d  a p p o in t  
e c o n o m ic  e x p e rts  a s  h is  a d v iso rs .
Ju n e  24 T h e  p o lic y  m e a s u re  w a s  s im p lif ie d  b y  
th e  c a b in e t. Im p o r ta n t  c a b in e t  p o s ts  
s h o u ld  n o t  b e  c h a n g e d  h a lfw a y  
th ro u g h .
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Ju n e  25 P o lic y  m e a s u re  is a  p o lit ic a l  
re sp o n s ib ility . T h e  b u re a u c ra ts  sh o u ld  
p re s e n t  a  lo t o f  c h o ic e s .
Ju n e  26 S h o u ld  p re s e n t  a ttra c t iv e  p o lic ie s  to  
th e  p e o p le .
Ju n e  27 $ g » sg . s m s * .» « .  m 
ÖJUg*.
(T h e  g o v e rn m e n t)  s h o u ld  in tro d u c e  
s ig n if ic a n t p o lic y  m e a s u re s , in d u c e  
fa c tio n a l c o o p e ra tio n , fix  o n  n a tio n a l  
in te re s ts , a n d  a v o id  p o lit ic a l  c o n flic ts .
Ju n e  28
n a j  p̂ < ä'
W h a t’s g o in g  o n  w ith  th e  H a s h im o to ’s 
a d m in is tra tio n ?  Is it ta n g le d  u p  w ith  
p o lit ic a l  s tra te g y , o r  is  th e re  a  c h a n g e  
o f  w in d ?
Ju n e  29 nm
e. r® j ^Ä K S 9 jT ?
A  w a r  o f  w o rd s  o v e r  re s o lv in g  b a d  
lo an s . E a c h  p a r ty  le a d e r  w a s  
c a m p a ig n in g  a t d o w n to w n  T o k y o .
Ju n e  30 «iäTO Dm 'Ätt^ÄJ:
iists^mssr^e»
S to p  c a n v a s s in g  v o te s  b y  m a k in g  a  
sw e e t p u b lic  p le d g e . T h e  p u b lic  s h o u ld  
v o ic e  th e ir  o p in io n  a t th e  e le c tio n .
J u ly  1 sitoanmiMEs as L e a d e r  o f  th e  L D P  re je c te d  to  h a v e  a  
d e b a te  w ith  th e  le a d e r  f ro m  th e  
D e m o c ra tic  P a rty . K a n , the 
re p re s e n ta tiv e  o f  th e  D e m o c ra tic  P a r ty , 
s tro n g ly  c r i t ic is e d  th e  L D P .
J u ly  2 T h e  P M  w is h e d  fo r  a  p e rm a n e n t tax  
re d u c tio n .
Ju ly  3
fcA/KJtWWlc. g g rt& lN
A  d e c is io n  to  in tro d u c e  a  ‘b r id g e  
b a n k ’ w a s  m ad e . I t ’s q u ite  c le a r  to  
h a v e  a  ro c k y  s ta r t as  th e re  w a s  c o n c e rn  
fro m  w ith in  th e  L D P  a b o u t its  
a m b ig u o u s  d e fin itio n .
Ju ly  4 ®*§ r - a s i * -  kj w -s # k  
g & ä ä a * < D f^ ic
T h e  P M  p la y e d  ‘th e  tax  re d u c tio n  
c a rd ’. T h e  la s t lap  o f  th e  H o u s e  o f  
C o u n c i l lo rs ’ e le c tio n  c a m p a ig n  
s h o w e d  s ig n s  o f  th e  g re a te s t  c o n te s t .
Ju ly  5 H a s h im o to ’s d ip lo m a tic  ta c tic  w a s  a t a 
te s t  d u r in g  C lin to n ’s v is it.
Ju ly  6 n ^ Ä S tü ysöS M s mg 
Ä « » Ä « * * » 6 -» E »
A  w a r  o f  w o rd s  o v e r  th e  p e rm a n e n t  tax  
re d u c tio n  e sc a la te d . L e a d e rs  o f  th e  
O p p o s itio n  p a r t ie s  to g e th e r  r e a c te d  
s tro n g ly  a g a in s t  th e  P M .
Ju ly  7 S f t # H K I k l C « l * .  g S Ä T h e  O p p o s i t io n ’s jo in t  s tru g g le  
f le x ib ly  g ro p ed . T h e  L D P  re g im e  h a s  
la s t  to o  lo n g .
J u ly  8 m «  r n ^ ia e i j  w m ^ j a s  
■<>7 um t
T h e  P M  a n n o u n c e d  th e  p e n n a n e n t  tax  
re d u c tio n  sc h e m e  in  tu n e  w ith  th e  
m o n ito r in g  o f  in fla tio n .
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Ju ly  9 IW & SIj 64%, 
K ftlc*Ä fi«© 85%
T h e  v o tin g  tu rn o u t o f  64  %  is  c e rta in  
a t th e  H o u se  o f  C o u n c i l lo rs ’ e lec tio n . 
A s  h ig h  as 8 5 %  a re  n o t s a tis f ie d  w ith  
c u rre n t p o litic s .
Ju ly  10
Ä aSSgülc
T h e  P M  sp e n t a  w h o le  d a y  e x p la in in g  
a b o u t th e  p e rm a n e n t tax  re d u c tio n  
s c h e m e , a rg u in g  th a t  th e  p re s s  
c o n fu s e d  th e  w h o le  s itu a tio n .
Ju ly  11 g g .  3£&4ÄRiffi<07jSt. H o w  th e  L D P  m e a s u re s  o f  re d u c in g  
tax  fo r  4  tr i ll io n  y e n  w o u ld  a f fe c t th e  
p o ll  re su lts  re m a in  o p a q u e .
Ju ly  12 g g  W 7 - O J L D P  w ill  lo se  o r  w in  is u n c e rta in .
Ju ly  13 ggßSKSffiBW'v fäfötk  
KICK U N S »
L D P  to ta lly  d e fe a te d , th e  P M  re s ig n e d . 
S e v e re  ju d g m e n t  o n  th e  
m is m a n a g e m e n t o f  th e  e c o n o m y .
Ju ly  14 jEäCiSWäSW P M  H a sh im o to  fo rm a lly  d e c la re d  h is  
re s ig n a tio n .
Mainichi
Date H eadlines Translation
Ju n e  12 g ± ,  g ö .  Ä S  3 Ä ,
e s s a t t i
T h re e  p a r tie s  -  th e  D e m o c ra tic , the  
L ib e ra l, a n d  th e  J a p a n ’s C o m m u n is t  
P a r tie s  w ill su b m it th e  n o n -c o n f id e n c e  
m o tio n .
Ju n e  13 BftlcIMbMMfc. S ilC I i  
p w n tr  gÄ Ä fcw ftsA '
T h e  s itu a tio n  b e c a m e  m o re  c o n fu s in g  
fo r  th e  o p p o s itio n . Is th e  L D P  g o in g  to  
fo rm  a  s tra te g ic  a ll ia n c e  w ith  th e  
K o m e ito , b u t n o t th e  D e m o c ra tic  
P a r ty ?
Ju n e  14
WSttmURj R S 'V  g g K
E s ta b lis h in g  a  “ p u b lic  r e c e iv in g  b a n k ” 
b e c a m e  a g o v e rn m e n t m e a s u re  fo r 
f in a n c ia l  re s u s c ita tio n , a n d  a 
p ro te c tio n  o f  a  lo a n  b e tw e e n  th e  
g o v e rn m e n t a n d  b u s in e s s  e n te rp r is e s .
Ju n e  15 N /A N /A
Ju n e  16
g g ,  rts*pgi,j t*  
* kj
T h e  L D P  w o n d e rs  i f  it  w ill  ru le  b o th  
H o u se s  a g a in . H a sh im o to  is  h id in g  an d  
d o d g in g  a t c r i t ic is m  a g a in s t th e  
e c o n o m ic  m a la ise .
Ju n e  17 r j ia ic ^ ^ . g T h e  L ib e ra l P a r ty  p le d g e d  to  e x a m in e  
th e  fa ilu re  o f  th e  H a sh im o to  
a d m in is tra tio n , a n d  to e a rn  a v ic to ry  in  
th e  H o u se  o f  C o u n c i l lo rs ’ e le c tio n .
Ju n e  18 T h e  k e y  fac to rs  fo r  th e  su rv iv a l o f  the
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H ashim oto’s adm inistration are to 
handle a diplom atic challenge, and to 
hold on to pow er after the election for 
the H ouse o f  Councillors.
June 19 The PM  m ade up his m ind to go ahead 
w ith the perm anent tax reduction 
scheme.
June 20 mtb ic t
31. tJ-v-Xffil&f IcflnKR 
GAS
Kato told the D eputy Secretary o f  the 
State, Mr. Sum m ers, that a concrete 
policy for the receiving bank w ill be 
ready by early next month.
June 21 &SSt& rgij-mtgj ic&ia 
g ± S ®  liS H  t  W WrÄftÄ
The Long-Term  Credit Bank o f Japan 
w ill be restructured into a “R eceiving 
B ank” . Y et independent restructuring 
w ould be equally difficult to the 
judgm ent on investing public funds.
June 22 The H ashim oto adm inistration was 
under fire for its policy m isjudgm ents.
June 23 - K i f f .  g 
s .  RflKofiBTtiEBte. 
& » f t£ £ a « 8 i
The governm ent, particularly  the LDP, 
gave a full support to the Long-Term  
Credit Bank o f  Japan. The total 
am ount o f deposit and bond w ere 
confirm ed at the special m eeting.
June 24 * * * * « 1  UKD90007JAft 
ic. » jsa Ä Ä itn if . &m
The num ber o f eligible voters has 
increased to 90 m illion people. 
H ow ever, the voting turnout w ould  be 
dow n if  there is no political 
turnaround.
June 25 *8c£-C85JSlcSax. f t * * Prim e M inister H ashim oto w ishes to 
im prove the foundation o f the 
Japanese-R ussian relations by next 
autumn.
June 26 ffl^isfiijsato'5. »fff. g The governm ent and the LDP 
strengthened a plan to establish a 
national bank, the structure o f  w hich 
w ould take a form  o f  a subsidiary o f 
the N ational Reserve Bank.
June 27 gEtS*S*fl5*8ii& f f & t t Prim e M inister H ashim oto R yütaro 
m ade a policy announcem ent w ith no 
criticism  against the O pposition.
June 28 rtH fcü . ÄSÄA * .  ■ $ »
«><y a s « »
The tim e for cabinet reshuffle and 
change o f personnel w ithin the LDP 
has come.
June 29 Äiß^SflHS r^ßm icH U  
gK$**Ä<!:»I8£ 
SäSSftfbS& fciSA
Before incorporating the non­
perform ing loans into the Long-term  
Credit Bank o f Japan, purchasing 
m echanism  m ust be established. The 
Secretary o f  the LD P and H ead o f  the
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P o lic y  R e s e a rc h  C o m m itte e  h a v e  
a g re e d  o n  th e  in je c tio n  o f  fu n d s  to  
k e e p  th e  a c c o u n t b a la n c e .
Ju n e  30
0 6 1  ic jS S
A t th e  e a r ly  s ta g e  o f  th e  H o u s e  o f  
C o u n c i l lo rs ’ e le c tio n , s ix ty -o n e  L D P  
c a n d id a te s  a re  e x p e c te d  to  b e  r e ­
e le c te d .
Ju ly  1 S l t f t l N ! ? .  E K
tfi -CJEtBH
P M  H a s h im o to ’s P R  s ty le  d id  n o t 
w o rk , as th e  p u b lic  re s p o n d e d  w ith  
th e ir  t ru e  fee lin g s .
Ju ly  2 S f f i 0 H A Ä 8 4 § f 5 .  BüÖW 
J8 » * * Ä ä £ U
T h e  P M  p e rm a n e n t tax  re d u c tio n  
s c h e m e  w a s  g iv e n  a  go  a h e a d , th o u g h  
it  c a m e  r ig h t  o u t w ith  p o lit ic a l  
in te n tio n .
Ju ly  3
I C b Ü ?
D id  th e  P M  h a s ti ly  a n n o u n c e  th e  
e x p a n d e d  a m o r tis a tio n  p la n  o n ly  to 
c a tc h  th e  U S  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te ’s 
a tte n tio n ?
Ju ly  4 J t t t t r ä t t & M .  r £ < ä |
< J  S B U H R * * .? .  8 » «  
j E t * W
T h e  p la n  to  im p le m e n t p e rm a n e n t tax  
re d u c tio n  is  a  m a jo r  c o n c e rn . I f  it  is 
to o  g e n e ra l a n d  to o  l ittle , it w il l  n o t 
p ro m o te  c o n su m p tio n , a n d  th e  
c o rre c tio n  o f  tax  ra te  w ill b e c o m e  
d iff ic u lt.
Ju ly  5 s s s m j ä a * ,  mmmzb
E M M 0 K V 9 U
C h a n g e  in  th e  p a r ty  l in e -u p , a n d  th e  
e le c tio n  o f  th e  L D P  P re s id e n t  is 
e x p e c te d  a f te r  th e  e le c tio n . T h e  
n e g o tia tio n  a m o n g  th e  L D P  fa c tio n s  
w ill  h a p p e n  a ro u n d  a t th e  la s t s ta g e  o f  
th e  e le c tio n .
Ju ly  6
Ä « 0 8 4 S J » ¥ S S
W h ile  sc o p e  o f  fu n d in g  re m a in s  
o p a q u e , P M  H a s h im o to  h as  a n n o u n c e d  
h is  tax  re fo rm  p lan .
Ju ly  7 s f i m a s i c f e « ® .  ü ¥ » < h '  
C 3 A '
T h e  m a jo r ity  o f  th e  p u b lic  h a s  
d e v e lo p e d  a se n se  o f  c ris is  to w a rd s  th e  
L D P .
Ju ly  8 H A H S i ^ - 5 0  7 ^  £ > & ( . ' 
0 ? »  < i x . j
B K Ä r t l C t t t f l .  S ¥ R #
U S  IC
T h e  d e c is io n  as  to  w h e th e r  th e  tax  w ill 
b e  r e d u c e d  o r  n o t, sh o u ld  b e  p u t  in  a 
c le a re r  te rm . C r itic ism s  a g a in s t th e  
L D P  h a v e  b e e n  w id e s p re a d  in  th e  
c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  as w e ll  a s  w ith in  th e  
p a rty .
Ju ly  9 x k & j l  w b e s u  m x
f c j  M B' # K 3 I & ä S 1 f l£ lc  
fefiS® . S f f l 0 Ä ^ i S S : - o
T h e  g o v e rn m e n t w a s  fo rc e d  b y  its 
c o n c e rn s  o f  d e fe a t  to  a n n o u n c e  th e  tax  
r e d u c tio n  sc h em e . A t th e  la s t  s ta g e  o f  
th e  H o u se  o f  C o u n c i l lo rs ’ e le c tio n , 
th e re  w a s  s tro n g  fe e lin g  o f  c ris is , an d  
th e  P M  lo ss  o f  p o lic y  d ire c tio n  w a s
459
obvious.
July 10
. W i l i e s t
The PM  announcem ent o f perm anent 
tax reduction schem e continued to 
draw  criticism . Several M inisters were 
w orried about sources o f  funding.
July 11
mm
The H ouse o f  Councillors w ill go to 
the poll tom orrow , the day both 
H ashim oto and the LD P will be 
judged.
July 12 SIS3Hf.fc30:M*. a s  
61S8SS. fuSlciSSt. 
*»*< !£  5 ffffl
The LD P aims at getting 61 seats at 
today’s poll. Its selling points are 
focused on its tax reduction schem e, 
and m anagem ent o f  non-perform ing 
loans.
July 13 ssttsK. mffljsw'N. a& 
mm, *K£SS
The LD P defeated. The PM resigned. 
H igh voting turnouts. Results clearly 
reflected his m isadm inistration.
July 14 w ts
mm /j'MüRttic, 21 s ic ®
ims&
PM  H ashim oto announced his 
resignation. The succeeding candidate 
is likely to com e from  the old-guarded 
O buchi faction. Both H ouses w ill m eet 
on the 21st.
Asahi
D ate H ead lin es T ran sla tion
June 12 A tam e ending or a bright start?
June 13
«*»*©*> 3  3  «*>&■**
The m arket has no confidence in 
H ashim oto adm inistration. There has 
been no change in the w eakened 
econom y.
June 14 f ä l E l Ä S l * Should hurry to approve the revision.
June 15 N /A N /A
June 16 The dead K akuei still runs the LDP.
June 17 K B ?
.  S S .  h ' J ^ U S C Ä M Ä
A  sense o f crisis in the governm ent 
w as signalled by the dropping o f  three 
econom ic indicators. The LD P is m ore 
concerned about the econom y than the 
Opposition. W atch out for a 
turnaround in the upcom ing H ouse o f 
C ouncillors’ election.
June 18 A n inform al talk w ith PM  Hashim oto.
June 19 « * * « * * >
l c ± ^ j Ä A Ä S S 5 ® I  U T I S S I
PM  H ashim oto concluded at the press 
conference that all efforts w ill be put
460
to m anage the bad loans and reduce 
the corporate tax.
June 20 K an N aoto, a D em ocratic P arty ’s 
representative, declared that his party 
is sided w ith the taxpayers, and will 
form ulate a plan to confront the LDP.
June 21 a * .  f l-E ic s t ,'? .  
«
Japan w as again pressured by foreign 
pow ers by being asked about its 
slow ness to em bark on refonn .
June 22 * ¥ 1 9 f 7 & £ £ < \  
S £ & iS . tSAITffl
PM  H ashim oto announced the 
hastening o f inspection processes o f 19 
banks, and the strengthening o f 
protection given to account holders.
June 23 i B C t t U ' f f f f .  
* t t t s s i i a s  a E ic fö n u  
S ^ E  22% fil»089^7km
Results o f A sah i’s poll on the House 
o f C ouncillors’ election show ed the 
pub lic’s disenchantm ent w ith  the LDP. 
The LD P m ight get as low  as 22 % 
from  all o f  its constituencies -  the 
sam e level w hen it defeated in 1989.
June 24 s u m iR © a » ? i# « ^ f iR ft The PM  announced after a serious 
deliberation that all loans w ill be 
handed over to the R eceiving Bank.
June 25 #Kä&CDSgl$llä. Sffi.
* « i a s * S 0
The PM  proposed to change the 
special D iet session planned after the 
H ouse o f C ouncillors’ election into a 
regular D iet session.
June 26 6 » ,  1 0 ft...X 8 U U ttIF ft  
& * & & & §  K 's
The opposition attacked the 
governm ent’s slow ness in 
im plem enting the tax reduction 
schem e, declaring that it w ill reduce 
tax up to 6 or 10 trillion yen if  it is in 
the governm ent.
June 27 <±fl. JUKSff. gititfßcD
b u s . s s & w t t
K ic ftf f& £
The ‘R eceiving B ank ’ is aim ed at 
m erging the Long-Term  Credit Bank 
o f  Japan and Sum ishin. The LD P and 
the governm ent’s influence in this 
operation is clearly inevitable.
June 28
* « * I B * #
PM  H ashim oto R yutaro will not 
com prom ise w ith the agriculture, 
forestry, and fishery industries.
June 29 Sttim«&ttÄ£303llSR$Sffl
b u s . a s ^ t t s e e i n s i ^  
m
A ccording to the LDP governm ent’s 
policy to w rite-o ff bad loans, the 
Receiving Bank w ill use up to 30 
trillion yen.
June 30 RHSfe
JS. A V O ttM X U .
Feelings o f  discord are w idespread 
w ithin the LDP. The tim e for cabinet 
reshuffle and new  party line-up has
461
a m .  a r t a rr iv ed . T h e  P M  m u s t  k e e p  h is  e y e s  on  
b o th  th e  e c o n o m y  a n d  h is  p a rty .
J u ly  1
I f — > 8ffiS *§ 8 l© «S t6E
T h e  P M  g a v e  a  g o -a h e a d  to  th e  
J a p a n e se  v e rs io n  o f  b r id g e -b a n k . Y e t 
o n ly  its  g e n e ra l s tru c tu re  a n d  
fu n c tio n s , n o t  a  c o n c re te  p o lic y , w e re  
m e n tio n e d .
J u ly  2
» J f i F & S y y y ^ A V ^ S I A
T .
T h e  L D P  g o v e rn m e n t in tro d u c e d  
b r id g e -b a n k  as a  f in a n c ia l  sy s te m  
a d m in is tra to r  o u ts id e  th e  l im it  o f  th e  
b a n k ru p tc y  law .
J u ly  3 A  f in a l a n sw e r  to  th e  c r i t ic is m  o n  
la c k in g  p o lic y . T h e  U S  g o v e rn m e n t 
re p re s e n ta tiv e s  a c c e p te d  w ith  so m e  
p re c a u tio n .
J u ly  4 g £ . m « . * i i i £ j g f s  * « .  
« w t v  t ä s i * - k j
D u e  to  c o n c e rn s  a b o u t th e  e le c tio n , th e  
s to c k  m a rk e t, a n d  th e  U S  re a c tio n , the  
P M  to o k  th is  o p p o r tu n ity  to  u s e  h is  
‘tax  re d u c tio n  c a rd ’.
J u ly  5 T h e  S e c u rity  C o o p e ra tio n  P la n  a n d  
fo re ig n  p o lic y  la c k s  c o n c re te n e s s , b u t 
th e  P M  d id  n o t to u c h  o n  th is  issu e .
J u ly  6 Ü W C A S U  jBBi. ^ - X 7  
y?  r* s * jä i3 ij  i t a t f a s
T h e  L D P  w e n t o n  c a m p a ig n  to u r  in  the  
c o u n try , a im in g  to  c a p ita l iz e  o n  
H a s h im o to ’s p o p u la r ity .
J u ly  7 rg f& Ä W j -väsrnfe n 
ffi. ® A » 8 i © A « s S f f i ö - r
T h e  L D P  w a s  a t a  lo ss  b y  th e  
a n n o u n c e m e n t o n  ta x  re d u c tio n . Y e t  
th e  P M  d id  n o t sp e ll  o u t a n y  c o n c re te  
p o lic y  o n  ta x  re d u c tio n  sc h em e .
J u ly  8 s s  r^ ;Ä ^ ® ic jt i ) f f l3 s ia j  
s ä ©  r Ä S u t j  » o m - r
T h e  L D P  fo c u s e d  o n  e ffe c tiv e  p o lic ie s  
to  m a n a g e  th e  re c e s s io n , w h e re a s  the  
O p p o s i t io n ’s N e w  L o o k  c a m p a ig n  d id  
n o t g a in  m u c h  g ro u n d .
J u ly  9 m s  rmvurnzmi T h e  P M  a n n o u n c e d  in c o m e  tax  
re d u c tio n . F ro m  n e x t  y e a r  lo w e s t 
ta x a tio n  le v e l w ill  b e  in  u se .
J u ly  10 T h e  d isc u s s io n  o n  b a d -lo a n  
m a n a g e m e n t fa d e d  a s  th e  is s u e  o f  tax  
re d u c tio n  n o w  re p la c e d  th e  to p ic  o f  
b r id g e -b a n k .
J u ly  11 S S » » 7 - f > ( i 6 K  A 3 f©  
asKBmjS
T h e  w in n in g  lin e  fo r  L D P  is  m a rk e d  at 
61 . T h e  P M  h a s  a d if f ic u lt  t im e  as th e  
fo cu s  w a s  a lso  o n  th e  tim in g  o f  ca b in e t 
re sh u ff le .
J u ly  12 « a f a T B i y ^ * « .  * r *  
W lcA » Ä < flM
F ro m  th e  d a w n  o f  to m o rro w  a lo t o f  
p e o p le  w ill  m a k e  th e ir  ju d g m e n ts  on  
e c o n o m ic  re c o v e ry .
J u ly  13 a s m T h e  L D P  d e fe a te d . T h e  P M  w o u ld
462
re s ig n , as h e  a d m itte d , “ a ll o f  th is  w a s  
m y  o w n  fa u lts ” .
J u ly  14 as&iMfc. »ssu/tsm. 
mt
T h e  L D P  d e fe a t w a s  a re su lt  o f  an  
o u tb u rs t  o f  p u b lic  d isse n t. V o te rs  w a n t 
fu r th e r  c h a n g es .
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